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This thesis aims to show the neglected inclusive face of neoliberalism through transformation 
from higher levels of financial exclusion to increased levels of financial inclusion in Tanzania 
facilitated by mobile money (MM) growth. I illustrate that, in the case of Tanzania, the roll-
back and the roll-out of neoliberal policies aided the advent of MM. I argue that classical and 
neoclassical perspectives, as perceived in the political-economic sense, informed the neoliberal 
roll-back and roll-out policies, which promoted the growth of MM and its role in moderating 
the factors of financial exclusion. Thus, I deploy and develop a conceptual framework that 
includes both classical and neoclassical perspectives to explain the roll-out and roll-back 
neoliberal policies and how they facilitated financial inclusion through MM. Most scholars 
neglect the inclusive role of neoliberalism. They also underestimate the role of classical 
perspectives by putting more emphasis on neoclassical views. Moreover, they do not explain 
the role of MM in facilitating financial inclusion through the neoliberal lens. This thesis 
addresses these gaps. I ask three questions to address the above issues. First, how did 
neoliberalism facilitate the growth of MM in Tanzania? Second, how did MM moderate the 
factors of financial exclusion in Tanzania? Third, what was the response of the banking sector 
to increasing levels of financial inclusion caused by MM in Tanzania? Therefore, the 
significance of this study is that it informs our empirical and theoretical understanding of 
inclusive neoliberalism and MM by introducing a focus on the transition from financial 
exclusion to financial inclusion through classical and neoclassical lenses hitherto lacking. 
Literature suggests the need for qualitative research in this field. Thus, the in-depth 
unstructured interviews/focus groups and content analysis of key documents/literature inform 
our empirical understanding of roll-back and roll-out neoliberal policies and their role in 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
There is a strong case to be made that neoliberalism is inclusive in some cases. The advent of 
mobile money (MM) and its role in moderating or weakening some factors of ‘Financial 
Exclusion’ (FE) to facilitate ‘Financial Inclusion’ (FI) of financially-excluded individuals can 
be used to demonstrate the inclusive character of neoliberal policies. This is one of the most 
critical and credible ways of bringing the neoliberal inclusive case to political-economic 
literature and the development of academic discussions and debates. The crucial point here is 
that neoliberalism facilitated the advent and growth of MM, which helped to provide access to 
formal financial services to financially-excluded and poor individuals. Findings in Tanzania 
have shown fallen levels of FE, since the advent of MM. I define MM as money stored using 
a mobile phone as opposed to an account in conventional banking (also see: Section 5.2.2). 
MM has become the most efficient way of providing access to formal financial services for 
financially-marginalised individuals in Tanzania. Before MM, specific segments of the 
population in Tanzania, especially the rich and wealthy, were granted access to formal financial 
services. At the same time, poor and financially-marginalised people were denied that access. 
This mode of financial resource allocation and arrangements was, and still is a political-
economic issue in many countries across the world. 
Most serious studies and surveys, of course, provide a more nuanced account of increased 
levels of FI in Tanzania, which helps to explain the transformation from higher levels of FE to 
increased levels of FI (Mazer and Rowan, 2016; GSMA, 2015a; FinScope, 2009; FinScope, 
2013a; FinScope, 2018; InterMedia, 2014a; InterMedia, 2017; InterMedia, 2018). Nevertheless, 
with some notable exceptions, most researchers depict the exclusiveness of neoliberal policies 
and their financial implications (Christiaens, 2018; Duménil and Lévy, 2011; Dymski, 2008).  
In contrast, this thesis adopts classical and neoclassical perspectives that conceptualise the 
neoliberal agenda as a transformative force bringing financially-excluded individuals into the 
mainstream financial sector by granting them access to formal financial services. The principal 
argument is that neoliberalism can be transformative and inclusive. I use MM, and classical 
and neoclassical views to empirically demonstrate these facts. Classical and neoclassical 
perspectives help me to investigate the neoliberal roll-back and roll-out policies that facilitated 




To this effect, this research advances three arguments: (a) neoliberalism facilitated the growth 
of MM in Tanzania; (b) MM moderated and weakened some factors of FE, and by doing so it 
helped increase levels of FI; (c) the response of the banking sector and other key stakeholders 
to increased levels of FI helped catalyse the implementation of FI strategies (see section 1.3 for 
further details on the research themes, questions, and objectives). Section 1.4 provides the 
underlying analytical framework. 
Hence, the research focuses on how the roll-back and roll-out neoliberal policies aided MM 
growth, and how this growth reduced FE and increased FI. The key period of this study is 
between 2005 and 2017. Old data covering the period before 2005 has also been used to help 
explain the research findings. Like earlier works in neoliberalism, which associate 
neoliberalism with exclusion (Dymski, 2005; Muñoz and Pantazis, 2019; Christiaens, 2019a; 
Chollet, 2013), this work acknowledges the forms of exclusion created by neoliberal policies. 
It also distinguishes itself by adding the neoliberal inclusive agenda through re-regulation, 
deregulation, liberalisation, and MM technology. Using the data available for FI, and by 
studying MM through in-depth unstructured interviews and secondary official documents, I 
can tell the neoliberal transformation and inclusion story. Firstly, the contexts of FE and FI in 
Tanzania and globally are provided, using classical and neoclassical perspectives, which are 
crucial to the process of neoliberalisation and the advent of MM. The context includes the 
description of the patterns of FE and FI over time in Tanzania and worldwide. Secondly, the 
advent of MM and what helped it to launch, grow, and survive is discussed. Thirdly, the role 
of MM in moderating the factors of FE, its role in increasing FI is placed into context. Fourthly, 
an investigation of the role of the banking sector in responding to increasing levels of FI caused 
by non-banking institutions such Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) is undertaken. This 
introductory chapter will: (i) explain how my interest in MM, FE, and FI developed; (ii) 
describe the contexts of MM, FE and growth in a neoliberal era both nationally and globally; 
(iii) give a brief outline of the analytical frameworks drawn upon; (iv) state the thesis 
contribution to the field; and (iv) introduce the organisation of the chapters. 
1.2 Background, Motivation and Research Gap 
MNOs increased the levels of FI in Tanzania and moderated some factors of FE to help reach 
financially-excluded individuals (FinScope, 2009; FinScope, 2013a; FinScope, 2018; 
InterMedia, 2014a; InterMedia, 2017; InterMedia, 2018). The provision and use of MM 




financial services by non-banking institutions. MM provides easy access to financial services 
as it breaks the physical barriers and distance from financial institutions (Morawczynski and 
Pickens, 2009; Mbiti and Weil, 2016). It also cuts down the costs incurred in the provision of 
financial services, and therefore ensures the affordability of financial services to all (Donavan, 
2012; Porteous, 2007). Also, it helps manage some risks that were once associated with the 
refusal by banks to provide financial services to poor individuals. Hence, there are institutions 
other than banks that offer some limited financial services through digital platforms and other 
innovations, many of whom come from the telecommunications sector. These institutions and 
their financial services are worth researching because they are recent, successful, and seek to 
make neoliberal policies inclusive (see Chapter 5 and 6 for the MNOs contribution). 
Surprisingly, the inclusivity of neoliberal policies through MM has not been well researched. 
When it comes to MM, its growth and its role in moderating FE, as well as its role in increasing 
FI, are issues which have not been given much attention. This research tries to bridge this gap, 
and this is its contribution to the field. 
Nearly 2.5 billion people worldwide lack access to formal financial services (GPFI, 2014:3; 
Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015). Most of them live in developing countries and are in dire need of 
financial services. In 2006, only 9% of the population of Tanzania were formally included in 
mainstream financial sector systems (FinScope, 2006). There are different reasons for their 
exclusion from mainstream financial services. Some of these are socioeconomic and political 
reasons. Neoliberalism has also been partly blamed for its role in excluding poor individuals 
from accessing and reaping the benefits of financial services (Dymski, 2005; Duménil and 
Lévy, 2011). It has also been praised for preparing a conducive environment that allowed the 
advent of digital financial services for the poor such as MM services. These services have also 
helped the inclusion of many individuals who were previously excluded by neoliberal policies 
(Leistert, 2013). Neoliberalism calls for small governments and stronger markets. Whether 
neoliberalism has made markets stronger than the government is a paradox. So far, neoliberal 
reforms have never achieved the creation of small governments (Kiely, 2018; Griffith, 2006). 
In fact, in some countries, for specific markets to succeed, the government has to play an active 
role. Tanzania demonstrates this through the roll-out and roll-back of neoliberal policies, where 
the role of the government decreased during the roll-back (deregulatory) phase and increased 
during the roll-out (reregulatory) phase. It was during the roll-back phase (the period of 
deregulation, liberalisation, and privatisation), that FE increased. It was also during the roll-




involved in the provision of inclusive financial services (see chapter 7). Therefore, this 
dissertation first looks at FE, both nationally and globally, and then at how neoliberal policies, 
through roll-out and roll-back policies, as explained by classical and neoclassical views 
facilitated FI through MM. Accordingly, I assert that not only the role of the government 
through deregulation and re-regulation facilitated the development of MM, but also the 
capability of MM to moderate the factors of FE was key to increasing FI. I also demonstrate 
the response of the banking sector to MM services as well as the role of key stakeholders in 
promoting MM growth and FI. The inclusive role of neoliberalism through FI and MM, the 
role that has been forgotten by researchers, will also be placed in proper context.  
My interest in the topic was first stimulated by Cahill et al. (2012) who analysed neoliberalism 
beyond the free markets, and Peck et al. (2012) who analysed the Regulatory Capitalism 
Approach (RCA) to explain the roll-out and roll-back processes of neoliberalisation (see 
section 3.6 for further details on regulatory capitalism). Edwards et al. (2012) broadened my 
interest with their chapter on theoretical and methodological perspectives that facilitated the 
discussions and analyses of neoliberalism. Porter and Craig (2004), Klak et al. (2011), 
Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2010), and Konings (2016) also added to my intrigue with their 
research works on ‘inclusive’ or ‘positive’ neoliberalism, with Scott (2006) expanding my 
thinking on the political economy of capitalism. Furthermore, Booth (1997) discussed the 
political economy of regulation, reviewing socialist market, neoclassical, and public interest 
approaches to regulation; all informed my understanding of deregulation and re-regulation. 
Some of these approaches were also explained in detail by Majone (1992) and Majone (1997) 
who elaborated on neoclassical and classical perspectives with views related to deregulation, 
re-regulation, privatisation, and liberalisation. Self (2000) provided the details on the process 
of rolling back the markets and the observed consequences, which were key to helping to select 
the constructivist paradigm as a paradigm for this research. Mooslechner et al (2006) also 
analysed in detail the political economy of financial market regulation and the dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion. Likewise, Klimina (2011) reinforced my views with his argument that 
there are two sides to economic liberalisation, namely, libertarian and constructivist. Moreover, 
Folgelberg and Kulkarni (2006) discussed neoclassical theory of development, neoliberalism 
and the Kenyan experience on the one hand, and Hurwitz and Manne (2018) examined classical 
liberalism and the problem of technological change with explanations of libertarianism and 
technology, which depended heavily on neoclassical perspectives on the other hand. 




classical and neoclassical political economies. From all these scholars and their arguments, it 
seemed clear that neoclassical and classical perspectives not only fit well with roll-back and 
roll-out neoliberalisation policies, but also with technological changes and innovations. The 
two views also worked well with Leistert’s (2013) explanations of political rationality of 
mobile media and modalities of neoliberalism. Also, Christiaens (2019a) linked the neoliberal 
discussions with forms of exclusion. He discussed finance, financialisation, and the expulsion 
of surplus populations. After a thorough evaluation of the afore-mentioned research works, I 
could see the validity and importance of the present research argument.  I was blown away by 
these findings and started assembling the different related arguments to write my Ph.D. 
dissertation.  
In order to further explore MM growth and its relation to FE and FI in the neoliberal era, a 
theoretical framework using the ideas from the ‘RCA’ (Edwards et al, 2012:5, Braithwaite, 
2008; Levi-Faur, 2005) has been created (see Sections 1.4 and 3.6). This framework examines 
the significant transformations brought by neoliberal policies by exposing the ‘destructive and 
deregulatory moment’ (‘roll-back phase’), as well as the ‘creative and regulatory moment 
(‘roll-out phase’) (Peck et al., 2012: 24; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Peck, 2010). Neoclassical and 
classical perspectives also supported the two phases, as the two perspectives are 
complementary. Together, they explain the roll-out and roll-back phases as well as the support 
that the two phases provide to innovations such as MM and other digital forms of technology 
(Butter and Hofkes, 2006). There is also the role of ‘technology neutrality’ (Maxwell and 
Bourreau, 2014:19) that allowed the creation of the ‘Converged Licensing Framework’ (CLF) 
(Mfungahema, 2006), which also permitted the advent of MM. The neoclassical theory of 
innovation also supported the CLF through the concept of ‘permissionless innovation and 
technology’ (Hurwitz and Manne, 2018). Both classical and neoclassical views cannot only 
explain the roll-back and roll-out neoliberal policies, but also the processes associated with 
those policies such as deregulation, re-regulation, liberalisation, and privatisation of state-
owned enterprises and sectors. There are also details of financialisation and its role in exclusion 
and inclusion, which explain why some populations are financially excluded while others are 
financially included (Fama and Jensen (1983); Sassen, 2010; Sassen, 2014; Christiaens, 2019a; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Streeck, 2017; Davis and Walsh, 2017; and Vogl, 2017). 
The availability of relevant views, theories and data to support my claims that inclusive 
neoliberal agenda aided the growth of MM and facilitated FI made it possible to demonstrate 




policies and their role in facilitating the growth of MM services to increase FI. The closest 
research being done by Leistert (2013), who mentioned mobile devices and their uses in the 
neoliberal era, including the facilitation of making digital transactions. Madise (2019) discusses 
the issues with the regulation of MM in sub-Saharan Africa. Asongu and Asongu (2018) 
explore MM services in inclusive development. Di Castri (2013a) and Di Castri and Gidvani 
(2014) researched MM regulations and policies. Ho (2018) examined the development of MM 
in China, India, and the Philippines. Mandalu et al. (2017) researched neoliberalism and 
Tanzania, but he did not include MM research. There is research on financial sector reforms, 
development and transformation that did not include MM development or FE and FI in detail 
(Mbowe, 2010; Ndanshau, 1996; World Bank, 2005; World Bank, 2003; Lwiza and Nwako, 
2002; Collier and Gunning, 1991; Ndalichako, 2014). There is also a small body of research 
done to show how the telecommunications sector deregulated. Some of them show how 
deregulation policies created the CLF, which became crucial for the advent of innovations such 
as MM (Mwalongo and Hussein, n.d.; Mfungahema, 2014; Majone, 1992; Torre, 2009; Macra, 
2014; Garcia-Murillo, 2005; Bezzina, 2005; Bar and Sandvig, 2000). However, these analyses 
did not link the development of MM and FI directly. In some cases, research has covered the 
political economy of FI, but fell short of including MM development and FI (Dafe, 2011; Dafe, 
2013; Johnson and Williams, 2013; Johnson and Williams, 2016). This research tries to bridge 
these gaps by discussing inclusive neoliberalism through MM, and how it facilitates FI via the 
moderation of some FE factors. 
There was already a substantial body of work not only on financial reforms, financial 
neoliberalism, deregulation and re-regulation of MM, but also on the telecommunications 
sector, FI, and FE in general. Therefore, it made sense to explore the issues of MM growth and 
how they moderated FE to increase FI, in a context that would satisfy present research 
objectives which might eventually be of practical value. I became aware that MM and FI issues 
had become important for inclusive neoliberal policies. In addition, states, International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs), and other global political economy bodies proposed ‘inclusive 
neoliberalism’ for inclusive economic growth and development (Porter and Craig, 2004; Klak 
et al., 2011; and Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2010) as discussed later in Section 1.5. 
As I recognise the importance of the inclusive neoliberal concept, it appears that the discussions 
on neoliberalism are more focussed on its exclusivity and neglect the importance of MM as an 
important tool for FI, guided by neoliberal policies. There was a limited uptake of formal 




through MM (TNCFI, 2018). In summary, although MM growth has developed over the last 
13 years, its political economy or how it is a neoliberal tool of inclusion is something that has 
remained of low priority amongst researchers. It also emerged that despite the growing interest 
in MM, with the notable exceptions of the works of Dahlberg et al. (2008), Duncombe and 
Boateng (2009), Diniz et al. (2012), and Kim et al. (2018) who analysed 73 peer-reviewed 
papers, 43 research papers (17 peer-reviewed and 23 non-peer-reviewed), 196 papers (94 peer-
reviewed and 92 non-peer reviewed) and 54 academic research papers (vis-a’-vis the nexus of 
mobile financial services, FI and development) respectively, the neoliberal role in facilitating 
the growth of MM and its role in supporting FI has not been a priority amongst the academics. 
In the light of the current status quo, it seemed to me that there was a context in which my 
initial findings on neoliberalism and the development of MM, as well as, the role of the latter 
in moderating some factors of FE to increase FI might be of some value. Discussed in Section 
1.3 are the research objectives. 
1.3 Scope, Research Questions, Objectives, and Value 
The research aims to understand particular aspects of neoliberalism and its impact on MM 
growth in relation to the facilitation of the transition from FE to FI in Tanzania, and to fill in 
the knowledge gaps in such aspects. To do so the neoclassical and classical views of 
neoliberalism are essential and complementary in guiding the analysis of this research (see 
section 1.4). With the help of researchers studying neoliberalism and regulatory issues, the 
‘RCA’ (under which the classical and neoclassical perspectives operate) as discussed in 
Chapter 3, facilitates the analysis. Data analysis is done through a ‘thematic analytical approach’ 
as specified in Chapter 4. This thesis addresses the three main research themes, and each theme 
answers its research question, and has its objectives discussed in detail in Chapters 5-8. Below, 
I explain the main research themes, questions, and objectives. 
The first research theme is: “Neoliberalism and how it facilitates the growth of MM.” The 
theme tries to answer the following research question: “How did neoliberalism facilitate the 
growth of MM in Tanzania?” The objective of the above research question is to explore the 
advent and successful growth of MM in Tanzania with the view to determine how it happened. 
This is research Objective Number 1. What inspired the formulation of the research question 
and Objective Number 1 is the fact that the advent of MM occurred some years after the 
implementation of neoliberal reforms in Tanzania. Neoliberal reforms succumbed the state to 




financial sector to include or exclude people according to their endowment of human, financial, 
economic, and emotional capital. In tandem with the first objective, as mentioned earlier, 
Objective Number 2 seeks to study the levels of FE and FI in Tanzania to understand the 
seriousness of these issues, and how they relate to MM, and neoliberalism. 
The second research theme is: “MM and the moderation of some factors of FE.” The second 
theme seeks to reply to the second research question: “How did MM moderate the factors of 
FE in Tanzania?” The objective of the above research question is to assess the role of MM in 
moderating FE. This is research Objective Number 3. This objective seeks to determine 
whether the moderation of the factors of FE was one of the driving forces that helped the 
survival as well as growth of MM. MM survival in a competitive financial sector depended on 
specific distinctive features that distinguished it from the other formal financial services such 
as those offered by the banking sector.  
The third research theme is: “the response of the banking sector to the increasing levels of FI 
caused by MM.” The third theme attempts to respond to the third research question: “What was 
the response of the banking sector to increasing levels of FI through MM in Tanzania?” The 
objective of the third research question is to investigate the possibility of any changes in the 
banking sector caused by the successful penetration of MM services in the sector. This is 
research Objective Number 4. What triggered the formulation of this objective was the fact that 
it was inconceivable to imagine that banking institutions were so relaxed and did nothing to 
stop the expansion of MM services. It is naive to think that they did not perceive MM as a rival. 
Hence, there was a need to understand the reaction of the banks and the roles played by other 
Financial Service Providers (FSPs) to allow the growth of MM. 
As far as I am aware, these issues were not thoroughly investigated in Tanzania, which led me 
to formulate these research themes, questions, and objectives. The expressed research themes, 
questions, and objectives help to explore these issues and add value and knowledge to this field 
of study. They also facilitate the analysis. Each of the three research questions demanded a 
slightly different analytical focus. However, the theories used were mostly guided by classical 
and neoclassical perspectives, and their relations to neoliberal roll-back and roll-out policies. 
The two approaches were used together because they complemented each other, and none of 






1.4 Analytical Framework 
My intention at the outset was to examine the growth of MM and how it dealt with FE and FI 
issues. Neoliberal policies controlled exclusion and inclusion issues. Neoliberal policies 
controlled exclusion and inclusion issues. At the early stages of neoliberal policies, the 
capitalist class benefited. In many countries, these neoliberal policies and reforms put the poor 
in a disadvantaged position. There were no long-lasting safety nets for the inclusion of the poor, 
both socio-economically and financially. After lessons learned from the wave of neoliberal 
reforms in the 1990s, the new inclusive neoliberal policies and agendas emerged (also see: 
Duménil and Lévy, 2011; Rodrik, 2006; Darder, 2019; Martin, 2004; Kushnir, 2020; Pensera 
and Owen, 2018; Chandra, 2010; Klak et al., 2011). When inclusive changes arrived, neoliberal 
policies opened the markets for new entrants such as the MNOs. These changes were vital in 
moderating the factors of FE. They also increased FI, as discussed throughout this dissertation. 
Diagram 1.1 summarises the theoretical perspectives underpinning this research developed 
from the key research findings and literature reviews (appearing in chapters 2,3, and 4). At the 
centre is neoliberalism. Using Diagram 1.1, moving from the centre to the upward direction 
through the blue line, neoliberalism demanded the roll-back of state regulatory and 
interventionist policies. The neoclassical perspectives supported this view. They claimed that 
deregulation, liberalisation, and privatisation policies helped to improve the efficiency of the 
markets. The same policies helped individuals and firms to maximise utility and profits. To 
support the rollback services, both individuals and firms were required to make rational 
decisions, and that deregulation, liberalisation, and privatisation of the economic and financial 
sectors created open markets and enhanced competitive economic and financial activities (also 
see Chapter 3). I will illustrate later how deregulation favoured the advent of MM in Chapter 
5. 
Neoliberalism also supports limited regulatory activities to create conducive environments for 
economic and financial operations. Using Diagram 1.1, from the centre moving downward with 
the blue line, neoliberalism triggers the rolling out of state regulatory and interventionist 
policies to correct market failures. Classical perspectives guide this process. Classical 
perspectives acknowledge market failures. In this case, the disadvantaged people cannot make 
rational decisions because they do not have the resources or information they need to do so. 
Hence, from the classicist point of view, some regulatory activities are required to protect new 
industries and consumers. I will later demonstrate how new regulations protected the survival 




In Diagram 1.1, the bold yellow line shows this process. Whether an economy deregulates or 
re-regulates, it addresses the interests and ideas of the institutions and individuals. The brackets 
on both sides indicate this process. In this regard, the deregulation or re-regulation of the 
financial and telecommunications sector were implemented to serve the interests and ideas of 
the financial and non-financial institutions and individuals (see Chapters 5 and 7). Both 
neoclassical and classical views were critical in facilitating the transformation from a financial 
sector that excluded the poor to a more inclusive financial sector. The research findings suggest 
this in the next chapters. See Chapter 3 for the details of the theoretical and research framework. 
Diagram 1.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
1.4.1 Reasons for the Selected Approach to Studying Neoliberalism, MM and its Relation 
to FE and FI in Global Political Economy (GPE) 
Three essential perspectives inform research in Global Political Economy (GPE), namely: the 
‘economic-nationalist’, ‘liberal’, and ‘critical’ (also referred to as the ‘structural’ perspective) 
(O’Brien and Williams, 2016). The economic-nationalist view perceives the global political 
economy as “constituted through the actions of rational states” (O’Brien and Williams, 2016). 
In this case, the role of the state and its power are critical in guiding outcomes in GPE. From 




political power that influences how the markets work. Likewise, the liberal view deals with the 
individual or a wide range of individuals and actors “from the state to the cooperation to interest 
groups” (O’Brien and Williams, 2016). The liberal perspective emerged to oppose the 
economic nationalist or the ‘mercantilist view’ arguing against protectionism and restrictions 
of economic activities by the state. Adam Smith and his colleagues supported a method of 
wealth creation through the liberalisation of commerce and the support of broader national and 
international markets (Smith, [1776] 1983). As economic activities are mostly liberalised, the 
GPE today mostly operates using liberal and neoliberal principles. There is a wide variety of 
liberal thoughts ranging from classical to neoclassical perspectives. From those who see a 
limited role of the state in economic activities as emerging from liberalisation policies and a 
borderless world dominated by multinational corporations (Ohmae, 1999, O’Brien and 
Williams, 2016) to liberal institutionalists who emphasise the role of the state and the 
interdependence between the state and international organisations. In reacting to the liberal 
perspective, a structural or critical perspective emerged to contest the world order and to change 
the world. The theories under the critical perspective include Marxist, feminist, 
environmentalist, cultural, post-structural, etc. 
This research selected the use of the liberal perspective, specifically the neoliberal perspective, 
to advance its claims. Liberal theorists see the market being at the centre of economic life.  The 
markets are not always optimal as sometimes market failures occur. Classical and neoclassical 
theories are the main variants in the liberal thoughts. From the neoclassical perspective, the 
state’s intervention in the market is most likely to reduce market efficiency. From the classical 
perspective, the state should only interfere when there is a dire need for it to do so, to reverse 
market failures. Liberals focus on the behaviour of individuals, firms, and states, which allow 
this research to focus on FE and FI and how roll-out and roll-back neoliberal policies facilitate 
the growth of MM. To increase FI, MM growth has been key to moderating the factors of FE. 
The research applies classical and neoclassical assumptions to study neoliberalism to 
understand the growth of MM, and how MM shapes FE and FI (I associate classical 
perspectives with the thinking developed from Adam Smithian thinking and that kept on 
changing, and that the neoclassical perspectives emerged from this thinking). The research 
perceives markets as socially constructed realities, and that classical and neoclassical 
perspectives inform the neoliberal political economy on how to develop and sustain the markets 
(see sections 1.4.2.1 and 1.4.2.2). In this case, the research explores the construction of the MM 




1.4.2 How Does This Research Connect to Trends in Contemporary GPE Theory? 
In GPE, there are three trends helping researchers to contextualise their research in 
contemporary GPE theory. These are ‘consolidation’, ‘integration’, and ‘expansion’ (O’Brien 
and Williams, 2016). Consolidation occurs when researchers view their research topic as being 
part of the politics of international economic relations. In this case, they investigate the issues 
of their research and employ appropriate methods that explain the relevance of their research 
issues in the politics of international economic relations (O’Brien and Williams, 2016). As it 
regards ‘integration’, researchers attempt to study GPE with other wider political-economic 
issues, using comparative political-economic methods or classical political-economic 
perspectives, to mention a few methods. Among other topics, the emphasis could be on global 
structures, domestic structures, national diversity, varieties of capitalism, and the changing 
nature of capitalism. Researchers through this tradition have also become aware of the global 
processes affecting competition and regulation in national political economies. In most part, 
GPE shares with the classical political economy: “a commitment to integrating politics and 
economics” (O’Brien and Williams, 2016). ‘Expansion’ is the third trend that seeks to expand 
global political-economic issues by developing new areas of inquiry such as race, FE and FI, 
the role of mobile phones and money in GPE, etc. These new non-traditional issues are nothing 
to ignore as they require interdisciplinary expertise and methods. Moreover, global economic 
processes and the inequality effects they have generated, are at rates too alarming to be ignored. 
This research has been designed to alternate between the ‘integration’ and ‘expansion’ trends 
in the contemporary GPE. Firstly, it expands GPE scholarship to study the issues of MM, FE 
and FI, which are the areas not studied thoroughly in GPE. Secondly, it brings back the classical 
perspective in a world influenced much by the neoclassical perspective with an argument that 
both classical and neoclassical perspectives inform the operations of the current neoliberal 
political economy, which facilitated the growth of MM in Tanzania.  
1.4.2.1 The Neoclassical Perspective and How It Informs Neoliberalism 
Cook (2016) studied the impact of neoclassical economics on progressive neoliberal reforms. 
He found that neoclassical perspectives derive from mathematical models or cost-benefit 
formulas. He also asserts that the world is made up of two social classes, namely the educated 
and the ignorant. Thus, it is considered that the former dominates the latter. According to Cook 




political science have a close affinity to neoclassical views, and that the expansion of these 
views became known as ‘neoliberalism’. With neoliberalism, he argues:  
“individual decisions are conducted according to a calculus of utility, benefit or satisfaction against 
a microeconomic grid of scarcity, supply and demand, and moral value neutrality” (Cook, 
2016:257). 
Harvey (2010) describes the neoclassical theories used to implement the neoliberal reforms. 
He stresses that neoliberalism follows the logic of neoclassical principles. Neoclassical views 
assume that individuals are rational and self-interested. These views coincide with the 
neoliberalist agenda of free market reforms.  
Davies (2019) acknowledges the relationship between neoliberalism and neoclassical 
economics by asserting that neoliberalism has emerged as a reaction to previously existing 
economic policies:  
“meaning the discarding of the previous set of intellectual and policy preferences and their 
replacement by neoclassical economic policy proposals identified by John Williamson and others”. 
Harvey (2007), Larner (2000), and Peck (2010) also concur with these views. Davis and Walsh 
(2017) also claim that neoliberalism creates state institutions with a broader set of ideas and 
values, which include individualism, laissez-faire, and free choice with principles tied to 
neoclassical economics and economic liberalism. I define neoliberalism as a political-
economic ideology that enhances laissez-faire and free-market capitalism through policies of 
deregulation, re-regulation, privatisation, economic and financial liberalisation, which help to 
reduce state’s intervention in the market and the economy. 
1.4.2.2 The Classical Perspective and How It Informs Neoliberalism 
According to Merino et al. (2010:274):  
“neoliberalism should not be viewed as a simple extension of either classical or neoclassical 
theories …  Classical liberal theories stressed the need for competitive markets and posited a 
minimum role for government, but they recognised that markets were amoral, and some government 
oversight was needed”.  
Some neoliberal aspects omit one aspect of Adam Smith’s theory, which is the moral aspect of 
Smith’s treatise (Merino et al., 2010). Thus, I emphasise the classical perspective role in 




relation to classical liberalism and its approach to crisis management. He asserts that 
neoliberalism resembles classical economy in the sense that it fosters: 
 “free-market political philosophy and a wide range of innovations in public management to 
patterns and processes found in and across diverse political spaces and territories around the globe” 
(Dean (2014:150). 
Like classical perspectives, neoliberalism desires to construct market and market-like relations 
as well as to enhance and utilise capacities of economic freedom through specific practices and 
policies. Moreover, neoliberalism opponents are economic protection, state economic planning, 
state intervention, and state regulation (Foucault, 2008). In this respect, neoliberalism shares 
some of its philosophical foundation with classical perspectives, which puts classical 
perspectives in a position to inform neoliberal policies. Hence, neoliberalism in big part has 
“no rupture with classical liberalism” (Dean, 2014:154; Mirowski, 2009). 
Classical perspectives as manifested in ‘Manchester Liberalism’ (also see: Jackson, 2010; Dean, 
2014) are founded on the belief that markets required a self-regulating mechanism and that the 
state’s role was to abstain from intervening in the markets. In this regard, the classical 
perspectives have a resemblance to neoliberalism. However, over the years, the classical 
schools have agreed to minimal state intervention to protect individuals’ rights, freedoms, and 
the efficient allocation of resources. 
1.5 Inclusive Neoliberalism 
According to Klimina (2011), constructivist neoliberals forged collectivist strategies that made 
institutions support strong private rights and free markets. The view was that the two tools 
could not start from below. Hence, it was in the state’s interest to create, protect, and maintain 
institutional frameworks that favoured private property and liberalised markets (Klimina, 2011; 
Harvey, 2005; Mirowski, 2009).  
In the 1990s, neoliberal policies came under criticism. There was a growing dissatisfaction of 
their outcomes. According to Rodrik and Subrimanian (2003) and Williamson (2003), the same 
Washington Consensus policies highlighted the creation of ‘market-friendly’ state forms and 
modes of governance and regulations. The post-Washington Consensus policies created roll-





The post-Washington Consensus policies came under criticism for their lack of ability to 
resolve issues of inequality, structural causes of poverty, and their carelessness in the matters 
of class power in societies. This brought the idea of creating inclusive neoliberal policies into 
the spotlight (Stiglitz, 2008; Birdsall and de la Torre, 2001; Fine, 2000: 134-136). 
I will further elaborate upon the concepts of neoliberal roll-back and roll-out development 
agenda, which facilitate the understanding of what the inclusive neoliberal agenda is.  
1.5.1 Neoliberal Roll-Back Development Policy Agenda 
Roll-back and roll-out neoliberalism is also well explained in Chapter 3.  Between the 1980s 
and 1990s, the World Bank and the IMF reinforced and supported roll-back neoliberal policies 
that promoted certain development policies under the previously described Washington 
Consensus (Williamson, 1990). The roll-back policies were used to revive the economies of 
Latin American countries which struggled to restore the soundness of their balance of payments 
in the 1970s and 1980s. They later spread throughout the world through the World Bank and 
the IMF, as they became institutionalised.  
The Washington Consensus incorporated the following policy recommendations: minimal 
government intervention and the elimination of subsidies, fiscal policy discipline, broadening 
of the tax base through tax reforms, freeing of interest rates, competitive exchange rates, trade 
liberalisation, liberalisation of state-owned businesses, property rights, deregulation to abolish 
regulations impending market entry or all factors restricting competition; and independent 
central banks (Williamson, 1990). 
From the above policy recommendations, the World Bank and the IMF prescribed macro-
stabilisation and structural adjustment policies (SAPs). The SAPs became the standard 
packages for reforms in developing countries (Ferreira, 1992; Ghai, 1991). As the IFIs 
implemented the neoliberal agenda, the roll-back neoliberal policymakers used the SAPs in the 
early 1980s to create economic development policies. The SAPs had the following two 
objectives. Firstly, and in the short run, they sought the stabilisation of financial and budget 
deficits. This was done at the macro-level. The IMF’s policy recommendations included 
austerity measures to curb budget deficits, currency devaluation, and price liberalisations. 
Secondly, at the micro-economic level and in the long-run, the SAPs sought to achieve market 
efficiency through resources allocation and by global market alerts (also see: Bienefield, 
2000:534) as well as the minimal role of the state in the markets (Engel, 2006:7). At the 




liberalisation, tax, and labour market reforms. The SAPs era conforms with the “roll-back” 
neoliberal policies as described by Peck and Tickell (2002) and as demonstrated in Chapter 3. 
1.5.2 The Roll-Out Development Policy Agenda 
The SAPs had more failures than successes (Naastepad, 2002; Please, 1996). This meant that 
the neoliberal development policies required state and regulatory support to recover from 
market failures. Despite some of SAP’s failures, roll-back neoliberal development policies 
extended and concretised the free markets. The issue in the late 1990s was not the market 
extension issue, but rather how to create institutional frameworks capable of reversing the 
neoliberal failures. If the SAPs were the first generation of market reforms, there was a need 
for a second generation of market reforms. This second generation of reforms was successful 
as it included more effective social and economic institutions capable of giving neoliberalism 
a more "human face" (Pastor and Wise, 1999). Increasingly, the role of institutional economists 
became prominent in their efforts to advocate for a ‘human face’ neoliberalism. Joseph Stiglitz 
was key in popularising the idea of letting the IFIs revert to the interventionist states to help 
construct the regulatory environment capable of enabling markets to work efficiently. Attracted 
by these ideas, the IFIs allowed a significant neoliberal turn to rolling out the state in their 
development agenda while keeping the free market economies (World Bank, 1997). Hence, a 
new development approach emerged to address the neoliberal issues of inequality, poverty, and 
other issues of neoliberal adjustment policies. Scholars have referred to this approach as the 
‘inclusive' neoliberal development policy (Klak et al., 2011; Klimina, 2011).  
1.5.3 Inclusive Neoliberal Development Policy 
Several policy initiatives were undertaken in the 2000s to reverse the issues of exclusion, 
inequality and poverty. The most prominent policy initiative was the ‘Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper’ (PRSP). The IFIs reoriented from their agenda of neoliberal policies and 
focused on economic growth. Poverty reduction became an equally important goal of the 
development policy of inclusive neoliberal agenda (Klak et al., 2011 citing Craig and Porter, 
2007; Porter and Craig, 2004). This new ‘inclusive’ neoliberal development agenda attempted 
to silence the critics of neoliberalism by creating a development policy that was ‘more country-
driven’ and owned by the developing countries themselves (became an equally important goal 
of the development policy of inclusive neoliberal agenda) (Klak et al., 2011 citing Craig and 




strategies of the development policies in the developing world (Porter and Craig, 2004; Craig 
and Porter, 2003). 
The development of financial markets was encouraged to increase financial depth to promote 
economic growth, and to increase FI. Financial innovation was also encouraged to facilitate 
competitive prices, which promoted efficiency in the allocation of financial resources (Mohan, 
2019). 
Efforts to make inclusive neoliberalism popular prioritised FI around the world. Empirical 
evidence also suggested that FI could help reduce exclusion, poverty and inequality by helping 
the poor smooth their consumption and manage their financial risks (Demirguc-Kunt al., 2017; 
Williams et al., 2017). Mobile phones facilitate FI through MM, as demonstrated in Chapter 5. 
Leistert (2013:48) argues that the mobile phone is a political technology that facilitates the 
spread of the neoliberal agendas as it pushes forward the neoliberal paradox: 
“Mobile phones integrate many more people into the liberalised financial system and make them 
partakers of the market. Of course, changes in the banking model occur in parallel, as the companies 
that provide these services are not banks. As the costs for accounting and administration are lower, 
smaller balances already produce a good return of investment. Mobile phones are able to integrate 
larger parts of the population whose productivity has not been brought under the rule of a regulated 
economy. The incentives had been too low so far. Mobile media change the scale”. 
According to Leistert (2013) and Miller and Roses (2008:16), mobile media can bring the 
authorities and the people closer in “locales that were often distant”. Mobile phones, therefore, 
bridge the distance between the people and the authorities as well as these two and the markets. 
In this way, mobile phones become the address for people without addresses, and this allows 
them to open MM accounts. Donner (2009) and Leistert (2013) perceive mobile phones as 
‘market enforcers’. According to Donner (2009), mobile phones ameliorate the efficiency of 
markets as they enforce the law of one price-reducing waste. They also increase productivity. 
He further claims that the social relations established by mobile phones facilitate transactions 
and productive activities which promote economic development. In other words, mobile 
phones reinvent banking services. Sinha (2005:11) also argues that mobile phones facilitate 
direct payments. Mobile phones facilitate forms of exchange or transactions. They also store 
monetary value. They are also used as devices that spread inclusive neoliberal agenda through 





1.6 The Thesis Structure 
The structure of this thesis, which addresses the outlined themes, research questions, and 
objectives, is illustrated in Diagram 1.2. Chapter 1 introduces the topic detailing the 
background, motivation, research gap, scope, research questions, objectives, value, and the 
structure of the thesis. The chapter also presents the efforts to make neoliberalism inclusive, 
which raises awareness to make the provision of financial services more inclusive. Chapter 2 
introduces, defines, and elaborates FE and FI. It also prepares the discussions on: (i) FE and 
FI; (ii) the role of MM in moderating the factors of FE; (iii) MM development in Tanzania; and 
(iv) the changing banking sector and its response to MM. Moreover, it provides the context of 
FE and FI globally to help depict Tanzania’s situation. It also presents the national and global 
contexts of FE and FI. The chapter briefly explains the lack of a national FI policy in Tanzania. 
It also provides statistics on FE and FI, which provide a clear picture in terms of FI and MM 
development in Tanzania. 
In Chapter 3, I present the theoretical framework that forms the basis for conceptualising the 
role of neoliberalism in facilitating the growth of MM, and how it facilitates the transition from 
higher levels of FE to increasing levels of FI in Tanzania. The theoretical framework also 
demonstrates the development of MM through the rolling back (deregulatory) and rolling out 
(re-regulatory) phases of neoliberalism on the one hand, and by using the classical and 
neoclassical perspectives on the other. Additionally, the chapter presents the ‘RCA’, which 
also facilitates the analysis of the study. 
In Chapter 4, I outline the methodology, the methods of data collection, the processing of data, 
and the data analysis. The chapter facilitates the discussions. It also facilitates the analysis of 
neoliberalism and its role in promoting MM growth as well as its role in increasing FI. The 
chapter also discusses methodological perspectives. It links them with the research questions, 
research design, methods for data collection, data analysis, and with the processes used to 
collect and interpret the available data. 
Chapter 5 analyses the development of MM in Tanzania and the politics of FI that enhanced it. 
The chapter recognises the role played by MM in reaching financially-unreached and excluded 
people, overtaking banking and other financial services in Tanzania in this regard. Although 
FE was a significant issue in Tanzania and the banks were in a better position to curb FE by 
far, they failed to do so. It is, therefore, crucial to understand the development of MM as they 




Chapter 6 explores the role of MM in moderating FE and in supporting FI. The chapter credits 
MM for making the delivery of financial services to financially-excluded people easier.  The 
chapter investigates and acknowledges that MM moderates some FE factors. How this happens 
is explained in Chapter 6.  
Chapter 7 analyses the response of the banking sector to increasing levels of FI resulting from 
MM innovations or services. The chapter clearly explains the difference between deposit and 
non-deposit taking institutions and how they use the National Payment Systems (NPS). The 
Bank of Tanzania (BOT), as the regulator for the NPS, established the roles of the banks and 
the MNOs. The chapter investigates where the banks and MNOs collaborate, and where they 
do not. It also seeks to explore whether the banking sector transforms due to the presence of 
MM innovations. 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by summarising the research findings as well as providing the 
key conclusions and the recommendations that the research makes. The chapter will return to 
the key issues and arguments of the dissertation and will give some evaluation and/or 
interpretation of the research findings. The recommendations I will make in this chapter will 
















Diagram 1.2: Layout and Structure of the Thesis 
 
1.7 Study Limitations  
This study employs a qualitative methodology. The findings of the study are only valid in 
Tanzania. The results are only accurate for Tanzania. To generalise the findings of this study 
elsewhere, caution must be taken. However, the study offers a possible explanation for the 
growth of MM and its role in moderating the factors of FE to increase the rates of FI. Although 
there is evidence to suggest that some other countries took a similar or different path to develop 
MM services (Ondiege, 2015; Muthiora, 2015), it is in the best interest of the research design 




national data to contextualise MM development, FE, and FI; it is not the focus of the study to 
compare Tanzania and other countries directly. While those comparisons may inform this 
research, the focus is solely on the Tanzanian reality. Lastly, FI and income inequality are two 
different concepts. Thus, I did not depend much on the concepts of income inequality to discuss 
FI. Please, refer to the definition of FI on Chapter 3. 
1.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have introduced the topic for this research and outlined the rationale of my 
interests in MM development and its relation to FE and FI. I also provided the background 
information about the research itself as well as my motivations to explore the research 
questions and objectives, as well as how I arrived at them. I indicated what I set out to achieve 
in this study by outlining the chapters that explain the context, theoretical framework, 
methodology, findings and data, as well as the conclusions and recommendations. Lastly, I 
understand the limitations of this study that FI and income inequality are two different concepts. 

















Chapter 2: Financial Inclusion and Financial Exclusion: Contexts, Concepts and 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
According to the GPFI (2014:3) and Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2015), about 2.5 billion adults, who 
are about half the total working-age population of the world, are financially excluded. As it 
regards those, who are financially included, about 89% of adults living in high-income 
countries report that they have an account at a formal financial institution. Only about 41% of 
adults living in developing countries report having an account at a formal financial institution. 
“Overall, 23% of adults in Africa have an account at a formal financial institution” (Triki and 
Faye, 2013: 44). This chapter defines and elaborates FE and FI. It also presents the national 
and global contexts of FE and FI. It also introduces the debates and discussions on FE and FI 
and how they relate to MM and neoliberalism, including the two perspectives, namely, classical 
and neoclassical, which are the key informants of neoliberalism. I also present the literature 
critically on these issues to find the research literature gaps. Furthermore, I seek to explain how 
my research fits in with these research gaps to demonstrate its worthiness, in the light of what 
has already been researched and known. This chapter, therefore, illustrates what we know about 
FI, FE, and the research gaps. It sets the ground for the study to address the main research 
questions in the next chapters. Chapters 3 and 4 identify other theoretical and methodological 
gaps. 
The case for the research is that FE is a problem. The numbers and surveys demonstrate this 
reality (see Section 2.1). The need for FI is dire. All of these are political-economic issues. It 
is about who has access and who does not have access to formal financial services. The 
transition from higher levels of FE to increased levels of FI in Tanzania has not been linked to 
neoliberal policies. Different alternative solutions were employed to help with inclusion, but 
not as successfully as it has been with MM. From the literature review, past research had a lot 
written on mobile/digital devices, financial services and development (Kim et al., 2018; World 
Bank, 2012a; Kpodar and Andrianaivo, 2011; Waverman et al., 2005; Saker and Wells, 2003; 
Leistert, 2013; Qiang et al., 2011; Aker, 2010; Duncombe and Boateng; 2009; Dahlberg et al., 
2008). This literature also includes studies on MM, financial services and FI (Peruta, 2015; 
Duncombe and Boateng, 2009; Maurer, 2011; Morawczynski and Pickens, 2009; Mbiti and 
Weil, 2016; Donavan, 2012, Jack and Suri, 2011; McKay and Pickens, 2010). Also, the 




and Haley, 2002; Sarma and Pais, 2011; Beck et al., 2007a; Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 
2012a). The literature has also focused on MM and development (Mendoza and Thelen, 2008; 
Spence and Smith, 2010; USAID, 2013; GSMA, 2015a; Beck et al., 2015; Aker et al., 2016; 
Sekabira and Qaim; 2017; Chale and Mbamba, 2015; Nan, 2019). The available literature does 
not thoroughly investigate neoliberal policies and how they facilitate FI and the moderation of 
some factors of FE through MM growth. My research has identified this literature gap. The 
chapter demonstrates this gap and seeks to prepare the discussions that bridge the gap in the 
next chapters. To do so, I cannot escape the debate on FI and FE issues, as MM facilitates FI 
and moderates some factors of FE. Its growth depends much on these roles. 
This chapter contains ten sections. Section 2.2 briefly introduces the issues of FE, discussing 
what we know about it. It details the key concepts, global context, indicators, and the urgency 
of FE. Section 2.3 discusses the relationship between FE and FI. Section 2.4 defines FI. It 
explains the barriers to FI as well the importance of FI and its systematic indicators. Section 
2.5 introduces the exclusion debates, FE, and neoliberalism. Section 2.6 discusses the context 
of Tanzania’s FE and FI to provide an understanding of Tanzania’s situation. Section 2.7 
discusses the changing banking sector that has finally adopted the inclusive financial agenda. 
The section also details what went wrong in the past, and what has changed over the years. 
Section 2.8 presents the global and national emergence of the FI agenda. Section 2.9 discusses 
FE issues and MM. Section 2.10 concludes the chapter. 
2.2 What Do We Know About FE? 
FE received attention in the late 1990s and early 2000s. IFIs and economies realised the role 
of the financial sector in increasing economic growth and poverty reduction. At least 67 
empirical studies confirm this (Valickova et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2000). Literature suggests 
that the role of the financial sector in poverty reduction is controversial (World Bank, 2008a; 
World Bank, 2008b). Furthermore, FE received attention when there was clear evidence that 
neoliberal policies had widened the gap between the rich and the poor (Duménil and Lévy, 
2011). Also, IFIs and governments shifted the financial sector development agenda from 
microfinance to warranting access to formal financial services for all (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 
2008). It was this shift in focus that made researchers and policymakers interested in 
investigating FE in all its forms. According to the Financial Services Authority (2000), the 
issue of FE has received particular attention recently because financial product ownership has 




pronounced manner. Moreover, the debate on FI has also moved on from its initial focus on 
location-based exclusion to digital technologies such as MM. These technologies have 
financially included many of the previously excluded people (also see: Mpogole et al., 2008; 
Asongu and Asongu, 2018). 
2.2.1 Definition and Key Concepts 
There is not a universally accepted definition of FE. However, in the academia the definitions 
tend to reflect the inability, lack of or reluctance to access appropriate ‘mainstream’ (also 
referred to as ‘formal’) financial services (also see: Mitton. 2008; McKillop and Wilson, 2007; 
Koku, 2015:655; Leyshon and Thrift, 1995:314). My research adopts this definition. Different 
researchers, IFIs, and global institutions also define FE similarly or differently depending on 
their research objectives, mission, vision, or operations.  
A person is considered financially excluded, if she/he does not have access to any or all 
available formal financial services. Likewise, she/he is excluded if she/he does not make use 
of these services: 
“It is, therefore, useful to use the term ‘financially excluded’ for those who lack all products and 
‘marginally’ excluded for those who have limited access” (Lämmermann, 2010: 26).  
Simpson and Buckland (2009: 967), the European Commission (2008), and Federal Deposit 
Insurance Cooperation (FDIC) (2011) also use the terms ‘unbanked’ and ‘underbanked’ to refer 
to financially-excluded and marginally-excluded people. ‘Unbanked’ people are those without 
any mainstream bank account while ‘underbanked’ people are those depending mostly on 
fringe and/or informal financial services for cashing cheques, serving, getting loans and credit, 
saving or making payment services (Simpson and Buckland, 2009).  
According to Aduda and Kalunda (2012:97), FE brings about social classes and divisions. 
Those lacking social services comprise of certain exclusive groups of people and that forms an 
essential component of a much broader exclusion. Devlin (2009: 1021) supports this view as 
he asserts that FE is “seen as closely linked to wider social exclusion”. According to Chibba 
(2009), financially excluded people are more often than not average citizens. Aduda and 
Kalunda (2012:97) echo this view by asserting  
“the included become fearful and distrustful of the excluded and vice-versa culminating to polarised 




Furthermore, Leyshon and Thrift (1995) and Conroy (2005) perceive FE in terms of processes 
that deter specific individuals or group of individuals from accessing the formal financial 
system. Carbo et al. (2005) define FE as the inability of some social groups to access the 
financial system. Panigyrakis et al. (2002:55) define FE as “the inability of some financial 
service segments to access financial services in an appropriate form”. Carbo et al. (2007) 
describe FE as an invariable experience of the poorer members of society, whether they live in 
developed or developing countries.  Mohan (2006) defines FE as “lack of access to appropriate, 
low cost, fair, and safe financial services” by certain groups in the society from mainstream 
providers. In summary, Koku (2015) asserts that FE is “a global problem that has been studied 
by scholars from different academic fields”. 
The FE debate has broadened to: (i) investigate more closely the types of people that are likely 
to be excluded; and (ii) the types of FE. Kempson and Whyley (1999) provide a list of 
dimensions of FE that are within the debates mentioned above. The list of aspects includes: 
access exclusion, condition exclusion, price exclusion, marketing exclusion, and self-exclusion 
(also see: Sinclair et al., 2009).  While access exclusion occurs as a result of risk assessment or 
management where risky people are excluded (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2008), condition 
exclusion occurs when conditions are attached to financial products and services, making some 
people unwilling or unable to access them (Devlin, 2005:77). Moreover, while price exclusion 
occurs when some people cannot afford financial services subject to high prices (Corr, 
2006:65), marketing exclusion occurs when marketing and sales activities target only a specific 
segment of the population and excludes others (Sinclair, 2001:15). Likewise, some people tend 
to self-exclude due to past experiences or the fear of being rejected (Fuller, 1998:147). 
Just as the above paragraph identifies the dimensions of FE, literature has also identified several 
more causes of FE.  To start with, the Financial Services Authority (2000) identifies some 
economic, socio-cultural, and demographic trends that assist in causing FE. Moreover, recent 
economic growth might have created FE of some groups of people, as the neoliberal policies 
of the 1990s were exclusive. Furthermore, neoliberal financial reforms have generated 
economic growth in some countries. However, the redistribution of wealth and income 
generated by this growth might not have been equal. Also, in some states, the demographics 
have changed. For instance, there are more single parents and older people who do not have 
sustainable means of sustenance. In some cases, homelessness has increased due to various 
factors such as illnesses, being an orphan, or bankrupt. All of the factors mentioned above have 




FE, therefore, can be understood by studying basic banking and digital financial services such 
as MM. By examining these basic banking and digital financial services, we determine the 
percentage of the population who use these services and those who do not use these services. 
By doing so, we can learn the portion of the population that is still in exclusion. According to 
McKillop et al. (2007), studying FE is a complex issue, and that it is interconnected with the 
non-usage of financial products, poverty, level of education, unemployment, predatory lending, 
family breakdown and so forth. The Financial Services Authority (2000) and Hogarth and 
O’Donnell (1997) echoed this view. They found that some factors impact the level of 
ownership of various financial services and products, including income, employment status, 
region, race and ethnicity, and marital status. 
Moreover, in some instances, gender and age were also essential in explaining exclusion from 
savings, insurance, and pension, but not current account. For example, Devlin (2005) studied 
the UK market and concluded that mixed evidence on gender and age explained exclusion from 
the above-mentioned financial products. Those aged between 16 and 25 were more likely to be 
excluded. Contrarily, the Financial Services Authority (2000) remains less convinced that 
either gender or age explains FE in an effective manner. 
Furthermore, some scholars see marital status, family, and race as factors that may cause FE. 
For instance, Devlin (2005) and the Financial Services Authority (2000) argue that divorced 
individuals with children are likely to be financially excluded. They also say that households 
with low income are also vulnerable to exclusion. As far as race is concerned, Hogarth and 
O’Donnell (1997), as well as the Financial Services Authority (2000), all found that race and 
ethnicity could, at times, influence FE. 
Other scholars see FE as one of the issues catalysed by neoliberal policies. Free markets 
exclude and include. Neoliberal globalisation has, in some cases, created the losers and 
winners; the haves and have-nots; the rich and poor. The gap between the rich and poor has 
widened. It is with this view that the Financial Services Authority (2000) claims that financial 
markets, social class, level of education, and career path can be sources of exclusion. Moreover, 
Marron (2013) argues that FE can be well “understood as a generic process produced by 
economic and political transformations of recent decades”. Market and neoliberal reforms are 
only a few examples of economic and political transformations. These processes of change 
marginalise certain social groups or classes from engaging within financial markets (Marron, 




Hogarth and O’Donnell (2000) see technological advancements impacting on FE by affecting 
the poor who are less likely to have access to technology, or such channels. According to Devlin 
(2005) and Lee (2002), the poor are less likely to use electronic banking, except for ATMs. 
More importantly, financial institutions have used technology to identify and exclude some 
people they consider undesirable due to the risks they pose to them (also see: Van Steenis, 
2019:6).   
2.2.2 The Global Context of FE 
FE is a global problem that has been studied by scholars from different academic fields (Koku, 
2015:665). FDIC (2009) and FDIC (2011) demonstrates that access to standard banking 
services is not universal. According to Fernández-Olit et al. (2016), early studies on FE in 
developed countries researched the issues of geographical access to formal financial services 
and their determinants. Leyshon and Thrift (1993, 1994, 1995) and Carbo et al. (2005) have 
also researched on geographical access issues of FI. After several more studies, FE has been 
regarded as the issue of a lack of access to formal financial services, and a lack of use and 
utilisation of formal financial services (Dymski and Li, 2003; Hill and Kozup, 2007; De Meza 
et al. 2008; World Bank, 2014a).  
Earlier studies of FE before the early 2000s demonstrate that FE had small but growing 
literature, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom (Simpson and Buckland, 
2009; Leyshon and Thrift, 1995).  Also, the literature for Canada and Europe was slimmer, and 
so was the literature for the global south, where literature was based more on microcredit and 
microfinance (Simpson and Buckland, 2009). In Europe, for instance, some countries have the 
highest levels of FI in the world, while some others have FE issues. Those with higher levels 
of FI include Denmark (96.1%), Netherlands (98.9%), Sweden (98%) and Finland (96.7%) 
(Simpson and Buckland, 2009: 968). Those with stunning levels of people without a bank 
account included: Italy (22.4%), Greece (17.9%), Ireland (16.8%), Portugal (16.7%), Austria 
(13.5%) and the UK (10.5%) (Carbo et al., 2007).  As it regards the USA, the FDIC estimated 
that about 7.7% of US households in 2013 did not have a bank account and that an additional 
20% were underbanked but also gained access to alternative financial services (AFS) outside 
the mainstream banking system (FDIC, 2014; Mylonidis et al., 2019). As it regards Canada, 
about 3% of Canadian households and about 8% of low-income households were unbanked. 




Overall, 23% of adults in Africa had an account at a formal financial institution by 2012 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012a). See Diagram 2.1. Africa’s account ownership statistics 
vary from 42% in Southern Africa to 7% in Central Africa. The highest levels of FE were 
recorded in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic, with about 
95% of adults lacking access to formal financial services. In North Africa, about 23% of adults 
had an account at a formal financial institution (Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012a:4). Also, 
with regard to levels of access to formal financial services, Latin America and the Caribbean 
had 39%, the Middle East had 15%, South Asia had 33%, East Asia and Pacific had 55%, and 
high-income countries had 89% (Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012a:5) . These statistics also 
concur with Affleck and Mellor’s (2006) claim that FE is a world-wide problem that leaves 
poor communities disconnected from mainstream financial services (Triki and Faye, 2013:44).  
Diagram 2.1: Account Penetration (% Adults) 
 
From the global reality, neoliberal roll-back policies facilitated an increase in unemployment 
rates as more workers faced redundancy. They also made them lose their earnings, health 
coverage and means of sustenance (Rhine and Greene, 2006; Campbell et al., 2012; and Rhine 
and Greene, 2013) which also facilitated FE. Furthermore, liberalisation policies if analysed 
from the supply perspective, could enhance FE. This would depend on the quality of the 
environments in which financial institutions operated, the costs of enforcing contracts and 
whether financial institutions operated under public or private settings (Beck et al., 2007a).  
FE remained a social issue, regardless of where it occurred. Previous literature on FE traced 
the issue to the deregulation of the financial sector, during the roll-back phase of neoliberalism 




The literature attributed it to the sector’s tendency to segment the market into two: the 
‘upmarket’ and the ‘downmarket’ and let most of the financial institutions focus on the more 
profitable ‘segments’ (Koku, 2015; Pollard, 1996; Dymski, 2005:454), which is a neoclassical 
perspective. Some studies found that banks became larger after deregulation and that large 
banks were very unlikely to serve small businesses or financially-excluded people (also see: 
Cole et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2005). Small banks may have comparative advantages in lending 
to small businesses and low-income people than large banks (also see: Berger et al., 1998). 
However, at times they fail to survive the competition from the big banks. 
Banking activities were highly regulated around the world until the final decades of the 20th 
century (Bernard et al. 2008). Thus, banks were not able to employ competitive solutions 
available from other industries, such as prices and location. At times, banks could not open 
new branches in certain locations, and the interest ceilings on credits and deposits, not only 
reduced the geographical area but also curbed price competition. Prior to the implementation 
of financial deregulation programmes in the early 1990s by most countries of the world: 
“all signs of the financial repression such as excessively high-reserve requirements, credit controls, 
interest rate controls, strict entry barriers, operational restrictions and predominance of state-owned 
banks were present” (Kumar and Gulati, 2004: 201)  
around the world. The introduced neoliberal reforms sought to end: 
 “the regime of financial repression and to promote a diversified, efficient and competitive banking 
system. Deregulatory measures like lowering of statutory pre-emption, easing of directed credit 
rules, interest rates deregulation, and lifting of entry barriers for de novo private and foreign banks 
were undertaken to induce efficiency and competition into the banking sector” (Kumar and 
Gulati, 2004:201). 
On deregulation, there is empirical literature on developed nations (Grabowski et al., 1994; 
Christopolous and Tsionas, 2001; Zaim, 1995; Giradone et al., (2004); Chortareas et al., 2009). 
Before the mid-1990s, the banking literature focused more on the availability of financial 
services in the US than elsewhere (Leyshon and Thrift, 1995). The literature compared different 
US regulatory schemes and their effects on service and accessibility of financial services. 
According to Bernard et al. (2008), this literature traced its origins to the articles written by 
Lanzilotti and Saving (1969), Seaver and Fraser (1979), Savage and Humphrey (1979) or 




Other literature supports the role of deregulation in reversing FE. Chava et al. (2013) argue that 
“deregulation leads to an active market” and lowers entry barriers and therefore increases 
competition. It also increases the bargaining power of the banks and encourages them to invest 
in relationships that benefit them (Rajan, 1992; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Petersen and Rajan, 
1995). There is empirical evidence showing the benefits of deregulation. For instance, the 
elimination of branching restrictions, and reduction of interest rates led to the expansion of 
financial services, and created more efficient FIs (Fuentelsaz and Gómez, 2001; Jayaratne and 
Strahan, 1997). Alternatives to bricks-and-mortar branches were imperative (Bierman et al., 
1996). Avery (1991) provided a significant analysis as he studied the period between 1977 
(before deregulation) and 1989 (after deregulation) in the US. This analysis facilitated 
deregulatory analysis elsewhere. Moreover, the development of other alternatives, such as 
digital financial services could help serve less-favoured communities (Leyshon et al., 2006). 
Most of the global literature on FE also fails to include MM services.  
Some researchers argued that liberalisation facilitated exclusion. Bierman et al. (1996) studied 
several bank branches between 1985 and 1993. Their findings demonstrated that liberalisation 
increased the number of financial services in higher-income communities and decreased those 
services in low-income areas. Midgley (2005) came closer to these views after studying 
deregulation and geographical issues in Britain. Midgley concluded that deregulation changed 
the patterns of financial service provision and that bank and branch closures had been one of 
the reasons for branch rationalisation (Bernard et al., 2008). Melnik and Shy (2015) argue that 
liberalisation provides market power to the banks and that market power ‘in the retail banking 
sector’ can be a cause of price distortions and market segmentation, which can block some 
people from accessing certain financial services. Stiglitz (2000) argued that financial market 
liberalisation had increased the frequency of ‘financial crises’ (also see Ang, 2010:697; 
Ranciere et al., 2006:3342), and according to Dymski (2005:451-454), financial crises facilitate 
FE.  
Some other researchers argued that liberalisation facilitated FI. According to Bernard et al. 
(2008), Gunther (1997) studied the relative number of branches per 1,000 inhabitants between 
1980 and 1990 and concluded that the removal of branching restrictions increased financial 
services in rural areas. With the absence of efficient digital financial services prior to the late 
1990s, branches were the primary means of providing access to financial services and that 
branch network size mattered for better financial service availability (Leyshon and Thrift, 




supports the importance of branches in protecting against FE (Dymski and Veitch, 1996; HM 
Treasury, 1999). Kempson (2000) argues that by then branches were suitable for low-income 
people who risked being financially excluded, especially when they depended on ‘hard-to-
reach’ or distant branches. Beck et al. (2007a) and Beck et al. (2008) surveyed 62 countries 
and found that liberalisation or low barrier levels in retail markets affected competitive banking 
systems. Ranciere et al. (2006:3342) claim that financial liberalisation ‘relaxes borrowing 
constraints and increases growth’. Dell’Aricia and Marquez (2004a) and Dell’Ariccia and 
Marquez (2004b) argue that financial liberalisation leads to risks, which gives rise to boom-
bust credit cycles.  
There are different views on liberalisation and its role in FE and FI. Financial liberalisation is 
an integral part of financial sector development. Ang and McKibbin (2007) suggest that 
policies that remove interest rate controls and other restrictions on banking operations are also 
key to financial development and economic growth, which are also vital in eliminating FE. 
However, Ang and McKibbin (2007:218) also argue that financial liberalisation may cause: 
 “fragility or deepen the financial system, but its long-term benefits on the economy are ambiguous 
from both empirical and theoretical perspectives”. 
Due to these different perspectives on liberalisation and its effects on FE and FI, two schools 
of thought are used to explain the two different positions. Ang and McKibbin (2007) refer to 
these schools as the ‘McKinnon-Shaw school of thought’ and ‘Financial Endogenous Growth’ 
(Shaw, 1973; McKinnon, 1973). According to Dymski (2005:443): 
 “Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973) provided definitive expositions of the neoliberal approach to 
financial markets and development.”  
Firstly, the ‘McKinnon-Shaw’ school of thought:  
“proposes that government restrictions on the operation of the financial system such as interest 
rate ceiling, direct credit programmes, and high reserve requirements (dubbed financial 
repression) may hinder financial deepening. This may in turn affect the quality and quantity of 
investments and retards the development of the financial systems. Therefore, the McKinnon-
Shaw financial repression paradigm implies a poorly functioning financial system may 
negatively influence economic growth’ (Ang and McKibbin, 2007:218).  
Secondly, according to Ang and McKibbin (2007:218), the endogenous growth theory 




“also shows that financial repression may have a negative impact on financial development. In this 
case, financial development is less likely to be effective in stimulating economic growth in the 
presence of a repressed financial system. In fact, the cross-country evidence of Rossi (1999) 
suggests that financial restraints can hamper financial development”. 
Chava et al. (2013) found that financial development benefits economic growth as it relaxes 
financial constraints and boosts innovation. Their evidence also suggests that financial 
development benefits small and young businesses that are more likely to transform ‘industries 
with their technological breakthroughs’ than large businesses who are innovative path-
dependent.  
In the short-run financial liberalisation efforts in countries like Tanzania failed to produce 
higher levels of FI. Arestis and Demetriades (1999) provided reasons why financial 
liberalisation failed to produce positive results. They argue that financial liberalisation agenda 
depended on a set of impractical presuppositions, including the presence of perfect 
competition, lack of information asymmetry, robust and conducive institutional and regulatory 
frameworks, and the limited influence of stock markets. These beliefs were unlikely to be met 
in the short-run and could explain the failure of liberalisation to boost FI in the 1990s. In the 
long-run, financial liberalisation produced positive results such as MM and FI as discussed in 
this dissertation. 
As demonstrated in this section, much of the literature links FE with the banks and not with 
MM financial services. Hence, I am bringing in the MM and FE discussions. 
2.2.3  Indicators and Urgency of FE 
Financially-excluded adults usually do not have access to formal financial services like savings 
accounts, credit, insurance, and payment services. Being financially excluded does not mean 
that one does not have access to finances. Instead, it means that one does not have access to 
formal financial services. For instance, in developing countries most financially-excluded 
adults tend to depend on informal mechanisms for loans and savings to protect themselves 
against financial risks. Due to a lack of access to formal financial services, financially-excluded 
adults rely on moneylenders. Informal moneylenders lend money to them at high-interest rates, 
and in case of emergencies they often have to pawn assets. Diagram 2.2 illustrates the 
consequences of resulting from being financially excluded or unbanked. Firstly, financially-
excluded people do not have access to affordable credit. Secondly, they may have difficulties 




Fourthly, they may find it hard to manage money or plan for the unforeseeable future. Fifthly, 
they may be unable to make the most use of their finances. 
Diagram 2.2: The Consequences of FE 
 
Moreover, Sahrawat (2010:4) claims: 
“… it needs to be emphasised that mere ownership of a financial product does not result in financial inclusion”.  
It is the usage of the financial product that indicates whether a person is financially excluded 
or included. In other words, the opening of an account, by an individual is treated as an indicator 
of FI. What makes an individual financially excluded or included is how often he/she uses 
his/her bank accounts, and how the FSPs reflect the value derived by that individual in the 
mainstream financial system.  
FE is measured either by the percentage of the adult population with no access to formal 
financial services or the percentage of the adult population who have limited access to formal 
financial services (also see: Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012a). Other researchers use the 
two leading indicators as ‘unbanked’ and ‘underbanked’ (also see: Demirguc-Kunt and 








Diagram 2.3: Account Penetration (Adults with an Account at a Formal Financial 
Institution) (%). 
 
In high-income economies, account penetration is 89%, while in middle- and low-income 
economies account penetration is only 41% (see Diagram 2.3 for regional data). 
Operationalising the ‘unbanked’ or ‘lack of access to formal financial services’ concepts is 
straightforward. The indicator is either a bank account or any formal financial account such as 
an e-wallet account for MM users. Operationalising the underbanked is more complicated as it 
may require different definitions, for instance: 
 “defining a minimum frequency of account use, defining a minimum set of bank account services, 
identifying reliance on fringe or informal financial services, or simply asking respondents if they 
have adequate access to financial services through a mainstream bank” (Simpson and 
Buckland, 2009:967). 
Having defined FE and its key concepts, I relate it to FI in Section 2.3. 
2.3 What Do We Know About the Relationship Between FE and FI? 
In a neoliberal world, there is a growing role in terms of the power of finance in the political 
economy of capitalism and development (Kotz, 2008). According to Kotz (2008:1), also 
quoting Duménil and Lévy (2004:1-20) and Duménil and Lévy (2005:17):  
 “… neoliberalism is the expression of the desire of a class of capitalist owners and the institutions 
in which power is concentrated, which we collectively call ‘finance’, to restore … the class’s 
revenue and power … some analysts view the rise of what might be called ‘finance dominance’ as 
the underlying development that explains not only the emergence of the neoliberal order but also 




There is empirical evidence that neoliberalism produced ‘financial dominance’ of particular 
groups of people (Duménil and Lévy, 2011). It also created the concept of ‘financialisation’, 
which increased the role of finance in economic activities. ‘Financial dominance’ was 
accelerated by the neoliberal reforms and restructuring of various sectors of the economy. 
Epistein (2005:3) and Kotz (2008) define financialisation as: 
 “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial 
institutions in the operation of domestic and international economies”.   
It is the financial dominance of the few that excludes the majority of people from the financial 
system. Hence, those deprived of economic resources and small businesses do not have access 
to, or belong to finance. Kotz (2008: 6-7) and Duménil and Lévy (2005:21-22) interpret finance 
as:  
“… both institutions (the financial system: commercial and investment banking, pension funds, 
insurance, …) and individuals, [that is,] capitalists … or a fraction of capitalists since some 
capitalists are more ‘financial’ than ‘others’ … The capitalists specified to be excluded from 
‘finance’ include the ‘small shareholder or the owner of a small firm’ who ‘does not actually belong 
to finance’ …”.   
Finance, in the neoliberal era of the 1980s and 1990s, created inequality, as depicted in this 
chapter. The consequences of inequality beyond political and social instability also caused 
financial instability and stagnant economic growth (Ostry et al., 2016). Inequality was not good 
for economic growth due to its links with financial instability and global financial crises (Lim 
and Khor, 2011). The rising disparity generated by neoliberal policies was among the leading 
causes of global financial crises (Ostry et al., 2016). The IFIs such as the World Bank and the 
IMF, as well as, the G-20 countries became aware of the inequality, poverty, and forms of FE. 
They sought ways to change these situations, as discussed later in this chapter. This change 
came under the name of “FI”. 
2.4 Defining FI 
I define FI as the provision of affordable access to formal financial services for every adult, as 
well as the use of those financial services by every adult. According to Kuriakose and Iyer 
(2014), and Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper (2012a), FI is unarguably a fundamental part of 
economic development and growth. FI is also a world-wide problem (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 




access to formal financial bank accounts or financial services in 2015 (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Klapper, 2012b). 
Unfortunately, there is no standard universal definition of FI (TNCFI, 2014:13; IEG, 2015:3). 
According to Kodan and Cchikara (2013) and Kempson and Whyley (1999), the different 
views about FI prevail across the globe because of the need for financial products that vary 
from individual to individual and country to country. Bhaskar (2013) claims that many 
definitions of FI have characteristics that are symptomatic of broad access to financial services. 
The proposed definitions have tended to view FI as a “universal access” to a “wide range of 
financial services” at a “reasonable price” (TNCFI, 2014; Aduda and Kalunda, 2012; Tabaro, 
2011; CGAP, 2009; World Bank, 2008a; World Bank, 2014a; FATF, 2011; Thorat, 2006; 
FATF, 2011, Dev, 2006; Accion International, n.d.).  
Some definitions emphasise the provision of formal financial services to ‘all’, ‘poor’, 
‘vulnerable’, ‘unbanked’, ‘excluded’, ‘disadvantaged’ and ‘low-income’ groups and the 
‘different segments of the population’ (CGAP, 2009:1; Chakrabarty, 2010:3; Thorat, 2006; 
Sarma and Pais, 2011:613; Dev, 2006; Hanag and Jansen, 2010:1; Accion International, n.d.). 
According to Kodan and Cchikara (2013), FI should be available in either: (i) a ‘broader sense’ 
(meaning the availability of all banking services at an affordable cost, in reasonable time and 
quantity to all needy people) or (ii) a ‘narrower sense’ (meaning through the minimum essential 
financial services). Most of the definitions originate from these ‘broader’ or ‘narrower’ points 
of view.  
Beck and Torre (2006) argue that FI, as analysed through the view of modern economic and 
social development perspectives, emphasises access to financial services for two main reasons. 
Firstly, the theoretical and empirical literature shows the importance of a well-developed 
financial system which has a positive impact on economic development and poverty 
alleviation. Secondly, some literature describes FI as a public good. It calls for broad 
participation in the mainstream financial sector (also see: Peachey and Roe, 2004). 
Tanzania defines FI as: “regular use of financial services by individuals and businesses through 
financial infrastructures to save, manage cash flows, invest in productive capacities and 
mitigate shocks, which are delivered by formal providers through a range of appropriate 
solutions with dignity and fairness” (TNCFI, 2018:7). Most of the above literature emphasises 
“access” and “use” separately. I have decided to highlight both “access” and “usage” in my 




affordable cost, fairly and transparently, for all segments of the adult populations. It also 
considers the use of financial services by all sections of the adult populations. By all parts of 
the adult populations, the research refers to individuals and firms. These individuals and firms 
include vulnerable groups such as those from the weaker sections of society, the low-income 
and disadvantaged groups, the unbanked and underbanked people, the financially-excluded and 
marginalised people, as well as the rich and the poor. The provision of financial services, in 
this case, comes from the regulated mainstream FSPs.  
IEG (2015:3) asserts that attempts to define FI have been by: 
 “an array of different definitions that vary according to the types of services, the degree of formality 
of the depth of access”.  
This definition is vital because financial service providers have their interests and seek to 
protect them. They need to define what FI is for them, in an attempt to preserve their interests, 
as well as to provide financial services according to the laws of the countries they operate in. 
This research selected MM and tried to study its role in moderating FE and in increasing FI 
during the neoliberal era. The key argument seeks to discuss the increasing role of 
neoliberalism in supporting the growth of MM, and in aiding its role in increasing FI. 
Researchers rarely study this argument.  
2.4.1 What Prevents FI? 
What causes FE (as discussed in Section 2.2.3) is also a barrier to FI. FI and FE, therefore, are 
the two sides of the same coin. Hence, what causes FE prevents FI and vice versa. The literature 
on Tanzania and FI groups the barriers to formal financial services into three levels, namely: 
macro, meso, and micro (TNFCI, 2014). 
2.4.1.1 Macro Level 
TNFCI (2014) mentions two critical barriers of access to financial services as an unsupportive 
macro environment and an inefficient legal and regulatory framework. Firstly, digital financial 
markets require a stable and enabling macroeconomic environment to operate efficiently 
(Porteous, 2006). A macro environment is the totality of the different spheres of socioeconomic 






Diagram 2.4 Macro Environment 
 
Before liberalisation policies were implemented in Tanzania, and under the socialist political 
environment, the macro-environment was not friendly for financial investments and 
innovations (Mbowe, 2010; Collier and Gunning, 1991). After liberalisation, the macro 
environment enhanced innovations (such as MM) due to deregulation and liberalisation of the 
economic sectors. This is demonstrated through the conducted interviews and the next chapters 
of this dissertation. Through the Converged Licensing Framework (CLF) and financial reforms 
as depicted in Chapter 3 Sections 3.7.2 and 3.7.3 (also see: Mfungahema, 2014; Mwalongo and 
Hussein, n.d.), MM emerged. Even this literature fails to link the CFL with the arrival of MM 
directly. My interviews with the key respondents linked the CLF with MM as demonstrated in 
Chapter 5. The CLF established the rules cutting across the different macro environments that 
allowed technologies such as MM to reach financially-unreached people and provide them with 
the financial services of their choice, as it is discussed in this dissertation. 
Secondly, the legal and regulatory framework must ensure fast and efficient enforcement of 
laws, regulations, and contracts. As Diagram 2.4 illustrates, when there are overlapping macro 
domains, and all are equally important for the success of economic and financial activities, the 
state needs to remove any macro barriers to allow the smooth operation of the macro 
environment. Diagram 2.5 depicts the presence of the key enablers of mobile-payment (m-




smooth operation of the financial system, and the creation of an enabling environment for m-
payments and m-banking for FI. Lack of these regulatory domains and enabling m-payments, 
and the m-banking environment constitutes barriers to FI. According to Porteous (2006), m-
payments and other digital financial services involve up to five different regulators, namely: 
the central bank, payment regulator, anti-money laundering authority, Telco regulator, and 
competition regulator.  Diagram 2.5 considers these five domains.  
Diagram 2.5 Overlapping Domains 
 
Source: Porteous (2006:28). 
The first issue presented in Diagram 2.5 is the issue of e-commerce legitimacy. For e-
commerce policymakers, there were issues regarding e-signatures. The legal system did not 
recognise the e-signatures. These issues posed challenges to both businesses and individuals, 
as both electronic payees and payers, risked repudiation. Tanzania resolved this issue by issuing 
the 2015 ‘Electronic Transactions Act” (ETA) and the 2015 Cybercrimes Act, which 
recognised electronic money, electronic evidence, electronic data and signatures (URT, 2015a; 
URT, 2015b). Moreover, the central bank was preoccupied with several issues including 




between payments and deposits, laws and regulations for e-money issuance, anti-money 
laundering issues as well as the use of agents to provide financial services. The establishment 
of the following laws and regulations resolved these issues: the 2006 Anti-Money Laundering 
Act and the 2019 Anti-Money Laundering (Electronic Fund Transfer and Cash Transaction 
Reporting) Regulations, which sought to combat money laundering and financial terrorism 
(URT, 2006a; URT, 2019). Furthermore, the National Payment Systems Act (NPSA) and its 
regulations (licensing and electronic money regulations) were enacted to take care of the issues 
of the NPSs in 2015 (URT,2015a; URT,2015b; URT, 2015c; URT, 2015d, URT, 2015e). In 
addition, the central bank worked with the Fair Competition Commission (established by the 
2003 Fair Competition Act) and the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) 
(established by the 2003 Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority Act (TCRAA)) to 
ensure fair competition for banks and the MNOs (also see: URT, 2003a; URT, 2003b). Being 
hot issues, regulators are always concerned with the boundaries of cooperation around 
payments infrastructure. They are also concerned with the risks of anti-competitive behaviours.  
They understand that payment systems are complex ‘ecosystems’. Tanzania tried to resolve 
these issues by establishing interoperability of MM services, which fosters competition and 
cooperation within the MM industry, see Chapters 5 and 8. The National Switch project to 
bring together the banks and the MNOs is underway (see Chapter 8). 
For the telecommunications sector, both the TCRA and BOT worried about the role of m-
payments in providing financial services and how their licensing requirements and solvency 
would be affected. While the TCRA could limit the MNOs license from becoming directly 
involved in m-payment and e-money issuance, the CLF was already in place and therefore 
provided support for technology use for mobile payments. The TCRA and BOT had to work 
together to regulate the MNOs. Lack of these co-operations, laws, and regulations in the past, 
slowed down and acted as a barrier to FI at the macro level. The current regulatory frameworks 
allow fair competition and a level playing ground for all players in the financial sector. There 
may also be issues with ‘know-your-customer’ (KYC) requirements, high security for bank 
branches, lack of Digital Financial Service (DFS) and distribution channels, collateral 
requirements, acceptance of discriminatory laws, and lack of explicit consumer protection 
regulations which also factor in delaying the development and growth of inclusive financial 
services and MM. Moreover, in most cases, innovations outpaced regulations. There was a 





2.4.1.2 Meso Level 
TNCFI (2014) mentions three issues at the meso level as the barriers to FI. These are: 
information asymmetry for FSPs, financial incapability of customers, and lack of appropriate 
market infrastructure. Firstly, information asymmetry is an issue as it challenges the design and 
implementation of inclusive financial products and services. It also challenges efforts to 
manage risks, especially when dealing with low-income people, who are regarded as risky by 
the FSPs. Without information and credit history, it was hard for the FSPs to determine who 
was a more or less risky client (also see: Fan and Zhang, 2017; Wagura and Shavulimo, 2017; 
Dobbie and Skiba, 2013; Hörne, 2008; Izquierdo and Izquierdo, 2017; Gerhard, 2012). 
Secondly, there is the issue of financial illiteracy, which affects a customer’s access and usage 
of formal financial services. Financial illiteracy encourages predatory lending behavior from 
some FSPs (TNCFI, 2016; Braunstein and Welch, 2002). Thirdly, lack of proper infrastructure 
to deliver formal financial services to poor and low-income people affects the delivery of 
financial services in remote areas (Ravi, 2019: 6,8; Allen et al., 2012). The traditional bricks-
and-mortar branches that the banks used to reach remote and rural populations did not do much 
for FI. Distance from these branches was an issue. Digital financial services and MM were 
therefore developed to resolve these issues, as demonstrated in Chapter 5. Other pieces of 
literature see the supply-side barriers to FI at this level (AFI, 2016a), including the risk-
aversion of banks and inappropriate delivery systems. 
2.4.1.3 Micro Level 
TNFCI (2014) also mentions the unmet demand or the supply-side barriers, and the lack of 
suitable products to address the needs of customers as key issues at the micro-level. Firstly, the 
unmet demand is caused by either lack of appropriate products and services or lack of access 
to formal financial services for the poor and financially-unreached people. Poor infrastructure 
could also be an issue impacting lack of access as inappropriate infrastructure does not handle 
the delivery of formal financial services well. There was a need for the FSPs to develop and 
launch products and services that encouraged people from all backgrounds to access formal 
financial services. 
Except for TNCFI (2014), other pieces of literature do not group these barriers into three levels, 
namely, macro, meso and micro but provide explanations by citing the factors causing these 





2.4.2 The Importance of FI 
FI is said to be very important for economic growth (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; 
Rajan and Zingales, 1988; Beck et al., 2000; Levine, 2005). Over the last decade, FI, has made 
its way into the centre stage of development policy (Cull et al., 2014; AFI, 2013a), and as part 
of the inclusive neoliberal agenda (also see: Kalpana, 2015; Gabor and Brooks, 2017). 
Policymakers tend to believe that a good financial sector is one that supports and encourages 
FI. This is because well-functioning financial systems offer key services such as: savings, 
credits, payment, and risk management products to people with a range of needs. These services 
can easily be made available to all if countries promote digital technologies such as MM.  
According to Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013), inclusive financial systems provide access to 
financial services at low costs and that their use should also benefit the poor and other 
disadvantaged groups. In other words, Claessens (2005) and Rojas-Suarez (2010) claim that a 
sound financial system is one that is also inclusive. On the contrary, FE occurs when financial 
services are expensive, unavailable, or when the poor cannot afford them. 
According to the GPFI (2014:3), more than 2 billion adults, about half the total adult population 
in the world, are financially excluded. According to Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2015), about 2.5 
billion people are financially excluded. As it regards the financially included, about 89% of 
adults living in high-income countries report having an account at a formal financial institution. 
Only about 41% of adults living in developing countries report having an account at a formal 
financial institution. “Overall, 23% of adults in Africa have an account at a formal financial 
institution” (Triki and Faye, 2013: 44).  
But why is FI important? There are several reasons to explain why the world should pay special 
attention to FI. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, FI is still essential for economic growth 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1988; Beck et al., 2000; Levine, 
2005) and it is a concern for policymakers (Melnik and Shy, 2015:190). Therefore, FE 
contributes to slower economic growth and persistent income inequality. In other words, and 
according to Aduda and Kalunda (2012: 101), “financial inclusion is a step toward inclusive 
development”. Without FI, some groups in the population will be disadvantaged.  For instance, 
according to Devlin (2005), women and the poor are likely to be the most disadvantaged 
groups.   
Secondly, as it regards to income inequality, the current trend is the one that favours income 




women do in developing countries (Demirguc-Kunt at al., 2015). This means that there is a 
persistent gender gap of 6% to 9% across income groups within developing economies. In this 
regard, FI is only one of the tools, if wisely used, will help countries to close the income gap 
between men and women. This again is one of the reasons why FI is important and why 
countries should research ways to help them build inclusive financial systems. Moreover, broad 
access to financial services would not only reduce the financial gap between men and women, 
but it would also benefit the poor. The availability of the financial services and capital would 
not only allow the poor to have access to business opportunities, but would also allow them to 
invest in them. As a result, their investments would generate positive welfare effects. 
Thirdly, the economy grows when people save to increase physical capital, and when people 
spend to accelerate consumption and investment. According to Collins et al. (2009), FI in this 
regard, has many direct benefits to poor households that are using loans or savings to accelerate 
consumption, absorb shock or invest in durable goods, school fees, and home investments. 
Beck et al. (2009) argue that the poor could also manage risks by accessing other financial 
products such as insurance, and that FI could result in women’s economic empowerment. 
Moreover, they argue that economies with more advanced financial intermediation tend to 
grow faster and reduce income inequality. Aduda and Kalunda (2012) echo these views when 
they claim that FI is a necessary condition for financial deepening, which helps to address the 
underlying issue of growth with equity. Therefore, FI is mainly concerned with poverty 
eradication.  
Fourthly, by studying FI, we also understand what FE is. And by knowing what FE is and how 
we can build inclusive financial systems to reverse financial exclusiveness, we will be able as 
researchers to help states make effective FI policies. If there is the discourse of inclusive 
neoliberalism, then FI should support the inclusive neoliberal agenda as detailed in chapter 1. 
Kempson and Whyley (1999) list a range of six barriers to FI that enhance FE as discussed in 
Section 2.2.1. If countries remove these barriers, they will be in a better position to build 
inclusive financial systems for all. Research that helps to study these barriers proposes different 
ways to enhance FI, helps countries to design policies that empower the poor and the 
disadvantaged.  
2.4.3 Systematic Indicators 
According to the OECD (2008) and the World Bank (2012b), systematic indicators of the use 




emerge. These indicators can be used to measure the degree of success of FI.  According to 
Cnaan et al. (2012:187), there are two approaches to measuring FI or FE. Firstly, to calculate 
bank accounts (or bank branches) per population (in terms of adults or households). The issue 
with this approach is that it ignores those who own multiple accounts. It also does not take into 
account accessibility to other financial services. Furthermore, it does not take into account the 
issues of FE. 
The second approach is through surveying those who live in a specific area. The survey takes 
into account people’s experiences and perceptions. Researchers use this approach to examine 
accessibility to a wide range of financial services, including the depth of FI. This research uses 
the Global Findex, FinScope Surveys, InterMedia surveys, etc., as demonstrated in Chapter 4. 
The issue with this approach is that it is costly. Allen et al. (2014: 632) suggest measuring FI 
by taking into account the following: Firstly, the percentage of adults that have an account at a 
formal institution; Secondly, the percentage of adults that have or had a loan at a formal 
financial institution. According to Allen et al. (2014: 632), access to loans remains a significant 
obstacle to FI. Thirdly, the percentage of adults using mobile telephones to send money, receive 
payment, and to pay bills can be used to measure FI.  
2.5 Exclusion Debates, FE and Neoliberalism 
Five significant theories explain poverty and exclusion in the neoliberal era (Davis and 
Sanchez-Martinez, 2015). According to Davis and Sanchez-Martinez (2015), the classical 
perspective claims that individuals and laissez-faire policies cause poverty and exclusion (also 
see Section 2.5.1). The neoclassical perspective provides explanations for poverty and 
exclusion that are beyond an individual’s control, such as market failures (Davis and Sanchez-
Martinez, 2015). Also see Section 2.5.2. Furthermore, the Keynesian and neoliberal schools 
view poverty and exclusion as voluntary and as a result of unemployment (Davis and Sanchez-
Martinez, 2015). The Marxist school regards poverty and exclusion as caused by class and 
group discrimination. In addition, social inclusion and social capital theories explain economic 
and social precursors of exclusion and poverty (Davis and Sanchez-Martinez, 2015). The 
debates rarely link FE with MM services. Hence, my research is imperative as it seeks to engage 
classical and neoclassical perspectives with MM. A medley of theories explain exclusion; this 
dissertation has chosen the classical and neoclassical views. The two views were selected for 




Firstly, the neoclassical perspective considers FE as the result of consumer choice and 
rationality or mistaken government policy (Tamanisha, 2018). As it regards the consumers, 
they may opt out of mainstream markets because the benefits are lower than the economic costs. 
Hence, some would revert to informal and fringe financial services. As far as the government 
is concerned, the motive for exclusion in accordance with this perspective is that some 
government policies create market failures which exclude specific segments of society. The 
same perspective rejects instance of discrimination or other instances which may adversely 
impact on consumer choices. Thus, the perspective explains issues of FE that can be linked to 
neoliberal issues.  
Secondly, the classicists agree that human beings are rational individuals, just as the 
neoclassicists assert. However, they differ with the neoclassicists as they believe that human 
behaviour faces important limitations to the neoclassical perspectives of perfect rationality. By 
using the human rationality assumption, these theorists uncover the consumer side of the FE 
equation (also see: Tamanisha, 2018). According to Buckland (2013:73-73), as quoted in 
Tamanisha (2018): “the behavioural patterns of the poor may be neither perfectly calculating 
nor especially deviant … (because) in poverty the margins of error are narrow”. This view 
“relaxes the notion of rationality as presented by the economic theorists” (Tamanisha, 2018). I 
expand on further the classical perspective below. 
2.5.1 The Classical Perspective 
Classical perspectives explain FE from the angle of value and distribution. For the value and 
distribution discussion, see Robinson (1962). The value of financial services depends on the 
costs of accessing financial services as well as the costs of delivering those services. Beyond 
certain charges, some people cannot access financial services. Hence, they become financially 
excluded. The high costs of attaining financial services are viewed adversely as a source of 
economic inefficiency as they generate incentives that exclude the poor individuals from the 
financial systems. The classical view justifies state intervention whenever poor people need to 
be financially included. Hence, later in Chapter 3, the role of classical theories in supporting 
re-regulation of financial and MM services is explained. 
There are tensions between classical values and technology (Hurwitz and Manne, 2018). 
Likewise, MM is technology. It is understood that classical perspectives have aided the spread 
of technology. This complementarity is due to the classical values, which embrace liberty-




liberty-enhancing and private-ordering activities (Hurwitz and Manne, 2018). Technology and 
innovations, therefore, facilitate private transactions to support individual liberty. Without 
technology, some people cannot breakdown the cultural barriers to FE. 
Furthermore, technological advancements create tensions with classical values when they 
embrace classical values as it has been explained in Chapter 3. Also, see Hurwitz and Manne 
(2018).  While technology can enhance liberty, it may undermine legal rules and institutions 
that create efficient and just private ordering of interactions in a liberal society. This explains 
the re-regulation of technology and innovations supported by the neoclassical values as it has 
been detailed in Chapter 3. At times, technology and innovations, even liberty-enhancing 
technology can exclude a segment of the population as well as the private ordering founded 
upon dysfunctional institutions. To resolve exclusion issue, classical values create a system 
through which transactions benefit those involved in those transactions. As Chapter 3 illustrates, 
classical values facilitate Pareto efficiency while neoclassical values facilitate the attainment 
of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (Dobbs, 1981; Iancu and Trichakis, 2014; DeMartino, 2015; 
Stringham, 2001). For a classicist, transactions should benefit all parties; if one party benefits 
more than the other party, or excludes the other party, the classicists address these issues rather 
than using Kaldor-Hicks efficiency which violates one’s utility causing exclusion.  
According to the classicists, technology is the means we use to do things, increasing the 
benefits, and lowering the costs (Hurwitz and Manne, 2018). Technology, therefore, is a crucial 
input into liberty; it defines the boundary of an individual and expands the scope of those 
boundaries as it enhances liberty. Hence, the classicists are concerned with protecting the 
liberty of the individual as well as institutional ability to support private ordering. Thus, 
exclusion in any forms is what the classicists oppose. What lacks in the classical literature is 
how the classical views link MM, FE, and FI to neoliberalism. Hence, I intend to explain how 
the classicists’ views can be used to explain FE, FI, and MM, as illustrated in Chapters 3, 4, 5, 
6, and 7. 
2.5.2 The Neoclassical Perspective 
The neoclassical perspective asserts that human beings make rational decisions to maximise 
profit and utility (Cook, 2016; Harvey, 2010; Ross, 2005: 66-57). Banarjee and Duflo (2012) 
question this assertion as they provide examples to justify that human beings sometimes make 
decisions contrary to their rationality. They argue that the poor have fewer choices and less 




illiterate and lack appropriate information for them to make rational decisions. Information 
asymmetry reduces their chances of making economic and financially-rational decisions. 
Finally, they also assert that there are behavioural constraints such as bias against the poor, 
which make them disengage with certain choices. Such behaviour works against them.  All 
these factors are what constituted market failures in the form of information asymmetries and 
income inequality between different segments of society. All this plays a significant role in 
excluding the poor from mainstream financial systems. 
Neoclassicists differ from the classicists. They believe that firms should maximise profit and 
that individuals should also maximise their utility through rationality (also see: Zafirovski, 
2008). They argue that free markets optimise resources, and therefore, they reject government 
intervention. They also say that with the right policies, markets work and that the best 
governments create conducive and stable macroeconomic environments. Unfortunately, 
market failures also occur in the process, and some forms of exclusion also emerge with market 
failures. 
Furthermore, the neoclassical theory supports innovation and technology and places the 
significance of the role of demand in triggering innovative activity at the centre of the debate. 
It discusses the timing and location of innovation (also see: Schmookler, 1962; and Ruttan, 
1997). An alternative theory stresses resulting price factors that support innovation, and which 
economise exorbitant prices (Hicks, 1939), and by doing so, the total costs are reduced (Salter, 
1960; Ahmed, 1966; Binswanger and Ruttan, 1978). Neoclassical theory of technology 
emphasises research and development to facilitate technological change, as long as that 
technological change increases economic growth and promotes profit-maximisation. 
Neoclassical perspective does not only support technology and innovation, but it also supports 
the models of diffusing these technologies. Some of these models cause many forms of 
exclusion. For instance, innovations such as microfinance services ended up being extremely 
stressful and caused some suicides in countries such as India (Ashta et al., 2011). Nevertheless, 
neoclassical perspectives tend to support models of diffusing technology that are fairly easy, 
smooth, and more or less costless. Neoclassical economic aspects disturb or rearrange the very 
institutions that were created by Keynesian or classical political economies which causes 
exclusion. Hence, the tension between classical and neoclassical perspectives is real. Thus, this 
dissertation uses them as complementary theories, as it needs both theories to support the roll-
back (deregulatory/liberalisation) and roll-out (re-regulatory) neoliberalisation processes that 




2.6 The Context of Tanzania’s FE and FI 
2.6.1 Issues of FE and FI in Tanzania 
Tanzania has FE issues (Finscope, 2006, FinScope, 2009, FinScope, 2013a, and FinScope, 
2018). Neoliberal and neoclassical policies are partly to blame for this type of exclusion. FE 
rates for Tanzania in 2006 were 54% of the adult population (of the remaining 46% of the adult 
population: 9% used bank services, 35% used informal financial services and 2% used semi-
formal financial services (FinScope, 2006)). The FE rate in 2009 was 56% of the adult 
population (of the remaining 44% of the adult population, 12.4% used bank services, 4.3% 
used semi-formal financial services, and 27.3% used informal services) (FinScope, 2009).  The 
FE rate in 2013 was at 26.8% of the adult population (of the remaining 73.2% of the adult 
population, 13.9% used bank services, 43.5% used non-bank formal services, and 15.8% used 
informal services only) (FinScope, 2013a). FE rate for 2017 was 28% of the adult population 
(of the remaining 72% of the adult population, 16.7% used bank services, 48.6% did not use 
bank services but used other formal financial services, and 6.7% used informal financial 
services) (FinScope, 2018). Prior to 2006, it was difficult to find FE statistics in Tanzania. The 
reason was that the FE literature was not well developed, and very few countries conducted 
surveys before the 1990s to study FE (Prabhakar, 2018:39; Leyshon and Thrift, 1995). For 
instance, two critical surveys initially identified FE issues in Tanzania: the 2003 World Bank 














Access Strand 2.1: FI by Demographics 
 
Given the current post-Washington Consensus neoliberal policies in Tanzania, the following 
adult populations are more likely to be excluded: women (who raise children and engage in 
household activities that do not generate enough income); adults living in rural areas (who 
mostly depend on small farming activities); adults with low levels of education (who cannot 
easily find high income jobs); youth aged between 16 and 24 (who are either at school or in 




and have limited sources of income). The FI by demographics strand above shows this. Access 
Strand 2.2 depicts the FI picture from 2009. 
Access Strand 2.2: Tanzania’s FI Picture 
 
Source: FinScope (2018). 
In 2008, by using the financial sector and monitoring policy, the issues of FI caught the 
attention of policymakers in Tanzania. FI emerged because of: higher levels of financially-
excluded people as demonstrated in Access Strand 2.2, high-interest rates for banks and loans, 
poor infrastructure in rural areas, as well as, financial institutions concentration in urban areas 
that left rural areas without, or with very few, financial institutions. For the first time, the 
FinScope Survey was conducted in Tanzania in 2006 and revealed that only about 9% of 
Tanzania’s entire adult population were financially included (FinScope, 2006). The 
government developed some interest in changing the higher levels of FE. FI was not a 
government policy, but there was a need to respond to these higher levels of FE.  
What were the barriers to FI? Firstly, different financial sector stakeholders had different 
financial interests, as they implemented neoclassical profit maximisation and neoliberal 
policies and strategies. These policies were the key objective of their service realities. The 
policies were exclusive. There was, therefore, the need for government intervention to help 




bad financial sector policies as well as because of the supply-side and demand-side barriers. 
For instance, ATMs did not have enough money; and strategies such as the microfinance policy 
were outdated. Moreover, there were issues with banking sector supervision, which were 
rectified later by the 2006 Banking and Financial Institutions Act (BFIA) (also see: URT, 
2006b). Likewise, the high cost of obtaining loans, as well as the dependence on seasonal 
farming for low-income farmers, who made most of the population, was an issue.  
Tanzania did not have a FI policy. It still does not have such a policy. The main reason for this 
is that Tanzania regards FI as an outcome and not as an end in itself. Tanzania, therefore, uses 
different strategies and policies to arrive at that outcome. As the government intends to increase 
levels of FI in Tanzania, policymakers perceive this process as meeting a target and that they 
need to use various policy instruments, strategies, and leviers to reach the FI target they have 
set for the country. They claim that just as it is for poverty, they do not have a poverty policy 
and that they allow different economic policies cutting across sectors to help them eradicate 
poverty, and achieve their poverty reduction goals: 
“What is the meaning of the financial inclusion policy? If the policy was to help reach this outcome 
by doing a, b, c, d, this is just setting a target. And you use various policy levers to achieve your 
target. It is like poverty. We do not have a poverty policy. No! It is an outcome. You use various 
strategies, investments, policies, in order to get there … You still have to set targets, set a plan of 
action because you measure an outcome. The issue is, is financial inclusion an outcome or an action? 
I take it to be an outcome” (Former Governor). 
These are the reasons why Tanzania does not have a FI policy and opted instead to develop the 
NFIF to help increase the rate of FI (TNFCI, 2014). Increasingly, neoliberal strategies of 
governance support ‘Public-Private Partnership Initiatives’ (PPPIs) in the creation of national 
policies and strategies (Fiszbein and Lowden, 1999; Miraftab, 2004; USAID, 2002; DFID, 
1999). National policies and strategies created through the NFIF involved a ‘consultative 
process’ with the participation of both the public and the private sector (TNCFI, 2014; TNCFI, 
2016; TNCFI, 2018). A National FI Policy (NFIP) would be a government’s policy imposed 
on the private sector. Hence, strategies and policies through the NFIF, result in commitments 
and agreements from both the state and the private sector. This makes national FI policies and 
strategies more effective (AFI, 2011). Within the policy realm, barriers included the outdated 
microfinance policy in 2008, lack of a legal and regulatory framework to help guide the national 
payment systems, an issue which resolved only in 2015 when the NPSA and regulations were 




and regulations. These issues were also resolved in 2015 (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7). The NFIF 
became operational in 2014 (TNCFI, 2014). The CLF in telecommunications came into play 
in 2005 (Mfungahema, 2014; Mwalongo and Hussein, n.d.). Interoperability and agency 
banking began to function between 2010 and 2017 (see: Parkes, 2014). Before the NFIF 
became operational, feasibility studies were conducted (FinScope, 2006; FinScope 2013a; 
World Bank, 2003). The studies found that: (i) FI/FE was an issue; (ii) ‘uzembe’/‘nonchalance’ 
(irresponsible attitude/behaviour of some public and private institutions) was sometimes an 
issue; (iii) it required government intervention; (iv) it required a national framework as a 
solution (which could provide directions in terms of how FI agenda should move forward). 
Once the feasibility studies were conducted, it was established that there was a need for: (i) 
policymaking in different sectors; (ii) calling every stakeholder and engaging them in 
discussions for policies, strategies, plans, guidelines, etc. The emphasis was also on issues 
concerning the grassroots, regional efforts, and economic blocks. The Tanzanians thought that 
the NFIF was more appropriate to advance the FI agenda in the country.  
The NFIF consists of: stakeholder mapping both internally and externally. ‘Internally’ means 
tasks and duties within the Ministry of Finance (MoF), and ‘externally” means tasks and 
responsibilities of other ministries and government institutions, development donors, special 
groups, regulators, and the private sector (TNCFI, 2014, TNCFI, 2018). The NFIF is not a 
policy. However, it consists of different policies and strategies from various policymakers and 
stakeholders. Hence, it does not have enforceability. It is more of a guide. The policy process 
is a long one. It has to come from the Ministry. Then, it must go to the cabinet of ministers, 
which represents the entire government and where the President of the Republic chairs the 
meeting. If it is approved, it goes to the parliament to be legally authorised. From there, and if 
approved, it is legally binding and the relevant minister signs it. The minister must advertise it 
in a government gazette. Once approved in the gazette, it becomes a policy with legal 
enforcement. So far, Tanzania has had two NFIFs, which did not go through the approval 
processes to become policies. For more on NFIF and MM see Chapters 5 and 8.   
Currently, about 28% of the adult population is financially excluded, according to FinScope 
(2018). In some regions, the inclusion rates vary from 3% to 7%. What FinScope (2018) fails 
to say is that if government employees were removed, the inclusion rates would probably go 
down to 10% - according to a Respondent from the MoF. Credit and savings are still low. The 
challenge remains regarding how to increase FI rates using technologies. MM inclusion rates 




2018; Kaffenberger et al., 2018). The existing literature in this section does not mention the 
tension that existed between the MNOs and banks. The banks questioned the involvement of 
the MNOs. They wondered why the MNOs could use digital financial services to help eradicate 
FE, while the banks, for instance, could do the same. South Africa is an excellent example of 
banks’ resistance to MM at its initial stage as the banks opposed the MNOs entry to offer 
financial services (also see: King and Graham, 2015; Robb, 2015; Mbele, 2016). In Tanzania, 
the MNOs did not decide on providing financial services on their own. Digital platforms also 
influenced their decisions, as the platforms made it easier for the MNOs to offer financial 
services. These platforms act as ledger books which simplify the process of recording financial 
transactions. Before MM services, the agents sold ‘vouchers’. Voucher trading enhanced 
money transfers.  
The NFIF was one of the platforms used to thwart tensions between the MNOs and the banks. 
The banks were made to understand that the MNOs do not offer banking services. They created 
electronic money backed up with cash from the trust accounts. Electronic money services that 
the MNOs provided were no longer in terms of vouchers, but in terms of e-money, for instance, 
e-wallet. Hence, one of the critical outcomes of the discussions within the NFIF was the 
establishment of the NPSA in 2015. The NPSA allowed the MNOs to use the NPS as well as 
to register as financial institutions and become directly regulated by the BOT for their financial 
tasks while the TCRA regulated the communication aspects of MM. Since then, MM has been 
key to increasing FI. From the beginning, the regulatory payment system was an issue. With 
no robust legal and regulatory framework in place, the roles of the regulators were confusing. 
There were not clear demarcations to show where their powers and responsibilities ended. 
Although there was goodwill from the government to include poor and financially-excluded 
people, some challenges existed, including: (i) insufficient budget in the MoF; (ii) financial 
illiteracy in the majority of low-income and financially-excluded people. There were also 
demand-side issues at the grassroots level regarding collaterals, land ownership, and preference 
to use the informal financial service due to inappropriate financial products and services for 
financially-excluded and underserved people.  
2.6.2 The Neoliberal Exclusion Era 
Due to the financial system failure in the 1980s, Tanzania implemented neoliberal reforms in 
the late 1980s and mid-1990s. The ujamaa political economy led to an economic crisis of the 




Economic Survival Programme in 1981/1982; (ii) The Structural Adjustment Programme 
1982-1985; The Economic Recovery Programme between 1986-1989 with a focus on 
stabilisation and liberalisation of the financial sector; (iii) adjustment with a human face 1989-
1992 (World Bank, 1991: i-iv). Between the mid-1980s and early 1990s, there were demands 
for development policies that fitted well with poverty reduction issues. This led to the creation 
of the poverty reduction strategy between 1996 and 1997 as well as the designation of the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) around 1999 and 2000 (IMF, 2000; Wangwe, 2009a; 
Wangwe, 2009b). The PRSP was used as a comprehensive development framework that 
oversaw the implementation of poverty reduction policies. It was the PRSP that called for the 
ownership of the development project to allow participation of different development 
stakeholders in economic and development reforms (Robb, 2000). It also highlighted the social 
dimensions of poverty. As neoliberal policies were implemented, the PRSP tried to put back 
the development agenda at a time when the neoliberal agenda emphasised economic “austerity 
measures” (also see: Elkins et al., 2015) and further increased rates of FE due to redundancy 
of employees, deprivation of land in favour of large scale investors, and the provision of 
financial services to less risky customers (also see: Bryceson et al., 2000; Sassen, 2014; 
Navarro, 1998; Sassen, 2010). 
As for the financial sector, two crucial surveys paved the way to Tanzania’s financial reforms. 
The first was the survey conducted by the Nyirabu Commission in 1988 which identified the 
following issues: (i) lack of competitive banking sector; (ii) lack of freedom of entry for both 
domestic and foreign institutions; (iii) lack of private financial institutions and a conducive 
environment for them to operate freely; (iv) issue of non-performing loans and bad governance 
(Ndalichako, 2014:47-48, World Bank 1995:2; African Development Fund, 2000:1; Nyagetera 
and Tarimo, 1997:73). The second survey was a World Bank financial sector assessment for 
Tanzania in 2003 which helped implement financial sector reforms and opened discussions on 
Tanzania’s payment system (World Bank, 2003). The payment system later became key to MM 
development; see Chapter 8. Lots of literature do not mention this. My contribution to this field 
has been to identify this issue and to include it in my Ph.D. analysis; see Chapters 5 and 8. 
Moreover, the two above-mentioned documents did not emphasise access to financial services. 
I identified this issue as a research gap. The problems of distance, scale, affordability, and risk 
management for financially-excluded people persisted and were later identified by FinScope 




FinScope survey conducted in 2006 estimated that only 9% of Tanzania’s adult population had 
access to formal financial services. 
2.7 The Changing Banking Sector 
To better understand the changes in the banking sector, and how the state sought to increase 
access to financial services, I tried to follow the financial system at least from the British 
colonial era to the present. During the British colonial period, at least the “big three” banks 
(‘National and Grindlays’, ‘Standard’, and ‘Barclays’) held about 67% of the deposit assets 
share in the banking sector. This was a colonial capitalist economy. The financial institutions 
at that time did not have intentions to build inclusive financial systems or to provide inclusive 
financial services (Lwiza and Nwanko, 2002; and Caselli, 1975:75). Table 2.1 below represents 
how the financial system looked three years before independence. There were no native African 
banks. Cooperatives were an instrument used to reach out to the indigenous African people. 
Most of the native Africans had access to financial services through the cooperatives.  
Table 2.1: Pre-independence Tanganyika’s Banking Sector Structure as of 1958 
 
2.7.1 The Banking Sector Overview 
By 1961, the year of Tanzania’s independence, the peasant economy accounted for over 90% 
of the national population and 40% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Ndanshau, 1996). 
The methods of production were quite mundane, depending on family labour and by using hand 
hoes. Production was mostly small-scale subsistence farming. Lack of capital in peasant 
agriculture affected most of Tanzania’s population who could not get financial services due to 
lack of income through agricultural activities. The cooperatives were closer to the grassroots 
and therefore, better served the challenges affecting rural finance (Ndanshau, 1996).  
“A feature of special interest is credit channelled through cooperative societies for a large number 




purchase fertilisers, insecticides, seeds, and the various small tools necessary for this trade’ (Nairne, 
1965: 69).  
According to Binhammer (1975) and Chant (1967), FI and providing credit to the peasants 
through cooperative schemes had the following issues: Firstly, the reluctance of the foreign 
banks to fund the cooperatives due to the risks associated with small-scale farming. Secondly, 
high-interest rates, among other things, restricted their lending to cooperatives and agricultural 
estates.  
Similarly, the same cooperatives supported Tanzania’s socialist economy between 1966 and 
1985:  
“In a socialist Tanzania then, our agricultural organisation would be predominantly that of 
cooperative living and working for the good of all. This means that most of our farming would be 
done by groups of people who live as a community and work as a community. They would live 
together in a village, they would farm together, market together, and undertake the provision of 
local services and small local requirements as a community” (Nyerere, 1968:351). 
As the government tried to change the colonial capitalist political economy and the structure 
of the financial system, it nationalised the foreign-owned banks to help provide development 
financing for the people of Tanganyika, which later became Tanzania (BOT, 2011; BOT, 
2016a, BOT, 2016b). By 1988 the time when the financial sector needed reforms, the Diamond 
Jubilee Investment Trust was the only private financial institution operating in Tanzania in 
1988 (Mbowe, 2010:2). There was a need for denationalisation of the financial institutions 
through reforms. The government shifted its vision from ‘ujamaa’ to ‘neoliberal’ reforms. The 
neoliberal political economy it adopted sought the liberalisation of the financial sector, just as 
it did with the telecommunications sector. While Table 2.2 illustrates the pre-reform financial 
sector in 1988, Table 2.3 depicts the post-reform financial sector structure in 2008 during the 










Table 2.2: Pre-reform Financial Sector Structure as of 1988 
 
Table 2.3: Post-reform Financial Sector Structure at the End of 2008 
 
2.7.2 The Liberalisation and Privatisation of the Financial Sector 
Liberalisation helped financial sector development. Literature suggests that financial sector 
development stimulates economic growth and reduces poverty (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 
2009; Greenwood and Jovanivic, 1990; Haber, 2007; Durusu-Ciftci et al., 2017). According to 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2009), financial development reduces poverty and income 
inequality by broadening access for the poor to financial services. It also reduces risks and 
raises investment and productivity that generates higher income through the growth of Small 
and Medium Sized Entreprises (SMEs) by providing them with access to finance. SMEs are 
labour-intensive. They create more jobs than larger firms, and as a result, they contribute 
significantly to economic development in developing countries. Moreover, financial 
development requires comprehensive financial policies and regulatory frameworks that 
facilitate FI, entry of new financial services, and innovation such as MM as discussed in 




financial deregulation consisted of the: liberalisation of interest rates; repeal of credit control; 
competition from new institutions such as MNOs, which was suitable for FI; abolition of capital 
controls; removal of barriers on the capital flows; privatisation of state-owned financial 
institutions; and launching of the capital markets securities (also see Table 2.4).  
Table 2.4: Liberalisation and Privatisation of Tanzania’s Financial Sector 
 
Moreover, the liberalisation of financial services became an element of many development 
strategies, as it fostered not only innovation such as MM but also technology transfer from 
mobile companies to allow mobile banking. Hence, the liberalisation process during the 
neoliberal era enhanced transparency and predictability of financial services, which was an 
important aspect of FI.  
By 2008 and as shown in Table 2.5, there were over 30 banks in Tanzania. Even then access to 




Access Strand 2.3: FI in 2009 
 
The structure of the banking sector between 2012 and 2016 is illustrated in Table 2.5. By 2016, 
the number of banks had doubled compared to 2008.  
Table 2.5: Distribution of Banking Institutions’ Branch Network 
Source: BOT (2016c:1). 
I have briefly looked at the financial system during the British colonial era and soon after 
independence, then from 1966 to 1988, then from 1988 to 2008, and beyond 2008. I realise that 
the financial system serves the basic functionality of the system with the government at any 
point in time. The government is never separated from it. It may reduce its interventions, but it 
is still interested in maintaining financial stability in the country. Hence, before 1966, the whole 
commercial system was externally oriented (shaped by a changing colonial capitalist political 
system), and it meant in essence, one paid a lot more attention to working with the major 
marketing agencies, and companies that collected primary commodities for export. There were 
also a few major supplying entities of imports for use in rural areas. I found that even if that 
system had MM, it would have worked better than without MM. There are reasons for this, and 
what MM has come to solve is the moderation of the four factors of FE, namely: distance, 
scale, affordability, and risk management (Chapter 6). MM is a technical solution to FE issues 
in some cases. I conceptualise MM as a means to an end. It is not by itself regarded as an end. 




“It is also true that when the government nationalised the banking sector in 1966, it was a lot more 
about an issue of who owns the system. The nationalisation decision did not focus on how the state 
gets services to where they were needed. Otherwise, the government could have invested more in 
microfinance institutions. However, the cooperatives were used as instruments to help reach the 
rural and urban populations, should they require financial services. Of course, the cooperatives built 
their own ranks in there, and whoever was in charge thereof those ranks virtually bankrupted the 
cooperatives as a system” (Former Governor).  
Hence, the cooperative was an opportunity the government took to try to provide financing to 
farmers and other financially-excluded people. URT (1967); Binhammer (1975); Chant (1967); 
Westergaard (1973); Ndanshau (1996:78,82,84) would agree with these findings. I agree with 
their arguments that the state took over ownership of the big changing banks, so that they could 
align to this new operational framework, which in essence was built around cooperatives and 
villages. However, I also argue that the fundamental constraints of distance, affordability, scale, 
and risk remained (see Section 2.9 for further clarification). This was an issue that the changing 
political economy of the banking sector never resolved prior to the arrival of MM. This issue 
continued even in a more liberalised state under neoliberal and neoclassical policies. 
2.8 The Global Emergence of the FI Agenda 
As mentioned earlier, the neoliberal political economy created financial inequalities and the 
need for FI (Stiglitz, 2002; Duménil and Lévy, 2004; Duménil and Lévy, 2011). This section 
demonstrates that FI became a global agenda and what could be part of the inclusive neoliberal 
agenda. The agenda, therefore, involves global politics with the G-8 and G-20 countries also 
supporting it (Garrett, 2010). The emerging political processes and inclusive financial policies, 
as well as the relationship between supranational and national institutions help in the setting of 
FI policies and agendas (AFI, 2015:2; GPFI, 2011a:2-4; de Sousa, 2015:1). The governance of 
the FI agenda between global actors and state, governments and citizens, and state and non-
state actors created policies beyond the traditional boundaries of the state (World Bank, 2013). 
Neoliberalism tends to overcome traditional barriers of the state (Jonathan et al., 2016). 
Moreover, higher levels of FE influenced the neoliberal FI agenda.  
With 2.5 billion financially-excluded people (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015:13; Mehrotra and 
Yetman, 2015:84-85), the issue received global attention for the following reasons: (i) 
neoliberal policies had excluded the majority of the poor from accessing formal financial 
services, as a result, there was a need to make neoliberal policies more inclusive; (ii) 




crisis excluded more people from gaining access to formal financial services; (iv) there was a 
need for responsible delivery of formal financial services; (v) developing countries such as 
Tanzania and Kenya sought innovative ways of increasing FI, and MM technology emerged 
(see: Duménil and Lévy, 2011; Craig and Porter, 2007; Porter and Craig, 2004; Ostry et al., 
2016; Chiba, 2009). In 2008, as well as, in 2009, FI became a world priority (Prochaska, 2014). 
It became apparent that the neoliberal agenda and its political economy excluded more people 
by creating a big gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots.’ Diagrams 2.6 and 2.7 show the 
financial characteristics of financially-excluded and financially-included people. See further 
explanations in Section 2.2. 
Diagram 2.6: What is a Financially-Excluded Person Lacking? 
 





As demonstrated in Diagrams 2.6 and 2.7, there are consequences for a financially-excluded or 
financially-included person. What the two diagrams illustrate is that FI refers to a situation 
where financial services are available to all those needing them. Given the fact that more people 
in 2008 resembled the person described in Diagram 2.6, the 2009 G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh 
declared FI as their agenda and committed to supporting FI. This was the third G-20 meeting 
that discussed financial markets and the world economy. The two other meetings took place in 
2008, namely: (i) the G-20 ministerial level summit that welcomed financial ministers and 
central bank governors; (ii) the G-20 Heads of Government Summit. While the G-20 
Ministerial Level Summit in San Paolo prepared the agenda for the G20 Heads of Government 
Summit that took place in November in Washington DC, the G-20 Heads of Government 
Summit discussed financial markets, the world markets, and the world economy. The summit 
succeeded in terms of helping the G-20 leaders reach an agreement on how to cooperate in key 
areas to strengthen economic growth. This was in light of the 2008 financial crisis, and the G-
20 Heads of Government’s agreement laid a foundation for reforms to avoid the same crises in 
the future. The commitment to FI did not occur during this summit (see: AFI, 2015:1-2; GPFI, 
2011a:10; Timmermann and Gmehling, 2017; Timmermann, 2017; Culpeper, 2012; GPFI, 
n.d.).  
It was during the G-20 Heads of Government Summit in 2009 in Pittsburgh that the G-20 Heads 
of Government committed themselves to improving access to financial services for the poor. 
As mentioned earlier, the G-20 Pittsburgh Summit was the third meeting of the G-20 
discussions on financial markets and the world economy. According to GPFI (n.d.:2), the G-
20 commitment to FI included the launching of the G-20 FI Experts Group (FIEG) in an attempt 
to improve models of financing small and medium-sized enterprises as well as to identify 
lessons learned on innovative approaches to providing financial services. The FIEG would also 
promote regulatory and policy approaches and would elaborate standards on financial access, 
financial literacy, and consumer protection issues (see: AFI, 2015:1-2; GPFI, 2011a:10; 
Timmermann and Gmehling, 2017; Timmermann, 2017; Culpeper, 2012; GPFI, n.d.). 
The G-20 Pittsburgh Summit’s commitments were reinforced when the Heads of Government 
met again in Toronto in 2010 between 26th and 28th June.  They discussed the global financial 
system and the world economy. The summit’s agenda included: (i) the evaluation of financial 
reform progress; (ii) how to develop sustainable stimulus measures; (iii) debating global 
banking; (iv) promoting open markets. According to GPFI (n.d.:2), the G-20 Toronto Summit 




for the poor and called on the private sector to put forward its best proposal on how they can 
work with public entities to enhance the goals set for FI. The G-20 Heads of Government also 
endorsed a set of “principles for innovative financial inclusion” which “formed the basis of a 
concrete and pragmatic action plan for improving access to financial services amongst the 
poor” (Rosenberg, 2010). Later that year, they also created the Global Partnership for Financial 
Inclusion (GPFI) to implement their approved plan of action. To achieve the action plan, the 
GPFI works with other seven partners such as the CGAP, the Alliance for Financial Inclusion 
(AFI), the Better than Cash Alliance, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the World Bank (see: AFI, 2015:1-2; GPFI, 
2011a:10; Timmermann and Gmehling, 2017; Timmermann, 2017; Culpeper, 2012; GPFI, 
n.d.). 
The AFI assisted with the announcement and the adoption of the Maya Declaration principles 
in 2011. The Maya Declaration is a statement calling for the development of FI policy. The 
regulatory bodies, mainly the central banks, met at the ‘Global Policy Forum’ held in Mexico 
in 2011, and sought to: (i) create the right environment for FI; (ii) implement the correct 
frameworks; (iii) ensure customer protection measures; (iv) use data to track and inform FI 
efforts (AFI, 2015). Tanzania was and still is one of the participating members, and more than 
100 countries had adopted and implemented the Maya Declaration principles by the end of 
2013. Tanzania, for instance, by 2014 had: (i) created the right environment for FI; (ii) created 
its first national FI framework (NFIF); (iii) ensured the National Fair Competition Commission 
(FCC) works with other key FI stakeholders to protect financial service customers; (iv) worked 
with the Financial Sector Deepening Trust (FSDT) to conduct surveys for data collection which 
helped it to track FI progress. Hence, Tanzania, through the AFI, works with a network of 
financial regulatory bodies at a global level to align its FI plan of action. Moreover, the World 
Bank has also been of much help in advancing the FI agenda both at global and national levels. 
As demonstrated above, the G-20 initiatives and commitment to FI have received support from 
all over the world as different countries have collaborated with the G-20 countries to enhance 
and build inclusive financial systems. Some states have developed their ‘national policy 
actions’ towards FI. Likewise, a few countries have designed and executed NFIFs or National 
Financial Inclusion Strategies (NFISs) which set the stage for the FI vision based on concrete 




(TNCFI, 2014). These contexts and pieces of literature do not explain thoroughly the neoliberal 
policies, the growth of MM, and how the two facilitated FI.  
2.9 FE Issues and MM 
This section responds to FE issues I raised from the literature presented in this chapter. In this 
section, I seek to justify my conviction that linking MM and FE is relevant. The early effects 
were again that there was an open economy and that the doors were open to private ownership 
of banks. The government partly retained some participation, but indeed, the doors were open 
to the private sector. A whole range of new banks emerged, and some nationalised banks were 
privatised, by 2006, only 9% of the adult population was financially included in Tanzania 
(FinScope, 2006). Even when the government changed instruments from the cooperatives to 
community banks and microfinance, FE remained an issue. According to Beck et al. (2011:97) 
and Napier (2011), only 1% of the rural population saves with MFIs in rural areas, while 7% 
of the rural population fits this category. They argued this in 2011. Hence, neither the shift to 
state ownership and a cooperative system nor the liberalisation stage, succeeded in breaking 
these constraints. The above-mentioned instruments struggled to moderate the financial 
constraints caused by distance/access, scale, affordability, and risk management. Some other 
important factors that cause FE in Tanzania, that are relevant to the discussions of this 
dissertation are: ‘financial literacy’ and ‘culture’. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, none 
of the peer-reviewed literature for Tanzania and FE discusses these issues jointly in relation to 
MM. Chapter 6 discusses these issues.  
2.9.1 Lack of Access to Formal Financial Services 
“The reasons for challenges in access were obvious: “distance”, “space” and “scale”. No bank or a 
financial institution could open a branch where only five customers lived” (Former Governor).  
According to TNCFI (2014), the level of formal financial access in the rural areas was 8.5% 
compared to 23% in the urban areas, and the excluded rural population was 60% compared to 
45% in urban areas. The most significant constraint to FI or the main factor behind FE was, 
therefore, access. Banks, or Financial Institutions (FIs), could not provide services if they could 
not reach the people they wanted to serve. MM came as a new technology that helped reach 
the various segments of people at low costs. I also argue that access was an issue because the 
cost of opening a branch in rural areas could never be absorbed by the small number of people 
that formed single remote villages. The FIs always think in terms of maximising profit, which 




profit by reaching more financially-marginalised people. Chapter 6 explains this. In the 
Tanzanian context, it meant that if the FSPs only used the traditional system, there was no way 
they could go beyond where most of the branches now are (in a district, headquarters or small 
towns upwards). Hence, that was challenge number one. The first NFIF gave more emphasis 
on access and financial literacy (TNCFI, 2014). 
 
2.9.2 Financial Illiteracy 
According to TNCFI (2016:2), Tanzania has low levels of education among adults. Of the adult 
population, 76% completed primary education, while only 1.3% have a college or university 
education. 83.8% were capable of reading and writing in Swahili, while only 19.4% were 
capable of reading and writing in English. Most Tanzanians fall under the primary education 
bracket, and the majority of whom are financially excluded. Hence, there is a need for financial 
education to include the majority of the adult population financially. According to TNCFI 
(2016), financial illiteracy facilitates FE as people do not know the benefits of financial 
services, and therefore, do not receive formal financial services. Financial education, therefore, 
will help them to select the services they need and make informed financial decisions. 
Moreover, most of the adult population lives in rural areas where physical barriers to FI exist. 
2.9.3 Physical Barrier or Distance 
FinScope and InterMedia surveys conducted between 2006 and 2013 illustrated distance from 
financial access points as a barrier to FI. Proximity to financial services increased in 2017 as 
the population living five kilometres closer to financial services reached over 80% (FinScope 
2018:61) as compared to only 30% in 2012 (TNCFI, 2014:5). According to the following 
surveys: InterMedia, 2014b; InterMedia, 2017; FinScope, 2006; FinScope 2013a; FinScope, 
2018; TNCFI, 2014; TNCFI, 2018; TNCFI, 2017b; distance from financial institutions remains 
an issue to some of the adult population. Likewise, the affordability of financial services 
remained an issue since the ‘colonial capitalist’ era. During these eras, the costs of transactions 
remained high. Loans and credit were offered with high-interest rates, which constituted the 
affordability issue (Collier and Ganning, 1991; Ndanshau, 1996; Caselli, 1975; Chant, 1967).  
2.9.4 Issues with Financial Service Affordability 
Banking services were unaffordable to some segments of the population. This deterred FI to 
some people because they were unable to afford financial services through the mainstream 




 “I was interested I asked to visit the villages to have a couple of sessions with people, just to know 
why they don’t opt actually to put their money in a bank account instead of keeping it in their 
phones. Do you know the answer that I got? He said when you put money in a bank account, every 
end of the month, even when you never used your account, you would find a reduced balance. 
Because you know about the ledger costs, etc. Eh, but when you put money in e-wallets, that was 
what they said, even before profit sharing, your money is intact. Eh, and that is a big difference. 
Now I am sure if you ask them again, and on top of that I also still earn some profits on this mobile 
money side. So that was definitely a clear expression of why, eh, you know the clienteles were 
actually happy with the system as it was”.  
Hence, before the introduction of technology/MM services, the cost of service was so high that 
the ‘would-be-users’ of the formal financial system were not ready to absorb the exorbitant 
cost of services. Hence, one thing for sure that opened the door and moderated this issue was 
technology/MM services. It made sure that a bank or FSPs could reach as many people as 
possible, without investing so much in branch networks, or other systems that served everybody 
where they were physically located. Technology, and in this case, MM, made the cost of 
transfers and the cost of transactions to go down. 
 “Before technology, the cost was about 10 cents to a dollar, about 10%. After the introduction of 
mobile money, it went down to 1 cent to a dollar. That is one percent” (Former Governor).  
Thus, this is affordable! I could link ‘access’ to ‘affordability’. Issues of access and 
affordability of financial services determine who can access and who cannot have access to 
formal financial services. These were the two main targets that were being resolved by the 
introduction of technology and MM. Managing risks was also what MM tried to do. The banks 
regarded the poor as ‘high-risk clients’ and the rich as ‘low-risk clients’. The bank 
discriminated against the poor. MM tried to change this. Chapter 6 discusses these issues 
extensively. 
2.9.5 Risk Management Issues 
Banks regarded low-income people as a risk. The banks’ KYC requirements were strict, and 
most low-income people could not meet them. Hence, they could not access financial services 
through the banking sector. 
 “You know the usual system would take many days and uncertainties to make transfers. This 
[mobile money] was almost instantaneous, eh and virtually risk-free because there is virtually no 
timeline between sending and you getting confirmation that it is here. Immediately you push the 




releases risks. So, it is convenient, it is secure, and it is affordable. And those were the three main 
features that certainly were behind if you want the big push to get from exclusion to that degree of 
inclusion that you find today” (Former Governor). 
Chapter 6 discusses these risk issues. They are introduced here to help me focus later on what 
MM moderates. Also, unrelated to risk management is the cultural factor. 
2.9.6 Cultural Issues 
Culture plays a vital role in excluding some people. In some cases, the head of the family was 
the one to deal with financial issues.  
“Some women are not allowed to keep the money. The woman is told this. She engages in farming, 
this is a very important factor, she engages in farming, and she is told, your husband will keep your 
money” (Director BOT).  
In other cases, some people thought the banks were too clean and too fancy for them to even 
come close to a branch. They thought the banks were not for low-income people. 
 “Because you know there is, there was a story, but it is true that some customers, much as I don’t 
know if you normally get across those kinds of funny pictures, they normally tease them like these 
are Nyakyusa people, that you go to the bank, and that they leave their sandals outside. And then 
they get inside” (Senior TBA).  
For this reason, I argue that there is a perception that bank branches are set to the highest 
standards and that they are too clean for the local low-income people. From this section, I argue 
that any policies, neoliberal or non-neoliberal, either cause FE or FI. These policies and reforms 
rarely shape other factors such as ‘culture’. However, neoliberal policies and reforms do shape 
factors such as ‘affordability’, ‘distance’, ‘risk management’ and ‘financial illiteracy’. 
Thus, it was important to go back into the fundamentals of what helped to break the constraints, 
so that one could be able to understand: (i) the neoliberal  reforms and policies, and how these 
reforms and policies have changed the banking sector; (ii) the economic and political views 
used, as well as the approaches and instruments used by policymakers. I thought my analysis 
of FE and MM could be told, but alongside my analysis, I found out that the emergence of MM 
occurred to resolve technical constraints that needed solutions. In fact, without solutions to the 
constraints of distance, risk management, affordability, and scale it would be challenging to 
reach the financially excluded people. Understandably, neoliberal policies helped to bring 




MM provided those solutions to the financial sector (see Chapter 6). Hence, the neoliberal roll-
back and roll-out policies supported the efforts to reach FI through MM services. See Chapters 
5 and 8.  
2.10 Conclusion 
The chapter analysed FE and FI literature to depict the past and current contexts of FE and FI 
in Tanzania and across the world. It demonstrated what we know about FE, FI, neoliberalism, 
and MM. It considered whether there were research works that were closely related to my 
research. It clearly stated that research on FE and FI rarely combined neoliberal policies, and 
how they helped MM services moderate the factors of FE and facilitate FI. My intent is to 
demonstrate that my research tries to bridge this gap.  
The literature also indicated that neoclassical views, as part of the neoliberal agenda, 
emphasised profit and utility maximisation, which played a role in excluding disadvantaged 
individuals. Other literature also mentioned the classical views, which tried to correct the 
neoliberal and neoclassical market failures (Hurwitz and Manne, 2018; Robinson, 1962). 
The literature also suggests that the neoclassical views favoured technological advancement to 
lower costs, maximise profit, and to run services and businesses efficiently (Schmookler, 1962; 
Ruttan, 1997). These views discouraged the government’s intervening role in the economy. 
The role of classical theory in curbing exclusion, facilitating technological development and 
innovations (such as MM) to enhance both the liberty of the individual, and their privacy in 
their economic activities, is also presented in the literature (Hurwitz and Manne, 2018).  
I delineated the issue of banking and FE in Tanzania. I also explained the factors of FE, such 
as: lack of access to formal financial services, financially illiteracy, physical barrier and 
distance, the unaffordability of financial services, and risk management issues. I also argued 
that MM came to moderate these factors of FE and to facilitate FI. The literature discussed 
builds a wide range of FE and FI scenarios but fails to consider MM and its relation to the 
discussion of FE, FI and neoliberal policies. I also mentioned that this was where my research 








Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Chapter Overview  
This chapter presents the theoretical framework that forms the basis for conceptualising the 
role of neoliberalism in facilitating the growth of MM, and the role of MM in moderating FE 
as well as in promoting FI. Firstly, the chapter discusses what we know about the theories or 
theoretical frameworks that are used to study MM, neoliberalism, and the issues of FI and FE. 
Secondly, the chapter identifies the theoretical gap that exists in this research area. Thirdly, the 
chapter describes how this research addresses those gaps, and fourthly, the chapter explains the 
theoretical framework chosen to underpin this study and how it works. Fifthly, it explains other 
key concepts. 
From the literature the chapter finds that there are different theories, theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks underpinning the studies of MM, neoliberalism, and issues of FE and FI (Kim et 
al., 2018; Dahlberg et al., 2008; Duncombe and Boateng, 2009; Diniz et al., 2011; Cahill et al., 
2012; Peck et al., 2012; Lwoga and Sangeda, 2019). There is a big gap between the issues of 
MM and FE in terms of the existing research theoretical frameworks. Theoretical frameworks 
tend to embrace more MM and FI issues. However, most of the researchers studying the 
problems of exclusion and poverty rely mostly on the following schools of thought: classical, 
neoclassical, Keynesian, neoliberal, Marxist and radical views, social exclusion and social 
capital (Davis and Sanchez-Martinez, 2015). The systematic reviews conducted so far to study 
MM, FI and development classify the areas of research into three main clusters: delivery of 
mobile financial services, environmental factors supporting mobile financial services, and the 
impact of mobile financial services (Kim et al., 2018). The main issues emerging from the three 
clustered areas of research include: agent network, interoperability, intention, perception, usage 
pattern, regulation, sociocultural factors, demographic, impacts on FI and economic 
development (also see: Kim et al., 2018; Dahlberg et al., 2008; Duncombe and Boateng, 2009; 
Diniz et al., 2011; Lwoga and Sangeda, 2019; Zaremohzzabieh et al., 2014; Thapa and Saebo, 
2014; Mbuyisa and Leonard, 2017; Duncombe, 2016). My research indicates that current 
research on the theme of MM, FI and FE, and neoliberalism or development is still in the 
nascent stage. Kim et al. (2018) concur with these views. Duncombe and Boateng (2009:1250) 
claim: 
 “… overall, there is a noticeable lack of in-depth qualitative case studies that could provide a basis 




My research uses in-depth unstructured interviews to resolve this research gap and to provide 
a basis for theorising. They also claim that studies on mobile payment need more than one 
theory:  
“M-finance research related to the design and adoption has been fairly well conceptualised, drawing 
more strongly on approaches borrowed from innovation research. Conversely, needs and impact 
research is more conceptual, and consequently appears not to be following a well-defined and 
thought out research trajectory … one reason for this may be that the complexity of influencing 
factors makes it challenging for practitioners and researchers to conceptualise needs and assess 
financial impact within a single model-based approach” (Duncombe and Boateng, 2009: 
1252).  
I came across these difficulties and decided to conceptualise my research using classical and 
neoclassical perspectives around the ‘RCA’ as explained later in this chapter.  
The chapter consists of seven sections. Section 3.2 discusses the current state of research in 
MM, FI and FE, and neoliberalism. It identifies the various theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks to determine the research gap in theoretical frameworks. Section 3.3 discusses the 
different schools and perspectives of neoliberalism, and it selects the ‘RCA’ to underpin this 
research. Section 3.4 explains the theoretical framework chosen for this research. Section 3.5 
provides further insights on classical and neoclassical perspectives. Section 3.6 delineates how 
the ‘RCA’ fits into the proposed theoretical framework. Section 3.7 discusses the issues of 
neoliberalism and technological innovations, while Section 3.8 concludes the chapter’s 
discussions.  
3.2 The Current State of Research in MM, FI and FE, and Neoliberalism 
MM devices have become an essential mean of promoting FI (Kanobe et al., 2017). Its 
mobility, always-on availability, and personalised features make the delivery of mobile-based 
financial services accessible (Evans and Pirchio, 2014). There are few systematic research 
articles that examine the theoretical and conceptual frameworks used to study MM and other 
related ICTs for FI and development (Kim et al., 2018; Dahlberg et al., 2008; Duncombe and 
Boateng, 2009; Diniz et al., 2011; Lwoga and Sangeda,2019; Zaremohzzabien et al., 2014; 
Thapa and Saebo, 2014; Mbuyisa and Leonard, 2015; Duncombe, 2016). 
From studying the systematic literature reviews examining the different research works on MM 
and FI as well as other ICT related issues, I discovered that a significant number of research 




of MM and ICT for development research using qualitative methods for data collection and 
analysis (Lwoga and Sangeda, 2019; Duncombe and Boateng, 2009; Kim et al., 2018). 
According to Duncombe and Boateng (2009), no single theory provided a ‘valuable initial 
understanding’ for analysing Mobile Financial Services (MFSs). Many theories and 
approaches have also been used to study MM and its related issues (Kim et al., 2018; Dahlberg 
et al., 2008). Research approaches, including theoretical and conceptual frameworks, are 
grouped to fit into the categorisation of issues addressed through the various models and 
approaches used (Duncombe and Boateng, 2009). These conceptual and theoretically-based 
approaches include: (i) theoretically-based approaches which test and apply a specific theory; 
(ii) framework-based approaches, which use a framework for analysis derived from ‘a body of 
theoretical work’; (iii) model-based approaches which employ models without ‘reference to a 
deeper body of knowledge’; (iv) concept-based approaches, which employ defined concepts 
not theoretically grounded; (v) category-based approaches, which prescribe a set of factors to 
carry out analysis (Duncombe  and Boateng, 2009).  
Regarding MM and other MFSs, the conceptual frameworks seem to be conceptualised around 
innovation. Some other frameworks assess the financial impact of MM and other digital 
financial services. Some other related theories tend to deepen the understanding of how 
financially-excluded people gain access and use of formal financial services. The contexts for 
these studies differ from one research to the next, and from one country to another. For instance, 
Peruta (2018) uses a macroeconomic approach through cluster analysis to conceptualise 
patterns of adoption of MM in emerging and developing countries.  
According to Duncombe (2011), conceptual approaches are significant in looking at the process 
that links the use of ICTs to measures of outputs, outcomes or impacts (also see: Lwoga and 
Sangeda, 2019). These conceptual and theoretical frameworks use different theories to study 
MM. There are also individual studies that chose the use of theories or models only. Lwoga 
and Sangeda (2019) categorise these theories as ‘explanatory’ and ‘predictive’. Explanatory 
theories are those focusing on social capital, socioeconomic issues, network analysis, 
technology adoption, and development. Examples of explanatory theories used to study MM, 
and FI include: contingency and systems theory (Dahlberg et al., 2008); diffusion of 
innovations theory (Munyoki et al., 2015); theory of change (Aro-Gordon, 2017; Betete et al., 
2018); etc. Predictive theories, on the other hand, tend to focus on microeconomic analysis. 




people, financial deepening, connectivity, and economic growth (see: Lwoga and Sangeda, 
2019; Duncombe and Boateng, 2009). 
From the findings of the systematic reviews mentioned in this chapter, as well as from my other 
literature reviews presented in Chapter 2, certainly, the existing theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks delve into neoliberalism, MM, and its role in FI and FE separately. Hence, my 
proposed theoretical framework, as presented in Chapter 1, and as presented in this chapter, 
tries to bridge this gap by providing a framework capable of explaining all of these issues 
together. The next section describes the different schools and theoretical perspectives of 
neoliberalism to help build the theoretical framework underpinning this study.  
3.3 The Different Schools and Perspectives of Neoliberalism 
There are different theoretical perspectives, also used as methodological perspectives, that 
facilitate the discussions, and analyses of neoliberalism. They differ in their epistemological 
and ontological views that define neoliberal policies, reforms, and how markets are constructed. 
The theoretical perspectives express the views of the following schools of thought: ‘historical 
institutionalists’, ‘regulation theorists’, ‘Foucauldians’, ‘Marxists’, ‘Polanyi-inspired scholars’ 
and the ‘experts on the history of neoliberal ideas’. These perspectives:  
“provide useful foundations for further progress in understanding and challenging neoliberal 
ideologies and practices” (Edwards et al., 2012:1).  
Different theoretical perspectives see neoliberalism as a process that facilitates the construction 
of markets through social, economic, and political means. 
 “This is a common ground, that as far as we are aware, has not previously been demonstrated so 
comprehensively” (Edwards et al., 2012:2).  
The perspectives also explain why studies of neoliberalism differ or deviate from each other. 
They also delineate the different ways of contributing to the neoliberal debates as well as the 
social construction of markets. Firstly, neoliberalism is a socially-constructed reality, and for 
this reason, its effects are demonstrated differently in different realities. Secondly:  
“by combining this diversity with a theoretical and methodological plurality, a sophisticated and 






3.3.1 The RCA 
Of the above-mentioned schools of thought, this research employs the ‘regulatory capitalism’ 
tradition, a perspective from the ‘regulation theorists’ (see: Edwards et al., 2012:5; Braithwaite, 
2008; Levi-Faur, 2005). This approach fits well with neoliberal policies of regulation, 
deregulation, liberalisation, and privatisation. These policies are key in explaining the growth 
of MM, and its role in moderating the factors of FE as well as in enhancing FI. The RCA can 
also be explained by using the classical and neoclassical views of regulation and deregulation 
(also see: Majone, 1992; Majone, 1997; Self, 2000; Booth, 1997). The ‘regulatory’ approach 
examines the significant transformations brought about by neoliberal policies. Inclusive 
neoliberal policies are part of these transformations. The approach also recognises the role of 
the government and regulatory bodies in the market economy and at times contrasts neoliberal 
concepts of ‘small government’ and ‘free-markets’. It does not state that ‘small governments’ 
and ‘free-markets’ are bad, but it states that the reality of neoliberal reform has, at times, 
deviated from ‘small governments’ and ‘free-markets’. Both classical and neoclassical 
perspectives to regulation agree with these views. Thus, neoliberal policies, in some cases, have 
not been: 
 “associated with a decline in state power, rather than state regulators have been reconfigured … 
This has led some to view neoliberalism as a ‘misnomer’, as captured in Braithwaite (2008:4) 
description of the ‘neoliberal fairy tale’” (Edwards et al., 2012:5).  
The theorists in this tradition and their areas of expertise include: the capture theory (Stigler, 
1971), regulatory capitalism (Braithwaite, 2008), the regulatory state (Majone, 1997), the 
regulation of entry (Djankov, 2002); tollbooth theory (Djankov, 2002); the regulatory society 
(Braithewaite, 2003); the post regulatory state (Scott, 2004); the domestic politics of banking 
regulation (Rosenbluth and Schaap, 1993); the public interest theory of regulation (Hantke-
Domas, 2003); deregulation revolution (Vogel, 1996).  
3.3.1.1 RCA and Neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism is a dominant ideology of global capitalism, and with it comes the RCA (also 
see Flew, 2014). Regulation is increasingly perceived as a significant part of governance 
(Braithwaite, 2008). Levi-Faur et al. (2005) claim that this large part of governance includes 
the expansion of the scope, arena, instruments, and depth of regulation. The government 
continues to regulate, and in some cases, it shares with or delegates regulatory responsibilities 




capitalism, therefore, is seen as a networked order spreading the scope and depth of regulation 
(Busch et al., 2005; Way, 2005). Neoliberalism provided capitalism with new agility and 
dynamics, that raise concerns on the efficiency of the markets and the design of the institutions 
that govern our nations and the world in general (Levy-Faur, 2006; Blyth, 2002; Kalyvas, 1994). 
In this sense, the state collaborates with national and international actors to create governance 
structures that assume regulatory or leadership responsibilities to help increase the efficiency 
of the markets. 
“Yet neoliberalism did not appear on its own, and it hardly reflects all or even the most important 
aspects of change. It takes two to tango … the new capitalist order is mediated by regulation in 
general and the rise of the regulatory state … and regulatory society in particular … Indeed, the 
notions of neoliberalism on the one hand, and the regulatory state/society on the other are major 
contenders for the best label to capture. The nature of change. Both portray major aspects of change, 
and we aim to make the most of both by suggesting the notion of regulatory capitalism as a phrase 
that conveys their essence and something more. Change is best epitomised by the coevolution of 
neoliberal and regulatory hybrids of governance regimes, where controls are achieved by the 
supreme command of the two regulators: the market and the state. While neoliberal systems of 
control are manifested in the marketisation of social and economic life, regulation supplies the 
means to promote, sustain, and control marketisation” (Levi-Faur, 2006:497). 
Neoliberalism, therefore, is aimed at the deregulating and shrinking of the public sphere. 
Paradoxically, the world has witnessed more regulation (Levi-Faur, 2009; Ayers and 
Braithwaite, 1992; Ruhl and Salzman, 2003). Regulation has resulted in new forms of 
governance where the state and non-state actors perform regulation. This new order is known 
as the RCA where the state meets the regulatory society (Levi-Faur, 2009) or uses the PPPIs to 
coordinate how the markets work. The NFIF is an example of these PPPIs where the different 
regulators meet to coordinate inclusive financial activities as well as to set the regulatory 
standards that facilitate these activities, including the deployment of MM to help achieve FI. 
3.3.1.2 Linking the RCA, Neoliberalism and the Issues of FE and FI in GPE 
According to Balaam and Veseth (2001), the financial structure is one of the key dimensions 
of the global political economy. It is perhaps the: 
 “most abstract set of linkages between and among nations”.  
The financial structure also determines the pattern of money flows between and among nations, 
and can also help us to understand a specific country’s financial structures and the issues 




access to money or formal financial services, and how and on what terms. Financial structure, 
therefore, is: 
 “really a description of how certain resources are allocated and distributed between and among 
nations” (Balaam and Veseth, 2001).  
Thus, researching financial structures and services help to understand the issues of FE and FI. 
This research uses MM services and the response of the banking sector to MM as part of 
studying Tanzania’s financial structure. 
Neoliberalism encourages regulatory capitalism through the PPPIs. These PPPIs are decision-
making bodies or frameworks. It is important to know who is included and who is excluded 
from these decision-making bodies. As Mooslechner et al. (2006:xxii) suggest: 
“finance is considered the exclusive terrain of experts, pointing to widespread exclusion through 
expertise are common, as expertise knowledge represents a normative framework”. 
The inclusion of the MNOs in the NFIFs, which is a PPPI, allows the MNOs to voice MM and 
financially-excluded people’s concerns. The regulators are part of the PPPI and get the 
opportunity to listen to the concerns of the different FI stakeholders. In return these 
arrangements ease any regulatory issues or tensions. 
The PPPIs and their political-economic arrangements remain in touch with their roots in 
classical political economy (Underhill, 2006:16, 17, 18, and 20). 
“Adam Smith observed that there was an ongoing tension between the private interests and the 
needs of the wider community - a tension between the pursuit of self-interest and the public good” 
(Underhill, 2006:17).  
Through classical political economy’s concern with history: 
“that over time, there is a systematic but not always linear relationship between the changing ways 
in which societies organise production and exchange on the one hand, and emerging patterns of 
governance on the other” (Underhill, 2006:18).  
This explains the emergence of the RCA over time. What the new PPPIs do is reducing the 
costs of operating the markets. Markets cannot thrive without the reduction of transaction costs, 
which governance structures such as the PPPIs provide (Underhill, 2006:20). 
 “The central role played by finance in political and economic systems, the secrecy in which many 
financial decisions are made, the arcane character of the technical language that those in finance 




popular concern with the relationship between finance on the one hand and the problem of inclusion 
and exclusion on the other” (Porter, 2006).  
Finally, it is worth noting that the RCA differs from ‘the political thought’ approach which 
studies and:  
“traces the lineage of political ideas by observing their genealogy and evolution and the various 
branches and derivation that emerge” (Edwards et al., 2012:3).  
3.3.2 The Political Thought Approach 
The political thought approach uses two schools, namely: ‘ordoliberal’ and ‘paleoliberal’ (also 
see: Friedrich, 1955; Peacock and Willgerodt, 1989; Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009; Ptak, 2009; 
Massimiliano, 2010; Emmett (2012)). The ‘ordoliberal’ school rejects the idea that effective 
and fair markets are naturally occurring and would emerge spontaneously, it also reckons free 
market failures and how they facilitated the rise of fascism in Germany (Megay, 1970; Edwards 
et al., 2012:4; Friedrich, 1955:512). The ‘paleoliberal’ school opposes the ‘ordoliberal’ 
approach and supports free markets as “natural phenomena that appear spontaneously” 
(Edwards et al., 2012:4). The ‘paleoliberals’ argue that state intervention disturbs the markets 
and that markets do business better than the state (Hayek, ([1933]/1975; Hayek, 1949; 
Friedman, 1951; Van Horn and Mirowski, 2009). The idea was that the minimal role of the 
state would help markets operate freely and efficiently. The above two approaches wouldn’t 
work better for my research as the growth of MM or the transition from FE to FI depended 
heavily on the regulatory role of the BOT and the TCRA. During the era of neoliberal reforms 
in the 1990s, Tanzania’s neoliberal experience was founded on the ‘Washington Consensus’ 
template. The template embraced more ideas from the ‘paleoliberal’ and not from ‘ordoliberal’ 
perspectives. My research, therefore, determined that the ‘regulatory’ approach could explain 
better the growing role of MM in moderating FE than the two above-mentioned schools would.  
3.3.3 The Polanyian Approach 
An alternative to the ‘RCA’ is the ‘Polanyian approach’ which criticises the doctrine of 
‘laissez-faire’, and the belief that the economy is separate from society and politics. The 
Polanyian approach sees economic processes as embedded in both ‘economic and non-
economic’ institutions (Edwards et al., 2012:4; Polanyi, 1957:250; Campbell and Pedersen, 




 “fallacy of free markets that it overlooks (or deliberately silences) the role of institutions in 
patterning the distribution of economic resources” (Edwards et al., 2012:4).  
It analyses the embeddedness issues (Edwards et al., 2012; Barber, 1995; Block, 2003; Gemici, 
2008; Polanyi, 2001; Ruggie, 1982). According to Polanyi (1957), markets are institutional 
structures, and thus, they are institutional constructions. Therefore, they tend to disembed 
themselves from their institutional context (also see: Gemici, 2008; Levien and Paret, 2012).  
Hence, to re-embed them again re-regulation seems to be an option:  
“Undoubtedly, our age will be credited with having seen the end of the self-regulating market” 
(Polanyi, 2001[1944:148]).  
Although this research borrows some ideas from Polanyi on re-regulation of the markets, the 
embeddedness issues are not the focus of my research. For this reason, this approach was not 
selected as the main theoretical perspective for the analysis of this research. 
3.3.4 Varieties of Capitalism Approach 
Furthermore, another alternative approach to analysing neoliberal policies is the ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ approach. The ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach uses comparative and empirical 
analysis to study the institutional basis of economic relations (Edwards et al., 2012; Hall and 
Solskice, 2001; Coates, 2005; Hanké, 2009). The approach challenges the assertion that ‘there 
is no alternative to capitalism’ (TINA) (Edwards et al., 2012:4), the famous phrase from 
Margaret Thatcher, who thought that historical facts created a neoliberal state. This approach 
claims that there are different types of capitalism and that they operate differently depending 
on where they are applied. ‘Stakeholder capitalism’ is a version of a coordinated market 
economy where different stakeholders receive different benefits of the capitalist economy, and 
this model of capitalism is used mostly in German and in Scandinavian countries (Wolfgang 
and Yamamura 2005). Contrarily, ‘shareholder capitalism’ is a version of the liberalised market 
economy where profit maximisation and the interests of the shareholders come first (Vogel, 
2019; Freeman et al. 2011). This model of capitalism is mostly applied in the United States, 
the UK, and most western English-speaking countries (Dore, 2000; Freeman et al. 2011). Since 
the aim of this research was not to study the different types of capitalism, the ‘varieties of 






3.3.5 The Foucauldian Approach 
Likewise, the Foucaldian governmentality approach was not appropriate for this research as it 
seeks to study governmentality concerns (Focault, 2008) such as the “modalities, rationalities, 
mechanisms, and techniques” (Edwards et al., 2012:5) that seek to illustrate state control over 
different citizens. Focus is on the mechanisms used to control citizens and make them behave 
properly (Edwards et al., 2012; Focault, 2008; Miller and Rose, 1990; Rose, 1999; Barry et al., 
1996; Dean, 1999; Hindess, 1996). In this regard, the Foucaldians either study the “forms of 
control that operate by punishing people” or those forms of power that reckon “people’s beliefs, 
preferences and desires to be shaped for themselves” (Edwards et al., 2012:5). These views 
resemble the RCA views that the government applies so much:  
“power and control over society as ever before, and that neoliberal reforms are not about liberating 
people from the state, but rather institute a different way of organising and regulating people” 
(Edwards et al., 2012:5).  
According to Konings (2012:60), Foucaldian governmentality perspectives assume “the 
proliferation of governance mechanisms in social life has meant an attenuation of the centrality 
of the formal state, but this tends to produce the image of neoliberal capitalism as a movement 
of ‘disembedding’”. As the governmentality issue was not at the core of my research issues, 
this approach was not selected as the main approach to studying the issues of this research. 
3.3.6 The Marxist Approach 
Additionally, the Marxist approach could not be the main methodological perspective as the 
research design focused on FE, FI, the growth of MM, and the response of the banking sector 
and not on class conflicts or communism. Some Marxists could inform us on how neoliberalism 
created classes and some forms of exclusion (Duménil and Lévy, 2011). The Marxist approach 
studies class struggle and social exclusion issues (also see: Dahrendorf, 1959). The Marxist 
approach to studying neoliberal policies emphasises class relations and how neoliberal 
practices transform societies (Edwards et al., 2012; Duménil and Lévy, 2011; Harvey, 2005; 
Duménil and Lévy, 2004). In other words, the Marxist approach is about studying the 
restructuring of relationships of class power within societies (Edwards et al., 2012:6). 
According to Birch (2016:111), this approach instils a ‘market ethic’ across society. There was 
not much to gain from this approach in terms of studying MM, and how it moderates the factors 
of FE, as the users of MM services come from different social classes, both the rich and the 




3.4 The Theoretical Framework 
Chapter 1 (Section 1.4) briefly introduced the proposed theoretical framework. Diagram 3.1 
summarises the theoretical framework. See Chapter 1 to review the explanations for Diagram 
3.1. This section seeks to expand on what has been said in Chapter 1 about Diagram 3.1. The 
theoretical framework helps to answer the research questions, in the next chapters, by providing 
explanations for the development of MM through neoliberal roll-back (deregulatory) and roll-
out (re-regulatory) policies. It also facilitates the explanations for MM and its role in 
moderating FE and promoting FI through classical and neoclassical views (also see Chapters 
2, 4 and 5). In this regard, the two views are complementary. While the neoclassical view 
advocates the maximisation of profit and utility for firms and individuals, it also assumes that 
these firms and individuals are rational and make choices rationally, and therefore state 
intervention should be limited, as individuals make consistent choices or preferred alternatives 
from what is available to them. The perspective assumes that individuals and firms are the best 
judges of their own actions (Ogus and Veljanovski, 1984). Thus, deregulation allows firms and 
individuals to make independent choices. As we will see later in Chapter 5, deregulation was 
key to the emergency of MM. Classical perspective, on the other hand, does not contend that 
all individuals are rational. From the classicist perspective, some regulations are needed to 
correct any market failures. FE is one of those market failures. The classicist would advocate 
the removal of any forms of exclusion. To prevent technological advancement without 
regulations, the classicists would support some forms of regulations to minimise market 













Diagram 3.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
The neoclassical and classical perspectives explain better rolling out and rolling back 
neoliberalisation (see Section 3.6, Chapter 1, Section 1.4, for the details of Diagram 3.1) with 
regard to deregulation and re-regulation. Deregulation also includes liberalisation and 
privatisation of some of the economic and financial sectors. All these concepts support the 
constructivism of neoliberal markets. The ontological assumptions of neoliberal debates 
support the assertion that markets are socially constructed, and that ‘neoliberalism is an all-
pervasive, and constantly evolving epistemology’ centred on promoting and constructing 
markets (Cahill et al., 2012; Birch, 2016; Swarts, 2013). These market constructions and the 
capitalist realities they cherish create market success or failure, which forces the government 
to regulate or deregulate certain aspects of the market and capitalism. It is also concluded that 
the epistemological assumptions of the roll-back and roll-out neoliberal perspectives are 
consistent with the assumptions of Scott’s (2006) political economy of capitalism (see Section 
3.6.5.) as well as with the neoclassical and classical perspectives (Blyth, 2013; Swarts, 2013). 
All these above-mentioned theoretical perspectives support the constructivist paradigm of 
society, innovations, and markets. They can explain the different neoliberal policies during the 





3.5 Classical and Neoclassical Perspectives: Further explanations 
From the theoretical framework, and as depicted in Diagram 3.1, it is evident that neoliberalism 
is a coherent worldwide project causing political-economic transformation through rolling back 
and rolling out neoliberal policies. These are political-economic issues for various reasons. 
Firstly, neoliberalism opposed the Keynesian-welfarist and national development regulatory 
arrangements, and became a global project during the post-1970s period and has spread 
throughout the world ever since (Duménil and Lévy, 2001; Crotty, 2003). From deregulation, 
privatisation, and liberalisation to stricter regulation than it was during the Keynesian era, 
neoliberalism provides possibilities for economic and financial solutions to global markets 
(Brand and Sekler, 2009), which reinforces the role of neoliberalism in political-economic 
discussions. Whether it is a rolling out or rolling back neoliberalism, it is done to enhance either 
public or private interests through deregulation or re-regulation. Secondly, rolling back and 
rolling out neoliberalisation can result in FE or FI. There is literature to support that rolling 
back neoliberalisation caused a lot of people to lose their jobs, and the disparity between the 
rich and the poor increased (Duménil and Lévy, 2011). Thus, this fostered exclusion. Contrarily, 
rolling out neoliberalisation corrected some of the rolling back adverse outcomes. There is 
evidence that rolling out neoliberalism facilitates the provision of formal financial services for 
financially-excluded people (Claessens and Rojas-Suarez, 2016). The G-8 and G-20 realised 
this and supported FI, as discussed in Chapter 2. Thirdly, during the rolling back phase, the 
neoclassical theory was vital to forcing the reduction of government interventions as it sought 
to create competitive markets where both firms and individuals strived to maximise profits and 
utility through rational means for their survival (also see: Tadaro and Smith, 2002; and Shakow 
and Irwin, 2002). The result was increased exclusion during the rolling back phase (also see; 
Sassen, 2014; King and Rebelo, 1990; and Christiaens, 2019a). The classical views helped 
rolling out policies by supporting state intervention through re-regulation to defend those 
excluded economically and financially, as described earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 2.  
Neoclassical perspective provided a comprehensive logic, if not a limited account of how the 
markets worked under any conditions. The view suggested that prices, wages, and rents were 
all determined by the market conditions of demand and supply. Without government 
intervention, the neoclassical position claims that individuals are rational creatures who 
coordinate their market and economic activities rationally. Both individuals and firms 
maximise the utility of their actions to the point that no further profit from their actions will be 




created the concept of ‘marginalism’ in defence of ‘rational’ market decisions (Self, 2000:7). 
Furthermore, the neoclassical position considers micro and macro approaches.  It assumes that 
if markets were to operate efficiently at appropriate price levels:  
“a general equilibrium would be reached, where all available resources would be fully utilised” 
(Self, 2000:7).  
In most cases this general equilibrium never arrived; more people continued to be excluded in 
economic and financial terms. Why was the neoclassical view not a silver bullet solution? 
According to Self (2000:7-8): 
“The original neoclassical thinkers carried over into their theories the philosophical baggage of the 
utilitarians. Just as these viewed ‘mankind’ as under governance of two sovereign masters, pain and 
pressure … so did the economists assume that consumers would constantly strive to maximise their 
expected ‘utility’: a shadowy concept supposed to underlie their preferences but unable itself to be 
measured. ‘Utility’ really explained nothing, unless one could swallow the idea that market price 
somehow measured the pleasure that an individual received – or expected to receive …”. 
In the financial sector, for instance, the costs to access financial services were high (GDP, 2009; 
The Economist, 2015a; AusAid, 2010:13). The poor could not access formal financial services. 
Thus, they could not maximise their unexpected financial service utility. The number of 
financially-excluded people exceeded the number of financially-included people. All this 
raised the question of market failures. The neoclassical perspective had its share as the cause 
of some market failures (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.2). For instance, first and foremost, the 
assumption of perfect competition and information were controversial. Some theorists argued 
that perfect competition and markets did not exist (Sraffa, 1926; Kirzner, 1987; Stamate and 
Musetescu, 2011). Monopolies, oligopolies, or price cartels, as well as different products and 
services, did not share the same market details. The level of competitiveness differed from one 
market to another. This might have affected how individuals and firms make rational market 
decisions. The neoclassical assumptions about rationality and motivation were empirically 
inaccurate. The assumptions that market actors were rationally driven to maximise utility 
seemed to be equally inadequate (also see: Soukoup et al., 2015; Zafirowski, 2008; Hinden, 
1977; Hodgson, 1998; Hodgson, 2012). In some cases, individuals did not plan their 
transactions rationally as assumed by economists. They were sometimes ignorant or 
uninformed, erratic or indifferent. Sometimes their situations conflicted with the pursuit for 




Likewise, the concept of general equilibrium is also controversial. Reaching a general 
equilibrium would be hard in ever increasingly changing markets. As market factors change, 
they also alter the equilibrium. Theorists argue that it takes time for the markets to reach their 
full equilibrium given increasing technological changes, and that: 
 “an equilibrium point holds only for a given set of consumers’ tastes and available technology. As 
tastes and technology change (and the drive of actual capitalist systems is towards rapid change), 
so the positions of market equilibrium alter. Hence, the theory of equilibrium is consistent with 
continuous instability rather than the spontaneous harmonisation of all resources, which it seems to 
imply” (Self, 2000:9).  
All these issues provided a chance for the classical theorists to fire back. As the liberalisation 
of markets was assisted by deregulation, and in some cases such liberalisation did not bring the 
expected economic outcomes depending on a variety of factors, it followed that neoclassical 
theory was not a silver bullet solution. Liberalisation and deregulation policies posed specific 
market and economic risks. The classical theorists were spotlighted again, criticising these 
trends. It took the classical theorists to understand deregulation and its relationship to financial 
regulation and economic laws or antitrust (Majone, 1992). As neoclassical theorists agree, the 
classical theorists also see that institutions aim to achieve their economic objectives. To achieve 
these objectives, the competition should be favourable in terms of: Firstly, setting prices close 
to incremental costs to allow purchasing and production decisions that minimise economic 
waste. Secondly, achieving efficient production processes could help institutions meet their 
financial objectives. Thirdly, innovation to improve production processes helps institutions 
achieve their economic goals (Majone, 1992). Classical theorists understand the constructivist 
nature of the markets and seek to understand the hidden issues of the markets (Bell, 1981:77).  
According to Majone (1992:20-21): 
“From a classical perspective, these economic benefits, perhaps like happiness and reputation, are 
best secured when one does not aim at them directly. Decentralised individual decisions made in a 
workably competitive marketplace or more likely to prove economically efficient, to bring about 
efficient production processes, and to encourage desirable innovation than are the centralised, 
bureaucratic decisions of the economic regulator. The classical theory emphasises the many 
systemic institutional features of the regulatory system that prevent them from ever coming close 
to replicating the effects of well-functioning competitive markets. The classicists nonetheless find 




According to the classicists, regulation or re-regulation becomes unavoidable in some cases. 
The classicists and neoclassicists help us explain rolling out and rolling back neoliberalisation, 
and their roles in allowing deregulation, re-regulation, and the survival of innovations such as 
MM. While market failures, a lousy economy, increasing inequalities, and so forth provided 
salient reasons for re-regulation to prevent dysfunctional markets or to correct ‘market defects’, 
regulation was used as a weapon of last resort to reverse economic and financial failures. 
Classicists, for instance, provided examples of natural monopolies where economies of scale 
were too large to permit a single firm to monopolise the entire market through production at 
the lowest costs. Also, the classicists expressed concerns about market information asymmetry 
or exorbitant rents that might have necessitated direct governmental intervention. According 
to Majone (1992:21), the classicist seeks to protect the consumer from unfair market practices, 
and he depends on laws and regulations to do so and to preserve competitive markets. 
Regulation, in this case, is regarded as ‘a weapon of last resort’ (Majone, 1992:21). Hence, the 
classicists offer a credible theoretical perspective to help explain the reasons used to help reach 
financially-excluded people. The research uses those explanations and links them with the 
advent of MM technology through deregulation and re-regulation policies of both the banking 
and telecommunication sectors. The rationale for these policies is curbing market failures, 
exclusion of all sorts, and the necessity to re-regulate some sectoral services to correct market 
failures as well as to eradicate any forms of exclusion. 
3.6 How Does the ‘RCA’ Fit in the Theoretical Framework? 
Neoliberalism operates under finance-led capitalism (Soederberg, 2013). The RCA helps the 
research to unveil the emergence or enhancement of the neoliberal policies of deregulation, 
regulation, liberalisation, and privatisation. The approach can do so because neoliberalism has 
two faces. Firstly, the ‘roll-back face’, which is the face showing ‘the destructive and 
deregulatory moment’, and secondly, the ‘roll-out face’, also referred to as the ‘creative and 
regulatory moment’ (Peck et al., 2012: 24; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Peck, 2010). According to 
Peck et al., 2012:22-23): 
“Roll-back processes tend to be predominant with the initial onset of neoliberalisation … projects 
are typically focused on dismantling alien institutions, disorganising contending centre of power, 
deregulating zones of bureaucratic control, disciplining potentially unruly (collective) subjects. 
Often prosecuted in the name of deregulation, devolution, and even democratisation, this offensive 
is typically associated with attacks on labour union, planning agencies, entitlement systems, and 
public bureaucracies, by way of the now-familiar repertoire of funding cuts, organisational 




revolution tends quite quickly to encounter predictable limits – neoliberalism’s own object lessons 
in market failure”. 
According to Peck et al. (2012:23-24): 
“Roll-out neoliberalisation is both a creative and reactive process, reflecting both tactical and 
strategic responses to the limitations, failures, and unmanaged externalities of preceding 
experiments in deregulatory roll-back. Examples of such roll out-roll back dialectics in particular 
policy fields have included: labour-market flexibility and deregulation policies, coupled with 
welfare setbacks, leading to the downstream imperative to develop ‘in work’ support systems for 
the working poor; privatisation … private monopoly abuses … overreach in trade liberalisation, or 
financial deregulation, in cases of market economic dislocation, any market failure, being followed 
by exceptions-to-the-rule ‘deals’ and re-regulatory ‘corrections’”. 
In some cases, neoliberalism produced undesired outcomes, which were destructive to some 
institutions, practices, and identities. It continued to feature in the political-economic moment 
for more than three decades. To explain the persistence of neoliberalisation, its failures, 
successes and role in transforming societies, some theorists use a ‘historical analysis’ of 
neoliberalisation capable of explaining the reasons for roll-back neoliberalism through which 
institutions, and policies of the post-war welfare state were rolled back (Birch, 2016; Campbell 
and Pedersen, 2001). Neoliberalism has always generated controversial results. According to 
Peck and Tickell (2002) and Lockie and Higgins (2007:3), this paved the way for the 
development of roll-out neoliberalism from the early 1990s. According to Graefe (2005:3), the 
roll-out phase: 
 “rejuvenated neoliberalism in more socially interventionist and ameliorative forms, in order to 
regulate, discipline and contain ‘those marginalised or disposed by the neoliberalisation of the 
1980s”. 
 According to Rogerson et al. (n.d.:11), roll-out neoliberalism placed “the importance of social 
aspects” in the neoliberalisation processes. The RCA embraces the social aspects and help 
create different forms of governance such as the NFIFs, which depend on classical and 
neoclassical points of view. According to Birch (2016:112): 
 “there is now a general agreement amongst (academic) critics that neoliberalism does not entail 
erosion or hollowing out of the state, primarily because the state is necessary to institute, maintain 
and enforce the market”.  
The rolling back of the state creates the need for new forms of governance needing the 
rolling out of the state through other means. Moreover, the rolling back is accompanied 




neoliberal agenda (Foster and Byrne, 2014). Hence, public and private actors form 
partnerships to govern and regulate financial and economic activities referred to as the 
‘RCA’.  
3.6.1 Roll-Back and Roll-Out Neoliberalism and their Importance in 
Regulation/Deregulation 
According to Peck and Tickell (2002), the roll-back moment was the deregulatory phase of 
neoliberalism while the roll-out phase was the re-regulatory phase of neoliberalism (see Table 
3.1). Benner et al. (2010:13) refers to these phases as “from the uneven development of 
neoliberalisation” (to refer to the deregulatory roll-back phase) to “the neoliberalisation of 
regulatory uneven development” (to refer to the roll-out uneven re-regulatory development) 
(see Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1: Roll-Back and Roll-Out Neoliberalisation 
 
Several neoliberal theorists reported the ‘rolling back’ of the state (Kelsey, 1993) as the state 
withdrew from social and economic spheres. The roll-back phase was a project that started in 
the 1930s and 1940s as an opposition to the Keynesian political-economic order and a return 
of the economic liberalism of the 19th century to fit into 20th-century institutions (Brenner et al. 
2010; Friedman, 1951; Hayek, 1949). Different types of liberalisms helped neoliberalism to 
consolidate itself.  
“Neoliberalism built on the dispersed ideational resources found in the situated liberalisms of 




Keynesian. Neoliberalism was thus effectively born in an already transnationally networked, 
intellectually hybrid, and uneven developed ideological form” (Benner et al., 2010: 211 citing 
Peck, 2008). 
Due to this joint base that neoliberalism had in different forms of liberalism, and also the 
inefficiencies of Keynesian economic policies, the roll-back policies of the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s gained global momentum in shaping institutions and markets. As shown in Table 3.1, 
the state withdrew from markets or at least reduced its influence, and cut public expenditure, 
which affected social policy and welfare. Deregulation of economic and financial markets took 
place. The financial sectors were liberalised and public institutions were privatised, which 
recorded mass unemployment, as more people lost their jobs, and as companies sought to raise 
their profits. Job losses were also one of the critical causes of social and financial exclusion. 
Economies in bad shape adopted structural adjustment programmes. All this reflected: 
 “the particularities of the conjunctural crises in which there were no clear-cut resolutions” 
(Benner et al., 2010:213). 
 In general, the roll-back deregulatory phase caused more economic and financial issues than 
expected. This is where the contribution of this research comes in. More and more pieces of 
literature criticise the roll-back phase of neoliberalism because of the crises it created. 
Contrarily, this research argues that there were also good things that roll-back neoliberalism 
did, such as the facilitation of the development of fintech technologies, and the development 
of MM as discussed in this dissertation. Moreover, the previous neoliberal failures helped 
create the inclusive neoliberal agenda, as discussed in Chapter 2. Neoliberal theorists have 
recently argued that: 
 “new forms of state activity are being rolled-out under neoliberalism” (Dodson, 2006:225). 
 The roll-out regulatory phase sought to respond to the challenges created during the roll-back 
deregulatory period. FE and income inequalities were some of these challenges. With the state 
trying to reduce its influence in the markets, new forms of governance allowed the state 
participation in the markets as the re-regulation phase gained momentum. The new 2015 
regulations in Tanzania’s financial sector and in MM services were part of the re-regulation 
experimentation (see: URT, 2015a; URT, 2015b; URT, 2015c; URT, 2015d). Regulatory 
experiments were vital as they were used to help regulatory bodies learn from their past 




which allowed policymakers to test new financial services before introducing strict regulations 
(see Chapter 5). According to Benner (2010:18): 
“Regulatory experiments within contemporary capitalism necessarily emerge within unevenly 
developed institutional landscapes that have always been shaped and reshaped by a wave-like 
succession of market disciplinary reforms. The collision between newly emergent regulatory 
strategies – whether market disciplinary or otherwise and such inherited geo-institutional 
landscapes is likely to further differentiate patterns of regulatory uneven development at all spatial 
scales and across places and territories”. 
Hence, regulation is essential because it is one of the key features in the development of any 
market system. Regulation refers to the management of complex systems according to a set of 
rules and trends. The following reasons can be used to call for regulations: Firstly, 
inefficiencies in the markets leading to market failures; secondly, the state’s desire to help 
specific groups of people access certain types of markets; thirdly, regulation may be used to 
eliminate or create opportunities for particular markets and businesses; and fourthly, regulation 
may be used to create a fair playing ground for everybody in the markets. Thus, the 
development of any market depends on the nature of regulation and its legal framework. Booth 
(1997) refers to three critical approaches to regulation from the lenses of political economy that 
shape regulation, namely the: (i) market socialist approach; (ii) public versus private interest 
approach; (iii) neoclassical approach. There is also a fourth approach, known as the classical 
approach (Majone, 1992:21). 
3.6.2 Political Economy of Regulation 
Firstly, the socialist market approach applies where productive resources are owned by the state 
(Le Grand and Estrin, 1989; De Jasay, 1990). 
“It was believed that complete regulation and state ownership of the sector was desirable, because 
of the central planning board would have a much wider knowledge of conditions, consumer 
preferences, and costs in the economic system as a whole than any private entrepreneur would have 
under capitalism. This particular argument, therefore, recognized the market for its information 
processing role and maintained that the central planning board could perform that role not just as a 
regulation, but in controlling every aspect of the market” (Booth, 1997:677). 
The results were that the socialist market approach created a monopoly of state enterprises. The 
economy was the inward-oriented or closed economy. As a result, investments were crowded 
out in most socialist economies. Corruption increased, and the financial sector was inefficient. 




Collier and Gunning, 1991). Tanzania was a socialist economy for over 25 years and suffered 
most from these economic symptoms. There was a need for reforms for the above-mentioned 
market failures. The first step was to deregulate and remove the state from the markets. The 
next step was to embark on neoliberal reforms. Roll-back neoliberalisation was the more 
appealing option at that time. Hence, countries deregulated their economic and financial 
sectors, allowing more rooms for liberalisation and privatisation of economic and financial 
activities. As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, deregulation paved the way to the CLF, which 
made the advent of MM possible. During the neoliberal reform era, the implemented reforms 
supported deregulation and sought to minimise or make regulations more cost-effective. For 
instance, the liberalisation and expansion of financial markets promoted by neoliberal 
institutions were not only key to the restoration of the upper class in the financial sector but 
also allowed innovations, including technological innovations, in the financial sector 
(Neubauer, 2011; Harvey, 2005:145). This made it easier to coordinate global financial markets 
and eased the provision of services from one place to another place with speed and efficiency 
(also see, Neubauer, 2011; McGuian, 1999:386).  
Secondly, the public versus private interest is another approach to regulation. According to 
Hantke-Domas (2003:165):  
“the public interest theory explains in general terms that the regulation seeks the protection and 
benefit of the public at large” (Hantke-Domas, 2003:165).  
The other, the Chicago theory, also known as the private interest theory: 
 “suggests that regulation does not protect the public at large, but only the interests of groups”.  
In this regard, if FI is a public interest, the government will protect it. FE has for a long time 
been in the interests of the banking sector, as banks did not desire to serve risky and financially-
excluded populations. The PPPI was established to resolve these issues as it is depicted in 
Chapter 2. The next section discusses the two-remaining political-economic approaches to 
regulation, namely: classical and neoclassical approaches.  
3.6.3 Classical and Neoclassical Approaches to Regulation 
Both neoclassical and classical schools of thought argue against the socialist market approach, 
claiming that the markets are in a better position than governments to process relevant 




stance, and mostly leaning towards the ‘rolling back’ and ‘rolling out’ policies, as well as to 
classical and neoclassical views.  The neoclassical school, for instance, argues that the: 
“ .. consumers are seen to react to prices and product quality, and to organise their consumption 
patterns in a way which is efficient, given their budget constraints and the prices they face … 
suppliers react to relative costs to find the most efficient way of producing a product the process by 
which this maximises economic welfare … many of the justifications for regulatory intervention 
arise because the conditions under which competition is said to lead to the optimisation of economic 
welfare do not, necessarily hold in practice” (Booth, 1997:678). 
Furthermore, the classical approach provides a possible framework to analyse markets and 
regulations. It views the market as realistic. The Austrian school of thought also supports it. It 
differs from the neoclassical approach in the sense that it supports different philosophical 
disciplines. Hence, it provides a more concrete understanding of the market than the 
neoclassical approach, and it includes the economics of law and the degree to which it uses 
various frameworks to impinge on markets (Booth, 1997:676). The Austrian school provides 
this alternative for the justification of a free market regulation as it sees:  
“the market, primarily, as an institution for communicating and using the information being 
naturally dispersed ... The free market is efficient because the participants in the market only need 
to know information relating to prices and costs, which is relevant to their own decisions … It is 
not possible for the government to centralise the information regarding costs and benefits of a 
particular course of action, and use that information to direct productive resources and determine 
prices, because the costs and benefits of a particular action are known only to those who undertake 
that action … Whilst the Austrian approach might suggest that detailed regulation and central 
planning would undermine the market, regulation which enforces the prediction of information may 
be compatible with the Austrian view” (Booth, 1997:678). 
The classical approach seeks to manage organisations and markets more efficiently. The 
classicists agree that it is essential to limit government intervention and that it is important to 
keep free markets free of potential barriers to their efficient operation. The classicists also 
consider regulation as their perspectives agree on supporting the fact that the Long-Run 
Aggregate Supply (LRAS) is inelastic, and that the real GDP is determined by supply-side 
factors – the level of investment, the level of capital, the productivity of labour, etc. The 
classicists also suggest that in the long-term, an increase in aggregate demand (faster than 
growth in LRAS) will cause economic issues such as inflation and will not increase the real 
GDP. Hence, some mechanisms to correct this issue, such as regulation, become imperative in 




The advent of MM, as well as Tanzania’s current regulation of MM is an example of 
deregulation and re-regulation policies of the telecommunications and financial sectors, as well 
as the practicality of neoclassical and classical approaches to regulation. These two approaches 
complement each other and are used as the fundamental theories for this study. Conducive 
regulatory and legal frameworks have been put in place to further MM advancement and FI. 
Before these frameworks, deregulation and liberalisation of the telecommunications sector 
allowed the introduction of the CLF, which permitted innovation to spread across different 
economic sectors. This involved the flexibility of the regulators who dealt with many and very 
varied market players. When the markets mature, and many players join them, the regulators 
must weigh the public against private interests to protect the wider society as well. This also 
falls under the umbrella of the RCA as described in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.6.  
3.6.4 What do We Learn from These Political Economic Approaches to Regulation? 
The ‘RCA’ is an umbrella of all these approaches to regulation except for the socialist market 
approach. All these regulatory approaches, as viewed from the above-mentioned political-
economic lenses, illustrate their compatibility or incompatibility with neoliberalism. While the 
neoclassical and the classical approaches embrace the neoliberal concept, the socialist approach 
does not. There are also some limitations to these approaches. For instance, the neoclassical 
approach to market regulation is regarded as incomplete as it fails to explain the behaviour of 
the regulator. This could be explained by the ‘capture’ and ‘tollbooth’ theories (Djankov et al. 
2002). The ‘capture’ theory explains how various stakeholders, including politicians, capture 
the regulator to get some favours from him (Stigler, 1971). Furthermore, the ‘tollbooth’ theory 
asserts that not everybody is equally affected by the same regulations (also see: Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998; Kroszner and Strahan, 2000; Raddatz, 2006; Braun and Larrain, 2005). These 
perspectives may be used to explain the role of policies affecting financial market 
developments and their distributive consequences. It is also argued that it is through the various 
stakeholders that regulation creates and extracts rents/favours from the regulated industry (also 
see: De Soto, 1990). 
The classical approach, on the other hand, interlinks law and economics in such a way that 
legal structures can undermine or support free competition. The Austrian school believes in 
legal and regulatory frameworks as a condition for the proper functioning of the market. Legal 
and regulatory frameworks were vital to implementing MM and inclusive financial services, 




with innovations. Think about an innovative market and how incompatible legal and regulatory 
frameworks could have stifled innovations and MM services. In the case of Tanzania, MM 
innovations led the market. The regulations came later. In this case, the regulation did not drive 
innovation, and this is credited for successful MM development in Tanzania, as shown in 
Chapter 5. According to Booth (1997:695), “by the nature of innovation, it will not be possible, 
once an activity is directed by regulation”, to predict the development of the innovations. In 
most cases, regulation if wrongly implemented deters the fast growth of innovation.  
3.6.5 Breaking Down the RCA into Government Roles and Modes of Intervention   
Neoliberalism fosters capitalist policies and markets. Capitalist economies operate on a three-
level system. See Diagram 3.2. 








Source: Scott (2006). 
The market occupies the first level, where the competition takes place; the institutional 
foundations that underpin those markets occupy the second level; the political authority that 
administers the system holds the third level (Scott, 2006). Some forces help shape capitalism, 
neoliberal systems, and policies. They are referred to as: ‘invisible’ and ‘visible’ hands. The 
invisible hand is the one that coordinates the supply and demand mechanisms of economic and 
financial markets. The visible hand is the one that the state uses to organise the modernisation 
of market frameworks by changing circumstances (see Table 3.2).  To this end, the state has 
two distinct roles, namely: the administration and provision of the institutional structures and 
infrastructure, as well as the administration of laws and regulations including the mobilisation 
of political power to bring about modernisation of those structures and infrastructure (Scott, 
2006). In Tanzania, the government implemented these roles by creating conducive and legal 
frameworks that allowed the implementation of FI and MM growth, as demonstrated in 
Chapters 2, 5, 7, 8. Hence: 
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 “for a capitalist system to evolve in an effective developmental sense through time, it must have 
two hands and not one: an invisible hand that is implicit in the pricing mechanism and a visible 
hand that is explicitly managed by government through a legislature or a bureaucracy” (Scott, 
2006). 
Despite the reduced role of government in the neoliberal era, two forms of state intervention 
have persisted: ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ with the government assuming the role of an 
administrator and an entrepreneur. 
Table 3.2: Government Roles and Modes of Intervention   
Roles Modes of Intervention 
 Direct Indirect 
Administrative Operate State-Owned Enterprises • Enforce Laws and Regulations 
• Maintain Infrastructure 
Entrepreneurial Take Property (Buy/see/grow State-Owned 
Enterprises) 
• Pass New Loans 
• Issue New Regulations 
• Build New Infrastructure 
Source: Scott (2006:3). 
The direct involvement of the government occurs when markets coordinate themselves without 
the need for plans and orders from the government. At times, new markets form without 
regulations or the existence of appropriate infrastructure which forces the government to act 
and provide the needed support and regulations. The advent of MM in Tanzania demonstrated 
this pattern (see Chapter 5). Furthermore, the government intervenes directly to safeguard 
public interests. Indirect interventions occur when the government uses the complicated system 
of governance to specify the responsibilities of the various actors in the markets for the safety 
and serviceability of the products and services, as well as when it sets the conditions under 
which they are produced and distributed (Scott, 2006). This may also lead to the designation 
of a strategy with the involvement of the government and various stakeholders (Scott, 2006: 4-
5). The NFIF is an example of this in Tanzania. See Chapters 2, 5, and 7.  
The government also takes the administrative role to ensure that the existing capitalist and 
financial systems work effectively. The government also takes an entrepreneurial role as it 
mobilises ‘power’ to achieve legislative authorisation to make changes, whether in laws, 
regulations or the provision of public goods such as infrastructure (Scott, 2006: 2-3). The 2015 
NPSA and its regulations to increase efficiency in both banking and MM services is an example 





3.7 Neoliberalism and Technological Innovations 
Technological innovations advance the neoliberal agenda and transform economies (Neubauer, 
2011). Neoliberalism weakens or relaxes national sovereignty over trade, encourages capital 
flows, and defines the lines between fiscal and monetary policies to enhance free trade. 
Technology also favours free markets and trade. McManus (2018) argues that new technologies 
in the neoliberal era have created new identities. What technology and neoliberalism do is to 
create a ‘global citizen’. Global citizenship connects individuals globally through technology. 
It lets them access and enjoy services that they would not ordinarily be able to enjoy in non-
neoliberal environments or through less developed technologies (Neubauer, 2011).  
Schumpeter and Solow recognise the use of technology in wealth creation, redistribution, and 
economic development (Solow, 1956; Acemoglu, 2009). Firstly, Schumpeter demonstrated 
how the capitalist system is affected by market innovations through his ‘creative destruction 
process’ (Scherer, 1986). According to Carayanis (2013), Schumpeter describes how new 
market reflects the “process of industrial mutation that constantly revolutionises the economic 
structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, by creating a new one”. Secondly, 
the Solow model is a technological process that explains long-run economic growth through 
capital accumulation, labour growth, and productivity (Holtz-Eakin, 1992). According to 
McManus (2018), the impact of technological transformations in a neoliberal state is massive. 
Technologies have aligned with neoliberal ideology bringing transformations with positive and 
negative implications. There is also the role of technology in legitimating contemporary forms 
of capitalism (Fisher, 2010; Clair, 2016). Digital technologies are also a mechanism for the 
dissemination of market logics and services through neoliberal forces that foster: (i) 
‘entrepreneurship’ where neoliberal governments encourage entrepreneurism among their 
citizens (Amable, 2011; Botanski and Chipello, 2005; Brown. 2015; Clair, 2016; Dardot and 
Laval, 2014; Wacquant, 2010); (ii) ‘market-faith’ which is the tendency of making consumers 
have faith in products and services provided by the various markets (Clair, 2016; Campbell and 
Pedersen, 2001; Cerny, 2010; Clarke, 2004; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000;  Giroux, 2004; 
Mirowski, 2013);  (iii) ‘profit-maximisation’ the view that products and services should be 
placed in markets and their prices should maximise the economic profit that the seller receives 
and that neoliberalism opens up new field of capital accumulation in areas that were considered 
as off-limits to the equation of profitability (Clair, 2016; Chomsky, 1999; Harvey, 2005; 
Harvey, 2007); (iv) ‘efficiency’ a way of providing quality, speedy and cost-effective products 




cost-effective manner as well as a way to implement ‘best practices’ of the government (Clair, 
2016; Clarke, 2004; Gere, 2002; Jessop, 2002); (v) ‘individualism’ where individual interests 
and values are preferred over those of the community as neoliberalism adopts the ethos of 
individual responsibility. The individuals become responsible for their own survival (Clair, 
2016).  
3.7.1 Regulation and Technology 
Technological changes or innovations affect law and regulatory governance. Innovations and 
technology are legally disruptive and transformative; legal and regulatory frameworks, as well 
as the institutions, are always challenged by new technologies and innovations. This is 
demonstrated by, for instance, the latest issues emerging in contract laws and their applications 
to e-commerce (Hutton, 2015; Brownsword et al., 2016; Brownsword and Yeung, 2008). 
Technological disruptions extend beyond the legal order to regulatory order. New technologies 
have tendencies to disrupt the existing regulatory frameworks, and by doing so, they also 
undermine the regulatory legitimacy, which triggers calls for some regulatory reforms 
(Brownsword et al., 2016; Brownsword and Yeung, 2008). There is a broad agreement in the 
literature that law and regulation are challenged by new technologies (Brownsword, 2008). 
Therefore, neoliberal roll-back and roll-out principles should apply accordingly to limit some 
of these challenges. 
According to Mandel (2016), the key issue for the regulation of technology concerns ‘how’ 
and ‘when’ regulations should be adopted as technological innovations evolve. There is also 
the issue of “technology neutrality” and the slow pacing of law and regulation which is 
compared to the ‘tortoise’ as opposed to the rapid pacing of innovation compared to the ‘hare’ 
(Moses, 2016). Technology neutrality is one of the key principles of regulatory frameworks for 
electronic communications (Maxwell and Bourreau, 2014). In Europe, the principle was first 
introduced in 2009 (OECD, 2011). In Tanzania, it was introduced in 2005. Technology 
neutrality means three things:   
“Meaning 1: technology neutrality means that technical standards designed to limit negative 
externalities (eg., radio interference, pollution, and safety) should describe the result to be achieved, 
but should leave companies free to adopt whatever technology is most appropriate to achieve the 




“Meaning 2: technology neutrality means that the same regulatory principles should apply 
regardless of the technology used. Regulations should not be drafted in technological silos” 
(Maxwell and Bourreau, 2014:19). 
“Meaning 3: technology neutrality means that regulators should refrain from using regulations as a 
means to push the market toward a particular structure that the regulators consider optimal. In a 
highly dynamic market, regulators should not try to pick technological winners” (Maxwell and 
Bourreau, 2014:19). 
“In practice, Meaning 1 and Meaning 3 can overlap. A regulator may impose a given technological 
solution both as a means to limit harmful externalities, such as radio interferences (Meaning 1), and 
a means of structuring the market in a certain way (Meaning 3)” (Maxwell and Bourreau, 
2014:19). 
From the three meanings of technology neutrality, what comes from Meaning 1 is that the 
regulator does not only limit interference in performance standards, which are the standards 
describing the expected output, but also the structure of the market (Meaning 3). She/he needs 
to define the scope of regulation and to adapt to new technologies without issues with 
jurisdictional boundaries (Meaning 2). Meaning 2 assures that the regulators establish the rules 
that are ‘technology neutral’ to allow the convergence between the electronic communications 
networks and services. The regulators, therefore, cannot impose a particular technology on 
mobile operators (Maxwell and Bourreau, 2014; Kannecke and Körber, 2008). This principle 
took it to the spectrum licenses, and the principle of ‘service neutrality’ was established. 
Spectrum licenses allowed the licensed businesses not to be restricted in the services they 
offered. This was key in allowing telecommunications companies in Tanzania to provide 
financial services. MM was a result of these spectrum licenses. 
The central debates also centre on how to ‘regulate technology’ (Brownsword and Yeung, 2008) 
and on how existing legal and regulatory frameworks need to change in responding to the rapid 
technological changes (Moses, 2016). Some believe in the ‘neutrality of technology’ and others 
believe in ‘non-neutrality of technology” (Maxwell and Bourreau, 2014; Shallis, 1984; Ellul, 
1990; Pursell, 1994; Postman, 1979). Shallis (1984) asserts that agreeing with the proposition 
that technology is neutral is accepting the technological imperative. Some technologists would 
argue that technology is neutral. Those who question the ‘neutrality of technology’ say that the 




effects, all depends on how it is used. To this end, technology is neither good, bad, nor neutral. 
(Ellul, 1990, Postman, 1993; Pursell, 1994). 
3.7.2 Technological and Service Neutrality and their Applications in Tanzania 
According to Materu-Behitsa and Diyamett (2010:1): 
“The Communication Act of 1993 paved the way for the liberalisation of the telecommunication 
sector, while the National Telecommunication Policy (NTP) of 1997 provided the framework for 
further reforms and private-sector engagement in the sector. A milestone in telecom liberalisation 
was achieved by the establishment of the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) in 
2003, as an independent agency for the regulating and licensing of postal, broadcast and 
communication industries. The TCRA is mandated to promote competition and economic efficiency, 
protect consumer interests, grant licenses and enforce license conditions, regulate tariffs, and 
monitor performance”. 
Before the neoliberal roll-back and liberalisation phase, thus deregulation, of the 
telecommunications sector, the Tanzania Telecommunications Company Limited (TTCL) 
monopolised the sector. It was also responsible for the regulation of all telecommunications 
activity. The broader liberalisation of the economic policies in Tanzania, allowed the 
establishment of the 1993 Tanzania Communication Act (TCA), which speeded up the 
government’s move to liberalise the telecommunications sector. The 1997 NTP triggered 
further reforms in the sector (Adam, 2005; Nogahella, 2006). 
In 2005, Tanzania introduced the CLF through the TCRA, which facilitated the regulation of 
licensed communications operators, their technologies and services. It also supports the 
development of converged services (Nkoma, 2010; Mwalongo and Hussein, n.d.; Mfungahema, 
2014). The CLF was designed to embrace technology and service neutrality to help the 
regulators impose no particular technology on mobile operators and other communications 
technologies. According to Materu-Behitsa and Diyamett (2010), the CLF was used as a pivotal 
strategy to implement the full liberalisation policy of the telecommunications sector. Through 
the CLF regulatory flexibility has been possible in addressing market and technological 
development (Gunze, 2014). The CLF also allows efficient utilisation of network resources 
and supports market entry of small-scale operators (Nkoma, 2010). Two principles guide the 
CLF: technological neutrality and service neutrality. Technological neutrality allows licensed 
firms to employ any technology they want for communication services. The technology 
neutrality principle is also flexible for the adoption of new technologies. According to 




 “a licensee retains the ability to choose the technology and equipment to be used to provide the 
licensed service. The spirit is to have the best not to turn Tanzania a damping place”. 
Moreover, service neutrality is the other principle of the CLF, which allows licensed firms to 
provide different types of services in any sector. It also allows communication operators to 
embark on the provision of various services. The TCRA, therefore, has the power and mandate 
to issue licenses according to the 1993 TCA and the 2003 TCRAA. The CLF is guided by the 
2005 Tanzania Communications Licensing Regulations, which name the types of licenses 
issued in Tanzania. The CLF groups the licenses into four main categories, namely: ‘Network 
Facility License’ (NFL), ‘Network Service License’ (NSL), ‘Application Service License’ 
(ASL), and ‘Content Service License’ (CSL).  
“Under the NFL category, a licensee is authorised to install, own, control and provide access to 
electronic communications facilities, such as fixed links, radio communication transmitters, satellite 
stations, submarine cable, fibre/copper cable, towers, switches, etc., to other licensed operators on 
a commercial basis. The NSL category allows a licensee to operate and maintain public electronic 
communication networks with various technologies (like CDMA, GSM, WCDMS, WLL, ADSL) 
that involve intelligent network platform signalling control, traffic distribution, switching 
translation and quality of services control. Examples of network services include mobile services, 
fixed-line services, bandwidth services, and broadcasting distribution services” (Materu-Behitsa 
and Diyamett, 2010:7). 
Moreover, the ASL also: 
 covers the provision of electronic communications services to end-users. Access to these services 
can be through the establishment of private facilities and networks, or through procurement and 
reselling of services from licensed facilities or/and network service providers, e.g., Internet Service 
Providers, Virtual Mobile providers, Payphone Services, or Fixed/Mobile Services. The CSL covers 
the provision of content services such as satellite broadcasting, broadcasting terrestrial free-to-air 
TV, terrestrial radio broadcasting, subscription TV, and other broadcasting services” (Materu-
Behitsa and Diyamett, 2010:7). 
3.7.3 The Essence of the CLF and the Regulatory Environment 
According to Mfungahema (2006), the CLF defines the: (i) market structure; (ii) level of 
competition; (iii) pace of infrastructure expansion; (iv) affordability and range of services 
available to consumers. It is also used as a tool to exercise control over many variables to 




“The main challenge in the regulatory environment is building capacity to maintain a proactive 
legal framework that can keep the pace with the rapidly changing telecommunication technology 
and e-business environment. The areas that need attention include data access rights, privacy 
protection, computer frauds and crimes, security, and privacy of e-transactions, the establishment 
of rules of governing e-transactions, delivery of e-opportunities to the wider population. TCRA has 
been instrumental in the development of the electronic and postal communications bill, which has 
provisions for these”. 
As stated earlier, Tanzania’s telecommunications regulatory environment is founded on the 
CLF, which allows various competitors to enter and leave the telecommunications market 
easily (also see: van Gorp and Maitland, 2009; Boshe, 2013; and Moshiro, n.d.). The easy entry 
requirements have boosted competition and have aided the growth and success of mobile 
telephones and MM services. The Ministry for Communications, Science, and Technology 
oversees the functions of the telecommunications sector through the help and function of an 
independent TCRA mandated to restructure and liberalise the telecommunications sector to 
foster competition and to create conducive conditions for the private sector to operate in the 
sector.  
The TCRAA clearly states the functions of the Ministry and regulatory bodies such as the 
TCRA and the FCC (URT, 2003b). The FCC was established by the 2008 Fair Competition 
Act (FCA) 8 to promote and protect both businesses and consumers from unfair and predatory 
market abuses. The FCC also intervenes to ensure fair competition among various competitors 
in the market. It also prevents price-fixing, and market monopoly. Furthermore, it regulates the 
market as well as ensuring stability. The TCRAA provides the FCC with the mandate to deal 
with all competition issues. Hence, the FCC co-exists with other regulatory frameworks across 
the different sectors. 
One of the regulatory issues that arose from the telecommunications sector was the lack of 
legal provisions and regulations for electronic money transactions and electronic transactions 
in government business, which the Bank of Tanzania only provided from 2015. This is one of 
the examples of rolling-out the government, and thus, re-regulation. 
3.7.4 The National Payment System (NPS), its Provisions and Regulations 
Besides the CLF, the NPS is also key to the growth and success of MM services in Tanzania. 
According to Bossone and Cirasino (2001), the payment system is a facility that guarantees the 




and inter-bank fund transfers. According to Masoy (2017), the key payment systems users 
include the central bank as the regulator and monetary authority in Tanzania, financial 
institutions and banks, and all those who manage, own or use the payment systems such as the 
infrastructure providers such as telecommunications company, payment system end-users such 
as firms and individuals, payment system providers such as swift or card operators, regulatory 
authorities such as the TCRA and TRA. Other stakeholders of the payments systems include: 
the international monetary authorities such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and regional authorities such as the East African Community (EAC) and the South 
African Development Commission (SADC). 
In Tanzania, the payment system is regulated by using pieces of legislation and regulations: 
Firstly, the 2015 NPS Act (NPSA). Secondly, the 2015 licensing regulations also known as the 
2015 Payment Systems Licensing and Approval Regulations (PSLARs). Thirdly, the 2015 
Electronic Money Regulations, also known as the 2015 Payment System Electronic Money 
Regulations (PSEMRs). The NPSA and the two pieces of regulations provide the legal and 
regulatory framework for payment systems in Tanzania. See Chapters 2, 5, and 7 for more NPS 
details. 
3.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I started by identifying key existing literature on the conceptual and theoretical 
approaches to studying MM and other related ICT for development, FE, and FI issues. By 
doing so, I identified the gaps and proposed my theoretical framework as a bridge. I also 
discussed the different theoretical perspectives on neoliberalism. I selected the ‘RCA’ as 
appropriate for this research. Classical and neoclassical views guide the approach of this 
research to investigate neoliberal rolling back and rolling out policies. I also explained the key 
concepts and issues of the theoretical framework and how they applied to my key research 
issues to help answer the main research questions. Most conceptual and theoretical frameworks 
do not bring together the puzzle of neoliberalism and MM growth for FI through classical and 
neoclassical views. The theoretical framework for this research brings these concepts together. 
By doing so, it distinguishes itself from the previous conceptual and theoretical frameworks. 
The theoretical framework can provide an understanding of neoliberalism and its role in the 
growth of MM via rolling back and rolling out policies. Under the rolling back and rolling out 
neoliberal eras, the ‘RCA’ helps to unveil how neoliberal policies of deregulation (including 




and Higgins, 2007; Graefe, 2006; Self, 2000; Majone, 1992; Majone, 1997). Markets are 
constructed. Neoliberalisation supports the assertion that markets are socially constructed 
(Birch, 2016; Swarts, 2013; Mirowski and Phlehwe, 2009; Van Horn and Mirowski, 2009; 
Davies, 2010; Mirowski, 2013). The classical and neoclassical views under the umbrella of the 
RCA are key to explaining the need for re-regulation or deregulation that occurred while 
constructing the markets during the neoliberal era (Majone, 1992; Majone, 1997). Through the 
neoclassical and classical theories, it became easier to explain whether regulation or 
deregulation was implemented to safeguard public or private interests. Through re-regulation 
and deregulation, the advent of MM became possible through the CLF. Being technologically 
neutral, the CLF as mentioned earlier, favoured innovations and new technologies such as MM. 
Neoliberalism itself uses technology to advance itself. Likewise, the NPSA and its regulations 
in the banking sectors were also facilitated through the re-regulation of the NPS activities. Also, 
there is literature that backs the role of neoliberal, classical and neoclassical views on 
technological advancement (Comin and Hobijn, 2004; Butter and Hofkes, 2006; Leistert, 2013; 
Hurwitz and Manne, 2018; Ricardo and Jimenez, 2019; Sredojević, 2016). Also see Chapters 
2, 5,6, 7 and 8. 
In concluding, I summarise how the theoretical framework facilitates the responses to the main 
research questions. Firstly, ‘how did neoliberalism facilitate the growth of MM in Tanzania?’ 
The neoclassical and classical views explain the deregulation and re-regulation processes that 
aided the growth of MM in Chapter 5.  Secondly, ‘how did MM moderate the factors of FE in 
Tanzania?’ The classical and neoclassical views help the research to explain the logic that 
facilitated the moderation of some factors of FE in Chapter 6. Thirdly, ‘what was the response 
of the banking sector to increasing levels of FI through MM in Tanzania?’ In Chapter 7, I 
analyse the response from the global standard-setting bodies, and the neoliberal response that 











Chapter 4 Research Methodology 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to: Firstly, describe the current state of research methodologies 
used to study MM, FE and FI on the one hand, and neoliberalism on the other; Secondly, to 
identify and state any methodological gaps; Thirdly, state how the methodology I have selected 
adds value to the above-mentioned research area; Fourthly, identify possible methodological 
approaches for future research; and, Fifthly, explain the methodology used by this research for 
data collection and data analysis. The chapter consists of 12 sections.  Section 4.2 delineates 
the current state of research methods used in MM and ICTD research. Section 4.3 identifies 
the methodological issues of studying MM services. Section 4.4 describes the research 
questions and design, including the methodological perspectives used in studying 
neoliberalism. Section 4.5 presents the regulatory issues and the proposed research methods. 
Section 4.6 outlines the research settings, sampling and interviews. Section 4.7 explicates the 
protocol used for data collection. Section 4.8 spells out data collection methods and use of 
qualitative data. Section 4.9 demonstrates how data was processed and analysed. Section 4.10 
addresses validity and reliability issues in this research. Section 4.11 clarifies how no ethical 
issues marred the conduct of this research. Section 4.12 concludes and summarises the findings 
and discussions of the chapter. 
4.2 The Current State of Research Methods Used in MM and ICT for Development 
(ICTD) Research 
Several systematic reviews have been conducted to detail the research methods employed to 
study mobile financial services and ICTD (Kim et al, 2018; Lwoga and Sangeda, 2019; 
Duncombe and Boateng, 2009; Dahlberg et al., 2008; Diniz et al., 2012; Zaremohzzabieh et al., 
2014; Thapa and Saebo, 2014; Mbuyisa and Leonard, 2015; Duncombe 2016). ICTD also 
include MM. According to Duncombe and Boateng (2009), research on m-finance consists of 
two categories: (i) mobile financial services, including consumer preferences and behaviour; 
and (ii) the technological potential of mobile phones. They continue to argue that on the human 
side, mobile financial services are analysed in terms of: (i) the ability to access credit; (ii) the 
ability to deliver credit; (iii) the means and motivation for savings; and (iv) means to facilitate 
cash transfers and payments. These categorisations help identify the barriers to FI caused by 
economic, social and cultural factors. Moreover, the second categorisation under technological 




capabilities of mobile devices and MM technology in promoting FI. According to Duncombe 
and Boateng (2009), such capabilities among other issues, are not limited to the ability to: (i) 
store, convert, and transfer monetary value; (ii) enable transactions and payments; (iii) 
recognise the functionality of the SIM card; and (iv) processing power and user interface. Also, 
systematic reviews by Dahlberg et al. (2008), Duncombe and Boateng (2009), and Kim et al. 
(2018) reveal that designing mobile financial service research takes into consideration various 
parameters, not limited to financial, economic, social, cultural, and technological factors. When 
studying mobile financial services and FI issues, researchers also try to categorise the different 
levels of analysis, namely: micro, meso, and macro (Duncombe and Boateng, 2009; TNCFI, 
2014). While the micro-level focuses more on users and owners of financial services, the meso-
level emphasises the intermediaries who deliver those financial services. At the macro-level, 
the focus is on the role of institutions providing or determining infrastructure, policies, legal 
and regulatory frameworks. 
Findings from both the peer-reviewed and non-peer reviewed studies reveal that data for mobile 
financial services come from either primary or secondary sources (Dahlberg et al., 2008; 
Duncombe and Boateng, 2009; Kim et al., 2018; Sharma and Kansal, 2012). Some research 
works include neither primary nor secondary sources. Overall, the systematic reviews identify 
the following data issues: Firstly, primary data tend to be more representative due to 
representative sampling. However, it has limitations in enhancing theoretical understanding. 
Secondly, qualitative studies investigate individual cases and hardly make universal 
generalisations. They also contribute to theory as they provide in-depth data regarding mobile 
financial services. In some instances, studies on mobile financial services use mixed methods. 
Sometimes, studies using the mixed-methods approach tend to be quite descriptive (also see: 
Duncombe and Boateng, 2009; Kim et al., 2018). Section 4.8.1 briefly discusses my research 
methods and how they relate to this literature. 
4.3 Methodological Issues in Studying Mobile Financial Services 
In some cases, research works on MM tend to be descriptive with no precise research methods 
or approach to methodology. According to Duncombe and Boateng (2009), this happens 
because the study of mobile financial services is relatively new, and in some cases, it lacks 
methods of inquiry. At times, experienced practitioners provide information that is hard to test 
methodologically, which is usual for studying new phenomena. The current research seeks to 




methods for studying new issues. The interviews allow respondents to reveal unknown 
information relating to the studied topics (see Section 4.8 and its sub-sections to understand 
the rationale for my research methods and how they relate to this methodological literature). It 
also uses secondary official sources to check the validity of the collected data from those in-
depth unstructured interviews. Duncombe and Boateng (2009:1252) reaffirm:  
“the most apparent gap in the use of methods was lack of in-depth qualitative studies analysing 
primary data, in contrast to the loosely positivist mixed-method approaches, which tend to dominate 
the area of study”.  
Lwoga and Sangeda (2019:10) agree with these views in their systematic review for ICTD:  
“the reviews revealed that the qualitative approach was the predominant method deployed in the 
preliminary ICTD research. However, the findings from the assessed reviews showed that there was 
limited use of in-depth qualitative studies in the reviewed primary studies. It is therefore important 
to conduct extensive qualitative studies … to gain more insight into the local context. Further studies 
need to provide detailed statements on the research approach and conduct long-term studies to 
demonstrate the desired development outcomes, especially for the rural communities”.  
Duncombe and Boateng (2009), therefore, argue that the lack of in-depth qualitative data 
explains the lack of proper conceptualisation of mobile financial service studies. Kim et al. 
(2018:10) also reaffirm these assertions:  
“the choice of research methods in the extant research shows a limited variety and depth”.  
They also call for more quantitative research methods to gather empirical evidence to boost 
credibility and generalisability of the research findings. Moreover, Lwoga and Sangeda 
(2019:10) identify the future research methods to be used:  
“the reviews indicated that there is an inadequate application of participatory methods or action 
research, or experimental research designs, which are essential in understanding the concept in 
which ICTs are deployed and the interplay of social, organisational, cultural, political and economic 
factors”.  
Duncombe (2016) also agrees with the lack of participatory research methods. These above-
mentioned research works on mobile financial services and ICTD also fail to identify 
appropriate research methods to jointly study the issues of MM, FI and FE, and neoliberalism. 
This research attempts to bridge this gap with its proposed methodological perspectives and 




questions and design to start with, and then the subsequent sections delve into the essential 
research methods for data collection and analysis.  
4.4 Research Questions and Research Design 
4.4.1 Research Questions 
The research answers the following research questions: (i) “How did neoliberalism facilitate 
the growth of MM in Tanzania? (ii) “How did MM moderate the factors of FE in Tanzania?” 
(iii) “What was the response of the banking sector to increasing levels of FI through MM in 
Tanzania?”  
As Chapter 3 delineates, one needs to understand the roll-back and roll-out neoliberalisation 
policies to perceive the role of neoliberalism in facilitating the growth of MM. As specified in 
Chapter 3, roll-back and roll-out phases of neoliberalism are the deregulatory and re-regulatory 
periods respectively. The deregulatory phase includes liberalisation and privatisation of the 
economic and financial sectors. To illustrate the growth of MM, I use the classical and 
neoclassical approaches to regulation, which are complementary and useful, as they reinforce 
the ‘regulatory capitalism’ perspectives as illustrated in Chapter 3. Classicists and 
neoclassicists provide relevant views that explain the roll-back and roll-out neoliberalisation 
policies. Through those views and those presented by the RCA, I can link neoliberal policies 
and MM growth for FI, as explained in Chapter 3. 
The mechanism by which MM moderates the factors of FE substantiates its growth and survival. 
It is through the moderation of the factors of FE that MM grows and becomes one of the 
essential tools used to fight FE. In the same way, it provides access to formal financial services 
for financially-excluded people. Hence, research question 2: “how did MM moderate the 
factors of FE in Tanzania?” The answers to this question corroborate the answers from the first 
main research question. Moreover, regulation and deregulation of the telecommunications and 
banking sectors reinforced innovations such as MM which bolstered the levels of FI in 
Tanzania (Di Castri, 2013a; Di Castri and Gidvani, 2014). Hence, non-bank actors use NPSs 
to increase levels of FI (AFI, 2017a; AFI, 2017b; Bank of Ghana, 2017; Lumpkins and Joyce, 
2015). In political economy, the new entrants increase competition and are not always welcome. 
To this end, research question 3: “what was the response of the banking sector to increasing 
levels of FI through MM?”, substantiates the re-regulatory and deregulatory discussions to help 




4.4.2 Research Design 
The study applies a constructivist design as it perceives neoliberalism as a constructive project 
seeking to create free markets. Neoliberal market constructivism seeks to enhance the 
efficiency of free markets (Harrison, 2010). A traditional neoliberal view seeks a disciplined 
state with a predictable legal and regulatory framework that creates and guarantees the 
functioning of free markets. This constructivist view of neoliberalism has been protected and 
informed by the Washington Consensus and post-Washington Consensus policies. Hence, 
neoliberal views place importance on government failures and on the premise that free markets 
are more efficient with less government interference and that monopoly is free-market friendly. 
Hence, the neoliberal policies founded on the Washington Consensus template guided the 
market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s intending to create free and efficient markets. Whatever 
failures or successes neoliberalism generated, the previous Washington Consensus policies 
were replaced or enhanced by the augmented Washington Consensus policies, also referred to 
as the ‘post-Washington Consensus’. These two sets of policies created the neoliberal 
constructivist agenda. 
By applying the constructivist design, the research applies insights from both constructive and 
interpretive traditions to explain neoliberalism and its implications on MM growth and its role 
in fostering FI, and in moderating FE. The design supports neoliberal views that markets are 
constructed by government policies and through roll-back and roll-out policies in a neoliberal 
state (Edward et al., 2012; Harrison, 2010; Klimina, 2011). Political economy at large is 
concerned with how political forces shape the economy and economic outcomes. Using roll-
back and roll-out policies, political forces such as the government and institutions have shaped 
the economy and economic outcomes such as the levels of FE and FI by allowing the new 
institutions such as the MNOs to enter the financial sector to provide financial services. Re-
regulation and deregulation became key to the survival of these new entrants (Di Castri, 2013a; 
Di Castri and Gidvani, 2014; URT, 2015a; URT, 2015b; URT, 2015c; Mfungahema, 2006; 
Mfungahema, 2014).  
According to DFID (2009a) and Mcloughlin (2014), there are three levels of political-economic 
analysis. Firstly, the macro-level or country analysis consists of the top political and economic 
institutions and actors on the one hand, and their decision-making processes. Secondly, sectoral 
level analysis explores in more depth the forces influencing policy formation, execution, and 




solutions for existing issues where the actors and their interests, ideas, and institutions are 
examined to understand policy issues. Out of the three political-economic levels of analysis, 
this research chose sectoral level analysis where the financial and telecommunications sectors 
are studied to delineate their roles in allowing MM to take on the provision of formal financial 
services which enhanced its growth. 
In political economy, different methodological and theoretical perspectives facilitate the 
discussions, and analyses of neoliberalism. They differ in their epistemological and ontological 
views that define neoliberal policies, reforms, and how the markets are constructed. Also, see 
Chapter 3 for further details. These methodological and theoretical perspectives include: 
‘historical institutionalists’, ‘regulation theorists’, ‘Foucauldians’, ‘Marxists’, ‘Polanyi-
inspired scholars’, and ‘experts on the history of ideas’. These perspectives:  
“provide useful foundations for further progress in understanding and challenging neoliberal 
ideologies and practices” (Edwards et al., 2012:1).  
These methodological and theoretical perspectives support the views on market constructivism 
and see neoliberalism as a process facilitating the construction of markets through social, 
economic, and political means. The above-mentioned methodological and theoretical 
perspectives facilitate the study of neoliberal issues and policies as they explain why neoliberal 
studies differ and deviate from each other, as is illustrated in Chapter 3.  
They provide different possibilities for researchers to contribute to the neoliberal debates as 
well as to the discussion on the social construction of markets. Neoliberalism itself is a socially 
constructed reality drawing on the various interpretation of it. Its effects are demonstrated 
differently in different realities; according to Edwards et al. (2012:1): 
 “by combining this diversity with a theoretical and methodological plurality, a sophisticated and 
multi-layered picture of neoliberalism emerges”.  
Of the above-mentioned theoretical perspectives, Chapter 3 mentions that this study uses the 
‘regulatory capitalism’ tradition (Edwards et al., 2012:5; Braithwaite, 2008; and Levi-Faur, 
2005). The RCA fits well in both the constructivist and interpretivist traditions. Regulation or 
re-regulation is also about market constructivism. Regulations destroy or construct markets. 
For instance, the MM market depends on how it is regulated for its survival. Therefore, the 
RCA thoroughly explains the neoliberal policies of regulation, deregulation, liberalisation, and 
privatisation. These are the key policies capable of explaining the growth of MM and its role 




complementary approaches to regulation, which are part of the ‘regulatory capitalism’ tradition 
– are used to underpin the theoretical and methodological perspectives of this study. Through 
neoclassical and classical approaches, it is easier to understand the reality of neoliberal reforms 
and how it could deviate from ‘small governments’ and ‘free markets’ (Self, 2000; Majone, 
1992; Booth, 1997).  
Hence, the ontological position of this research is in terms of how neoliberalism helped the 
construction of economic and market realities. In this case, the growth of MM and its role in 
transforming high levels of FE into increasing levels of FI was facilitated by the deregulatory, 
re-regulatory, and legal frameworks that allowed the creation of the MM market. The 
epistemological position is that research tries to explore the MM growth and the transition from 
high levels of FE to the increasing levels of FI through re-regulation and deregulation of the 
telecommunications and financial sectors. Klimina (2011) and Harrison (2010) discuss 
neoliberal market constructivism in detail. These ontological and epistemological positions are 
in line with those expressed in Chapter 3, Section 3.4. Moreover, Chapter 1, Section 1.3 
describes the aims of this research. To achieve these aims, ontological and epistemological 
positions mentioned above were used to help the design of this research, as described in this 
chapter. Furthermore, they helped me to select the tools of investigation and to collect the 
required data as described in Section 4.8. The analysis of data as described in Section 4.9, and 
data Chapters 5, 6 and 7 also considered these epistemological and ontological points of view. 
4.5 Regulatory Issues and the Proposed Research Methods 
The research is using the constructivist paradigm and the interpretive tradition seeks to 
investigate the construction of market realities and how those realities are interpreted or 
understood. It looks at the creation and success of MM through roll-out (re-regulation) and roll-
back (deregulation) neoliberal policies. There are also ‘inclusive neoliberalisation policies’ 
(Klak et al., 2011; Revenga and Dooley, 2019; Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2010; also see 
Chapter 1) to speed up the growth of MM. Literature suggests that the success or failure of 
regulation and deregulation in constructing markets can be assessed essentially in four ways: 
(i) the creation of any successful market takes into consideration economic efficiency in terms 
of allocating economic and market resources; (ii) elimination of any forms of market failures; 
(iii) elimination of any forms of non-market failures; and (iv) government policies on fairness, 




As far as economic efficiency is concerned, regulators seek to achieve one of the following 
efficiencies: ‘Pareto’ (Saglam, 2016; Korinek and Kreamer, 2013), ‘Kaldor-Hicks’ (Stringham, 
2001; Munger, 2014; Kaldor, 1939; Hicks, 1939), or ‘dynamic’ (Poudineh et al., 2014; Distaso, 
et al. 2008; Borreau and Dogan, 2001; Viscusi, et al., 1995) if they were to allocate resources 
in the markets. ‘Pareto efficiency’ is achieved when no-one becomes worse off because of 
somebody’s economic gain when the government allocates the market resources. One achieves 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency through wealth maximisation, where those gaining wealth must 
compensate those not gaining wealth (also see: Ellerman, 2013). Likewise, one achieves 
‘dynamic efficiency’ through innovations where various services are produced through any of 
the following: ‘product innovation’, ‘process innovation’, as well as through the supply and 
demand created by those innovations, which facilitate the maximisation of wealth (also see: 
Poudineh et al., 2014; Distaso, et al. 2008; Borreau and Dogan, 2001; Viscusi, et al., 1995). 
Innovation is commercially successful exploitation of ideas (Nooteboom and Stam, 2008). For 
a new market such as the MM market, regulators must select one or more of these principles 
to help them regulate the new industry. 
As far as market failure is concerned, markets fail in theory and practice because of the 
following key issues: market power, externalities, public goods, and imperfect information 
(Veljanovski, 2010). The survival of a new entrant to the market depends on his market power 
and the degree of fair competition in the market. This is termed ‘market selection hypothesis’ 
(Alchian, 1950; Friedman, 1953; Sandroni, 2000; Leoni, n.d.). The new entrant also survives 
if externalities do not impose high costs of operation and significant losses (Renski, 2015; 
Tavassolli and Jienwatcharamongkhol, 2016). Moreover, the public good, such as a conducive 
regulatory environment and legal framework provides opportunities for fair competition to all 
(Veljanovski, 2010:5). Asymmetric information also results in inefficient market outcomes and 
choices causing ‘adverse selection’ issues where one party cannot make a proper selection 
between two or more services due to lack of information on those services (also see: Mattesini, 
1993; Spencer, 2000). Asymmetric information also causes ‘moral hazard’ issues whereby 
risky market behaviours cannot be monitored or priced appropriately (also see: Collin-Dufresne 
and Fos, 2013; Adamati et al., 1994). For new markets such as the MM market, information 
asymmetry hampers the progress and growth of such markets. It is therefore in the interest of 
the regulators, and the sector to have the market resolve asymmetric information issues as: 
 “regulators are unlikely to be perfectly informed, and regulation is unlikely to be costlessly 




Moreover, there are non-market failures that affect the success of new markets (Veljanovski, 
2010; 6-7). Non-market failures consist of the hierarchical or administrative methods of market 
coordination as well as the production of goods and services in those markets which interfere 
with market transactions (see Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). Some market actors prefer the 
use of the principal-agent model to cut down some of the market costs. Regulation also plays 
a vital part in determining the principal-agent relations as well as transaction market costs. 
Hence, the government’s role in market coordination is also key to allowing the growth of any 
new markets or services.  
Markets and regulation generate winners and losers (Thatcher, 2004; Weare and Smolensky, 
2000). As a result, there are always views about the acceptability or fairness of market and 
regulatory outcomes. Given the complex nature of the markets, re-regulatory and deregulatory 
policies, it was decided that in-depth unstructured interviews be used to unveil some hidden 
data because of their flexibility in allowing interviewees to talk about a wide range of important 
issues. Documentary review, or secondary data sources, and focus groups were the other main 
data collection methods employed. A detailed account of these methods is given in Sections 
4.8.1, 4.8.2, and 4.8.3, respectively. The reason for the in-depth unstructured interviews was to 
deliberately let the interviewees unveil data so that they would discuss the issues they deem 
important, as the researcher did not follow a specific pattern of prepared questions. Whatever 
was considered important during the interview that covered the researched topic was given full 
attention.  
Diagram 4.1 below illustrates the research methodology and design of this study. Sections after 
this illustration (Sections 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9), contain further explanations of the applications 











Diagram 4.1: An Illustration of Research Methods and Design 
 
 
Diagram 4.2 illustrates the plan I had for data collection. Further details in Sections 4.6, 4.7, 






Diagram 4.2: A Plan for the Main Data Collection 
 
4.6 Setting and Sampling  
4.6.1 Setting  
I conducted this research in Dar es Salaam. Dar es Salaam is Tanzania’s financial centre. Most 
of the respondents lived or did their businesses there. The research project also recruited a 
research assistant who coordinated the interviews, venues, and facilitated correspondence with 
the various institutions in both Swahili and English languages. It took about three months to 




4.6.2 Sampling Techniques 
The research used both ‘purposive’ and ‘snowball’ sampling techniques. Patton (2001) asserts 
that ‘purposive’ sampling reaches out to relevant respondents who have relevant information 
for the study. These are regulators and policymakers from various government and private 
sector institutions who get involved in banking and MM sector businesses. ‘Purposive sampling’ 
allowed me to reach other relevant respondents who were affected by neoliberal policies and 
FE issues as well as those who used formal financial services. Bryman (2008) and Cohen et al. 
(2011) also support purposive sampling, they believe it is useful for targeting relevant 
informants who have proper knowledge of the researched issues. Of the eighty-four 
respondents, sixty-four were elites (senior officials). Patton (1990) and Sandelowski (1993) 
argue that all types of sampling in qualitative research may be encompassed under the broad 
term of purposive sampling. The choice of purposive sampling for this study is appropriate. 
As far as snowball sampling is concerned, the research used the selected informants to identify 
other key informants who had a great deal of knowledge or information about the researched 
issues of MM, banking, FE, and FI. This chain of contacts was key to identifying the critical 
cases. A few key informants were identified through the recommendation of other informants 
(on snowballing, also see: Patton, 1990; Heckathorn, 2015; Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981; 
Webster and Watson; 2002). According to Lynch (n.d.), the researcher should: 
 “continue to develop the sample until he reaches ‘saturation’ in the data”.   
At the eighty-fourth interview, the repetitive arguments from the eighty-fourth respondent and 
those of earlier respondents suggested that I had reached ‘saturation’ point.   
For qualitative research, the sample size can be between one to twenty-five informants for a 
study to be credible. I continued to the eighty-fourth interview because I wanted to have as 
much data as I could from relevant professionals and other relevant selected interviewees. 
Cresswell (1998) also suggests that a good sample must have between five and twenty-five 
respondents as this is a good sample that can be used to tap into relevant individual’s 
perspectives and experiences. Bertaux (1981) recommends fifteen respondents as an acceptable 
required number for qualitative interviews. The bigger the sample, the better. Hence, I opted 






4.6.3 The Informants and the Rationale for their Selection 
According to GSMA (2016a), financial policy as it had been perceived in the MM world 
involved the following three principle actors amongst many others: policymakers, regulators, 
and NPS experts. Also, see Diagram 4.3 and Diagram 4.4 below for further details. 
Diagram 4.3 Ecosystem of Mobile Financial Services 
 
Diagram 4.4: Financial Sector Policy and Regulatory Frameworks 
 
Therefore, the first three elite groups I interviewed were the: (i) two senior policymakers who 
were part of the NFIF who came from the Ministry of Finance, and the Financial Intelligence 
Unit of the Ministry of Finance; (ii) nine senior officials from the five regulatory bodies, the 
BOT, TCRA, TIRA, TRA, FCC; and (iii) three senior officials overseeing the NPS at the 
Directorate of Oversight and National Payment Systems. While the ‘policymakers’ set policies, 
the regulators implement policies and establish regulatory frameworks. Also, the experts from 
the NPSs Unit have overall regulatory oversight and mandate covering payment systems. All 




banking, and MM policies. Their expertise and experience made them suitable informants for 
this research. 
Other informants came from the institutions, as mentioned in Appendix 4.1. They included: (i) 
ten senior officials from nine different banks that provided formal financial services; (ii) ten 
senior respondents from the six MNOs that provided MM services; (iii) five senior respondents 
from four digital platforms and switches who facilitated FI through digital financial services. 
They also provided the infrastructure through which MM and banking transfers and payments 
occurred; (iv) five senior officials from the insurance companies and one senior insurance 
broker who provided insurance services including micro-insurance services with MM 
companies; (v) two senior officials from banking and insurance associations that advocated for 
banking and insurance interests; (vi) two senior officials from the FSDT, which conducts the 
FinScope surveys; (vii) two senior political scientists from the University of Dar-es- Salaam 
who helped to intellectually validate the relevance of my findings; (viii) seven relevant senior 
professionals in the area, including the former governor of the BOT/Former Chair of the 
National Financial Inclusion Council, an interoperability expert, an IT platform expert with 
MM platform knowledge, a crucial relevant author who wrote a book on financial sector 
development in Tanzania; (ix) twenty low-income people from all walks of life who provided 
their understanding of the current rising FI levels. 
4.6.4 Reasons Behind the Use of 11 Elite Interviews 
I considered the leading players who understood the complex neoliberal issues and their impact 
on mobile money and the transformation from high levels of financial exclusion to increasing 
levels of financial inclusion in Tanzania. As stated in Section 4.6.3, these players came from 
the policymaking and regulatory bodies, and the experts running the NPS. Other players came 
from the mobile money ecosystem, and they included banks, MNOs, digital platforms, 
interoperability experts, and the aggregators and switches. The 11 ‘elite’ respondents came 
from these bodies and institutions. They were in a position to understand the research issues. 
They could also talk with authority as they were involved in policymaking processes. They 
were also involved in the execution and implementation of national financial inclusion 
strategies (see Appendices 4.9 and 4.10). They provided the best answers to support the key 






4.6.4.1 The Former BOT Governor 
The Former Governor got involved in the policymaking processes of the 1980s and 1990s, 
which contributed to the implementation of the neoliberal reforms in Tanzania. He also worked 
with the World Bank as a ‘Lead Economist’ in Africa and could understand both the national 
and international neoliberal agenda of reforms. He was also directly involved in the Mkapa and 
Kikwete administrations in implementing various financial sector reforms. He was the 
governor who coordinated the introduction of financial inclusion initiatives and strategies in 
Tanzania as he chaired the NFIC. He allowed as a governor the introduction of MM initiatives 
and the inclusion of the MNOs in the NPS (Ndulu, 2013; IMF, 2017; Carlyle, 2014). He was 
also a chair of the AFI (AFI-Global, 2016). Serving in all these capacities, he understood 
financial exclusion and financial inclusion in Tanzania, and the issues of the financial sector, 
including the MNOs. As a key policymaker in Tanzania aiming to resolve some of these issues, 
and based on the design of this research as explained in Chapter 1 and this chapter, he was the 
right respondent for this research. The details he provided were crucial for almost every chapter 
of this dissertation. 
4.6.4.2 The Executive Banking Sector Official 
In 1995, under the ‘Societies Ordinance’ (Cap. 337 of 1954), which sought to serve banks and 
non-bank financial institutions, the TBA was established (RITA, n.d.; Best-Dialogue, 2019). It 
provides a collective voice for these institutions and helps to safeguard their common interests. 
Thus, it coordinates various operations and activities and brings about their harmonisation in 
the banking sector. It works closely with the BOT and participates in the NFIC and the other 
national committees, given the mandate to implement the NFIF (also see: PaymentAfrika, 
2015; TNCFI, 2014; TNCFI, 2018). It was involved in the negotiations with the MNOs when 
the banks tried to object to the entry of the MNOs in the NPS. It is still involved in the talks 
involving the banks, MNOs, and other financial inclusion stakeholders. Its influence has been 
essential in helping me understand not only the response of the banking sector in Chapter 8, 
but also to perceive other financial inclusion and MNO issues, as well as other political-
economic problems in the banking sector. By considering the data I collected from the TBA 
respondent, I answered the three main research questions, as demonstrated in this dissertation.  
4.6.4.3 Senior Telecom Sector Official 
The Senior Telecom Sector Official came from the TCRA. While the TCRA regulates MM’s 




in Tanzania. The CLF was crucial to the advent of MM and was also vital in liberalising the 
communications sector (also see: Mhella, 2019; Materu-Bahitsa and Diyamett, 2010; 
Mfungahema, 2006; van Gorp and Maitland, 2009; Boshe, 2013; and Moshiro, n.d.). The CLF 
turned out to be a strategy used to regulate the communications sector. Mobile phone 
companies involved in application services were able to offer mobile financial services through 
the CLF. The TCRA also attends meetings in every committee, as stipulated in the NFIF. It 
also ensures regulatory collaborations to enhance digital financial inclusion services in 
Tanzania. Digital financial inclusion provides access to and use of formal financial services by 
financially-excluded individuals (also see: United Nations, 2016; CGAP, 2015). According to 
Nkya (n.d.), the TCRA enhances collaboration and increases dialogue between financial 
services and telecommunications regulators, including clarifying their respective roles and 
responsibilities in the DFS area. It also deals with the critical regulatory and policy issues that 
prevent the progress of liberalised DFS, and an interoperable DFS system. It also seeks 
solutions where other financial service regulators and Telco regulators overlap. The TCRA also 
supports innovative and inclusive policies to catalyse financial inclusion (also see: van Gorp 
and Maitland, 2009). It also manages and issues the MM numbering resources, SIM 
registration, DFS, and e-commerce infrastructure (also see: Makame et al., 2014; TCRA, 2014; 
di Castri and Gidvani, 2014). It also works closely with the national and international 
standards-setting bodies to address issues regarding MM technologies. In executing these 
functions, the TCRA was and still is in the position to inform the critical issues investigated by 
this research. Thus, a respondent with relevant knowledge from the TCRA was selected. 
4.6.4.4 Financial Sector Official 
The Financial Sector Official came from the FSDT. The FSDT contributes to studying the 
financial behaviour of the Tanzanians by conducting a nationally representative survey known 
as the FinScope survey. According to FSDT (n.d.):  
“FSDT works with regulators to address different market constraints to create an enabling 
environment for mobile financial services and agency banking in Tanzania. Further, in 
partnerships with financial institutions and mobile network operators, FSDT works to increase 
cash-outlets in Tanzania to improve the proximity of financial services to where people live and 
transact. To ensure that the financial services offered to meet the needs of individuals and 
enterprises, FSDT works with financial services providers through research and product 




The FSDT also sits on committees of the NFIF. It supports mobile money innovations and 
other market interventions in the financial sector by enhancing partnerships with financial 
sector stakeholders. It concentrates its works on the following theme areas: agricultural and 
rural finance, SME finance, digital finance, and insurance (also see: FSDT, 2017; FSDT, 2016; 
FSDT,2020). The FSDT also works with the MNOs to enhance digital financial inclusion. In 
all these capacities, the FSDT is one of the key players supporting MM development in 
Tanzania and has surveys and knowledge that significantly informed this study. Hence, 
selecting a respondent from the FSDT was not an option but a necessity for the research. The 
Financial Sector Official I interviewed was involved firsthand in FinScope surveys (also see: 
FinScope, 2006; FinScope, 2009; FinScope, 2013a; FinScope, 2013b; and FinScope, 2018). 
During the data analysis, it became apparent that the respondent had relevant knowledge and 
responded to the questions regarding the critical research issues. After the first interview with 
the financial sector official, I had a follow-up interview with the Executive Banking Sector 
Official. 
4.6.4.5 The Executive Financial Sector Official 
The Executive Financial Sector Official has been involved in policymaking processes and 
policy execution and implementation at different national levels. He sits in the NFIC and works 
with the regulators, including the BOT, TCRA, FCC, and other financial stakeholders, to 
ensure improved capacity and sustainability in Tanzania’s financial sector to meet the needs of 
low-income and financially-excluded people. The respondent himself has been involved in pro-
poor financial initiatives and has invaluable knowledge of banking and finance, the political 
economy of financial inclusion and mobile money, innovation policy, insurance, rural finance, 
and informal financial services. His knowledge of the political economy of financial inclusion 
and mobile money has informed some aspects of the researched issues, as demonstrated in 
Chapter 5. 
4.6.4.6 Senior TBA Respondent 
The respondent from the MoF had the responsibility to formulate, develop, and monitor the 
implementation of financial sector development policies, including FI and MM policies. The 
MoF itself is the high-level financial policymaking body in Tanzania. It advises the government 
on financial policy issues and reforms to help the government support its economic and social 
objectives (also see: MoF, 2020a; MoF, 2008; MoF, n.d.; MoF, n.d.a). The MoF also develops 




and internationally. The MoF also supports the enhancement of the optimal use of ICT and 
digital technologies for financial applications (MoF, 2020b; MoF, 2020c). It also brings 
together public and private institutions to support FI and MM activities in Tanzania (also see: 
MoF, 2019; MoF, 2008). It also seeks to enhance financial inclusion by: firstly, bringing 
financial services close to financially-excluded individuals; secondly, supporting and 
strengthening the financial systems and infrastructure used to deliver financial services; thirdly, 
supporting educational systems offering financial education to increase financial literacy. The 
MoF also builds a friendly and conducive environment for FI by supporting digital innovations 
such as MM and mobile banking (also see: MoF, 2016; Binala, n.d.; Wavuti, 2014). Through 
the MoF’s auspices, the government and the financial stakeholders have been able to reach  
financially-unreached individuals in rural areas through MM and other financial channels and 
innovations. The Senior TBA Respondent was one of the principal economists in the MoF who 
dealt with FI policy issues, including MM strategic issues. The respondent had extensive 
knowledge of these issues and could help explain the financial sector reforms in Tanzania, 
including the advent of MM, as demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6. 
4.6.4.7 Senior BOT Official 
The Senior Official BOT worked for the BOT. The BOT is an authority dealing with NPS 
issues as it oversees the NPS’s operations (also see: Msinjili, 2019; BIS, n.d; TanzaniaInvest, 
2019). Since 2008, the BOT has actively promoted NFISs and became a leading member of 
the AFI. It also helped create the NFIF, which sought to reduce the number of financially-
excluded individuals. It supported MM even before the regulations to keep it were not 
adequately established. The BOT also allowed MM innovations to formulate the legal and 
regulatory framework (di Castri and Gidvani, 2014). The BOT, therefore, is in a position to 
inform researchers about MM and its involvement in the financial system.  
The Senior BOT Official had experience in the oversight and policy of the NPS in the 
Directorate of NPS. The respondent was principal in detailing and informing this research on 
the following issues: (i) payment systems and national financial strategies including financial 
laws and regulations; and (ii) the transaction volumes involving the MNOs and mobile financial 
services as each of those transactions passed through the NPS, and the oversight and policy 
department was aware of the transactional volumes. The respondent also detailed the evolution 




market.   The Senior BOT Official was instrumental in providing the publications that helped 
me use diagrams 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 in Section 7.6.   
4.6.4.8 Senior Interoperability Expert 
WS Technology Consulting provides solutions to technical issues using cost-effective means. 
It also provides: 
“tailored technology consulting, project management, software development, information 
technology security and risk management services to the professional marketplace, which 
requires the very highest standards of services” (WS Technology Consulting, n.d.). 
The Senior Interoperability Expert came from WS Technology Consulting and dealt with the 
issues of technology and payments, mobile money interoperability being one of them. The 
respondent had a long experience in information technology and payments at national and 
international levels and got involved in various interoperability projects in Tanzania and 
elsewhere. The respondent had experience with BOT operations and digital financial 
technologies used in Tanzania. The respondent was vital in forming this research on the issues 
of interoperability. Chapters 5 and 6 detail interoperability and its benefits as well as how the 
rolling-out neoliberalisation made interoperability successful in Tanzania. 
4.6.4.9 Senior Banking Official 
The Senior Banking Official came from FINCA Microfinance Bank. FINCA works with low-
income people and seeks to help them access financial services through digital technologies 
and other traditional banking channels (Cowans, 2011; Fox, 2017; Gozman et al., 2018). By 
doing so, it facilitates mobile saving and loans (also see: FINCA, 2020; FINCA et al.,2017). 
FINCA has invested in Digital Financial Automation (DFA), which enables its endeavours to 
reach financially-excluded individuals (also see: FINCA, 2019; Mhina, 2020; OECD, 2018). 
The FINCA experience demonstrates that technology increases the efficiency of providing easy 
access to financial services (UNCDF, 2019). Since 2017, FINCA has delivered financial 
services to low-income and financially-marginalised individuals in Tanzania. Its ‘HaloYako’ 
mobile financial service, in partnership with Halotel, has helped provide financial services to 
financially-excluded individuals. Now, low-income people can apply and receive loans in less 
than two days. MM’s digital platform has facilitated the availability of this service. It enables 




cost. Indeed, this digitalisation has helped those in rural areas to be included in financial 
services (also see: AFI, 2018; ADB, 2016; GSMA, 2014b).  
I chose the Senior Banking Official from FINCA as he helped to explain how a bank 
collaborates with an MNO to deliver financial services to the poor, as FINCA does this through 
‘HaloYako’ in partnership with Halotel (FINCA, 2017). The respondent had good experience 
and knowledge of technological changes in the banking sector, ranging from digital channels 
and digital financial services to current issues on the banking sector’s transformation and 
business risks. The respondent was part of the team that helped FINCA to embrace digital 
financial technology in Tanzania. 
4.6.4.10 The Senior Switch Officer 
The Senior Switch Officer came from Umoja Switch. In Tanzania, Umoja Switch is currently 
used by 27 banks as a shared platform through which banks reach their customers, even through 
mobile phones. Established in 2006 by 6 banks, Umoja Switch provides a wide range of 
services, including: bank-to-wallet (from a bank account to MPesa, TigoPesa or AirtelMoney); 
wallet-to-bank (From MPesa, TigoPesa or AirtelMoney to bank accounts); inter-bank transfer; 
intra-bank transfer; pre-paid airtime; payments for some bills. Umoja Switch, as a platform, 
provides financial service users with the assurance of getting financial services and transacting 
on time using a wide range of FSPs (also see: Mbilinyi, 2018). 
The Senior Switch Officer was knowledgeable about digital financial services, including digital 
financial infrastructure, and could explain how switches work and how they facilitate FI. A 
switch is an interconnection of ATMs, which has been extended in some cases to connect with 
MM wallets for financial customers residing anywhere in the country. These services are now 
linked to certain mobile financial services. Chapters 7 and 8 briefly mention Umoja Switch.  
4.6.4.11 The CEO Aggregator 
The CEO Aggregator came from Selcom. Selcom was formed in 2011 and is a platform that 
seeks to digitise payments by providing solutions to facilitate easy and safe payments 
integration. It started as a prepaid airtime distributor. Over time it grew, and today it offers 
digitised bill payment solutions. Selcom has also been referred to as an aggregator in the MM 
ecosystem (also see: Winiecki, 2017; Arabehety et al., 2016:4; Mas and Elliot, 2014). It assists 




AirtelMoney to provide a virtual Mastercard, enabling AirtelMoney users to pay for services 
and goods. Selcom also has an agency-banking service known as ‘Qwikserv’, which offers fast 
access touchpoints for essential banking services including deposits, withdrawals, balance 
enquiry, mini-statement, funds transfer and instant account opening (also see: TechMetro, 
2020; Pavithra, 2020; Wasonga, 2020). In summary, Selcom seeks to promote FI in Tanzania 
through the digitisation of payments working with MNOs.  
The ‘CEO Aggregator’ has extensive knowledge of the telecommunications and banking 
sectors. He works with Selcom to enable merchants to receive digital payments, and offers 
easy, convenient, and secure payment solutions. The respondent has also been involved in 
various projects with banks and MNOs to facilitate Tanzania’s digital transformation to 
advance FI. In short, the respondent was engaged first-hand in helping reach financially-
excluded individuals through quick and convenient payment options on their mobile devices.  
I have also used some extracts from eight low-income respondents in Chapter 6 to substantiate 
some of their views and support the research findings. 
4.7 Instrumentation 
The protocol for data collection involved getting ethical clearance from the Geography 
School’s Ethics Committee. A letter from the university introducing me to the informants, and 
the institutions was written and sent to the key respondents or their institutions prior to the 
interview sessions (See Appendix 4.2). Other informants or institutions required the researcher 
to get clearance from the relevant ministries or authorities. Being an American citizen, I applied 
and received a research visa for Tanzania, which allowed me to conduct my research there. To 
facilitate the process of data collection in a new environment, I employed a research assistant 
who helped me to have access to different buildings. It was challenging to access some of the 
premises without a Tanzanian national ID. He had a Tanzanian voter’s ID so the gatekeepers 
could allow me to enter the buildings with him. He also assisted with the coordination of these 
interviews (see Appendix 4.1 for more details on the interviews).  
4.8 The Main Data Collection Methods 
Interviews are in-depth conversations between the researcher and the respondents that help the 
researcher to collect data and relevant research information. For this research, I used the 
following three data collection methods: (i) in-depth unstructured interviews; (ii) focus groups; 




4.8.1 In-depth Unstructured Interviews 
I preferred the use of in-depth unstructured interviews over other interviews because of the 
reasons provided in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. The systematic reviews recommend the use of in-
depth qualitative research. As Duncombe and Boateng (2009), Lwoga and Sangeda (2019), and 
Kim et al. (2019) claim, there is a lack of in-depth conceptualisation of mobile finance service 
studies. MM studies are new, and a lack of in-depth knowledge and data for theorising is an 
issue that requires in-depth qualitative investigations. I wanted to bridge this methodological 
gap by conducting an in-depth unstructured interview. Unlike other interviews, in-depth 
unstructured interviews do not set questions to be asked in advance to probe the understanding 
of an issue that has not yet been fully understood or thoroughly studied (Kombo and Tromp, 
2009: 92-93). They use open-ended questions as they are exploratory and interpretive means 
of investigation (Bryman, 2008). They let the respondents reveal as much information as they 
can. This helps the interviewer to explore more on the new emerging issues. I prepared a few 
questions before the elite interviews (see Appendix 4.3). I also let other unprepared questions 
follow as the issues and evidence unveiled. As MM services, FE, and FI issues are new and 
evolving; I had to use a method that would provide me with a lot of the unknown data and 
information. The in-depth unstructured interviews could help me achieve this goal easier than 
any other types of interviews (also see: Douglas, 1985; Fontana and Frey, 1994; Bernard, 1988).  
I interviewed eighty-four respondents, sixty-four of them were the elites working as senior 
officials. I presented my written requests and then followed up with them or their institutions. 
I also interviewed twenty low-income respondents from all walks of life (see Section 8.10). 
See Appendix 4.1 to view the names of the institutions or the categories of the respondents. 
4.8.2 Focus Groups 
The BOT and Vodacom M-Pesa preferred the use of mini-focus groups of three to five people. 
A focus group was a small group of people asked about their opinions, perceptions, beliefs, 
and attitudes towards MM, FI, and the response of the banking sector. It was a form of 
qualitative research with open-ended questions. Both the BOT and Vodacom M-Pesa selected 
the members of the focus groups carefully for effective responses. They asked beforehand what 
I wanted to know. The chosen members knew my topic of inquiry. They preferred a leading 
respondent who facilitated the sessions. I asked questions when I needed more details. During 
this process, I recorded the sessions. The discussions in the focus groups helped me to obtain 




When the participants replied to the questions by narrating their experiences, this stimulated 
the memories of the other participants and reminded them of their experiences and they were 
motivated to come forward with their opinions and evidence. They used or shared a common 
language to describe similar experiences. Although Rushkoff (2005) argues that focus group 
members may not express their views and may choose to support specific data and hide other 
pieces of evidence, this issue was resolved by other respondents who participated in my in-
depth unstructured interviews. The findings from these focus groups did not differ from the 
conclusions of the other interviews. They discussed policy issues, regulatory and legal 
frameworks, FI, FE, MM, and banking services. There were two focus groups at the BOT from 
the following departments: the Real Sector and Microfinance Department that deals with FI 
(five members in the focus group) and the Directorate of Oversight and Policy for the NPSs 
(three members in the focus group). Vodacom M-Pesa consisted of three members in their 
focus group session. 
The ‘in-depth unstructured interviews’ and focus group sessions provided data relating to the: 
(i) issues of FI and FE; (ii) neoliberalism; (iii) changing banking sector; (iv) regulatory and 
legal framework issues; (v) interpretation of the problems researched from the informants’ 
perspectives. The findings of the interviews reconstruct important events that have helped 
change the dynamics of FE and that have promoted FI, the transformation of the banking sector 
and its politics, as well as the growth of MM. In addition, the secondary sources of data helped: 
(i) build the context of the transformation and change; (ii) strengthen the neoliberal argument 
as one of the factors that promoted the advent of MM; (ii) strengthen the findings of the primary 
sources of data (see Appendix 4.4 for the criteria for assessing the quality of the secondary 
documents). 
At the macro-level (supply-side), data on the outcomes of the macro environment, and the 
impact of the regulatory framework affecting inclusive financial services was collected through 
interviews or the secondary sources. In order to understand the transformation and politics of 
the banking sector, as well as the declining levels of FE and increasing levels of FI, the 
effectiveness of the macro environment and its outcomes in terms of alleviating FE, needed to 
be analysed. Several interview questions were asked to help understand the changes at the 
macro and sectoral levels. Given that this research used in-depth unstructured interviewing 





4.8.3 Use of Official Secondary Data Sources 
Statistics and data on ‘FI’ and ‘FE’ can be derived from demand-side data surveys or supply-
side data surveys. The demand-side data surveys gather data on users of financial services, 
including MM data, from individuals, households, or firms. The data help researchers and 
institutions to understand customers’ financial needs both met and unmet. The data also 
delineate the barriers that customers face when they want to use formal financial services and 
products. Moreover, those surveys include customer’s demographic and socio-economic 
details such as age, income, gender, occupation, domicile, etc. These demand-side data surveys 
also help researchers and institutions to make country comparisons depending on surveys’ 
outcomes in different countries. These surveys are not limited to Bank of Tanzania documents, 
Global Findex, Enterprise Surveys, Consumer Protection, Financial Capability Surveys, Living 
Standards Measurement Study, FinScope, MECOVI, Financial Diaries (GPFI, 2011b; also see 
Appendix 4.5 for further details). I used FinScope surveys, InterMedia surveys, Global Findex 
Data and the GSMA data to build the contexts for FE, FI, the growth of MM and issues with 
banking services. For details on these surveys and documents, see Sections 4.8.3.1.1, 4.8.3.1.2, 
4.8.3.1.3, and 4.8.3.1.4. 
Likewise, the supply-side data surveys on FI provide data on formal financial institutions. The 
data itself are either what these institutions report to the regulators, or their responses during 
the surveys. The data include geographic demand and supply of financial services which could 
also consider the points of access such as branches, etc. The pricing of services and products 
is part of the data, as well as the penetration and usage of services and products. Supply-side 
data surveys include IMF Financial Access Survey (FAS), Global Payment Systems Survey 
(GPSS), Global Remittance Prices, MIX, BankScope, FinStats, IMF-International Financial 
Statistics (IFS), IMF Financial Soundness Indicators (FSI) (GPFI, 2011b), see Appendix 4.6. 
For the relevance of the Tanzanian situation, I used the following documents: the 2017 Self-
Evaluation Report of the National Financial Inclusion Framework, the 2014 National Financial 
Inclusion Framework, the 2018 National Financial Inclusion Framework, the 2017 Supply-
Side Report. For details on these documents, see Sections 4.8.3.2.1, 4.8.3.2.2, 4.8.3.2.3, and 
4.8.3.2.4. 
I demonstrate that MM facilitated the growth of FI by using data from the FinScope and 
InterMedia survey data. The FSDT conducts FinScope surveys which engage a wide range of 




Furthermore, InterMedia conducts Financial Inclusion Insights (FII) to facilitate MM service 
development in countries such as Tanzania, Kenya, etc. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
sponsors the InterMedia surveys. Moreover, the FSDT also has recently conducted a new 
supply-side study, which provides data on the state of the financial sector to access whether the 
needs of the market are met or otherwise. My research depends heavily on the data supplied by 
these surveys. The Tanzania National Council for Financial Inclusion (TNCFI) also provides 
information on FI data through its key publications: the 2014 first NFIF, the 2018 second NFIF, 
and the 2017 Assessment for the NFIF. 
As far as the regulation and legal frameworks are concerned, the following documents are 
useful in explaining the growth of MM and FI in both the telecommunication and banking 
sectors. From the banking sector: the 1991 BFIA; the 2006 BFIA; the 2015 NPSA (see Chapter 
3, Section 3.7.4 and Chapter 5); the 2015 NPSEMRs (see Chapter 3, Section 3.7.4 and Chapter 
5); the 2015 NPSLARs (see Chapter 3, Section 3.7.4 and Chapter 5); the 2015 ETA; the 2017 
Finance Act. From the telecommunications sector: the 1993 TCA; the 2003 National 
Information and Communications Technology Policies (NICTP); the 2003 National Postal 
Policy (NPP); the 2006 Universal Communications Service Access Act (UCSAA); the 2010 
Electronic and Postal Communications Act (EPCA); the 2003 TCRAA; the 2015 Cyber Crimes 
Act; the 1993 Tanzania Broadcasting Services Act. From other sectors: the 2003 FCA; the 
2006 Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA). These documents were key to the liberalisation, 
deregulation, and re-regulation of the financial and telecommunications sectors. They were 
also key to the efforts to support FI and the growth of MM. The most relevant ones being: the 
2006 BFIA; the 2003 TCRAA; the 2006 UCSAA; the 2003 NICTP; the 2015 NPSA; the 2015 
NPSEMRs and the 2015 NPSLARs. I had to go through all these documents to be able to 
analyse MM growth, deregulation and re-regulation policies, FI, and all other related studied 
issues. See Appendix 4.7 for further details. 
4.8.3.1 The Relevance of the Used National Surveys and Documents 
I used the interviews and these documents to cross-check the facts and the findings. In this way, 
I ensured the accuracy and reliability of the collected data.  
4.8.3.1.1 FinScope Surveys 
The FinScope surveys were the first national consumer perception surveys with the first survey 
conducted in 2006. The other surveys released their reports in 2009, 2013 and 2018.They 




They include formal and informal financial data. They record the attitudes and behaviours of 
different individuals. They are credible, robust and use scientific methods of qualitative and 
quantitative methods. The samples are nationally representative with the following number of 
respondents: 4,950 in 2006, 7,680 in 2009, 7,987 in 2013, and 9,459 in 2017. In 2017 
Tanzania’s population was estimated to be over fifty million with less than twenty-eight million 
about 54% of the population, was the age of sixteen which is the minimum adult age included 
in FI surveys. The FinScope surveys provide hard facts or a baseline; they unveil the scope of 
the FI challenge and demonstrate areas where the government can help, and where the financial 
sector can invest.  
4.8.3.1.2 InterMedia Surveys 
InterMedia surveys run yearly. They provide new updates within a twelve-month cycle. The 
surveys use questionnaires and interviews to collect data. These surveys and their published 
reports receive support from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundations. The average number of 
interviewed respondents per year is 3,000. The questionnaire asks several questions with 
sections on MM, mobile phones, banks, and non-bank institutions. Each section explores 
access, awareness, and use of financial services and mobile phones. In collaboration with the 
national bureaus of statistics and local research partners, InterMedia collects accurate data with 
representative samples. Intermedia updates its reports regularly.  It includes the methodology 
used for each update in the relevant report. The advantages of using InterMedia data is that it 
provides timely results yearly as opposed to the FinScope results which come out once every 
three years. Regardless, FinScope and InterMedia surveys do not vary much, which gives 
assurance regarding the FinScope statistics as well.  
4.8.3.1.3 Global Findex 
The global findex is the World Bank’s global FI database that provides over 850 country-level 
indicators of FI. According to Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2018), the global findex uses different 
variables and key demographic characteristics such as gender, age, education, income, 
employment status, and rural evidence. The global findex provides data from over 140 
countries. It uses both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection.  
4.8.3.1.4 GSMA 
The GSMA presents the interests of mobile operators worldwide. It uses its ‘GSMA 




as MM. It is the “definitive source of global mobile operator data, analysis, and forecasts, and 
publisher of authoritative industry report and research” (GSMA, 2020a). The GSMA collects 
data from mobile operators worldwide. It is the most reliable source of data for the mobile 
industry. It engages with regulators, financial institutions, mobile operators, vendors, and 
different stakeholders in the field of mobile phones. Data from the GSMA are frequently cited 
in academic papers and in the industry itself. The GSMA data are useful to inform my research 
on the current and past patterns of mobile phones and MM services not only for Tanzania but 
also elsewhere else. The GSMA also provides information on MM deployment in developing 
countries and around the world.  
4.8.3.2 Key Policy Documents for Financial Inclusion 
4.8.3.2.1 The 2017 ‘Self-Evaluation’ Report of the National Financial Inclusion 
Framework 
The 2017 ‘Self-Evaluation’ Report of the National Financial Inclusion Framework outlines the 
achievements and failures of the first NFIF. It is useful in delineating how the various FI 
stakeholders, including MNOs and banks, achieved their FI targets. The report used primary 
and secondary data sources. Closed-ended and open-ended questions were used to collect the 
primary data through questionnaires sent to respondents from the sixty leading members of the 
NFIF coordination committees. The questionnaire was designed to capture details on the design 
of the first NFIF, its implementation process, its outcomes, and further recommendations for 
future planning. To ensure the accuracy of the data, six members of the coordination 
committees tested the data. SPSS and Excel programmes were used to analyse the data (TNCFI, 
2017a:20-21). 
4.8.3.2.2 The 2014 National Financial Inclusion Framework 
The first NFIF was the guide used for building an inclusive financial system in Tanzania. It set 
out a strategic plan with an initial implementation period of three years from 2014-2016 
(TNCFI, 2014). It delineated the current financial services and the barriers to FI, which key 
stakeholders had to overcome. It also provided the definition of FI for Tanzania, and it 
mentioned the core enablers and priority areas, including the guiding principles, roles, and 
responsibilities of key stakeholders (TNCFI, 2014). It also defined the coordination structure 





4.8.3.2.3 The 2018 National Financial Inclusion Framework 
The second NFIF builds on the first NFIF. While the first NFIF focuses on the provision of 
access to financial services, the second NFIF emphasises the usage of financial services. The 
first NFIF increased access to financial services for various segments of the population from 
58% in 2013 to 65% in 2017. It also reduced reliance on informal financial services from 16% 
to 7% between 2013 and 2017 (TNCFI, 2018). Its preparation followed the outcomes of the 
first NFIF and the recommendations from the 2017 self-assessment report for the first NFIF 
which I have mentioned in section 4.8.3.2.1.  
4.8.3.2.4 The 2017 Supply-Side Report 
The 2017 supply-side survey provides data on formal and informal financial services in the 
Tanzanian financial market. It complements the FinScope demand-side surveys which 
addressed the demand for financial services from individuals and firms. With a clear picture of 
both the demand-side and the supply-side of financial services, it helps this research to analyse 
the financial sector and inclusive financial efforts in a more precise manner. The supply-side 
survey also reached the financial institutions with mid- and senior staff members who knew 
about financial service and product developments being the main respondents. The survey 
chose more than one respondent from each institution. It also chose face-to-face interviews 
guided by a structured questionnaire. The reported findings came from 157 different financial 
institutions. This was a good representative sample for Tanzania (TNCFI, 2017b). 
4.8.4 Use Qualitative Data in the Subsequent Chapters 
4.8.4.1 The 11 Elites and How I Used their Data in the Subsequent Chapters 
I will first examine how I utilise data from the 11 selected elites and then how I have used the 
rest of the qualitative data. For further details on how I used the interviews to develop my 
thinking, see Appendix 4.8. 
The 11 elites’ quotations were selected to support some assertions made by this research. I 
provided the reasons for the selection of the respondents in Sections 4.6.3 and 4.6.4. In any 
research, not every respondent provides the details sought, and if they do, not every detail 
will be used (also see: Krathwohl, 2005; Howitt and Cramer, 2014). In this dissertation, I 
used the most relevant information, which narrowed the selection of the interviews and 




trends and themes and aligned with the original research objectives (see Sections 1.3 and 4.9). 
Moreover, I went through the available literature to support the emerging research themes, 
and some respondents provided useful information that filled in the gaps of this literature. I, 
therefore, used their evidence to write the chapters and support some of the assertions. Like 
other respondents, I asked the 11 selected respondents about policy issues, MM, FI, FE, and 
the response of the banking sector to increasing FI caused by MM (see Chapters 5, 6, and 7).  
From their responses, it emerged that neoliberalism was the political economy that facilitated 
MM’s advent and growth in Tanzania. It also emerged that MM facilitated the transformation 
from FE to FI in Tanzania. To implement the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector, 
Tanzania created the CLF and used it as a tool to enhance the liberalisation and deregulation 
of the telecommunications sector. The ‘Senior Telecom Sector Official’ talked about these 
issues (also see Section 5.4.2). The CLF also facilitated the advent of MM (for literature on 
the CLF also see: Nkoma, 2010; Mwalongo and Hussein, n.d.; Mfungahema, 2014; Materu-
Behitsa and Diyamett, 2010; Gunze, 2014). The NPS was also essential to the growth and 
survival of MM. The ‘Former BOT Governor’ discussed the NPS issues (also see Section 
5.4.4; 7.5; 7.6; URT, 2015c; URT, 2015d; URT, 2015a; URT, 2015b). Changes in the NPS 
facilitated FI through MM. The new Acts in both telecommunications and the financial sector 
provided the legal and regulatory framework used to enhance MM and FI in Tanzania. It also 
emerged that the lack of strict regulations during the advent of MM and reregulation when 
MM grew was crucial in sustaining MM services and FI. It also appeared that MM moderated 
some factors of FE, and the banks responded to the increasing levels of FI caused by MM. 
Senior TBA Respondent provided information on the banking sector's response to increasing 
FI levels through MM (also see Section 2.9.6). Likewise, Financial Sector Official elaborated 
on the essential FinScope surveys on FI/FE and MM/banks conducted by the FSDT in 
Tanzania (also see Sections 5.4.3, 5.4.6, and 5.5). Furthermore, the Executive Banking Sector 
Official provided informed details on the critical aspects of regulations, the NPS, MM, banks 
and FI/FE (also see Sections 5.5, 7.8.2, 7.8.3). In addition, the Executive Financial Sector 
Official provided crucial details on the MoF and its policies, financial reforms, FE, FI, and 
the key challenges facing the financial sector on the whole (also see Section 5.5). Moreover, 
the Senior BOT Official helped the researcher understand FI, FE, the NFIF and its processes, 
and the advent of MM, neoclassical matters, and the contemporary MM issues (also see 
Section 6.4.1). Also, the Senior Interoperability Expert discussed MM interoperability issues 




to what has been said, the 'Senior Banking Official' explained MM and banking issues and 
how they are related to FI, FE, neoliberalisation processes and reforms (also see Section 
7.7.4). Additionally, the Senior Switch Officer detailed the MM ecosystem and the banking 
switches connecting various financial platforms and how FIs work together while sharing 
payment systems and platforms (also see Section 7.8.2). Lastly, the CEO Aggregator detailed 
intermediaries' solutions facilitating payments between MNOs on the one hand, and banks 
and other FIs on the other (also see Section 7.84). 
The 11 respondents provided the best explanations of all these issues that filled in the 
literature and theoretical gaps. Thus, I selected them to support the assertions made by the 
findings of this research. From them and the other respondents, I gathered informative and 
useful data that created a better understanding of the neoliberal political economy that enabled 
the advent and growth of MM, and how MM aided the transformation from FE to FI, as well 
as the response of the banking sector to the increasing level of FI through MM.  
To summarise, the discovery of the key themes that turned into empirical chapters was 
another aspect that helped me select the use of the eleven elite interviews (I have also used 
some extracts from eight low-income respondents in Chapter 6 to substantiate some of their 
views and support the research findings). During the interviews, I learned new issues and 
knowledge, and I kept on inquiring to know more about these discoveries and findings. The 
understanding of these new findings helped me build possible theories and perspectives. After 
reading the transcripts of all the interviews and based on the emerging themes, I knew who 
had the most relevant details and with whom I could use NVivo to find the most suitable 
quotations and interviews. As I identified the literature gaps, I used the new information from 
the interviews to fill in those gaps or provide further examples and details to explain some of 
the issues. For details on how I developed my thinking and used other interviews, see 
Appendix 4.8. 
4.8.4.2 How Did I Utilise Other Secondary Qualitative Data in My Thinking/Findings? 
In Chapter 3, I examined existing literature on the conceptual and theoretical approaches to 
studying MM and other related ICT for development, FE, and FI issues. By doing so, I 
identified the gaps and proposed my theoretical framework as a bridge. I also discussed the 
different theoretical perspectives on neoliberalism using the data from the literature search in 




this research not only in Chapter 3 but also in other subsequent chapters. Moreover, I explained 
the key concepts and issues of the theoretical framework and how they applied to my crucial 
research issues to answer the main research questions using the qualitative data I obtained from 
literature and interviews. Both Chapters 2 and 3 provide essential literature that defines and 
introduces vital data and knowledge to support the arguments, findings and theoretical 
perspectives supporting the thesis. 
Section 4.8.3 discussed essential secondary data sources that helped provide key data needed 
to strengthen and critically analyse the arguments presented in this dissertation. These sources 
included: (i) FinScope Survey Reports (FinScope, 2006; FinScope, 2009; FinScope, 2013a; 
FinScope 2013b; and FinScope 2018); (ii) Intermedia Survey Reports (InterMedia, 2014a; 
InterMedia, 2014b; InterMedia, 2016; InterMedia, 2017; InterMedia, 2018); (iii) Data from the 
Global Findex Reports; (iv) GSMA Reports and Data (GSMA, 2020a; 2020b; GSMA, 2016a; 
GSMA, 2016b; GSMA, 2017a; GSMA, 2017b; GSMA, 2019). I also relied on data from key 
policy documents on FI, including: (i) the 2017 ‘Self-Evaluation’ Report of the NFIF; (ii) the 
2014 NFIF Document; (iii) the 2018 NFIF Document; and (iv) the 2017 FI Supply-Side Report. 
The qualitative data obtained from these documents were nationally representative and 
credible. Throughout the dissertation, the data allowed the researcher to analyse the 
transformation from FE to FI in Tanzania. The data has been used to establish the rate of FI in 
Tanzania and depict the global situation.  The data also helped the research to demonstrate and 
tell the story regarding the development of MM in Tanzania and its other related neoliberal 
issues in subsequent chapters and sections of the dissertation. 
I have also used data from other government sources (also see Appendix 4.7). Such data from: 
URT, 2003a; URT, 2003b; URT, 2006a; URT, 2006b; URT, 2014; URT, 2015a; URT, 2015b; 
URT, 2015c; URT, 2015d; URT, 2019); also provided essential information on the legal and 
regulatory space and framework that has been used in Tanzania to support FI and MM issues. 
In Chapter 5, where I discussed the development of MM in Tanzania, such data was critical in 
demonstrating the importance of the different stages of these developments in Tanzania. 
The literature provided in Chapter 6 provided data that helped demonstrate the role of MM in 
moderating financial exclusion in Tanzania. For instance, the literature on interoperability, 
including explanations on the Moore’s and Metcalfe’s theories in Section 6.4.2.1, demonstrates 
this (see Oxford, 2019; Yoo, 2015; The Economist, 2015b; Metcalfe, 2013). There is also a 




In Chapter 7, the data obtained from CPSS documents was used to explain NPS issues and 
helped to showcase the response of the banking sector on increasing FI caused by MM (see 
Sections 7.4 and 7.5). I also used BOT documents to explain the banking sector's issues in 
Tanzania and its response to the increasing use of MM.  
The qualitative data from the literature I presented helped explain the role of neoliberalism in 
facilitating FI and MM development. From Chapter 2 to Chapter 8, the literature's data 
supported arguments on inclusive neoliberalism, FI, FE, and MM issues. The data has been 
used to help answer the research questions as demonstrated in the empirical chapters and 
throughout the dissertation. Cohen et al. (2011) define a documentary review as a process that 
involves examining the text to obtain relevant data and context to support the research's 
assertions. I used the documentary and literature reviews in this research to get relevant data to 
support both the contextual and empirical chapters. Knowledge and data of the documents and 
literature reviews helped and provided data that helped investigate the emerging themes and 
issues presented in each of the empirical chapters. 
4.8.4.3 How Did Other Respondents (Other Than the 11 Selected Elites) Inform the 
Findings? 
There are three main types of unstructured interviews, namely: oral history, creative 
interview, and post-modern interview (also see: Fontana and Prokos, 2007; Leavy, 2020). 
While oral history unstructured interviews collect historical details about the investigated 
issues, post-modern unstructured interviews seek to gather more diverse evidence about the 
problems researched. Moreover, creative unstructured interviews are more flexible and do 
not depend much on traditional interviewing rules. I utilised the creative unstructured in-depth 
interviews to gather meaningful patterns, themes, and stories that helped inform my research. 
As detailed in Sections 4.8 and 4.9, I also utilised ‘thematic’ and ‘content’ analyses to help 
answer the research questions and to fulfil the research objectives.  
I evaluated the data from the remaining 73 respondents. I considered including data that had 
been repeated by several respondents. I also included the findings that surprised me which 
were verified by several respondents or supported by literature (see Sections 5.2.1, 5.4, 6.2, 
7.3, and 7.8). Moreover, qualitative data that reminded me of a theory, concept, or perspective 
that could support my research findings were also incorporated into my analysis. At times, 




issues and decided to use them to tell my Ph.D. story. If the respondent explicitly stated that 
it was important, I sought further verification, or if it was previously published in peer-
reviewed reports or articles, I included it in the analysis. In some instances, some issues were 
included for some other valid reasons that made them relevant. During my data collection, I 
used periodic analysis which allowed me to investigate issues as they emerged or sought 
further clarification to understand them. For the selection of relevant secondary data, see 
sections 4.8.3, 4.8.3.1, 4.8.3.2, and 4.9. I also used relevant data supporting the respondents' 
assertions and the chosen theoretical framework. Also, see the literature in Chapters 1, 2, and 
3 that defined, introduced, and explained the key research and theoretical concepts and 
arguments. In each empirical chapter (Chapters 5, 6, and 7), relevant literature to support the 
key research arguments and findings has also been used to answer the research questions.   
The respondents I interviewed were FI and MM stakeholders with knowledge of the 
investigated issues. The respondents ranged from the professional elite to low-income and 
formally financially-excluded people. In Chapter 6, I also used extracts from the interview 
scripts of the eight low-income and previously financially-excluded respondents to 
demonstrate how MM moderated some factors of FE. These eight respondents were different 
from the eleven elite respondents I have used throughout the dissertation. 
In Section 6.4.1, I discussed the lack of access to formal financial services to financially 
excluded people. Respondents Said, Gaston, Mama, Seki and Karin provided their views which 
demonstrated how MM provided access to formal financial services. Their views helped to 
strengthen the evidence obtained from macro-data and other elite sources. Engaging with low-
income and previously financially-excluded individuals provided an understanding of how 
MM moderated lack of access to formal financial services.  
In Section 6.4.2, I discussed the high costs that hindered the poor from accessing formal 
financial services. Respondents Mbwana and Said from the low-income and previously 
financially-excluded individuals briefly asserted the high-cost issues and how they affected the 
poor individuals access to formal financial services. They shared what had changed since they 
had started using MM services. 
In Section 6.4.2, the interoperability issues were discussed. A low-income MM agent Noorah 
briefly provided a picture of what interoperability is from a low-income individual's eyes. In 
Section 6.4.2.1.1, I discussed exclusivity and non-exclusivity reasons for interoperability. MM 




demonstrated their benefits to MM clients. Respondent Mbwana in Section 6.4.3 briefly 
introduced some risks faced by financially-excluded and low-income people. 
The use of these eight interviews in Chapter 6 helped the inclusion of low-income and 
previously financially-excluded people in the analysis of MM to demonstrate the moderation 
of some factors of FE by MM.  
4.9 Data Processing and Analysis 
The data analysis uses the ‘thematic analysis’ as illustrated by Pope et al. (2000) and Attride-
Stirling (2001). ‘Thematic analysis’ was developed by Braun and Clarke (2006) to analyse data 
collected through qualitative interviews. It identifies themes within the data (Braun and Clarke, 
2006). According to Boyatzis (1998), it uses a coding process to develop themes from raw data 
by encoding them. The interpretation of the emerging codes and themes is usually done by 
comparing the frequency of the themes and how those themes relate to each other (Guest and 
MacQueen, 2012). A theme is a pattern of similar responses from data that helps to answer the 
research questions. According to Smith and Firth (2011), generating themes for data is a 
common feature of qualitative methods and also a widely used analytical method. Other 
analytical methods of qualitative analysis include: ‘socio-linguistic methods’ that explore the 
meaning and use of language in terms of ‘discourse and conversational analysis’ as well as the 
grounded theory which focuses on theory development. Neither of the two latter approaches 
fits with the design of this research. I decided to use the thematic analysis approach to analyse 
the data. 
4.9.1 Thematic Analysis  
The interviews and focus group sessions were recorded using a Dictaphone. They were also 
transcribed to help the process of data analysis. The data analysis paid attention to the contexts, 
consistency, and contradictions of views, frequency, and intensity of the comments, their 
specificity as well as emerging themes and trends. The thematic approach used ‘thematic 
network analysis’. 
Firstly, I considered my theoretical and methodological perspectives, which allowed me to 
process and reduce data (also see: Pope et al., 2000). By doing so, the research examined the 
findings to see if they concurred with or reflected in the theoretical framework and whether 
they were able to either answer the research questions or fulfil the research aims, and objectives. 




issues. The approach allowed me to focus on the relevant answers that helped me to answer the 
research questions. I, therefore, discarded the irrelevant answers. 
Secondly, a ‘thematic network analysis’ was used (also see: Attride-Stirling, 2001). This 
approach brought an ‘exploratory’ perspective into the research. With this approach, all data 
was processed and allowed for new details to emerge, which helped to include the unexpected 
findings within the interpretive process. 
By using a mix of the two approaches, I followed these steps: I first transcribed each interview. 
Then, I summarised what I wanted from those interviews which would aid the analysis. Next, 
I reduced the key themes and identified a few relevant themes that were able to answer the 
main research questions. The data reduction was made through the process of coding the data. 
By coding, the research refers to the use of a ‘word’ or a ‘short phrase’ that labels well the gist 
of the data (e.g., quotation). This was the first move towards data reduction and interpretation. 
I did some coding manually, and that was referred to as the ‘table method’ where you put 
different labels on the table for the emerging themes from the transcripts. I continued coding 
that way. This helped me to identify similar codes for merging. Following the above first step, 
coding helped me to develop a ‘coding framework’, which was an inductive ‘thematic network 
approach’. There is no rule as to how many codes the research should have. Similar codes were 
clustered together into themes. A new piece of paper was taken, and the ‘basic theme’ was 
written on it. Then, I placed it near the cluster of codes. For instance, if I had the following 
codes, namely: ‘lack of a bank account’ and ‘no regular income’ which appeared in the 
interview transcripts with financially-marginalised people, they were clustered together as 
‘financially-excluded people lacking income and a bank account’. Below, in Diagram 4.5, is 
an example of this coding process: 





This process produced more codes and themes as depicted in Diagram 4.6. Diagram 4.6 
illustrates the organisation of the codes and themes (there were more codes and themes not 
included in Diagram 4.6). I ended up extracting the three main themes. Each theme became a 
data chapter. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 represent these themes, namely: (i) neoliberalism and MM 
growth; (ii) MM and moderation of FE; and (iii) FI, MM, and the banking sector’s response. 
 
To ensure that I got the most out of the eighty four interviews, I also used the NVivo software 
to do the coding. After the completion of this process, I identified eleven elites and used their 
interviews and quotations to write this dissertation while considering the views from the other 
seventy-three respondents (I have also used some extracts from eight low-income respondents 
in Chapter 6 to substantiate some of their views and support the research findings). See 
Appendices 4.9 and 4.10. To process the data through thematic analysis, Braun and Clarke 
(2006) recommend the six-step approach I followed. The first step required that I familiarised 
myself with the data. I did this while transcribing the scripts. The second step was to produce 
initial codes by identifying the texts with the themes I wanted to use. The third step was the 
further identification of any recurring themes of interest. The fourth step was reviewing all the 




label the main themes. The sixth step was writing a report using the data from the themes to 
allow further data interpretation.  
The use of NVivo made coding and analysis easier. With the NVivo software, the creation of 
the initial codes was easier. This facilitated the creation of nodes containing phrases of interest. 
From the codes, I created the themes, also referred to as the ‘parent codes”.  A theme consists 
of several ‘child nodes’. Child nodes facilitate the process of extracting data from the 
transcripts during report writing. I was able to create several nodes with a direct link to my 
research questions. When the final codes and themes were confirmed, I initiated a discussion 
of findings and conclusions. This step interpreted the results. It was easier to conclude using 
this process. As I drew conclusions, I considered the explanatory patterns or relationships that 
adequately addressed the research questions.  The following questions guided the 
interpretations of the findings:  
• Are the data collected and the research methods addressing the research questions?  
• What about the contradictions or the new findings, do they interact? Do they concur or 
differ?  
• Can data from various sources be triangulated? The various sources can be interviewees, 
external sources of information such as the secondary sources, and the different 
methods.  
• If there were some limitations to the study, what were they, and how did they affect the 
findings of the research?  
• Is there a need for a follow-up or further research based on the research findings?  
This brought me to the next step of the data analysis, which was the effects of the study 
limitations.  While the research drew conclusions, and made recommendations as an integral 
part of the Ph.D. research, it was essential to acknowledge the limitations of the collected data. 
As this was qualitative research, the findings were applicable in Tanzania only, and they should 
not be generalised in other countries. The findings could be used to provide examples of how 
and why there were certain patterns or specific neoliberal policy contexts that aided the growth 
of MM, which in turn helped the transition from the high level of FE to increasing levels of FI. 
The conclusions were drawn by using the available data and not by using personal views or 





Finally, the research findings were to be reported.  Chapters 5 through 8 report the research 
findings with Chapter 5 answering the first research question.  The first question was: ‘how 
does neoliberalism facilitate the growth of MM in Tanzania? From the findings, neoliberal 
reforms were vital to introducing the political economy that allowed the advent of MM, which 
in the long run, led to increasing levels of FI. The other chapters of the dissertation were 
designed to reflect this reality, as well as to answer the other research questions.  
4.9.2 Data Analysis for Focus Groups 
According to Harding (2013), some authors argue that data from a focus group can be analysed 
in the same way as any other data from the interview sessions.  Other authors suggest that as 
focus groups include interaction between members, distinctive forms of analysis need to be 
used (Harding, 2013). Data analysis can be at the individual or group levels. The data analysis 
for focus groups was for group level, where I used the transcripts to evaluate the emerging 
themes and answers. In the transcript, the respondents were assigned names to distinguish their 
comments for citation purposes. Appendices 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14 contain extracts from a 
few selected interviews at macro, meso, and micro levels to provide evidence of these 
interviews and respondents. 
4.9.3 How Was Secondary Data Analysed?  
Diagram 4.7: Interactive Model of Qualitative Content Analysis Approach 
 
As illustrated in Diagram 4.7, the process consists of three interconnected processes of data 
analysis. The first process consists of getting relevant data from what has been collected, as 
well as, from the organisation of data into specific themes and patterns of data. The second 




assembling of information” in a meaningful way. The third process consists of drawing 
conclusions and verifications in the forms of research arguments and their validity. This can be 
done by revisiting the theories and verifying the data’s relevance (also see: Sansa (2010:31) 
citing Miles and Hubermas (1994b:10-12) and Holliday (2007:89-90). Sections 4.8.3 through 
4.8.3.2.4 detail the key secondary data sources. 
4.10 Validity and Reliability 
As this is qualitative research, the findings will not be used to make conclusions about a wider 
global population. However, the findings can be used to analyse and understand Tanzania’s 
specific situation, including the patterns of, or specific contexts of FI, FE, MM growth, and 
how they have been affected by neoliberal policies. The findings set a foundation for similar 
studies to be conducted elsewhere, but the findings cannot be generalised to include those 
countries. The conclusions of the dissertation were drawn using the available data and not by 
using the researcher’s personal views and opinions. The research only made conclusions on the 
researched issues based on the supporting evidence it had gathered. For qualitative research, 
validity is related to the accuracy and truthfulness of scientific findings (also see: Le Comple 
and Goetz, 1982:32; Ruane, 2005). 
Furthermore, reliability deals with the ‘consistency’, ‘stability’ and ‘repeatability’ of the 
research findings as well as the researcher’s ability to collect, process and interpret the findings 
in an accurate manner (also see: Seltiz et al., 1976: 182). Reliability was achieved after using 
the same research methods to yield the same, or comparable results, over repeated periods. At 
the eighty-fourth interview, the data saturation point had been reached. 
4.11 Ethical Considerations  
The informants were asked to be part of the research. They voluntarily agreed to take part in 
the research. Nobody forced them to participate against their will. I made them aware of their 
right to remain anonymous. Hence, their proper names do not appear anywhere in the 
dissertation. Other names have been used to mask their identities. The information they 
provided remains confidential. It will not be shared with any third parties without their consent. 
Only the principal researcher, the research assistant, and the two university supervisors could 
know their identities for verification purposes. The safety of every interviewee was the priority 
of this research. Any sensitive information that could cost the respondent’s job was not reported 
to the respondent’s supervisors. Recorded data was safely stored on a hard drive, secured and 




4.12 Summary and Conclusion 
The chapter sought to: Firstly, describe the current state of research methodologies used to 
study MM, FE, and FI on the one hand, and neoliberalism on the other. Secondly, it identified 
the existing methodological gaps. Thirdly, it stated how my selected methodology contributes 
in closing those gaps and adds value to this research topic. Fourthly, it identified possible 
methodological approaches for future research. Fifthly, it explained the methodology used by 
this research and how the data was analysed. 
As specified earlier in this chapter, research on MM lacked in-depth analysis. This was an issue 
for all new research areas of any discipline. The research has used in-depth unstructured 
interviews to help close this gap and obtain in-depth data, which was key to reaching the 
theoretical views and perspectives, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, and as applied throughout 
this dissertation to help answer the key research questions. Furthermore, the chapter identified 
lacking methodological issues needed for future research. It concludes that in-depth qualitative 
research is still useful for future MM and neoliberal research. It also agrees with Lwoga and 
Sangeda (2019), and with Duncombe (2016) that there is inadequate use of participatory 
methods or action research, or experimental designs. If used, these methods and design could 
help advance MM research in the future. 














CHAPTER 5: The Development of Mobile Money and the Politics of Financial Inclusion 
in Tanzania1 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter analyses the development and growth of MM in Tanzania and the policies, 
regulations, and legal frameworks that enhanced it. It answers the following research question: 
“How did neoliberalism facilitate the growth of MM in Tanzania?” By doing so, it fulfils 
research objective number 1, which is “to explore the advent and successful growth of MM in 
Tanzania with the view to determine how it happened”. It is the role of political economy to 
create a conducive environment for emerging industries, such as MM, by specifying the roles 
and responsibilities of the key actors in various sectors, and in this regard the role of MNOs 
and other financial service providers in boosting FI. The political economy is expected to create 
effective legal and regulatory frameworks to facilitate the effective functioning of the banking 
and financial sectors. I intend to illuminate the conditions that facilitated the advent and growth 
of MM as well as its usage in boosting FI. Previous studies on MM rarely acknowledge the 
role of neoliberalism to catalyse its growth and development, as well as the role of 
neoliberalism in supporting FI (Dahlberg et al., 2008; Duncombe and Boateng, 2009; Diniz et 
al., 2012; Kim et al., 2018). This chapter tries to bridge this research gap. 
MM has played a significant part in reaching financially-unreached and excluded people, 
overtaking banking and other financial services in Tanzania (FinScope, 2006; FinScope, 2013a; 
FinScope, 2009; FinScope, 2018). There is no doubt that MM emerged at a time when FE was 
a major issue. See Chapter 2, and this chapter. The banks opposed the advent of MM in the 
beginning.  They thought that the MNOs had entered the money business. Besides, the banks 
were in a better position to do money business better than any other institutions (see Chapter 7 
for further details). For this reason, it is crucial to understand the development of MM, 
neoliberal policies, regulatory and legal frameworks that allowed it to succeed. This is in the 
view of the ‘RCA’, using the classical and neoclassical views as detailed in Chapters 1, 2, 3 
and 4. 
 
1 The International Social Sciences Review, a peer-reviewed journal, has published this chapter as an article. 
See: Mhella, D. J. (2019).’The Development of Mobile Money and the Politics of Financial Inclusion in 
Tanzania’, The International Social Sciences Review, 1: 25-42. https://doi.org/10.37467/gka-
socialrev.v1.2088 Moreover, I presented this chapter at the 8th International Congress on Technology, Science 




The chapter has eight sections. Section 5.2 provides MM background by defining the term and 
by demonstrating the patterns of MM growth over time across different geographical regions 
and in Tanzania. It also shows the trajectory from ‘money transfer’ to ‘mobile finance’ to 
explain how MM services developed and evolutionised. Moreover, it mentions the main 
findings of this chapter. Section 5.3 introduces selected literature and relevant theoretical 
assumptions that facilitate to answer research question number 1 and that help the research to 
demonstrate the growth of MM in Tanzania. Section 5.4 presents the qualitative findings and 
their interpretation. It also analyses liberalisation/deregulation policies that supported the 
evolution of MM, which included the CLF, ‘test, monitor and regulate’ approach, NPS 
regulations, other regulations, interoperable issues, and the deployment of MM services. 
Section 5.5 examines national FI processes and the politics involved, with further details 
provided in Chapters 7 and 8 (Section 8.11). It briefly details the role of key actors in the 
business of FI in which the MNOs are also key players. It also introduces the concepts of ‘PPPI’ 
and ‘NFIF’. Section 5.6 briefly analyses the challenges and limitations that have emerged 
against the growth and development of MM with key issues being access, uptake, and usage of 
MM services. Section 5.7 identifies the surprising findings that came out of this chapter. 
Section 5.8 presents the conclusions of the chapter by summarising the findings and asserting 
how the chapter answers research question 1 and how it meets research objective number 1. 
5.2 Background 
5.2.1 What are the Main Findings in this Chapter? 
Most findings in this chapter apply to Tanzania. It was the roll-back neoliberal policies of 
deregulation (liberalisation) that facilitated the advent of MM through the creation of the CLF. 
The CLF allowed the telecommunications sector to use technology to add on services offered 
outside of the telecommunications sector, such as MM. This was key to the emergence of MM. 
Likewise, the roll-out (re-regulation) neoliberal policies enhanced the growth of MM through 
the NPS regulations that defined and accepted e-money as part of the NPS. The NPSA and its 
regulations resolved the compliance issues and legally recognised e-signatures. The regulations 
dictated who got involved in the NPS. Likewise, deregulation and liberalisation allowed MM 
to operate, during its initial stages, without stricter regulations. Hence, Tanzania used the ‘test, 
monitor, and regulate’ approach, which allowed the regulators to test MM, and learn from its 
functions and outcomes, which informed the process of regulating it before the regulations 




of MM services became easier, and Tanzania was the first country to have full MM 
interoperable services. Through neoliberal and regulated capitalist perspectives, NFIF emerged 
where state and non-state actors formed the NFIF to implement inclusive financial efforts 
through the NFIF. All these things were vital in allowing the advent and growth of MM as 
discussed in this chapter.  
5.2.2 MM Background Information 
In 2008, Tanzania allowed the advent of MM.  According to UNCTAD (2012), MM is: 
 “money stored using a ‘Subscriber Identity Model’ (SIM) card in a mobile phone as an identifier 
as opposed to an account in conventional banking”.  
The Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) also defines MM as: 
 “a mobile-based transactional service that can be transferred electronically using mobile networks.  
A MM issuer may, depending on local law and the business model, be an MNO which is a MM 
Operator, or a third party such as a bank. MM is often used synonymously with ‘mobile financial 
services’” (AFI, 2012:3).  
Hence, MM should not be confused with ‘mobile banking’ which is the: 
 “use of a mobile phone to access banking services and execute financial transactions. Mobile 
banking covers both transactional and non-transactional services, such as viewing financial 
information on a bank customer’s mobile phone” (AFI, 2012:3). 
MM is, therefore, a technology that links people to access formal financial services (Pope et al. 
2011; Kizza, 2013; Chauhan, 2015; Gichuku and Mulu-Mutuku, 2018). It is also an innovation 
that has been used to transform the delivery of financial services not only in Tanzania, but also 
around the world in general. See my definition in Chapter 1. Graph 5.1 below tracks the history 










Graph 5.1: Number of Live MM Services for the Unbanked by Region (2001-2013 Year 
End) 
 
Source: GSMA (2013:9). 
Graph 5.1 illustrates that MM has proliferated rapidly from one service in 2001 to about 219 
services in 2013 worldwide. There is a significant increase in every region, as Graph 5.1 shows. 
Sub-Saharan Africa leads in terms of having more MM services. South Asia and Latin America 
follow. The Middle East and North Africa as a region lags behind, while Europe and Central 
Asia have stunted growth of MM services.  In the case of Tanzania, the first MM service was 
M-Pesa in 2008. EzyPesa entered the market in 2009. TigoPesa followed in 2010. Airtel Money 
launched in 2011. TTCL and HaloPesa inaugurated in 2017 and smartphone was inaugurated 
in 2018. In total and in 2018, Tanzania had seven MNOs offering MM services. Hence, 
Tanzania’s MM industry has developed over time. In 2015 there were four MM service 
providers, as shown in Diagram 5.1 below. Vodacom M-Pesa had the most significant market 
share of 37%. Airtel Money and Tigo  Pesa had almost the same market shares, with EzyPesa 
owning only 5% of the market share. As this is a changing, vibrant and competent industry, in 
2018 the market shares changed significantly with Vodacom M-Pesa owning 43% of the 
market share, TigoPesa approaching Vodacom M-Pesa with 36%, and Airtel Money falling to 
17%. HaloPesa, a new entrant, was overtaking EzyPesa, and the TTCL (also a new entrant) 








Diagram 5.1: Tanzania’s MM Market Structure 
 
There are about four main MM models across the world known as: ‘bank-led’, ‘Telco-led’, 
‘peer-to-peer’, and ‘partnership’ models (Toma, 2012; Bossuyt and Hove, 2007; and AFI, 
2012:3-4). If it is a bank-led model, then MM is managed by banks and regulated by the central 
bank, and the MNOs are the pipes. If it is MNO-led, the MNOs are in charge, and they have a 
trust account managed by a bank. Hence, the money stays with the bank and not with the MNOs. 
The peer-to-peer model acts independently from the MNOs or banks to provide mobile 
payment. There is the fourth model which involves partnership with a third-party MM operator 
who leads MM deployments. Both the banks and MNOs play a secondary role in this case. 
According to Bindo and Hasnian (2015:9), Tanzania adopted the ‘MNO-led’, also known as, 
the ‘Telco-led’ model. The development of MM in Tanzania has therefore gone through the 
following three phases known as: services and money transfer, commerce and payments, and 
mobile finance. Graph 5.2 shows these three phases.  
Graph 5.2: The Journey to Fully Digital Financial Service 
 




The first phase of service provision and money transfer allowed the MNOs to provide telecom 
services such as ‘cash-in’, ‘buy airtime’, and ‘pay bills’. They also provide money transfer 
services such as ‘domestic P2P transfers’, ‘bulk payments’, ‘international remittances’, and 
‘cash-in services.’ The second phase of ‘commerce and payments’ was hard for the MNOs to 
arrive at as the banks objected to the operations of the MNOs (see Chapter 7). The great Mobile 
Financial Service (MFS) barrier was what they were referring to, in terms of the MNOs 
interfering with the money business, as the banks thought they were the only ones to operate 
in that area. It was not only in Tanzania that this had occurred, but also in other countries. 
Through the understanding of what MM could bring to the poor, the MNOs were allowed by 
central banks and governments to cross the barrier. As they entered the ‘commerce and 
payments stage’, they started to provide the ‘merchant payments’ such as ‘bill payments’, 
remote payments, retail payments, etc. Today MM has entered the ‘mobile finance stage’ where 
it allows the customers to save, or what could be referred to as ‘micro-savings’. It also provides 
microcredits. But what has allowed this to happen? In this chapter, I argue that there were four 
things that enabled the development of MM through these three stages, namely: the 
liberalisation of the Tanzanian economy through reforms (referred to as the roll-back or 
deregulatory phase in the theoretical framework in Chapter 3), CLF, the test, monitor and 
regulate approach (referred to as the roll-out or reregulatory phase in the theoretical framework 
in Chapter 3), interoperability, national FI politics and the 2015 NPSA (also see Chapters 2, 3 
and 4 for further details). Before looking into all these issues, I will present a selected literature 
review and theoretical assumptions to build up the rationale for further analysis. 
5.3 Literature Review and Theoretical Assumptions 
5.3.1 Literature Review 
In developing countries, poor infrastructure and low-income levels trigger expensive financial 
services, which are unprofitable (Mothobi, and Gryzybowski, 2017; Rocha et al., 2011). The 
traditional financial services face these above-mentioned challenges. MM, on the other hand, 
ignited a FI transformation for millions of the unbanked poor by using mobile networks (Jack 
and Suri, 2011; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015). Many rural poor households have been 
transformed by the MM revolution which not only allowed them to get access to basic financial 
services through MM transfers and savings, but also made them enjoy the communication 
aspect of mobile devices (Bongomin et al., 2018:363).  The main purpose of MM is fostering 
FI for financially-excluded people (Peruta, 2018:155). These are the benefits that make 




As far as FI is concerned, there is no universally agreed definition (TNCFI, 2014:13; Aduda 
and Kalunda, 2012:100; Tabaro, 2011:6) as previously discussed in Chapter 2.  Countries 
define FI according to their realities, but all definitions focus on the provision of formal 
financial services to all at a reasonable price (AFI, 2017a, World Bank, 2014a). The Bank of 
Tanzania defines FI as the “regular use of financial services, through payment infrastructures 
to manage cash flows and mitigate shocks, which are delivered by formal providers through a 
range of appropriate services with dignity and fairness” (TNCFI, 2018). About 2.5 billion 
people worldwide do not have access to formal financial services (World Bank, 2014a:1). In 
2009, 56% of the Tanzanian population was financially excluded (FinScope, 2009). Thanks to 
MM and other innovations in 2017, the number of financially-excluded people reduced to 
26.8% (FinScope, 2018). MM has been highly regarded for its role in fighting banking 
exclusion (Maurer, 2011), and for its role in offering a solution to at least two main problems, 
namely: the price of banking (McKay and Pickens, 2010; Mbiti and Weil, 2016; Donavan, 
2012; Arestoff and Venet, 2013) and the proximity to banking infrastructures (Morawczynski 
and Pickens, 2009; Jack and Suri, 2011).  
5.3.2 How Do the Findings as Described in Section 5.2.1 Relate to Previous Studies? 
Not much on the CLF and MM has been investigated in Tanzania. Some literature exists (see 
Chapters 1 through 4).  However, more must be done to understand how the CLF aided the 
advent of MM in Tanzania and elsewhere. This literature is rare and is still developing. The 
existing research suggests the neutrality of technologies (see Chapter 4), but more must be 
written on how the CLF helped additional financial services to be added to the providers of 
services in the telecommunications sector.  
Related literature includes Madise (2019) who analyses the development of MM in Malawi, 
and he links this development to suitable regulatory arrangements and FI. Nyaaba et al. (2018) 
investigate the political economy of MM interoperability and transactions in Ghana, while Jack 
and Suri (2011) analyse the economics of M-Pesa in Kenya. GSMA (2019) analyses state of 
the industry report on MM and how MM transforms access to financial services around the 
world. The literature on the liberalisation of the telecommunications and financial sectors does 
not inform much on MM (see: Prochaska, 2014; Adomi, 2011; also see literature on Chapters 
2, 3, and 4). UNCTAD (2012) analyses MM features of East Africa Community countries, 
including MM service deployments, regulations and policy, where the legal and regulatory 




industry, emphasizing the various actors, level of regulation, number of users, models of 
payments, and characteristics of interoperability. Literature linking classical and neoclassical 
perspectives and technology, as well as the literature on MM has been provided in Chapters 1, 
2,3, and 4. My findings relate to the above literature works as they bring the issues of roll-out 
and roll-back neoliberalisation into the analysis of MM as delineated in this chapter. I do not 
only aim at discussing the usefulness of MM, but also, delineating the theoretical assumptions 
for its growth. 
5.3.3 Theoretical Assumptions 
The theoretical underpinnings of this chapter are founded on the three assumptions, illustrated 
in Diagram 5.2 below, and as supported by the classical and neoclassical views.  
Diagram 5.2: Key Theoretical Assumptions for MM Growth in Tanzania 
 
The first assumption is that the ‘test, monitor, and regulate’ approach aided the development 
of MM (Haider, 2013; Di Castri and Gidvani, 2014). This is a classical perspective with the 
view that the markets are not perfect, and that the regulator needs to study them before placing 
rigid regulations, if he/she wants to achieve the best market efficiency. At the time of MM 
inception in 2008, the BOT did not know how to regulate MM innovation.  
There is literature on financial liberalisation, financial deepening, and technology, which is 
also key to explaining the role of technology in enhancing FI. Ang (2010), Romer (1990), 
Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992) provided a seminal contribution to 
the literature on economic growth. They argue that new ideas encourage the process of 
technological change, which improves the technology of production and service delivery. 
According to Ang (2010), the liberalisation of the various sectors of the economy boosts the 
generation of new ideas, which deepens the technological industry. Thus, one expects a positive 
relationship between finance and innovative services.  
Financial liberalisation can be measured by several types of policy changes in the financial 
sector (Ang, 2010). Abiad et al. (2010) and Ang (2010) measure financial liberalisation by 




restraints, entry barriers in the banking sector, prudential regulation and supervision, 
privatisation in the financial sector, restrictions on international capital flows, and securities 
market policy. According to Ang (2010):  
“the findings suggest that technological deepening in the financial sector rather than changes in the 
financial policy environment favour a more liberalised regime. In the case of developing countries, 
only financial development is found to be effective in reducing financial constraints and thereby in 
facilitating innovative production”. 
Hence, liberalisation and technology also play a key role in causing or reducing FE as 
demonstrated in Chapter 2 and as it will be demonstrated later in this chapter. The BOT 
liberalised the financial sector and allowed MM services without placing strict regulations on 
it (Haider, 2013; Di Castri and Gidvani, 2014). By doing so, it allowed regulations to follow 
innovations. Innovations move faster than regulations (also see: Moses, 2016). The BOT was 
of the view that it would be a mistake to place regulations first and after that, allow MM 
innovations. This way of regulating innovations could stifle the development of MM, which 
would also create undesired effects. According to Di Castri and Gidvani (2014) and Haider 
(2013), the BOT learned how MM operated. It tested MM operations and guidelines before it 
placed the strict regulations. These are the normal stages that the classicists use before placing 
regulations in any industry (see Chapters 1, 3, and 4). The results were promising as MM 
services took off and succeeded in Tanzania. Elsewhere, where innovations followed 
regulations, meaning where regulations were first put in place before MM services were 
allowed, MM growth struggled in those countries (also see: UNCTAD, 2012; Oyebode, 2014; 
Llewellyn-Jones, 2016). Hence, the ‘test, monitor, and regulate’ approach was behind the 
successful growth of MM in Tanzania (also see Section 5.4.3).  
The second assumption, as presented in Diagram 5.2, is that proper legal and regulatory 
frameworks facilitated the development of MM in Tanzania and elsewhere (USAID, 2013:12; 
Di Castri and Gidvani, 2014; Ondiege, 2015; Maina, 2018: 15-16). The different Acts as they 
will be described in Sections 5.4.2, 5.4.3, and 5.4.4 provided the legal space and framework 
for MM operations in Tanzania. The Acts came with regulatory frameworks or provisions and 
provided all-encompassing laws and rules for licensing, compliance, enforcement, and matters 
of liability and breach of the law (marking the roll-out or the regulatory phase). The BOT and 
the TCRA could use the regulatory framework(s), which granted them the power to permit or 
refuse the prescribed licenses and approvals. They also had the mandate to regulate, supervise, 




framework was a necessity for the development of MM in Tanzania as it will be discussed later 
in Sections 5.4.2, 5.4.3, and 5.4.4. 
The third assumption, as depicted in Diagram 5.2, is that a conducive environment and the 
politics of FI helped to create partnerships between the MNOs and other stakeholders in 
achieving the desired FI goals (TNCFI, 2014; Ondiege, 2015; TNCFI, 2017a; TNCFI, 2018; 
Komba 2016). Also, see Section 5.5. Tanzania’s NFIF recognised the role of MM in 
transforming the landscape of financial services over the past 10 years. The BOT, for example, 
embraced FI as a public policy objective. Moreover, the NFIF also reckoned four enablers of 
FI through which policy priority areas were set to enhance FI (TNCFI, 2014). The priority 
policy areas included: (i) increasing the proximity of financial access points to where people 
live and transact; (ii) enabling robust payment platforms; (iii) supporting robust electronic 
information infrastructure for individual and business profiles, credit history and collateral 
establishment for effective Know-Your-Customer (KYC) processes; (iv) ensuring that 
customers are informed and protected (TNCFI, 2014). All these policy priority areas not only 
supported FI, but also created a conducive environment for MM and for the politics of FI which 
were key to supporting MM operations as discussed later in this Chapter.  
According to Davis and Walsh (2017), neoclassical views on financialisation in the neoliberal 
era focus on transactions and the best conditions of those transactions, as well as, the 
affordability of transaction costs. This is in line with the profit-maximisation emphasis of 
neoclassical perspectives. The ability of MM in reducing the costs of accessing financial 
services and the increased number of MM users made MM services efficient and affordable. 
According to Alexandre et al. (2010), MM reduces FE as it addresses the gap between banks 
and the financially excluded as many banks do not find it profitable to make banking 
infrastructure and financial services available in poor communities. This is due to the banks 
incurring high transaction costs for small transaction values when engaging with low volumes 
of transactions. 
5.3.4 Conceptualisation of MM Development – Key Statistics and Findings 
I will start by revisiting various statistics from credible institutions and documents. This helps 






Graph 5.3 Evolution of MM in Tanzania – Mobile Payment Growth 2008-2015 
Source: BOT (2017). 
Graph 5.3 shows how mobile payments grew over time. These statistics do not include mobile 
banking payments because mobile banking payments are not MM payments. Trillions of 
shillings or billions of US dollars pass through MM every year. According to GSMA (2017b:6), 
about 52% of the GDP passes through MM services in Tanzania as quoted in the Bank of 
Tanzania sources.  
Table 5.1: Mobile Services Statistics 
 
From Table 5.1, the number of registered accounts reached 71million in 2016. Active users 
were 17 million, and registered MM agents reached 371,132. The trust account balance also 
grew, reaching 665.7 billion shillings. Again, this shows how MM services kept on expanding. 
From Graph 5.4 below, if the penetration of bank and MM accounts between 2008 and 2015 
were compared, you would notice that the penetration of MM accounts was higher than that of 





Graph 5.4: Account Penetration, 2008-2015 (Millions of Accounts) 
 
To improve MM, the MNOs agreed to have interoperable systems through which customers of 
any MNOs could receive services from a different MNO. TigoPesa customers could obtain 
services from Vodacom M-Pesa and so forth (Gilman, 2016; IFC, 2015; Musa et al., 2014). 
Interoperability not only created non-exclusivity of services at the provider level, but also at 
the agent level (Komba, 2016; Masamila, 2014:56). The benefits were clear as the volume of 
transactions increased, as depicted in Graph 5.5. The first interoperable MM services in 
Tanzania started in 2014. 





It is unthinkable to analyse the development of MM services without mentioning the MNO 
agents. Interoperability at the MNO agent level facilitated the delivery of financial services 
through MM. Graph 5.6 below shows how MNO agents increased significantly as compared 
to other channels of financial service delivery between 2013 and 2017.  
Graph 5.6: MM Agents and Other Access Channels 
 
Uptake Strand 5.1 below shows that the uptake of MM services between 2013 and 2017 was 
far higher than the uptake of any other financial services, which consolidated the survival of 
MM in the financial sector.  
Strand 5.1: Uptake of Formal Financial Services 
 




Uptake Strand 5.2 adds the share of financial products in the market. It is fascinating that the 
banks have 64% of the financial products and only 17% of the uptake of formal financial 
services. MM has only 1% of the financial products share in the market and 60% of the uptake 
of formal financial services. This trend means that the adult population uses more MM than 
banking services in Tanzania. 
Strand 5.2: Uptake of Formal Financial Services 
 
Source: FinScope (2018).  
 
Strand 5.3 shows the saving channels. About 22% of the Tanzanian adult population saved 
through MM services in 2015, and only about 8% did the same with banks.  





Graph 5.7 below shows that MM trust accounts have grown continuously over time. Trust 
accounts are the accounts that MM providers are required to open with a bank as a requirement 
for them to operate MM services. The money deposited in trust accounts acts as collateral or 
an advance for MM services. With money in the trust accounts, the banks release money when 
a mobile account owner requests it. Likewise, when a MM account holder deposits money in 
his e-wallet, that money does not stay with the banks but goes straight to the trust account. It 
is worthwhile to remember that while the banks are deposit-taking institutions, MNOs are not. 
Hence, any deposits and savings go to their trust accounts in banks.  
Graph 5.7: Bank Deposits and MM Trust Account Balances (TZS Billion and % GDP) 
 
I have included all of these statistics in this analysis to show the growth of MM with concrete 
statistics and examples. The subsequent sections will provide the narrative part of what caused 
the development of MM in Tanzania and what politics and policies of FI enhanced this 
development. 
5.4 Qualitative Findings and Their Explanations 
5.4.1 Liberalisation 
From the findings, it is crucial to understand what happened with the telecommunications and 
banking sectors before and after the liberalisation policies (during the roll-back and roll-out 
phases of neoliberalisation). It is also important to know how the liberalised policies shaped 
the ‘NPS’ and the politics of FI. All of this involves the role of the government and non-
governmental actors, as well as the neoclassical perspective, which limits government 
intervention in markets to allow liberalisation and deregulation, through the ‘RCA’ as 
explained in Chapters 1 and 3. I will start by clarifying the role of the government. One needs 




the government. And therefore, it is not separated from politics. According to Stiglitz (2000:27-
39), the primary role of the government is to provide a legal framework within which all 
economic transactions occur. From the private sector’s interests, these transactions should 
generate profits. The neoclassical perspective supports the profit-maximisation of financial 
transactions. According to Stiglitz (2000), payments that transfer money from one individual 
to another, but not in return for the provision of goods and services, are called transfer payments. 
A significant percentage of MM transactions fall under transfer payments. You will see later 
how the government has provided the legal and conducive environments for facilitating MM 
growth. According to Di Castri (2013a) and Di Castri and Gidvani (2014), the government also 
regulates the sector and makes policy decisions. It also sets: the licensing requirements, 
transparency and disclosure rules, market conduct rules, rules on the privacy of data, national 
strategies, rules on credit registry, etc. The roles of the banking and non-banking institutions 
are to: establish their industry code of conduct, create their internal recourse mechanisms, 
conduct self-assessments, train their staff, set their strategies for financial inclusion, as well as 
the provision of financial education or literacy. Moreover, the liberalisation of the financial 
sector was also key to allowing MM operations. According to Campbell and Stein (1991) and 
Mbowe (2010), Tanzania was not a mixed-economy before the liberalisation of its financial 
sector. This left the banking sector struggling and brought the economy to its knees (see 
Chapter 2). Moreover, the liberalisation of the economy (that is to say, the rolling back 
neoliberalisation) allowed the introduction of new and better products, increased customer 
choices, resulted in a growth in demand for financial and telecommunications services, 
increased investments and coverage for both financial and non-financial institutions (also see: 
World Bank, 2005; IMF, 2007; Goyal and Sarkar, 2014; and Beju and Giupac-Ulici, 2012). 
Liberalisation also increased the number of services that the telecommunications sector could 
offer, this included short messaging services (SMS), multimedia messaging services (MMS), 
and the possibility for operators to upgrade their networks to enable the delivery of new and 
more advanced services to customers. All this became possible because of the roll-back 
neoliberal policies as described in Chapters 1, 3, and 4. It also allowed the telecommunications 
sector to adapt the CLF.  
5.4.2 The CLF 
The CLF and its implementation are some of the changes that occurred when Tanzania 
liberalised its economy. The telecommunications sector was affected by these changes, which 




Telecommunications Policy, the 2003 ICT Policy, the 2003 Information Broadcasting Policy, 
and the 2003 Postal Policy (TanzaniaInvest, 2020). Telecommunications in Tanzania are 
regulated by the TCRA, which is a body set up by the 2003 TCRAA.  In 2015, the government 
of Tanzania enacted the Cybercrimes Act and the ETA. The TCRA expects that these two latter 
Acts will improve the confidence of financial institutions in ICT as they address e-services and 
cyber defence. The TCRA cited banks as the prime beneficiaries of the Acts as their activities 
are highly dependent on ICT (TanzaniaInvest, 2020). Furthermore, various sector legislations 
have shaped telecommunications services. These included: the Tanzania Communications Act 
No. 18/1993; the TCRA No. 12/2003 which introduced the CLF, complemented by 14 
regulations; the 2015 ETA; the 2015 Cybercrimes Act; the Universal Communications Service 
Access Act No. 12/2006; the 2010 Electronic and Postal Communications Act. All of these 
Acts were the results of the politics of the telecommunications sector in Tanzania. 
“The best thing that the TCRA did a while ago was creating what was referred to as the ‘Converged 
Licensing Framework’ … That Framework I am talking about 2006 or 2007. The issuance of the 
license to every service, as technology has changed over time. We issued converged licenses since 
2006. They said they provided a license that was technologically and service neutral. What did all 
this mean? … They are free to do any innovation based on the licensing framework. As I said earlier, 
it is converged and that we do not regulate the technology. We do not regulate the service …. Hence, 
mobile money was like an addition to the services offered by the operators” (Senior Telecom 
Sector Official). 
Service deregulation was the triumph of the roll-back neoliberal policies. The CLF was key to 
implementing the service liberalisation policy across the different economic sectors. The 
TCRA introduced it on February 23rd, 2005. Likewise, it was technologically and service 
neutral, as well as it accommodated locals with minimum investments. According to 
TanzaniaInvest (2020): 
 “the CLF ensures regulatory flexibility, addressing market and technology developments, as well 
as efficient utilisation of network resources and encouraged the market entry of small-scale 
operators. The CLF of Tanzania establishes four categories of licenses as follows: Network 
Facilities Providers (NF), Network Service Providers (NS), Application Service Providers (AS), 
and Content Service Providers (CS) … The licensing regime provides separate licenses for 
infrastructure and services. Previous regime services, including internet provision, were licensed 
individually”.  
According to Mfungahema (2006) and Mfungahema (2014), the CLF was a neoliberal roll-




creating innovative opportunities. For instance, it allowed content service providers who did 
not own transmission facilities (network facilities) to deliver broadcasting services using 
licensed network facility operators (Mfungahema, 2014; Mfungahema 2006; TanzaniaInvest, 
2020). Through the CLF, MM innovations were introduced in the telecommunication sector, 
and across other sectors of the economy.  
The four authorisation categories in the CLF are further divided into four geographic market 
segments: international, national, regional, and district market segments (Mfungahema, 2014; 
Mfungahema 2006). Hence, the operator could choose where they wanted to operate. The 
regulation of the markets took into consideration these new neoliberal realities. 
5.4.3 Test, Monitor, and Regulate 
“You know, the central bank is an authority. It has authority over the National Payments System. 
The MNOs and the other non-financial institutions get involved in the payment system side. They 
are not on the banking side. We were open to this. The banks objected in the very beginning. They 
said the MNOs were entering the money business. And that they were in the National Payments 
System. And that they did not have strict supervision and the requirements. They thought the 
requirements and supervision favoured the MNOs and not the banks. In which case, the banks 
thought this created the conditions for the unfair competition. And as they heard it from elsewhere 
that they could use the bank-led model to run mobile money, the big difference was whether one 
proceeded with innovation or not, and the willingness to take the risk to let innovation lead while 
you monitor and then appropriately manage the risks. The system was called ‘test, monitor, and 
regulate.’ This was the concept” (Former BOT Governor). 
Tanzania did not have an ‘Electronic Commerce Act’ when it launched MM services. It 
adopted the ‘test, monitor, and regulate’ approach which allowed the MNOs to launch and scale 
services depending on the guidance of the BOT ‘letters of no objection’(LNOs) (also see: Di 
Castri and Gidvani, 2014). In 2007, the BOT issued the ‘Electronic Payment Schemes 
Guidelines (EPSG) which gave the MNOs the right to offer payment services through mobile 
transfer. Although the EPSG allowed the MNOs to offer payment services through MM, they 
covered risks for banks and other financial institutions, leaving out the role of MNOs. Hence, 
the MNOs were required to partner with banks to receive the ‘LNOs’, which allowed the BOT 
to guarantee that the customer’s money is safe in the banking system, backed with a 100% 
liquidity prerequisite.  
Due to the lack of MM regulatory framework and laws at its inception in 2008, which occurred 




licensed banks and financial institutions for the BOT to release the LNOs which allowed the 
MNOs to deliver MM services (Di Castri and Gidvani, 2014). Due to the ‘test, monitor and 
regulate’ approach, Tanzania created and established regulatory and MM policies, which 
guided the development of MM services.  
“I think the interesting part is that the central bank does not regulate the actual MNO. What is 
regulated by the central bank is the e-money transfer. And that regulation is the same for the banks 
as it is for mobile money providers. What they differ is that they fall in the different tiers of providers. 
And in the way, they meet the different requirements, which I consider to be fair because they take 
into consideration the risk also which it carries, because if you are a bank, you transfer large amounts 
of money. You give out larger credit, things like that. So, that is why, by default, you will be in 
another tier than somebody who is just transferring small amounts of money. So, I don’t think they 
favour anyone in particular” (Financial Sector Official).  
The work of creating and establishing appropriate regulatory and MM policies is still ongoing 
and is a result of the neoliberal roll-out policies (see Chapter 3). There are still many gaps in 
the regulatory frameworks. Also, there are MM policies that still need to be introduced as the 
NPS transforms itself. 
5.4.4 The NPS 
The MM sector emerged due to the establishment and enactment of relevant legislation and 
regulations. The political economy of the financial sector is also shaped by the evolving legal 
and regulatory frameworks. The MNOs are not financial institutions but use the NPS: 
“Any payment mechanism that is in the country is grounded. It falls under the BOT mandate. 
Whether you pay through the bank, whether through the Western Union, through TigoPesa, M-Pesa, 
whether through the EMS, whether it is through the bus, anything involving the payments is under 
the BOT supervision” (Former BOT Governor). 
It is clear to envisage pieces of legislation if the non-financial institutions use the payment 
system supervised by the BOT.  There are four main pieces of legislation and six pieces of 
secondary legislation, that came during the neoliberal roll-out phase, that have allowed MM to 
operate in the financial sector. The four essential legislations are: Firstly, the 2006 BOT Act 
replaced the 1995 and 1965 Acts. It not only created the BOT, but also defined its principal 
functions. The BOT established a few guidelines that helped the development of MM services 
such as: the NPSs Guidelines for Retail Payments, Rules and Regulations for Retail Payments, 
and the Guidelines Introducing Electronic Payments, e.g., Mobile Payments Regulations 




banks, including the MNOs. It allowed them to provide services such as: account-to-account 
transfers, person-to-person fund transfers, business-to-business fund transfers, cash-in, and 
cash-out services. Secondly, the 2006 BFIA provided the legal framework for undertaking 
licensed banking operations within Tanzania. Thirdly, the 2007 Electronic Payment Schemes 
Guidelines allowed the advent of MM. Finally, the 2015 NPSA defined who could use the NPS. 
A payment system in Tanzania is a facility that ensures the circulation of money. The payment 
system includes payment instruments, banking and money transfer payment procedures, and 
interbank payment transfers. The payment system in Tanzania is regulated by: ‘the 2015 
Payment System (Electronic Money) Regulations’; and ‘the 2015 Payment System Licensing 
and Approval Regulations’ (the Licensing Regulations). The 2015 NPSA provided a legal 
framework for payment systems in Tanzania and included laws to oversee licensing, 
compliance, enforcement, and matters of liability for breach of the law. It also permitted 
institutions other than banks and financial institutions, such as the MNOs, to operate payment 
systems in Tanzania.  
The six pieces of secondary legislation are: Firstly, the 2006 Finance Act which empowered 
the government not only to make changes in the tax regime, but also to amend different 
financial and tax laws. Secondly, the 2002 Prevention of Terrorism Act created the Financial 
Intelligence Unit (FIU) in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs responsible for this 
unit’s functions. Moreover, UNCTAD (2012) mentions other regulations that have the 
potential to influence the functioning of MM services, such as: Firstly the 2006 Tanzania 
Evidence Act CAP 6, which specified the use of electronic documents as evidence in 
Tanzania’s courts. Secondly, the 2003 FCA fostered competition in different sectors and 
protected customers. To reinforce this Act, the FCC and the Fair Competition Tribunal (FCT) 
were authorised to administer the laws and provide the judicial forum to hear appeals 
respectively.  
As the neoliberal reforms were implemented, legislation and laws were introduced in the sector. 
They play a key role in making FI policy decisions and strategies which affect the development 
of MM. For instance, each of these Acts creates an institution which participates in the NFIF 
where the TCRA also engages in policy discussions. As MM providers needed to work with 
banks and other financial institutions, the BOT initially signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) with the TCRA to regulate the financial aspects of MM, while the TCRA 
regulated the communications aspects of MM. The BOT did not have strict regulations for MM 




limited its regulatory role. It relied on the ‘test, monitor, and regulate’ approach. The banks 
were the deposit takers while the MNOs remained the non-deposit takers providing financial 
services. MM, as such, was defined as a platform or tool that could be used to aid the provision 
of financial services. MM providers were required to open trust accounts with banks (Di Castri 
and Gidvani, 2014). Their monies were deposited in those accounts. So, MM providers use 
NPSs to provide their services. With these new realities in 2015, the NPSA was introduced, 
and with it the electronic money regulations and licensing regulations were introduced. In this 
way, MM providers were required to create a separate legal entity, separate from the mother 
company for regulatory purposes as required by the BOT. To provide MM services, the MNOs 
were no longer required to obtain a ‘letter of no objection’ from the BOT to operate but were 
required to apply for a license to use the NPSs. Hence, to operate MM services, the MNOs are 
required to comply with the following: the 2015 NPS Act, the 2015 Electronic Money 
Regulations, and the 2015 Licensing regulations (URT, 2015c; URT, 2015d; URT, 2015a; 
URT, 2015b). Diagram 5.3 below shows what I mean by the NPSs. There are two payment 
systems in Tanzania, one is the ‘Large Value Payment Systems’ (LVPSs), and the other one is 
the Retail Payment Systems (RPSs).  MM services fall under Retail Payment Systems. As you 
will see, the new emerging services in the Retail Payment Systems are mobile banking, MM, 
and agent banking.   





Diagram 5.4 depicts the DFS ecosystem. This is a very complicated ecosystem as shown here. 
As of 2016, fifty seven banks were operating in Tanzania, and five MNOs were offering MM 
services. In 2018, seven MNOs operated in Tanzania.  Thus, this is still a growing sector. I 
have decided to use this diagram to illustrate how complicated the digital financial ecosystem 
where MM services operate is. As complicated as the DFS ecosystem is, there is a need for 
interoperable systems.  
Diagram 5.4: DFS Ecosystem 
 
5.4.5 Interoperability 
“Since its inception, the ‘Converged Licensing Framework’ took care of a lot of issues. The BOT 
needed to change as they had reviewed the National Payments System. They issued another Act 
that recognised digital financial transaction services and mobile money issues. They enacted 
electronically associated regulations which identified electronic transactions, including the issues 
regarding interoperability” (Senior Telecom Sector Official). 
The neoclassical perspective aiming at generating efficient outcomes, especially with 
Solow’s and Schumpeterian views, would encourage interoperability because it could 
help increase economies of scale and economies of scope. Interoperability runs services 
across different types of networks and sectors, for instance, from telecom to banking. 





Interoperability can be defined as ‘money moving between mobile financial services accounts 
of different MNOs, and between mobile accounts and bank accounts’ (Musa et al., 2014). 
Interoperability, therefore, provides greater benefits to the MM service markets. It also allows 
the operators to offer more flexible payment options which can increase the overall number of 
transactions and velocity of money in the ecosystem. It also provides the regulators with an 
opportunity to draw more cash into the formal financial system. It also provides more 
accessible and flexible services as well as it allows for an opportunity to advance further FI 
(also see: Musa et al., 2014).  
According to Di Castri (2013a), interoperability also has the following benefits: first, it makes 
commercial sense for providers, and it creates value for customers. Second, it helps to share 
the regulatory risks. Third, it lowers the cost of financial services, and by doing so, it increases 
customer choices. Fourth, it increases competition and breaks dominant positions, which may 
help remove the need for individuals to own and manage multiple SIM cards. Interoperability 
also has its challenges. Its implementation can be technical and sophisticated and can “distract 
the operator from focusing on the basics of the service, such as building the distribution 
network and educating customers” (Di Castri, 2013a). Its compliance may increase costs, 
making the businesses more challenging for providers (Di Castri, 2013a). 
From the above-mentioned benefits and challenges, MNOs, banks, and policymakers work 
together to enhance interoperability. This should be easier because neoliberal policies facilitate 
the formation of partnerships for economic benefits. They should also agree on what type of 
interoperability suits them after assessing the benefits, costs, and risks. Moreover, putting 
regulations in place allows the markets to implement systems and solutions capable of being 
interoperable, which will deploy market-led interoperable solutions (Di Castri and Gidvani, 
2014). 
Kulkarni (2015) asserts that the CGAP has defined three levels of interoperability that need  to 
be addressed for a developing country like Tanzania: (i) ‘platform-level interconnection’:  this 
occurs when MM platforms are interconnected in such a way that one customer  with an 
account with one MNO may be able to send and receive money to or from another customer 
owning an account with a different MNO; (ii) ‘agency-level exclusivity’: this occurs  when a 
customer of one MNO is restricted from using an agent from another MNO to cash in  or cash 
out services related to that customer’s account. Hence, ‘agency interoperability’ can be 




interconnected. A good example is the ‘interoperable ATM networks’; (iii) ‘customer-level 
interoperability’: involves two interoperability scenarios for this end. While the first one has to 
do with the customer’s ability to access his/her account through any phone using a SIM card 
on the same network, the second scenario has to do with the customer’s ability to access 
multiple accounts on one SIM (also see: Masamila, 2014). 
Soon after the Maya Declaration in 2011, which called for the achievement of FI, the TCRA 
and BOT began to draft mobile payments regulations. The BOT also collaborated with 
financial, telecommunications, as well as competition regulatory bodies to create a framework 
to enhance competition and to encourage interoperability in the MM sector. In 2014, the 
‘government of Tanzania’ launched the ‘NFIF’ committing the government to address the 
challenges facing strategies to enhance FI. Interoperability of the networks was also a concern 
that was to be addressed while implementing the ‘NFIF’ (also see: URT, 2014). As the 
implementation of the ‘NFIF’ progressed, the need for full MM platform level interoperability 
became even more apparent if the ‘e-float liquidity management’ challenges were to be 
resolved. In Tanzania and in East Africa, ‘e-float’ is basically money kept in an account, and a 
customer can use his/her mobile phone to have access to that money in order to make payments 
or transfer money, etc.; the customer may add to it or exchange for cash, by visiting an agent. 
In 2014, an interoperability agreement between the BOT, two banks, and all four MNOs was 
reached as it laid the foundation for different levels of interoperability. Tigo led the remaining 
MNOs into an agreement as the MNOs became aware of the challenges facing the MM sector, 
which included: (i) the direct competition for market share in a stalling market; (ii) the slow-
pace of the growing market; and (iii) latent demand from potential customers’ willingness to 
increase frequency and value of transactions. To overcome all these challenges, in 2013 Airtel, 
Tigo and Zantel implemented their interoperability scheme, and while Vodacom supported the 
structure, it did not sign up (see: Jones-Evans, Bourreau and Valletti, 2015). In 2015, Vodacom 
started discussions to join the interoperability agreement (IFC, 2015) and in 2015 it joined the 
interoperability agreement to make Tanzania the first African MM market with full 
interoperability for MM peer-to-peer (P2P) transfers (Kabendera, 2015). Furthermore, in 2015 
‘the 2015 NPSA’ and ‘the 2015 Electronic Money Regulations’ were reinforced to set up the 
rules of the game. The interoperability of MM markets became even more critical. Besides the 
interoperability of MM, factors aiding the deployment of MM services are also worth 




5.4.6 The Deployment of MM Services 
Apart from the findings discussed in the previous sections, it is worth mentioning that in 
general, MM deployment in Tanzania and East Africa, was also determined by the following 
factors (also see UNCTAD, 2012): 
Firstly, the access channels, were used as different platforms and applied different methods to 
deliver MM services:  
“The issue is that we oversee communications related resources. For instance, the numbering, for 
example, for you to send a M-Pesa message, you need a USSD short code … Until today, when the 
operator emerges, he comes to us, and we give him the numbering resources, which is a short code. 
He has to declare what he wants to do with that code. So, he needs to have a business plan. At the 
moment, there are few and we want to make sure that everyone getting the numbering resources 
has a business. Otherwise, he can receive those resources and do nothing. So, we ask everybody to 
tell us about their business, and if we find it very impressive, we give them the numbering resources” 
(Senior Telecom Sector Official). 
A number of access channels used included but were not limited to: (i) SMS commands using 
a short code; (ii) Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD) which initiated sessions 
between the mobile phone and the server, and which performed a series of steps to accomplish 
transactions (M-Pesa and EzyPesa used this platform as well); (iii) Subscriber Identity Model 
Toolkit (STK) which was an approach supported by most platforms. The STK facilitated the 
breakdown of transactions into a series of logical steps which helped manage transactions. The 
presence of these channels helped the deployment of MM and the smooth functioning of the 
different platforms of MM services. 
Security factors also facilitated the deployment of MM. For instance, from a security 
perspective, if different platforms were used and the data was sent via USSD and received via 
SMS without being encrypted, that transaction risked being intercepted. Hence, well-stored 
data on the phone helped protect both customer details and account value. MM was safe 
because SIMs were registered. It was easy to track down where the payment started and where 
the payments ended. Theft incidents had been rarely reported.  
Finally, how an MNO was networked, in terms of agents, branches, people, and ATMs, made 
the deployment of its services easier. According to a Financial Sector Official:  
“… Mobile Money was the key factor in bringing services closer to the people. They were able to 




have to establish bricks-and-mortar structures. So, without investing a single cent in infrastructure, 
the only infrastructure they had put was the ‘minara’/ ‘towers’. They didn’t have to build the 
infrastructure as the banks did. No, they didn’t. They just did it by making the agent their business. 
That was how they were able to roll out across the country. They contribute significantly being 
within the 5 km or 1 km within a financial service point. It is driven by mobile money. Without 
mobile money we wouldn’t be where we are now”. 
The networks provided interfaces through cash-in and cash-out functions.  There were a lot of 
changing technologies and business models as the MNOs, and other stakeholders strived to 
manage MM services. This made service deployment an important aspect of supporting the 
smooth functioning of the MM sector. The deployment alone was not enough. Policies and 
regulations were also needed. This had much to do with the politics of FI in Tanzania, as well 
as how neoliberal reforms tended to be inclusive (as described in Chapter 1, Section 1.5).  
5.5 National Financial Inclusion Politics 
“So, the financial system serves the basic, eh, functionality of the system with the government at 
any point in time. It is never separated from it” (Former BOT Governor).  
This claim explains the link between the financial system and the government, which 
brings in the politics of FI. Diagram 5.5 illustrates the different players in the ‘NFIF’ and 
their roles. As the above statement indicated, the government is well represented in the 
framework. 
Diagram 5.5: Actors and Committees Implementing the NFIF 
 




When MM started in 2008, the banks objected. They thought MM providers were interfering 
with banking services, as they engaged in the money business.  
“The banks did not directly agree that the MNOs start mobile money services …  it was somehow 
the BOT agenda to support innovation. They wanted to promote innovation within the financial 
sector. That was the key agenda behind the establishment of mobile money. That was the reason 
why the BOT offered them the operating licenses without having their regulations in place” 
(Executive Banking Sector Official). 
At that time such disputes could be settled by the BOT and the TCRA. As Tanzania did not 
have a single FI policy, the NFIF was instead established. The framework defined FI and set 
the vision and targets to be met by financial and non-financial institutions. It also sets the 
different strategies to achieve FI nationwide. It is also a platform where disputes are settled, 
and new decisions are made through a ’consultative process’. It is a PPPI (see Chapter 8). It is 
a governance structure supported by neoliberalism and the RCA (see Chapter 3, Sections 
3.3.1.2 and 3.6). When the markets operate freely, and the government is restricted to intervene, 
any significant changes in the economic sector require a consultative process, with the key 
stakeholders responding to the process of discussing with the government, how the latter should 
respond to any change in the free markets. This one-way neoliberalism has been used to balance 
the powers of the institutions and the government.  I am mentioning the NFIF because it helped 
to bring MM services closer to key financial providers and it helped both the MNOs and banks 
to forge partnerships to allow the survival of MM. MM providers participate through 
TAMNOA, which is the ‘Tanzania MM Operators Association’. The banks participate through 
the TBA (Tanzania Bankers Association). Both TAMNOA and the TBA participate in every 
level of the NFIF, as shown in Diagram 5.5 above. By doing so, they both protect their interests. 
This is where the politics of FI occur (see Chapters 8), and the decision from the committees, 
as illustrated in Diagram 5.5 affect financial and non-financial institutions.  
When it comes to MM and the politics of FI, one has to understand what MM does with the 
everyday lives of poor people:  
“For me, one of the key things, why mobile money is key for driving financial inclusion is that 
mobile money has the best need of people. Within the Tanzanian society, we know that the family 
is a core source of credit. It is a core source of support. We have over a quarter of the women’s 
population who are the dependents. They receive money from somebody. If my uncle somewhere 
needs money, I am the one who is going to send it to him. So, what mobile money did was it 
provided an easy and a quick, and somehow a cheap way of addressing the need for sending money. 




phone, and 93% have access to mobile phones. If I do not have a phone, I go to my friend who has 
a phone” (Financial Sector Official). 
The politics of FI becomes the issue of how to incorporate MM services into the NFIF. The 
NFIF provides national strategies to achieve national FI goals, and the MNOs play an essential 
part in attaining the national FI goals. The National Financial Inclusion Council (NC) is a 
policymaking body that sets national financial strategies and policies. The process of 
policymaking has always been political. However, in the case of Tanzania, this process is a 
PPPI, and it involves both the public and private sectors. The BOT, TCRA, and MoF are among 
a few institutions that represent the government, and the TAMNOA and TBA are among the 
institutions that represent the MNOs, banks, and the private sector. The politics of FI are 
depicted in the NFIF with the different committees playing their role as assigned to them. The 
processes of policymaking, strategy formulation and implementation affect the financial sector 
(MM services and strategies are also included in the process). Policymakers design national 
strategies and policies such as the NPSA and its regulations, whereby parliament gets involved 
in the passing of those Acts. All Acts, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, went through the 
National Assembly, which is a political body. Debates took place in the National Assembly 
before the Acts were confirmed and officialised by all members of parliament. All the above-
mentioned Acts could be regarded as the political tools that allowed the reforms in both the 
telecommunications and banking sectors, and set forth the legal frameworks for the operations 
of the respective sectors. Those reforms and legal frameworks permitted the liberalisation of 
individual sectors, which in turn enabled new financial and non-financial institutions to use the 
national payments system. Thanks to the Acts and legal frameworks that were in place, MM 
could use the NPS.  
Moreover, policymakers were the state bureaucrats in charge of the financial sectors, or any 
other officials acting on behalf of the state or financial institutions. The role of the NC was to 
facilitate the smooth running of the financial sector by assessing and understanding the sectoral 
challenges. The politics of the NC involved knowing the right timing for the introduction of 
appropriate policies. The NC was expected to be in a position to identify any regulatory risks 
associated with policies and strategies. By doing so, it helped to enhance a healthy and 
competitive environment for the entire sector.  
National FI politics were friendly to MM. MM had increased FI rates and helped to reach 
financially-excluded people. The politics of FI favoured MM services as an innovation in the 




“The politics of financial inclusion allowed innovation. It has to be innovation in the market, and 
everyone should drive innovation. Not only by the financial service providers, but also the 
regulators. The regulators should encourage new movers and should try to assist with 
accommodating innovation, not to try to guarantee financial stability. Last but not least, they should 
also be flexible, so there should be flexibility from the financial provider side, especially the big 
players to also accommodate innovation, but also there should be flexibility from the regulator side 
to allow products entering the market may be in a controlled environment before they are launched 
to a wider environment” (Executive Financial Sector Official). 
Statistics illustrate how MM boosted FI over time. Strand 5.4 demonstrates that MM had a 
higher uptake of formal financial services despite having one of the lowest numbers of financial 
products in the market.  
 Strand 5.4: Demand for and Supply of Financial Services 
 
Source: FSDT (2017). 
From the ‘test, monitor and regulate’ approach mentioned in Section 5.4.3, Tanzania hesitated 
to charge taxes from MM users. This is another rolling back neoliberal example. Neoliberalism 
encourages deregulation, privatisation, and lowering of taxes to boost innovation and economic 
growth. According to Fuchs et al. (2016), MM taxation had been a policy issue.  Given the 
significant low use of bank products by the adult population in Tanzania, MM and its use 
became of greater importance in providing access to formal financial services. Imposing higher 
taxes would harm progress in the provision of inclusive financial policies. MM was yet to be 
widely used to meet broader payment needs. Incorporated in the fees that the MNOs charged 
for money transfers was the commission they paid their agents. While MNOs did not charge 




wallet transfers (paid by the sender) and for cash-outs (paid by the receiver) (also see: Fuchs et 
al. 2016). 
The 2013 Finance Act introduced taxation specific to mobile transfers in Tanzania. Tanzania 
also introduced excise tax in the same year. It applied to the principal transferred – a ‘Tobin’ 
or ‘turnover style tax’. The taxes were a fixed percentage of the principal. In 2014, excise tax 
applied to the fees paid by customers to their MM operators for money transfers (Fuchs et al. 
2016). 
Discussions between the MoF and the BOT resulted in the introduction of the ‘turnover tax’, 
which was established to generate government revenues. As the tax was introduced, a wide 
range of people affected by the new tax opposed it, even though very little revenue was 
collected from it. Furthermore, the TBA protested the imposition of the tax, which led the 
government to reconsider its position. So far, three Finance Acts were introduced in the 
following years: 2013, 2014 and 2015 (also see: Fuchs et al., 2016). 
Following the opposition to taxes, in 2013, the 2013 Finance Act introduced a 0.15% turnover 
tax on the amount transferred. Once more, strong objections from stakeholders in early 2014, 
forced the Tanzanian government not to enforce the turnover tax introduced by the 2013 
‘Finance Act’, and with cabinet’s approval, no excise duty was levied in the 2013/14 tax year. 
Things changed in late 2014. In the 2014 Finance Act, a 10% excise duty was introduced on 
charges payable for services provided by banks and MNOs. This was a significant amendment 
because initially, MNOs applied the excise tax to their transfer fees alone. They did not apply 
the tax to their larger cash-out fees. According to these amendments, excise duty was 
introduced and was to be applied to both the MNOs’ transfer and cash-out fees (also see: Fuchs 
et al., 2016). 
As should be noted at this stage, taxation on MM was (and still remains) a very delicate policy. 
Its delicacy was (and still is) in terms of the proposition that taxation could impact negatively 
on the development of the MM sector. From this perspective, it is easier to understand why the 
banks complained as the MNOs operated without or with low taxes. The introduction of the 
excise tax on all MNO fee incomes related to MM transfers could be contributing toward a 
levelling of the playing field (also see: Fuchs et al., 2016; GSMA, 2015b:16-17; UNCTAD, 
2012:32).   
Whether taxation introduced a fair playing field is subject to debate. MNOs also pay VAT on 




faces intense pressures to increase tax revenue collection. This pressure to improve tax 
revenues, especially for a service for which demand is relatively inelastic, could explain why 
excise taxes on money transfers were introduced with a rather narrow focus on revenue 
generation (Fuchs et al., 2016). Furthermore, GSMA (2015b) and GSMA (2017b) suggest that 
taxes on operators can reduce growth and investment in the mobile sector.  
The government taxation policy on MM is one of the examples of policies that have emerged 
to support the advent of MM and economic growth in general. However, mobile taxes in 
Tanzania remain inefficient and inequitable. In 2017, President John Pombe Magufuli raised 
tax concerns and forced mobile companies to be registered in the Dar es Salaam Stock 
Exchange (DSE) market. 
The President’s move came after claims that the telecommunications companies were reluctant 
to be listed in the DSE. This directive, which may become part of taxation policy, ordered the 
revocation of licenses for mobile phone companies which were reluctant to list on the DSE. 
The TCRA had the mandate to act tough against the ‘stubborn’ mobile companies. The 
directive was issued under the premises that all mobile phone firms should float shares in the 
DSE market. The ‘Electronic Revenue Collection System’ (e-RCS) was launched in 2017. The 
Tanzania Revenue Authority’ (TRA) and the ‘Zanzibar Revenue Board’ (ZRB) operated the e-
RCS. The new system was designed to track and directly collect excise duty and Value Added 
Tax (VAT) on all electronic transactions by MNOs, telecommunication companies, and 
financial institutions, which would enhance efficiency in the collection of government revenues 
(also see; Mwakyusa, 2017).  The directive sets up an environment for future new policies to 
emerge. 
5.6 Challenges and Limitations 
There are also challenges resulting from policy gaps between the use of MM technology and 
economic development in Tanzania (Hawaiju, 2013). For instance, though not severely 
impaired, a broader population of Tanzanian adult users lacks financial capabilities. The 
‘National Financial Education Framework’ (NFEF) was introduced in 2016, and will run 
through 2020 with its main focus on improving the level of financial capability of the 
Tanzanian population (TNCFI, 2016). To prevent them from lagging behind they must be 
informed about the various benefits and opportunities of MM and mobile banking. Policies to 
address these issues are needed, and it may be right to suggest that what has been analysed in 




frameworks will be introduced in the future. This chapter has been written as a brief 
introduction to MM sector development in Tanzania focusing on important selected legal, and 
regulatory Acts and agreements, as well as neoliberal policies of liberalisation, deregulation, 
and re-regulation which shape the political economy of MM and banking sectors. 
On the technical side, Diagram 5.6 summarises what would be the desired growth of MM 
services. MM has to increase the access, uptake, and usage of formal financial services. In 
Tanzania, MM has increased access to formal financial services on the part of the financially 
excluded (see Strand 5.4 in Section 5.5). Its uptake of formal financial services is higher than 
that of the banks. MM in Tanzania has 71,245,336 registered accounts as of 2016. However, 
only 17,025,685 registered users were active (see Table 5.1 in Section 5.3.4). The challenges 
facing the development of MM services include how to solicit customers to use their MM 
accounts. This is the challenge.  Is MM a service of diminishing returns? At what point will it 
start to show diminishing returns, and therefore, retrogression? This is another challenge.  
Diagram 5.6: MM Access, Uptake, and Usage 
 
Source: Multiple Sources 
The findings presented in this chapter are valid for Tanzania. Some other countries may 
resemble the Tanzanian situation; however, I advise that researchers should conduct similar 
studies for those countries to comment on the situations specific to those countries.  
5.7 Was There Anything Surprising that Came Out of the Findings in this Chapter? 
There is a surprising finding that much literature that covers technology also discusses the 




Hacker, 2003; Warschauer, 2004; Stevenson, 2009; Al-Jaghoub and Westrup, 2009; Ragnedda 
and Muschert, 2013). According to Wilson (2004) many studies analysed the widening gap 
between the rich and poor in developing economies. The digital divide was in the sense that 
technology divides different segments of the population nationally and internationally, creating 
a ‘national digital divide’ and ‘international digital divide’. Parts of communities with 
machines and technology advance economically. The poor communities lack technology and 
struggle to develop. On the contrary, MM as demonstrated in this chapter, provides more access 
to financial services for the poor, bridging digital divide issues. MM has been a tool to unite 
the poor and the rich through financial services. This is one big surprise from this research that 
somehow MM bridges the digital divide gap (also see: Kizza, 2013; Southwood, 2013). See 
the presented statistics in this chapter. Moreover, Tyce (2019) argues that researchers think that 
neoliberal and statist accounts fail to explain the emergence of MM. That neoliberalism 
facilitated the development of MM and therefore played a crucial role in helping MM to 
promote FI is also a surprise. This is demonstrated in this dissertation. I also discovered that 
more needs to be done on the political-economic literature on MM.  
5.8 Conclusion 
To conclude, MM development succeeded in Tanzania because of a number of factors. 
Neoliberal roll-out and roll-back policies supported liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, 
and re-regulation of economic sectors and services. This chapter demonstrated how roll-back 
and roll-out neoliberalisation enabled the growth of MM and provided critical examples of the 
CLF, the NPS and its regulations, as well as the continuous process of creating conducive legal 
and regulatory frameworks, which were all key to the political economy of MM, as well as to 
its development and growth. These processes were part of the neoclassical and classical views 
of neoliberal policies. 
Additionally, neoliberalism theorises the need for a limited government intervention to 
promote economic development and innovations through liberalisation, deregulation, 
privatisation, and lowering of taxes. Neoliberals argue that government intervention prevents 
economic development and technological advancement as they restrict the freedom of dynamic 
individuals and firms who drive innovation and development forwards (Ives, 2015, Wikan, 
2015). These arguments also concur with the classical and neoclassical perspectives of liberty 
for individuals and firms. MM development is compelling evidence to show how limited 
government worked to allow MM innovations in Tanzania as demonstrated in this chapter. In 




free-market capitalism; it allowed capitalism to support the smooth advent of MM. This is 
through the ‘RCA’ where the government backs off when it needs to do so, allowing other 
actors to help drive new and existing industries in the economy. The government also promoted 
a business-friendly environment that encouraged the MNOs to invest in innovations, which 
facilitated their role in boosting FI in Tanzania. Technologies did not emerge exogenously of 
the neoliberal transition, however technological innovations were a commitment by neoliberals 
to facilitate business transactions and to spread their ideological doctrine globally (Harvey, 
2005: 3-4). 
Finally, some see FI benefits and MM as a new delivery channel, its potential to reach 
financially unreached and excluded people, and its potential to reduce the costs of financial 
services, are all game changers. Moreover, in the Tanzania context MM services are safer than 
some other financial services. They can scale beyond any single financial institution’s footprint. 
The MNOs perceived MM’s ability to increase customer loyalty, and they have used it to reach 
as many customers as possible. Supported by conducive legal frameworks and politics as 
illustrated in this chapter, MM services developed and grew in Tanzania. To conclude, I have 
argued in this chapter that the liberalisation of the Tanzanian economy aided the development 
of MM through reforms, the CLF, the ‘test, monitor and regulate’ approach, interoperability, 
the national FI politics, NFIF, and the 2015 NPS Act. This was how MM started and developed 
in Tanzania, which answers research question number 1 and fulfils research objective number 













Chapter 6: The Role of Mobile Money in Moderating Financial Exclusion: A Tanzanian 
Experience2 
6.1 Chapter Overview 
After the initial rolling back of the state as depicted in Chapter 5, which gave rise to MM and 
enhanced its growth, this chapter discusses how MM moderated some factors of FE, and how 
the neoliberal rolling out brought back the state through the BOT to facilitate the 
interoperability of MM services. Before the advent of MM, the banking sector in most 
developing countries excluded specific segments of the population. The excluded communities 
were deemed as a risk to the banking sector. The banking sector did not work with cash-
strapped and financially-disenfranchised people. FE persisted to unsurprisingly higher levels. 
Those excluded did not have: bank accounts, savings in financial institutions, access to credit, 
loans, and insurance services (see Chapter 2). The advent of MM moderated the very factors 
of FE that the banks failed to moderate. This Chapter seeks to answer research question number 
2: 'How did MM moderate some factors of FE that other financial institutions failed to moderate 
in Tanzania?’ By doing so, the chapter fulfils research objective number 2, which studies the 
levels of FE and FI in Tanzania to understand the seriousness of these issues, and how they 
relate to MM and neoliberalism. The chapter also fulfils research objective number 3, which 
assesses the role of MM in moderating some factors of FE. But why are the issues of MM and 
moderation of the factors of FE considered as political-economic issues? First, FE is a global 
issue as depicted in Chapter 2. Second, it is part of the global political economy because it 
involves MM technology to moderate the factors of FE to increase rates of FI in Tanzania and 
elsewhere. Thus, more financially-excluded people get access to formal financial services and 
become financially included. Likewise, MNOs enter NPS, and regulators recognise their role, 
as MNOs collaborate or compete with other FSPs. 
MM changed how the banking sector operated (Aron, 2018; USAID, 2010). The banks have 
always been there, and they have provided formal financial services. However, high levels of 
FE have remained in Tanzania (FinScope, 2006; FinScope, 2009; FinScope, 2013a; FinScope, 
2013b). This issue also caught the attention of many innovators who sought to resolve it. As a 
result, MM technology was introduced to increase FI. The MNOs entered the financial 
 
2 The International Social Sciences Review, a peer-reviewed journal, has published this chapter: Mhella, D. J. 
(2020). ‘The Role of Mobile Money in Moderating Financial Exclusion: A Tanzanian Experience. The 
International Social Sciences Review’, 2: 1 - 24. https://doi.org/10.37467/gka-socialrev.v2.2287 
Moreover, I presented this chapter at the 7th International Congress on Social Sciences in Paris, France on the 17th 




ecosystem and had since then provided MM services. The scope of the chapter is twofold. 
Firstly, it introduces MM and its role in supporting FE and FI. Secondly, it illustrates how MM 
moderates the factors of FE in Tanzania. By demonstrating how MM has moderated FE in 
Tanzania, I also show how the MNOs change the provision of formal financial services. By 
doing so, I argue that they facilitate the moderation of some factors of FE. Most studies 
conducted show increasing levels of FI through MM (GSMA, 2016a; GSMA, 2017a). However, 
how MM moderates the factors of FE (in aiding the transformation of the banking sector) has 
very few studies conducted in Tanzania (InterMedia, 2014a). There is a gap, and this chapter 
tries to address it.  
The chapter, therefore, consists of seven sections. Section 6.2 explains the findings briefly. In 
Section 6.3, I intend to provide a brief history and MM context at both global and national 
levels that facilitate the understanding of the key statistics and achievements, as shown in 
Chapter 5. In this section, the institutions supporting MM and FI at the global level will be 
analysed. Issues of MM penetration, its ecosystem, and how it develops, as well as the patterns 
of registered and active users, will be examined. Moreover, Tanzania’s context of MM will be 
investigated, with discussions involving: (i) the uptake of formal financial services and the 
uptake of informal financial services; (ii) how Tanzanians keep their savings, including their 
sources of borrowing; (iii) financial services usage; (iv) mobile banking and MM growth; (v) 
trends in electronic payments. All these issues are discussed to create a picture that 
demonstrates the role of MM in FI with concrete evidence. 
Section 6.4 details theoretical assumptions and qualitative findings to explain how MM 
moderates the factors of FE. In this section the following issues will be discussed: (i) lack of 
access to formal financial services; (ii) high costs of financial services, which involves 
interoperability issues; (iii) lack of wide-scale adoption of new innovative services to serve the 
poor; (iv) the risk of providing formal financial services to financially-excluded people, in other 
words the risk management issues. All these issues will be discussed to explain MM and its 
role in moderating the factors of FE. Section 6.5 reflects on the limitations of using aggregate 
level/macro data to study FE/FI. Section 6.6 discusses the likelihood of being excluded from 
using MM services, the costs of using mobile phones, and the benefits received by financially-
excluded individuals derived from using phones and MM. Finally, Section 6.7 concludes the 





6.2 The Findings 
6.2.1 What are the Main Findings in this Chapter? 
MM moderates the factors of FE. Moderation here means that it removes or weakens the 
barriers to FI. The statistics and data presented in this chapter demonstrate the moderation of 
FE factors through increased FI (see the graphs and tables provided). The issues were distance, 
scale, and scope. MM came to resolve these issues by the moderation of the lack of access to 
formal financial services for the financially excluded; increasing proximity to financial services 
by making distance no longer the primary issue; making the delivery and access to formal 
financial services more affordable; reducing or managing the risks of using and delivering 
formal financial services. Due to MM’s ability to moderate some of the factors of FE, financial 
services for financially-excluded individuals have experienced a transformation over the last 
decade (also see: David-West et al., 2018). Moreover, interoperability expands MM services 
and lowers the costs of delivering financial services, making it easier for low-income and 
financially-excluded people to afford them. Interoperability is an example of a neoliberal roll-
out policy, where the state through the BOT seeks the cooperation of the MNOs and the banks 
to help enhance MM services. See Sections 6.4.2.1, 6.4.2.1.1, and 6.4.2.1.2. Neoliberalism, 
therefore, dismissed the 1980s and 1990s financial repression (see Chapter 2). During that time, 
the state-led financial sector provided a few individuals with access to formal financial services 
(Hanson and Ramachandran, n.d.). However, financial deregulation and liberalisation policies 
led to innovative solutions (Ellis, 2007). Today we can analyse the moderation of FE by MM. 
6.2.2 How Do These Findings Relate to Previous Studies? 
According to Porter (2006), the literature on FE has often been based on two principal 
arguments. First, his findings place much importance on the role of the financial elites to 
deliberately exercise power over states and markets (also see as cited in Porter, 2006: Gill, 
1990; Carroll and Carson, 2003; Roberts et al., 2003:443; Bhagwati, 1998; and Soederberg, 
2003; Porter, 2006:21). He also provides structural factor explanations as his second key 
argument. He asserts that some structural factors enhance “the dominance of finance over the 
aspect of contemporary life”. This literature also provides an institutional analysis of specific 
financial controls. Chapter 2 provides other literature. In this chapter, I explain the findings by 
using the literature and the interviews to demonstrate how the findings relate to the previous 
literature. There is more literature on FI and MM, and less literature on MM and FE in Tanzania 




6.2.3 Was There Anything Surprising that Came Out of the Findings? 
Usually, new technologies develop in industrialised economies first and then spread to 
developing economies. MM was the reverse. Addisu et al. (2019) call this “puzzling”. Aron 
(2017) and Van der Boor et al. (2014) also note this.  The ability of MM to leapfrog the banks 
in offering formal financial services to both low-income and financially-excluded individuals 
(Aron, 2018) is surprising. MM also leapfrogged the MFIs. In political-economic terms, the 
ability of MM to include more individuals and in transforming and reducing the high levels of 
FE, and therefore, changing the dynamics of exclusion and inclusion in accessing financial 
services, is of paramount importance. Also, its ability to solve the issues of financial delivery 
infrastructure and “the cost structure of conventional banking” (Aron, 2017) is worth noting. 
6.3 Brief History and MM Context at Both Global and National Levels 
6.3.1 MM: Origins 
MM, as we know it today, was introduced in Tanzania in 2008 by Vodacom after a successful 
launch in Kenya the previous year. Tanzania’s e-fulusi and ‘Mobipawa’ platform are 
sometimes credited for starting the MM innovation in Tanzania. Since 2008, MM has grown 
significantly, and according to GSMA (2017b), there are estimations that about 52% of GDP 
transactions in Tanzania pass through mobile financial services. 
 
6.3.2 MM at the Global Level 
There are institutions at the global level that facilitate MM rules, policies, regulations, and 
innovations. According to GSMA (2016a:27), in 2008 the GSMA established an MM 
programme for unbanked people, initially funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
Furthermore, in 2011 the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation through its Financial Services for 
the Poor (FSP) Programme supported investments in digital finance and global advocacy. The 
programme was established in 2005. According to AFI (2012), the AFI’s Mobile Financial 
Services Working Group (MFSWG) assists policymakers and regulators in the financial sectors 
with establishing a conducive policy and regulatory environment, which expands the reach of 
MM services, and enhances FI. Also, GSMA (2016a:27) asserts that in 2012, the United 
Nations (UN) launched the Better Than Cash Alliance (BTCA) to support the digitisation of 
cash payments supported by various donors.   
GSMA (2016b) also lists global institutions setting financial service standards and the global 




(CPMI), also known as, the Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems assists with 
regulatory issues. It proposes functional and non-discriminatory regulations, as well as, 
proportionate and adjusted regulations depending on the risks that each service poses. Secondly, 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides a platform for central banks to discuss 
banking supervision issues. Thirdly, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) works on FE and 
money laundering and terrorist financing issues. It incorporates Anti-Money Laundering and 
Counter-Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) systems as well as risk-based approaches. 
Fourthly, the International Association of Deposit Insurers deals with insurance issues.  
Moreover, in 2014, the UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) launched MM for the Poor 
(MM4P) to help increase branchless and mobile financial services (GSMA: 2016a:27). 
Likewise, the World Bank’s Taskforce on Payment Aspects of Financial Inclusion (PAFI) 
supported MM and worked to promote access to digital payment services, raising awareness 
of banking benefits to generate new openings of bank accounts (BIS, 2015). MM gained more 
support when the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were launched, and according 
to GSMA (2016a:27), MM was “poised to contribute to 11 of the 17 SDGs”. 
According to Ghazizadeh (2012), the introduction of the Global System for Mobile 
Communications (GSM) has helped the growth of wireless communication. The Enhanced 
Data Rate for GSM Evolution (EDGE) and the General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) were 
technologies that offered benefits such as saving costs for accessing data networks. They also 
utilised the IP-based networks. Likewise, the 3rd Generation (3G) technology met the 
specifications of the International Telecommunications Union. Furthermore, the Universal 
Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) technology provided different platforms and 
network infrastructure, enabling telecoms to offer a variety of services to customers, including 
MM. GSMA (2018:18) predicts that 4G will take the lead by 2019 and that 5G will move from 
trials to commercialisation as well. As technology evolves, it becomes easier for MM to 








Table 6.1: MM: Number of Registered and Active Customers, by Region (Recent 90 days 
Active Accounts, Dec. 2016) 
 
From Table 6.1, Sub- Saharan Africa has the most registered MM accounts, of which more 
than 100 million were active in 2016. This trend underlines the importance of MM in Africa.  
Graph 6.1: Growth of Registered and Active MM Accounts 
 
Source: GSMA (2017a:18). 
Graph 6.1 shows the growth of mobile accounts across the world, with active accounts growing 
at a plodding pace.  





Table 6.2 shows the potential for growth of mobile subscription in Africa, which may increase 
the use of MM services. Growth is slow in developed mobile markets, nearly approaching 
saturation. According to Donner (2008), there are more mobile phone owners than bank 
account owners in the world. According to GSMA (2018:12), there were more than five billion 
unique mobile subscribers in the world at the end of 2017. 
Table 6.3: An Overview of the Mobile Ecosystem  
 
Source: GSMA (2017a:23). 
Table 6.3 illustrates the shifting of the cash economy to a digital ecosystem. These transactions 
were able to be recorded thanks to the high level of digitalisation between 2012 and 2017. By 
December 2017, about $12.6 billion went into the global mobile ecosystem. The most used 
services being: cash-in, cash-out, bill payments, airtime top-up, mobile-to-bank, bank-to-wallet, 
P2P transfer, merchant payment, international remittances, bulk disbursement, and off-net 
transfer. As more services enter the MM industry, its potential for growth increases (GSMA, 






Graph 6.2: Number of Live MM Services for the Unbanked by Region (2001-2013 Year End) 
GSMA  
 
Source: GSMA (2013:9). 
In developing countries, the transfer of money (cash-in and cash-out) was the purpose of MM 
when it started. The agents were primarily used to help with these transfers of money. Money 
transfer services continue to increase, and so does the number of agent, as shown in Graph 6.3. 
According to GSMA (2017a:26-27), the agent network remains the backbone of MM in some 
countries, and the MNOs spend big to maintain these networks. Digitalisation has been used to 
address this.  
Graph 6.3: Global Growth of Cash-in and Cash-Out Values and Active Agents 
 





 6.3.3 MM in the Tanzanian Context 
The FinScope studies estimated that about 60% of Tanzanians used MM services in 2017 
(FinScope, 2018). Also, see Graph 6.4. Only 50% of Tanzanians used MM services in 2013 
(FinScope, 2013a). From 1961 to 2006, only 11.2% of the adult populations of Tanzania had 
access to formal financial services (FinScope, 2006). With the successful reintroduction of MM 
in 2008, in 10 years 72% of the population of Tanzania used formal financial services. The 
percentage of financially-excluded people decreased from 54% in 2006 to 28% in 2017 
(FinScope, 2006; FinScope 2018). 
Graph 6.4: Uptake of Formal Financial Services and Uptake of Informal Financial 
Services 
 
Source: FinScope (2018). 
Graphs 6.5a and 6.5b below show the difference before and after the introduction of MM. In 
2006, savings on mobile phones did not have any significance in Tanzania as Graph 6.5a 
illustrates. However, between 2013 and 2017, MM became one of the leading savings 




Graph 6.5a: How and Where Tanzanians Kept Their Savings in 2006 
Source: FinScope (2006). 
Graph 6.5b: Where Did People Save Between 2013 and 2017? 
 
Source: FinScope (2018). 
Moreover, sources and trends in borrowing have also started to change. Graphs 6.6a and 6.6b 
illustrate this. While in 2006, loans came from family/friends, MFIs and Savings and Credit 
Cooperatives (SACCOs), the MFIs and SACCOs financed more urban than rural populations, 
and so the need for loans was high. Between 2013 and 2017 (as illustrated in Graph 6.6b) 





Graph 6.6a: Sources of Borrowing by Urban-Rural Population 
 
Source: FinScope (2006). 










Source: FinScope (2018). 
Graph 6.7 illustrates how people keep their accounts active. Active usage of MM accounts 
surpasses that of bank accounts and other types of accounts, with MM active accounts at 64% 






Graph 6.7: Recency of Financial Service Usage 
 
With MM competition, mobile banking also grew between 2009 and 2015. See Graph 6.8. 
Between 2010 and 2012, sluggish growth was recorded. However, from 2012 mobile banking 
growth has continuously increased. We should not confuse mobile banking and MM or mobile 
payments. Hence, Graph 6.9 illustrates the trend for mobile payments.  
Graph 6.8: Mobile Banking Growth (2009-2015) 
 




Graph 6.9 shows rapid growth in mobile payments since 2010, and Table 6.4 below presents 
registered and active accounts for MM.  
Graph 6.9: Mobile Payment Growth (2009-2015)  
Source: BOT (2017). 
Table 6.4: Mobile Payment Services Statistics 
 
Source: BOT (2017). 
There were only 112,000 registered mobile payment accounts in 2008, and 71,245,336 in 2016, 
with active accounts reaching 17,025,685. This is because one person may have two or three 
registered accounts and one active account. Mobile service agents also increased from 2,757 in 
2008 to 371,132 in 2016 (see Table 6.4). For the trends in electronic payments, see Graph 6.10. 






Graph 6.10: Trends in Electronic Payments, 2011-2015 (TZS billions) 
 
From the above analysis, I argue that MM in Tanzania has changed the provision of financial 
services as it includes more of the adult population than banks and other FIs do. Between 2009 
and 2013, FinScope (2013a) shows that the percentage of adults with access to financial 
services increased to 57.4% from 15.8%, mainly due to the use of non-bank formal financial 
services, which reflect the uptake in use of MM services. Between 2013 and 2017, access to 
formal financial services increased from 57.4% to 72%, with MM providing about 60% of the 
formal financial services uptake (FinScope, 2018). There are about four model categories of 
mobile payments. They are: (i) operator-centric or telco-led model: which uses the mobile 
operator to deploy mobile payment services independently; (ii) bank-centric model: which uses 
a bank to deploy mobile payment applications or devices to agents or customers with the 
required Point-Of-Sale (POS) acceptance capability; (iii) collaboration model: involves banks, 
MNOs and a third trusted party; (iv) peer-to-peer model: which includes an independent mobile 
payment service provider, other than FIs and MNOs, to provide mobile payments (AFI, 2012:3). 
Tanzania uses the telco-led model for MM, with any third parties such as ‘Selcom’ and 
‘Maxicom’ facilitating utility payments. 
Typical mobile financial service payments adopted by the market in Tanzania include: (i) ‘P2P’ 
(Person-to-Person Payments): which includes both domestic and international remittances 
(money transfer); (ii) ‘P2B’ (Person-to-Business payments): which facilitates the purchase of 
goods and services, bills and utility settlements for water, electricity, TVs, medical expenses, 
school fees, etc.; (iii) P2G (Person-to-Government Payments): which include taxes and fees for 
instance, road licenses, road tickets, etc.; (iv) B2P (Business-to-Person Payments): which 
include salary payments and social benefits (BOT, 2017). As mobile financial services mature, 




regulate MM the BOT uses the following regulatory tools: (i) the 2015 NPS Act; (ii) the 2015 
Payment Systems Licensing and Approving Regulations; (iii) the 2015 Electronic Money 
Regulations (BOT, 2017). To operationalise the regulations, the BOT created the following 
tools: (i) oversight policy framework; (ii) oversight manual for licensing and approving; (iii) 
oversight off-site surveillance manual; and (iv) oversight on-site examination manual (BOT, 
2017). Before the introduction of these regulatory requirements in 2015, the MNOs required a 
‘letter of no objection’ to operate. They were also required to form separate legal entities that 
dealt with financial services. The BOT regulated them. The communication aspect of those 
entities is still under the TCRA. According to Parkes (2014), the BOT and the TCRA also have 
an MoU to help them regulate MM services. This MoU was for administrative purposes, and 
it did not give the status of co-regulators to the above-mentioned regulating bodies. It was the 
2012 Mobile Payments Regulations (MPR) that provided a system for regulatory and 
supervisory coordination between the two bodies. Chart 6.1 illustrates the MM Providers in 
Tanzania and their market share. 
Chart 6.1: Tanzania MM Market Share (March 2018) 
 
Source: TanzaniaInvest (2018). 
During the time of my fieldwork research in April 2018, there were six MNOs in Tanzania, 
while Smart entered the market later. Vodacom M-Pesa, Airtel Money and TigoPesa are the 





Following the above explanations of MM in Tanzania, the question remains what does MM do 
to moderate the factors of FE? I will delineate the theoretical assumptions as well as the 
qualitative findings to support my claims.  
6.4 Theoretical Assumptions and Qualitative Findings: Moderation of the Factors of FE 
Neoliberalism seeks to produce both big and small entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs maximise 
profits and want to reach a wide range of customers. FE bars low-income entrepreneurs and 
customers from accessing financial means. This challenge threatens their neoclassical profit-
maximising efforts (Christiaens, 2019b). During the neoliberal era, a time arrived when FE 
became a social problem requiring alternative solutions (Marron, 2013). DFS emerged for 
various reasons to provide access to different segments of the populations (Burns, 2019). DFS 
helped to expand the delivery of essential financial services to low-income and poor individuals 
through innovative technologies such as MM (Layman and Lauer, 2015).  
In this section, I present the theoretical assumptions and findings of my research. I argue that 
MM moderates the factors of FE. I start by asserting the classical and neoclassical perspectives. 
The classicists are more concerned with the removal of any forms of exclusion. They 
understand that FE is a market failure. According to Majone (1992) and Hurwitz and Manne 
(2018), the classicists contend that failure can be corrected through regulations, use of 
technology, or other means. The neoclassicists would support moderation of some factors of 
FE by MM if they saw profit and utility maximisation with it. Fortunately, MM provided all of 
these elements.  
From the classical perspective, and as depicted in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5.1), FE can be 
explained through the angle of value and distribution. The value of financial services relies on 
the costs of accessing those services, as well as the costs of delivering those services. As a 
result, beyond certain costs, some people cannot access financial services. The classicists 
support the use of technology (Hurwitz and Manne, 2018), and in this case, MM facilitates FI 
as technology increases benefits and lowers costs (Maurer, 2011; McKay and Pickens, 2010). 
From these perspectives, the classicists would support MM, and its benefits would be its ability 
to moderate the factors of FE and to increase the freedom of every individual to be part of the 
mainstream financial sector. See Section 6.4. 
From the neoclassical perspective, and as depicted in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5.2), people would 
support inclusion by MM if it moderated the factors of FE because human beings would make 




terms of people being able to access formal financial services at lower costs while their usage 
of formal financial services would maximise the profits of the MNOs. As Schmookler (1962) 
and Ruttan (1997) assert, the neoclassical theory of innovation and technology places 
significance in the role of demand in triggering innovative activity at the centre of debate, as it 
discusses the timing and location of innovation. And from the RCA, as detailed in Section 3.3.1 
of Chapter 3, it could be argued that the deregulation and re-regulation of MM services as 
depicted in Chapter 5, provided both the visible and invisible hands that helped MM to 
coordinate supply and demand mechanisms of formal financial services. Contextually, both 
classicists and neoclassicists help us to understand the importance of the moderation of the 
factors of FE through technology, making it possible for me to extend this theory to MM. I 
discuss these issues below.  
Based on research findings, I argue that the emergence of MM resolved the following  issues: 
(i) lack of access to formal financial services to financially excluded people, which include: (a) 
the physical barrier in terms of the distance that existed between the banks and the customers, 
therefore, inconvenience of services; (b) the lack of wide scale-adoption of new innovative 
services to serve the poor; (ii) high costs of formal financial services; (iii) the risk of providing 
formal financial services to financially-excluded people, therefore, risk management issues.  
6.4.1 Lack of Access to Formal Financial Services to Financially-Excluded People 
Neoliberalism allowed the growth of financialisation, also depicted in Sections 1.2 and 2.3, as 
well as the widening of the breadth and scope of financial markets, which transformed how 
people lived. Thus, people related closely to financial markets and needed financial services. 
FE became a policy issue in many countries (Marron, 2013). 
“The biggest constraint to financial inclusion or if you want the main factor behind exclusion, was 
first access. You can’t give service if you can’t reach the one that you want to serve. And the reasons 
for challenges in access were obvious, eh one is simply distance, space, and scale. You cannot open 
a branch where there are five customers. The cost of opening a branch can never be absorbed by 
that small number. It means that if you only use the traditional system, there is no way you can go 
beyond where most of the branches now are. In a district, headquarters, eh small towns upward. So 
that was the challenge number one” (Former BOT Governor). 
The above respondent was right. Financial deregulation, thus, roll-back financial 
neoliberalisation paved the way for innovative business solutions. In many cases, FSPs deemed 




those who had access to formal financial services were about 9% (FinScope, 2006). Due to the 
lack of access, people started using buses to transfer money.  
“Mobile financial services aided to mobilise funds. Access, people kept their money under the 
pillow. They were waiting for buses to help them transfer money. To send money to their mothers 
in the villages, they put money in the envelopes. They gave it to an agent. The agent took it to Dar 
Express Bus” (Senior Official BOT). 
Access strands 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate that access was an issue with high levels of FE in 2009 at 
55%, and with MM, those levels plummeted to 28% in 2017. 
Access Strand 6.1: Access to Financial Services by Categories in 2006 
 
Source: FinScope (2006). 
Access Strand 6.2: Uptake of Financial Services 
 
Graphs 6.11 and 6.12 reveal the results of InterMedia surveys conducted between 2013 and 
2017. The surveys indicated that the growth in access to formal financial services was driven 
by MM (InterMedia, 2017; InterMedia, 2018). Demombynes and Thegeya (2012) also 
acknowledge the transformation of poor rural households through MM that has increased 




Graph 6.11: Registered Users (% of Tanzanians Adults by Year) 
 
Source: InterMedia (2018:11). 
Graph 6.12: Account Access/Trials (% of Tanzanians Adults by Year) 
 
Source: InterMedia (2018). 
The data presented in Graphs 6.11 and 6.12 help me to argue that MM increased access to 
formal financial services in Tanzania. It reached those people who were unreached by the banks. 
It reduced the issues of distance, space, and scale, which enhanced FE. MM moderated the 
issue of scale as it created six networks to reach the financially unreached. Some researchers 
provide evidence to show that MM offers a solution to resolve the proximity to banking 
infrastructures (Jack and Suri, 2011; Morawczynski and Pickens, 2009; Mbiti and Weil, 2016). 
“We were able to increase access to people who used formal financial services, which was a success, 
and we were able to increase proximity to financial service providers, which was also a success. 
We were able to meet that … For instance, some people argue that the issue was the proximity to 
the branches and now you have mobile money so no matter where you are you can do transfers, you 
can receive money without going to a bank. For instance, issues of cost like I was in the village, and 




can buy and sell and get my value on the phone without having to transfer and pay for the bus, 
whatever, so the cost is cut” (Financial Sector Official). 
To moderate the access barrier, MM technology was quickly diffused to reverse the distance, 
space, and scale issues. This is in line with the innovation of diffusion theory and the theory of 
change. Invented in 1962 by Rogers, the innovation of diffusion theory could explain how MM 
diffused among the financially excluded over time. It may also explain the customer’s 
behaviour towards the adoption and non-adoption of new technology (Munyoki et al., 2015). 
The classical views have been widely used in the development world to assist with the 
attainment of different forms of development. For instance, the classical diffusion model fit 
well with the dominant paradigm of development of the 1970s.  
“The paradigm of development implied that the transfer to technological innovations from the 
development agencies to their clients lay at the heart of development” (Rogers, 1983:121-122). 
Classical and neoclassical views still support technology for development as demonstrated in 
Chapter 3. For financially-excluded people, I found that MM was appealing to them as it was 
quick, convenient, and easy because they could use their mobile phones anywhere, at any time 
and freely, which enhances the classical values of freedom. Hence, its diffusion amongst the 
poor was quicker. Rogers defined users in a graph as innovators, early adopters, early majority, 
late majority, and laggards. See Graph 6.13. The Tanzanian situation still shows an upward 
trend if you fit it in Roger’s graph.  





Moreover, increased access is supported by the theory of change. Using the theory of change, 
Leydier (2016:3) argues that MM affects savings in several ways. Firstly, MM increases 
income as the volume of money transfers increases due to cheap transfers of money. As a result, 
the adoption of MM helps increase the likelihood of saving behaviour. Secondly, MM is also 
a saving product itself, as it scales up and encourages the use of formal financial services. 
Thirdly, as more people join MM services, MM is considered as a bridge towards FI. Medhi 
and Ratan (2009) also claim that there are more MM account users than there are bank account 
users in the world.  
Of the 10 respondents, I had interviewed in Phase 3, 8 respondents used MM services, and only 
2 had bank accounts. Of the 10 respondents I interviewed in Phase 1, 7 did not have bank 
accounts. 7 out of 10 respondents in Phase 3 also claimed to have used MM for saving purposes. 
Their stories were first-hand evidence from the low-income respondents that MM had provided 
access to formal financial services, as most of the respondents did not own bank accounts. 
Below I include some quotes from the interviews with low-income people and MM agents as 
evidence that MM moderated lack of access to formal financial services for financially-
excluded people.  
Said (Low-Income Respondent), who lost his mobile phone: 
“My trade, as you see, I repair punctured tyres. I wash cars, and I am also a car mechanic. I 
repair cars. Sometimes I drive a commuter bus. How I use mobile money, I transfer money 
when asked, perhaps for my kid at school. When I have a debt, I pay back through mobile money 
transactions. I want to go back and use a line to facilitate transactions. I will go back to Tigo or 
Airtel or Zantel. I used mobile money for a long time for about five years … If I meet someone 
walking with money, I will tell them to put that money in a bank, but more likely, I will 
encourage them to use mobile money. You have it there, and you can use it at any time and 
faster. You own the phone even when you are in bed sleeping, and you can still make 
transactions while at home. If you have TigoPesa, you directly and quickly go to buy some rice 
to cook. It is convenient and easy to use these services”. 
Gaston (Low-Income Respondent): 
“I am self-employed selling ‘kashata’ (candy) and other small items. I get some little money. 
Yes, I get something. I walk and stroll-out selling candies. In this way, I get money to eat and 
survive. I use AirtelMoney a lot. I just like Airtel. I started using it since I owned my first mobile 
phone. I have stayed with Airtel, and I have not changed to getting another line with Tigo or 




I do not have a bank account. Mobile money helps small traders like me to get a wide range of 
financial services.” 
Mama (Low Income Respondent): 
“Mobile money empowers me financially and smoothens my consumptions. Sometimes, I am 
not near a financial point, and I need some money. The day before yesterday, I urgently needed 
money, and my sister was able to send it to me. I got it and transferred it where it was needed 
as I was not near a cashing agent. These transactions are quicker and timely. I like mobile 
financial services, the issue is we are low-income people and do not have a lot of money, but 
we use mobile money … There are microloans. There is ‘Tigo Niwezeshe’ (Tigo Empowers 
Me) loans. What do they call it? … ‘Tigo Timiza’. They give cash, and they include you in their 
account”. 
Seki (Low-Income Respondent): 
“I remember one day, my son was sick. I did not have money for his treatment. I thought what 
was I going to do to get some money. I called one of my relatives in Mwanza. We had met a 
long time ago. I told him what was going on and that I needed some financial help. Within 10 
minutes, he was able to send me some money through TigoPesa. I thought about the importance 
of TigoPesa in serving low-income people as it had helped me. I thought I would like mobile 
money to keep on serving people. That’s one. The second reason is that TigoPesa helps me to 
manage my personal and business expenses. When I drive passengers and they do not have cash, 
I ask them to pay me through TigoPesa. They also pay the associated charges. It makes us feel 
better sometimes … Some other times I feel like it is like picking a mango from a guava tree. I 
cannot believe it!” 
Karin (Low-Income Respondent): 
“When it comes to loans, there is Tigo, ‘Tigo Niwezeshe’ (Tigo Empowering me) … They give 
you cash, or they transfer that into your wallet … They choose who is eligible for those loans. 
They examine your transfers. I had that service as well … There is a small amount they start 
with. They keep on increasing it. You could reach about 300,000 Tanzanian Shillings … It 
helps me to pay electrical bills. When I cannot go to a shop at night, or when I feel tired, I do 
mobile transfers. So, it helps a lot. I get those services. I always save and keep balance. I always 
have money on my phone. Yes, I do.” 
From Said, Gaston, Mama, Seki, and Karin, it is evident that MM provides access to formal 
financial services to low-income and financially-excluded individuals. To conclude on the 
issue of moderation of lack of access, MM is designed to offer access to financially-excluded 




studying: (i) mobile and bank accounts (Toxopeus and Lensink, 2007; De Koker and Jentzsch, 
2013; InterMedia, 2017; InterMedia, 2018); (ii) availability of bank and MM services (Amidzic 
et al, 2014; Beck et al., 2008; Demirguc and Klapper, 2012b; Sarma , 2008; Sarma, 2012; 
InterMedia, 2017; InterMedia, 2018). Refer to the provided statistics throughout this chapter.  
6.4.2 High Costs of Formal Financial Services 
The second factor of FE and also the primary challenge to FI, was the high costs of formal 
financial services. What caused financial liberalisation was the high costs of financial services. 
Before neoliberal roll-back policies, repressed state-led systems were costly (Hanson and 
Ramachandran, n.d.). Neoliberal roll-back policies allowed new FSPs to use the NPS to provide 
low-cost and affordable financial services. Technology helped to cut costs (Masci, 2008). 
To understand the high costs of formal financial services during the neoliberal era and before 
the advent of MM, one needs to understand the financialisation issues during that time. 
According to Davis and Welsh (2017), one has to contemplate the following five factors:  
“the creation of money in financial markets, the transactional basis of finances, the centrality of 
financial markets to economies, the orthodoxy of shareholder value, and the intense microeconomic 
focus of investors. Each of these creates a microclimate for financialisation in which cultures, 
epistemology, and practices develop autonomously from neoliberalism. Such differences are further 
emphasized by the reliance of neoliberal theory upon a neoclassical economics that has never come 
to grips with the role of finance nor the growing primacy of financial markets to the exclusion of so 
much else”. 
Before the advent of MM, the costs of accessing formal financial services were so high that 
would-be users were not ready to absorb the exorbitant costs associated with the service: 
“A lot of banks in Tanzania still have minimum balance requirements for account owners. 
That minimum balance is 10,000 TSh. For a person who earns an average of 40,000 TSh a 
month, 10,000 TSh is a lot of money. It is a fourth of what they are supposed to spend. So 
having that 10,000 TSh in a bank account is a lot of money. So, we don’t have 10,000 
balance requirements for mobile money. You don’t need 10,000 TSh to stay active with 
mobile money” (Financial Sector Official). 
These views were supported by Mbwana (Daladala Bus Driver): 
“I am a commuter daladala driver. I drive the Tandika-Makumbusho route. It is known as 
Temeke-Makumbusho. We work with challenges. We just work. I do not have a bank account. 
I have not used banking services ever since I was born. I don’t use bank services because my 
income does not allow me to do so … It is not about the inconvenience. I get, for instance, 




only in the bank account. At the same time someone gets sick, how can you save? It is hard to 
manage and maintain a bank account. Mobile money has brought financial services to low-
income people like me. I want to ask for 2,000 TSh from my friend. I get it. I tell him, Bwege, 
please send me 2,000 TSh and things like that. Mobile money has also helped small traders to 
do their businesses … Mobile money helps. You can put 500 TSh, 1,000 TSh, 2,000 TSh, 3,000 
TSh. A day arrives, and you think you do not have money. Then you remember you have saved 
on your mobile phone. Then, you use it to buy food, and you eat for that day. It helps sometimes. 
That saving is like you carry a ‘Kibubu’ (piggy-bank).” 
Maurer (2011) argues that MM is in a position to fight against banking exclusion. Other 
researchers have also demonstrated that MM provides a solution for the high price of banking 
services (Donavan, 2012; Morawczynski and Pickens, 2009; Arestoff and Venet, 2013; Mbiti 
and Weil, 2016). One thing for sure, is that technology opened the door for the inclusion of the 
poor. 
According to Aker et al. (2014), electronic payment systems are more efficient than traditional 
banking services as they reduce transaction costs and time. Technology ensured that one could 
reach customers without investing much in bricks-and-mortar branches. McKay and Pickens 
(2010) studied 18 branchless service providers in 10 countries and found that they were 19% 
cheaper than the banks, and that their services were more inclusive. This finding matches my 
finding in Tanzania. Also, the Former BOT Governor asserted:  
 “… to start with the cost of the transfer, the cost of transactions, went way down, typically before 
it was almost like about 10 cents to a dollar about 10%. After the introduction of mobile money, it 
went down to 1 cent to a dollar. It is one percent. So, this is affordable. So, it is access, affordability. 
These were the two main, eh, targets that were being resolved by the introduction of this technology.  
So, I think that’s number one as to what occurred” (Former BOT Governor). 
MM systems can easily be linked to other financial systems, and the concept of open systems 
theory can be used to link MM with other systems to further cut down prices. An open system 
is a system that has external interactions (also see: Bertalanffy, 1968). With open systems 
theory, one could understand how MM was influenced by its environment and other players in 
the financial sector (Dahlberg et al., 2008). The system could also mean various networks. 
Dahlberg et al. (2008) have used the open systems theory to also to study MM. According to 
the World Bank (2014b), increasing mobile phones network adoption and penetration, its 
affordability and lack of affordable alternatives in the financial system, as well as higher 
conventional banking account fees, have helped MM to include more financially unreached 




social networks to transact and trade in developing markets. Therefore, the link between MM 
and other financial services, networks, and systems is imperative. Also, USAID (2012) sees 
MM as a cost-effective technology and more efficient when compared to cash payments.  
CGAP (2013a) acknowledges the fact that the poor use their closed networks of relatives and 
open networks of friends, to learn more about the use of mobile phones for saving and 
transferring money. As saving and money transfers through other financial channels can be 
expensive, MM becomes the most efficient means for saving and transferring money. Said 
(low-income respondent) reaffirms these views:  
“I remember to have saved money through TigoPesa. I saved on my phone to get money to pay 
for my license. I started saving when I was thinking about getting money to attend NIT to get 
me a license. I had no other option than using TigoPesa. Every time I worked as a ‘bajaji’ driver, 
I saved 3,000 or 4,000 TSh every day. I used TigoPesa as my bank, where I deposited money. 
After I had saved enough, I was able to get my license. Therefore, I use mobile money, 
especially, TigoPesa and MPesa. I mainly use it for savings. Low-income people like me can 
do it through mobile money.” 
The Former BOT Governor also supports these views:  
“I was interested, so I asked to visit the villages to have a couple of sessions with people, just to 
know why they don’t opt to actually put their money in a bank account instead of keeping it in their 
phones. Do you know what their answer was? One said, if you put your money in a bank account, 
every end of the month, even if you did not use that account, the balance has reduced. Because, you 
know, ledger costs, etc. Eh.  But, if you saved by using a mobile money account, that was what they 
said, even before the profit-sharing, your money was intact. Well, that was a big difference. Now, I 
am sure if you ask them again, and on top of that, I also still earn some profits on this mobile money 
side.” 
Thus, profit and utility maximisation, as we perceive it in the neoclassical sense, encourage 
people to use MM as detailed by the Former BOT Governor. Furthermore, the interoperability 
of MM systems also reduced the cost of MM services. 
6.4.2.1 Interoperability 
Neoliberal roll-back policies slackened obstacles that prohibited the expansion of formal 
financial services. Likewise, neoliberal roll-out policies encouraged the creation of business 
partnerships and alliances, as well as the development of new financial systems and solutions 
which facilitated efficiency in the financial sector. Thus, neoliberalism facilitated the increase 




to allow direct and seamless transfer of funds from one FSP to another FSP across networks, 
switches, and systems. Interoperability was a way to enhance microfinancing, electronic billing, 
electronic transactions between the government, and non-government users (Warioba, 2016). 
Interoperability enables MM services to interact with benefits for customers and operators. 
MM agents also enhance interoperability: 
“I like this agent job because it helps me serve the people. It also helps low-income people and 
the nation to empower financially-excluded individuals. It is also a system that protects your 
earned income because it has a limit. If I get my monthly pay, I save some of it there. Moreover, 
it helps people start saving. It is one type of ‘kibubu’ (piggy-bank) … As an agent, I serve Tigo 
and Voda … There is not any conflict arising from serving multiple MNOs. We, as small agents, 
are between companies and super agents. Super agents do not work with numerous MNOs. If 
he serves Voda, it is only Voda. If he serves Tigo, it is only Tigo. Only small agents serve 
customers of any mobile network. The customer comes to you knowing that the services will 
be available. As an agent, I become a one stop-centre. Customers from Tigo, Airtel, Voda or 
Zantel, come here to receive services. We work with all MNOs. The super-agent does not have 
any issues with these arrangements” (Noorah - MM Agent).  
 A customer owning a mobile account with an MNO can make transfers from his account to 
another account with a different MNO. The first interoperability agreement in Tanzania was 
signed in 2014 (also see Chapter 5, Section 5.4.5). The government got involved in ensuring 
the signing of the agreement, and this is one of the examples of the rolling out of state power 
to enhance MM services.  
“The Bank of Tanzania provided a supportive regulatory environment for engagement. Importantly 
however, the bulk of the content came directly from the industry … Through frequent meetings, 
debate, negotiations and eventually consensus, the industry has successfully put together a set of 
standards that will govern how person-to-person payments will be handled across networks” 
(Musa et al., 2015). 
According to Di Castri (2013a), interoperability has the following benefits, it: (i) makes 
commercial sense for providers, and creates value for customers; (ii) helps share regulatory 
risks; (iii) lowers the costs of financial services, and increases a customer’s choices; (iv) 
increases competition and breaks dominant positions; (v) removes the need for individuals to 
own and manage multiple SIM cards. 




“There is a correlation stating that the value of a network is exponentially based on the number of 
players in a network. Going with that theory, the more players you have connected, the value of that 
network grows. Theoretically, the volume of that network should grow. And with higher volumes, 
you should be able to run those transactions at a very low cost. And when you run those transactions 
at a very low cost, that is when you will be able to include people that are not in the system because 
of unaffordable costs. If you look at it from that angle, yes, interoperability will bring more volume. 
Yes, it’s true, but first, the pricing has to be right” (Senior Interoperability Expert).  
Furthermore, Moore’s law has been used to help reduce the costs of technology. According to 
Oxford (2009), Moore’s law states that the number of transistors packed into a given unit of 
space will roughly double every two years. The law has been used to develop new technologies 
and to improve existing technologies (The Economist, 2015b). Literature suggests that 
Metcalfe’s law and Moore’s Law together provide us with the best basis to understand how 
networks lower prices of services. Put together the two laws explain the supply side and 
demand side of services. On the supply side, the diseconomies of scale may lead to expansion 
in the size of networks, which may increase costs (Yoo, 2015:88) quoting Mann (2000)). 
Moore’s law claims that digitisation reduces costs and can reduce the increases in costs. If the 
increase in costs produced by the expansion in size remains lower than the reduction in costs 
related to Moore’s law, costs should remain manageable even as a network continues to grow 
(Yoo (2015:88) quoting Metcalfe (2013)). 
“On the demand side, Metcalfe’s law states that the number of potential connections increases 
quadratically with the number of nodes. To the extent that expanding the number of potential 
connections increases the value of a network. The Metcalfe’s law provides another reason for 
believing that growth in network size will be automatically beneficial” (Yoo, 2015:88). 
If the MNOs manage to get the pricing right, they will be able to involve those who have been 
excluded because of pricing. However, they may not be able to include those people who are 
excluded because the market has the wrong products for them or because they do not have the 
right to insurance, and so forth. In Sections 6.4.2.1.1 and 6.4.2.1.2, I will explain the application 
of interoperability to bring the costs down in Tanzania. I argue that interoperability has been 
allowed in Tanzania for ‘exclusivity’ and ‘non-exclusivity’ reasons. 
6.4.2.1.1 Exclusivity and Non-Exclusivity Reasons for Interoperability 
When MM started in Tanzania, M-Pesa had its own agents. Airtel had its own agents, and so 
forth. Later on, Tigo also came with its own agents. The problem was that the volume of 




customers. Likewise, the other agents dealt with their MNOs only. To remove this aspect of 
exclusivity, the ‘non-exclusive’ interoperable system was launched to facilitate profit and 
utility maximisation by businesses and individuals in the neoclassical sense.  
“We call the first stage: ‘non-exclusivity’. You know when we started if the agent served M-Pesa, 
he only worked for M-Pesa. Airtel needed their own agents. The M-Pesa agent could not serve 
Airtel. So, the first major step we took was to remove exclusivity. Now, the agent can serve any 
number of mobile money services eh that s/he has a contract with. You will see that the agent has 
advertisements from various MNOs. He serves M-Pesa. He serves Airtel. He serves another MNO. 
That’s step number one. There still existed two significant costs incurred by the customer. When 
you sent money as an M-Pesa client, and the receiver is from Airtel, it was sent as a message. He 
had to go to the sender’s network through their agent to receive cash. The receiver paid fees. If he 
wanted to send the same money elsewhere, as it was not the end process, he needed to go to an 
Airtel agent to buy electronic money and put it in his wallet as a balance. So, cost of time. There 
are fees because you have to pay for both services” (Former BOT Governor).  
In 2014, an interoperability agreement between the BOT, two banks, and all four MNOs (Tigo, 
Airtel, Zantel, and Vodacom) was reached as it laid the foundation for different levels of 
interoperability. The known levels of interoperability in Tanzania during the time of my field 
research were: (i) ‘agent level’; (ii) ‘wallet-to-wallet level’; (iii) ‘wallet-to-other platforms’. 
At the agent level, the removal of ‘exclusivity’ meant that no agent was exclusive to one 
operator: 
“I liked to do this business to provide financial services to a wide range of customers. Even 
when they are far away, they can still get financial services … I serve Tigo, Airtel, and 
Vodacom. I like to work with Tigo than other companies because Tigo pays well. Tigo has 
many customers as well. There are many customers because TigoPesa grew exponentially, and 
many low-income people like to use Tigo. Their charges are fairly low as well. Services at Tigo 
start at 500TSh … Everything is fine. Their services do not collide or are not in conflict. I do 
well. I have clients … I am always busy. My key customers are low-income people … Here, I 
offer deposit and withdrawal services. I connect bundles and help customers to send money … 
Sending money, withdrawing money, and selling airtimes are the main things I do here (Abuu 
– MM Agent). 
“We sell vouchers and deal with mobile money transactions … Services from different MNOs 
work together. There are also services that MNOs do not offer. However, MNOs offer float, and 
we get connected to work with other businesses. The MNOs have provided access to TANESCO 




transaction services. We get access to billing and payment platforms through other companies 
and the MNOs. Some share other services we do not provide” (Noorah – MM Agent). 
 Hence, a M-Pesa agent or an Airtel agent could serve other MNOs. This is the reason why an 
agent today serves more than one MNO. This has increased the scale and volume of business 
and is in line with Metcalfe’s theory. It also maximises profit in the neoclassical sense. Also, 
if the agent rented a place for his business, now he covers a much larger area than before. 
Meanwhile, when a non-M-Pesa customer receives money from an M-Pesa customer, the agent 
is likely to transfer the money from an M-Pesa account to a non-M-Pesa account. The non-M-
Pesa customer will be able to buy Airtel units and put the balance on his Airtel phone. Before 
these arrangements, a customer needed to leave the agent and walk a distance to find an Airtel 
agent, before he could buy the Airtel units. This is the agent level interoperability. 
“You know interoperability is something you can only convince the MNOs to do. There is only one 
reason for this. The one who puts ‘minara’ (towers) has already suffered a cost. And the prime 
movers always get their benefit from the fact that they will enjoy renting for a while. Later on, Airtel 
and only with its small system, Tigo were also starting. M-Pesa, who is the giant, has spread in 
many locations because he had massive investments. Now you tell them, ahhaa Tigo, now Tigo’s 
customer can also send money to their system. So, what happens in interoperability is to remove 
these two costs, and if I send you money from my M-Pesa account it comes straight to you, and it 
reflects in your balance as an Airtel’s customer. No agent is needed for this transfer. You don’t have 
to go, nor do you have to get charged. Now, the thing was how do you convince the prime movers?” 
(Former BOT Governor). 
This situation leads us to the second level of interoperability in Tanzania known as ‘wallet-to-
wallet’ level. My findings confirm that Tanzania was the first in the world to reach this level 
of interoperability. At this level, an M-Pesa customer could send money directly to an Airtel e-
wallet:  
“Before you received an SMS, you were required to cash, and you were charged while cashing out 
your money. Then, you bought the Airtel float and you were charged again. These days, from my 
Vodacom account, it goes straight to your Airtel account. You don’t need to visit the agent. You 
are not charged to cash out. You do not need to buy the Airtel units. This decreased expenses for 
the user and has also increased business volumes for the operators” (Former BOT Governor). 
The wallet-to-wallet interoperability triggered the banks to rethink their operations:  
“So, going with the Metcalfe’s theory, if you have a network of two operators, the value of that 




Vodacom, TTCL, Zantel,  and Halotel, in all of a sudden, I have increased or improved. I could 
send across, then is much more work” (Senior Interoperability Expert). 
If the pricing is right, the wallet-to-wallet interoperability reduces costs significantly. The 
banks have tried to use the same theory, but they have failed for a long time due to pricing 
among other issues:  
“It is something that banks have been doing for a while and send money from one bank to another 
bank. Of course, why is it not inclusive? Because the price is not right. The swift will charge you 
40 dollars to send money from one bank to another, regardless of the amount, right? … That’s an 
example, you have an interoperable environment, but it is not inclusive” (Senior 
Interoperability Expert). 
Hence, competitive pricing and the right products are key to interoperable systems. The MNOs 
with affordable services and the right products for financially-excluded people have managed 
to include more of the financially-excluded people in their interoperable systems. Because of 
the convenience of the MM interoperable system, the ‘wallet-to-other-platforms’ became the 
third level of interoperability in Tanzania.  It is much more convenient, once a customer 
receives money in his Airtel MM account, and he wants to pay for his electricity bill. This led 
to ‘wallet-to-other platforms’ interoperability. It is between the MM provider, the operator, and 
the service providers. If a customer wants to pay his electricity bill, there are aggregators such 
as Selcom and Maxicom. They act as the intermediaries who receive payments from customers 
and send them to TANESCO (the national electricity company in Tanzania). TANESCO 
receives the payments and provides the customer with electrical services. That is another stage 
of interoperability between the financial service provider and the ultimate service provider.  
“Therefore, what has this done? Firstly, it increases convenience. Secondly, it reduces the cost of 
service. Thirdly, as a result, it grows utilisation and the financial services market as a whole. It is a 
big motivator for the growth of the business, convenience, and reduction of cost” (Former BOT 
Governor).  
Graph 6.14 illustrates the growth of an interoperable MM market in Tanzania. Interoperability 
volume and values among the MNOs (TigoPesa, Airtel Money, EzyPesa and Vodacom) 






Graph 6.14: MNOs Interoperability Trends 
 
Source: BOT (2017) – Oversight Department.  
 
6.4.2.1.2 Background on Tanzania’s MM Interoperability 
In 2014, an interoperability agreement between the BOT, two banks, and all four MNOs (Tigo, 
Vodacom, Zantel, and Halotel) was reached and laid the foundations for the above-mentioned 
different levels of interoperability. Tigo led the remaining MNOs into an agreement as the 
MNOs became aware of the challenges facing the MM sector, which included: (i) the direct 
competition for market share; (ii) the slow-pace of the growing market; and (iii) latent demand 
from potential customers’ willingness to increase frequency and value of transactions. To 
overcome all these challenges, in 2013 Airtel, Tigo and Zantel implemented their 
interoperability scheme; while Vodacom supported the structure, it did not sign up (see Jones-
Evans, 2016 and Borreau and Valletti, 2015). In 2015, Vodacom started discussions to join the 
interoperability agreement (IFC, 2015) and in 2015 it joined to make Tanzania the first African 
MM market with full interoperability for MM peer-to-peer (P2P) transfers (Kabendera, 2015). 
Furthermore, in 2015, ‘the 2015 NPS Act’, ‘the 2015 Electronic Money Regulations’ and ‘the 
2015 Payment Systems Licensing and Approving Regulations’ were reinforced to set up the 




6.4.3 Moderation of Risk by MM Services 
Financial neoliberalism changed how governments and FSPs viewed risks. It also changed how 
the two engaged with financial risks, allowing them to find better ways of managing and 
controlling risks (Gould, 2019). Financial deregulation supported by neoliberal roll-back 
policies involved the following three steps: (i) the opening up of the country’s economy to the 
free flow of capital in and out of the country: (ii) the removal of regulations on financial 
institutions operating within the borders; (iii) the removal of political controls from the central 
banks (Beder 2009). Each of these actions came with risks. 
Risk is the other factor causing FE that MM has been able to moderate: 
“Before I started using mobile money, I had some challenges. People used to steal money from 
me. Since I was a child, I used to put money in nylon bags. I also used to sell Rambo plastic 
bags to get money. I used the daladala commuter bus to travel. You push people here and there 
to board the bus. While you are struggling and pushing to get on the bus, someone is stealing 
from you” (Mbwana - Daladala Bus Driver). 
People like Mbwana, therefore, could only walk with their little monies and were risking being 
robbed.  Today, they store their money on e-wallets, which helps them avoid being robbed. In 
the financial sector, and for this research, risk can be grouped into: financial risk, performance 
risk, and privacy risk (John et al., 2018). While financial risk may include things such as credit 
risk, liquidity risk, capital risk, and moral hazard; performance risk includes things like: market 
risk, business risk, systemic risk, reputational risk and legal risk (Apătăchioae, 2015:38; Rodica, 
2011; Piciu, 2013). Meanwhile, privacy risk includes leaking of information to unrelated third 
parties (Giovanis et al., 2012). Over time, banks have considered these risks (Apătăchioae, 
2015). The poor were considered a financial risk and therefore, unbankable because they did 
not have a regular income (Ayres, 1983; Bakhoum, 1989). MM has changed this, the MNOs 
consider people like Mbwana as customers and not as risks.  If a poor person owned a business, 
the performance of their business was at risk due to their inability to navigate through 
turbulence in the business environment, should it occur. A poor person may also be a risk in 
terms of their identity as they did not have IDs, and how to verify their particulars was an issue 
that could infringe their privacy. More often, the banks did not deal with the poor. The MNOs 
deal with the poor. 
Mishkin (1998) and Stiglitz (1990) claim that transaction costs and information asymmetry; 




collateral (Akerlof, 1970) or credit history, and lending to the poor was a risk because the cost 
of doing so was high (Bakhoum, 1989). For these reasons and for neoclassical rational 
assumptions, the banks excluded poor people. The MNOs instead were required to open a trust 
account that could be used to cover liquidity, credit, or other risks should they arise. Graph 
6.15 illustrates MM trust account balances. Those accounts have kept on growing since 2008, 
keeping the MM market stable (Bank of Tanzania, 2016). 
Graph 6.15: Bank Deposits and MM Trust Account Balances (TZS Billion and % GDP) 
 
“Firstly, mobile money providers are purely operating a money transfer system. It is a platform. 
They don’t issue money. For every unit that a customer buys in mobile money, there is a unit which 
is sitting in a trust account in a bank. So, there is no creation of money. It is also true that they are 
not taking deposits. This is clear. They are not doing credit. It is clear. What distinguishes banks 
from other institutions is the fact that they are deposit-taking, and per regulations, they are 
essentially in terms of supervision in managing the risk in relation to the protection of deposit 
interests. That’s the main principle. So those (MNOs) are not taking deposits. There is no risk of 
exposure to the depositors. They are involved in payment systems, and that’s purely a platform. 
Yeah, purely a platform. And, we told them that it is also true that actually every shilling of the 
electronic money balance sitting in the e-wallet of someone, they (banks) are the custodians in the 
trust account, of the equivalent that gives it” (Former BOT Governor).  
Traditional banking with siloed channels such as bricks-and-mortar branches was neither 
friendly nor efficient in meeting the poor’s needs. The risk of losing money by allowing the 
poor to use banking services was perceived to be high. Hence, bank products were not made to 
meet the needs of the poor (Ayres, 1983; Bakhoum, 1989). On the other hand, MM focuses 
more on the poor (Peruta, 2018:155). It opens accounts for them. The classicists view the costs 




“Market prices are the prices at which goods and services are exchanged. Natural prices are 
theoretical construct and served as a supposed centre of gravity of market prices. Natural prices 
cannot be observed directly but can be computed based on costs of production”. 
Given the predictability and efficiency of technologies, the classicists are in the position to 
predict technological outcomes in terms of cost reduction and constant returns to scale. With 
the MNOs ready to embrace these views, they offered financial services to the poor through 
MM which helped to cut down the costs of financial service delivery and increased MM’s 
economies of scale. Graph 6.16 illustrates that the penetration of MM accounts is higher than 
that of bank accounts. 
Graph 6.16: Account Penetration, 2008-2015 (Millions of Account) 
 
Moreover, more people now save more in MM accounts than they save in banks, see Graph 
6.17:  
Graph 6.17: Saving Channel (% of Adults) 
 
Furthermore, MM has started to provide microcredit services in collaboration with banks (e.g., 
Vodacom M-Pesa and CBA provide M-Pawa microloans; Airtel Money with Jumo 
Microfinance Service provide Timiza microloans, Tigo and Jumo provide Tigo Nivushe 




loans are based on the applicant’s history of M-Pesa deposits for six months, including: 
deposits over time, M-Pesa usage or airtime purchases. The minimum loan amount for M-Pesa 
was 1,000 Tshillings, and the maximum amount was 500,000 Tshillings (Blechman et al., 
2017). These loans have been quicker to obtain, and the transfer of funds has been faster as 
well.  
“Then, there is the risk part. You know the usual system would take many days and uncertainties 
to do transfers. This (MM) was almost instantaneous, eh, and virtually risk-free because there is 
virtually no timeline between sending and you getting confirmation that it is here. Immediately you 
push the button the other guy after a few seconds gets feedback that I received it. You know that 
hugely releases risks. So, it is convenient. It is secure. It is affordable. And those were the three 
main features that certainly were behind if you want the big push to get from exclusion to that 
degree of inclusion that you find today. Yeah” (Former BOT Governor).  
Aghion et al. (2005) argued that small enterprises in developing countries lacked access to 
credit, which led to unsustained underdevelopment. Income inequality and slow growth were 
a result of lack of access to financial services. The provision of microloans was a new aspect 
of MM that boosted economic development, given that MM accounted for about 52% of the 
Tanzanian GDP (GSMA, 2017b). Everybody knows that credit is essential and that it enables 
the growth of investments. It also provides working capital, and it allows the provision of a 
whole range of services. That is FI. It facilitates insurance. It facilitates treasury. It facilitates 
student loans. It promotes education. Development does not have to generate income; there is 
also the human component of it. At least, in the political sense, there is an attempt to make 
neoliberal policies inclusive as discussed in Chapter 1. It is all facilitated by financial services. 
The connection has to be financial services and development, and then FI is what grows 
financial services. Microcredit services target the poor, and it helps them improve their lives. 
Here is an example:  
‘Mama Ntilie’ (a lady who cooks and sells food on the streets), in the morning she goes to a fish 
market at Ferry and to the market to buy the ingredients. She uses mobile money and gets micro-
credit loans. She will be able to cook and sell. At the end of the business day, she will be able to 
repay the loans. It becomes a working capital source of those people who cannot get that kind of 
credit from banks. Just because the standards and requirements of the banks are different, they get 
secured credit. No collateral” (Former BOT Governor). 
This is how MM facilitates credit to low-income people. The risks are kept low. Moreover, 
MNOs, banks, and other third parties recognise that risk management is key to the success of 




electronic payments are less prone to mistakes, theft, and corruption. MM payments are more 
traceable than cash, and they are regarded as having the potential to reduce risks compared to 
cash payments (Solin and Zerzan, 2010).  
6.5 Aggregate Data: Analysis and Limitations 
Aggregate data are not only data on populations, groups, regions or countries (Anderson et al., 
1981; Speier-Pero, 2019), but also condensed and summarised data (Barefield, 1972; Speier-
Pero, 2019; Alfieri and Urgo, 2015). Examples of aggregated data are examples of rates of FI, 
rates of FE, financial literacy rates, GDP, and headcounts of financially-included or financially-
excluded individuals to determine their numbers in specific geographical areas. Global Findex 
Surveys, FinScope Surveys, InterMedia surveys and other surveys I described in Chapter 4 also 
compile and use aggregated data (Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2013). What all these have in 
common is that they are produced by combined data from individuals who participated in the 
surveys. For example, data from Graph 6.4 in Section 6.3.3 demonstrated that the uptake of 
MM services stood at 60% in 2017. However, this aggregated data did not tell us the concerns 
or details of those using MM services between 2013 and 2017. The disaggregation of this data 
in Graphs 6.5b and 6.6b allowed researchers to identify where people saved between 2013 and 
2017 and their sources of borrowing between 2013 and 2017, respectively. This data is still at 
the aggregation level, and it does not tell us more about the individual issues of the respondents 
of those surveys. This is one of the limitations of the aggregated data. To know more about 
each individual issue, we need to disaggregate the data more and more. The same aggregated 
data could be used to identify the barriers to FI. Another example is the data on Access Strand 
2.1 in Section 2.6.1. It shows FI by demographics where the aggregated data is placed in the 
following categorisations: gender, rural or urban settings, income-generating activities, and age 
groups. This data is at the country level, and it shows sharp disparities between men and women 
where women are more likely to be financially excluded than men. Also, those living in rural 
areas are more likely to be excluded than those living in urban centres. Moreover, those salaried 
and working in the formal sector are more likely to be financially included than those working 
in the informal sector. Also, those between 16 and 24 years old and those above 65 years of 
age are more likely to be financially excluded (Appendix 6.1 briefly explains who is likely to 
be excluded). Again, this data is at the aggregate level, and it does not tell us much about each 
individual issue. Hence, aggregate data minimise the amount of data and details that we may 
want to know about each individual participating in the survey.  This is another limitation of 




reduce details of data and to create variables and groups of data that they use to analyse issues 
at the macro level. Researchers seeking to disaggregate data also risk aggregation bias and 
more significant variance in data interpretations (Vibhanshu et al., 2015; Speier-Pero, 2019). 
Data aggregation becomes an integral aspect of the presented data from the surveys as it 
combines many details and information from various sources and respondents to prevent 
information overload. The empirical literature on information overload has been found across 
several disciplines including consumer behaviour (Cheung et al., 2014), finance and accounting 
(Brown-Liburd et al., 2015) and social media (Bright et al., 2015). Also, see Speier-Pero 
(2019).   
Aggregate data on financially-excluded people are either counts or averages or a total number 
of financially-excluded people derived from the individual level data found in the surveys as 
demonstrated throughout this dissertation or through census results. Say, for example, we have 
the total headcount for everyone who participated in FinScope national representative samples 
in 2013 and 2017 in Tanzania from the 16 to 24 age group who identified themselves as 
financially-excluded people. This is an aggregate count as it is produced as a total from the 
individual survey’s results in 2013 and 2017. The FinScope samples had 7,987 and 10,000 
respondents, respectively (see FinScope, 2013a; FinScope, 2018). These are counts from 
national representative samples and not from the country’s census where the entire population 
is counted. Policymakers cannot wait for a census count which comes every ten years. They 
use national representative samples to get accurate counts and numbers of financially-excluded 
people. These statistics help them to make high-quality decisions regarding FI strategies. In 
Tanzania, the FinScope surveys are used for these purposes. Hence, from these national 
representative samples, one could question the quality of data (also see: Bronner, 1982; Speier-
Pero, 2019; Abdel-Khalik, 1973). This is another limitation. However, governments, the World 
Bank and other global standard-setting bodies have agreed to regard data from these surveys 
as official data (also see: Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2013; see Chapter 4 Section, 4.8.3.1 
and Appendices 4.5 and 4.6). Furthermore, country original aggregate data are often time series 
data where the measurements are taken and triangulated. Time series data are often presented 
as tables with time running across the horizontal axis or as strands and graphs given specific 
dates as an annual time series data of the country that demonstrate the uptake of MM services 
or the levels of FI and FE (see Access Strands 2.1 and 2.2 in Section 2.6.1; Strand 5.4 in Section 
5.5; Graph 6.1 in Section 6.3.1, or Table 6.4 in Section 6.3.3). Aggregate data are such counts 




survey data by applying statistical methods summing or averaging then applying additional 
calculations such as weighting and estimations and sampling errors. This procedure has been 
designed to provide reliable inferences about the entire population based on data collection, 
collected from specific surveyed samples. For example, FI is one of the most-watched measures 
of the country’s increasing levels of access to formal financial services. But how is it 
calculated? The standard measure of FI is an access rate which measures the number of people 
who use formal financial services including MM as a proportion of the adult population in 
Tanzania (FinScope, 2006; FinScope, 2009; FinScope 2013a; FinScope, 2018). This FI rate is 
derived from FinScope survey data or other surveys. FI through MM stands at 60% and FI 
through the banks is at 17%, and total FE is 28% (FinScope, 2018). FE is at 28% in Tanzania 
in 2017 because some people use both banks and MM services. In Tanzania, the FinScope 
surveys provide official statistics for FI and FE. The FinScope surveys are conducted every 
three years. There are other alternative surveys for Tanzania, such as the global Findex and 
InterMedia (InterMedia 2014; InterMedia, 2016; and InterMedia, 2018). Thus, the FI rate is an 
aggregate example of how an aggregate indicator is produced from a survey. However, based 
on the FI rate calculated from the survey, some methodological issues can be raised. Firstly, 
although the FinScope survey covers a large representative sample, not absolutely everybody 
aged over 16 in Tanzania is included in the survey. In a few cases, sampling errors may occur. 
This means, arguably, a different sample would produce slightly different results. This is 
another aggregate data limitation. Borgatti (2002), Lago (2013), Roediger et al. (1993) and 
Bound et al. (2001) conducted different experiments and noticed some of these aggregate-data 
limitations. Despite the results that researchers obtain from the different national representative 
samples, those results are expected to show ‘sampling variability’. Resh (2011), Sailor and 
Vasireddy (2006), Lapp and Smith (1992) explain the variability issues. Sampling variability 
places confidence in deriving a final FI rate produced by the surveys. Secondly, as it is spaced 
on the survey, the FI rate also needs to be adjusted to reflect the population as a whole, perhaps 
by adjusting the results from certain areas or by age group and gender as demonstrated in 
Access Strand 2.1 in Section 2.6.1. The second measure of FI is MM service active user 
accounts count. This comes from a survey as a count of everybody who is claiming to own and 
use MM services. Table 6.4 in Section 6.3.3 provides the number of active registered MM 
users. Since it takes a 100% count, the FI rate remains unaffected by counting variability. 
Active users of MM services will remain a percentage part of those using formal financial 
services. Hence, active MM account users can be used as an indicator of FI, even in small levels 




the number of MM active account users as consistently lower than the FI rate. This is because 
not everyone who is financially included uses MM, as FI counts simply measure people using 
MM and other formal financial services. Thus, the number of MM active account users is 
considered to be the more accurate measure of accessibility to formal financial services as it is 
one of the standard indicators of FI (also see: AFI, 2013b; AFI, 2020; FinScope, 2006; 
FinScope, 2009; FinScope 2013a; FinScope, 2018). Hence, we have seen that aggregate data 
are data that have been derived from individual-level data, which put together large patterns 
and through which trends can be seen. Aggregate data are often data collected from different 
groups of people or regions for administrative or policymaking purposes (Speier-Pero, 2019). 
The government of Tanzania and other institutions in the financial sector use aggregate data to 
identify how and where they should be using public resources to eradicate FE and to enhance 
FI. They use such information to know how different segments of the population are affected 
by existing policies and to inform and shape future economic and financial sector policy 
changes. Despite the accuracy of the aggregate data they use, aggregate data based on national 
represented samples may still have errors and limitations, and any efforts to transform 
microdata into macro data requires attention as measurement or any other errors are likely to 
be an issue (Bound et al., 2001). How did I respond to the issues of aggregation of data? I 
interviewed 20 low-income people to learn whether the aggregate data and other data at meso 
and macro levels make sense. In short, the findings from those interviews suggested that both 
meso and macro data made sense (for meso level data limitations see Appendix 6.2). To learn 
more about macro data limitations, please see Appendix 6.3.    
6.6 How Do Low-Income and Financially-Excluded Individuals Benefit When We 
Analyse Aggregate Level Macro Data? 
It will be hard to reach 100% inclusion. But reaching high levels of FI is the target. According 
to Masha (2016), research that enhances financial development theory in cross-country 
contexts demonstrates that MM has an essential micro- and macro-economic impact that can 
be extrapolated from macro data studying the aggregate economy. Thus, MM growth expands 
financial intermediation. Levine (2005) and Pasali (2013) demonstrate that through financial 
development theory, financial intermediation correlates positively with growth and 
employment (also see Masha, 2016). Cross-country analyses pinpoint three substantial 
macroeconomic impacts of MM on economic growth, inequality and financial system stability 
(Masha, 2016). Several empirical studies demonstrate the link between FI and economic 




benefits that MM brings to financially-excluded individuals. I will expand more on these 
benefits in Section 6.6.2. For macro-level data issues on growth, inequality and financial 
stability, see Appendix 6.4. The next section will briefly detail the patterns of phone use in 
Tanzania. 
6.6.1 Mobile Phone Use in Tanzania: Extreme Poverty and MM Exclusion? 
According to InterMedia (2018): 
“Many adults in Tanzania rely on others for assistance using mobile phones. While the majority 
(81%) reported using a mobile phone to call someone, only 69% reported ‘complete ability’ to 
make or receive a call … Both unregistered and registered users rely on agents or other people 
to assist them with transactions; 52% have used a phone to make a financial transaction, but 
only 42% report having complete or some ability to perform such a transaction.”  
According to Hancock (2005), about 97% of Tanzanians claim to have access to a mobile 
phone. According to InterMedia (2018):  
“Tanzania’s population shows high capacity for using mobile technology. In 2017, 64% of 
adults owned a mobile phone, 19% used a borrowed phone, and 74% were able to send and 
receive text messages – the key proxy indicator of ability to use digital financial services (DFS) 
unassisted.” 
In 2017 Tanzania had 23 million internet users. 82% of these users surfed the internet via 
phones, which is around 19 million people. About 6 in 10 adults in Tanzania are financially 
included, and over 55% of financially-included individuals use MM accounts. In 2017 
Tanzania had 40.08 million mobile phone subscribers. Tanzania has around 50 million people 
(Reuters, 2018). Also, see InterMedia (2016).  
According to Borg (2014), between 2010 and 2015, MM subscriptions increased by 300 million 
across the world. Ericsson, a Swedish mobile operator, estimates 1.6 billion subscriptions will 
be added by 2020. This means more than 3 billion people will have access to a smartphone in 
2020 (also see GSMA, 2020b). The ability of financial institutions to facilitate connectivity is 
vital for the provision of their financial services. Hence, we must go beyond the macro and 
meso levels when we analyse FE. Transferring and handling money is an everyday activity in 
developed countries but can be transformative in a developing country. 
FI is a step-by-step journey. In this journey, and as far as MM is concerned, InterMedia (2018) 




primary users, advanced users, and mobile credit users. Intermedia surveyed 3,060 respondents 
throughout Tanzania. Less than a third of the Tanzanian population can be said to have 
difficulties in accessing mobile phone and MM services (InterMedia, 2018; FinScope, 2018). 
About 44% were considered to be non-users of digital-enabled financial accounts in 2017. 
About less than a third of the adult population had no access to formal financial service. The 
non-users consist of women, rural residents and below-poverty-line individuals who earn less 
than $ 2.50 per day. Lack of enough money was reported as a cause for not owning a bank or 
MM account. Most of these individuals still use MM ‘over-the-counter’ through agents or via 
a registered mobile phone account or through their friends’ accounts. 43% of non-users save 
their money by hiding it somewhere, which is not only risky but also exposed to thieves 
(InterMedia, 2018). 
Some unregistered users use MM at agent locations over-the-counter. These include users from 
other financial institutions such as banks and via accounts registered to other individuals. Of 
the unregistered over-the-counter users: (i) 53% are women, and 47% are men; (ii) those below 
the $ 2.50 per day poverty line reach 83%, while 17%  are those above the $ 2.50 per day 
poverty line; (iii) 74% come from rural areas and 26% from urban areas; (iv) 35% are younger 
than 35 years and 33% are 35 years or older. Most of the unregistered users save money at 
home at about 53%. They reported MM as the second-best available saving method. 17% save 
by electronic transfers as they wait to cash out when they need money via an MM agent 
(InterMedia, 2018). 
Registered inactive user is the other category identified by InterMedia (2018). About 9% of 
MM users were inactive in 2017. Inactive users are users who do not use their accounts for 
over 90 days. Registered inactive users consist mainly of some males, a few urban people, and 
some above-poverty adults (InterMedia, 2018). Active primary users are another 
categorisation. They usually cash in or out with person-to-person transfers. Active basic users 
are almost equally distributed among the different population groups. The fact that they are 
almost equally distributed across demographic groups demonstrates that the money transfers 
cut across other income groups (InterMedia, 2018). 
Advanced users are another category. 27% of adults were advanced MM users in 2017, 
compared to 6% who used banking services and 2% who used non-banking financial services. 
These groups consist mainly of males, people living in urban centres, and those above the 




population. However, they struggle to adopt advanced services when compared with their 
urban counterparts and those above the poverty line (InterMedia, 2018). Mobile credit users 
form another group. According to InterMedia (2018), more males than females live above the 
poverty line and use more mobile credit services. 
6.6.2 Benefits of Using MM for the Financially-Excluded People  
To reduce poverty, poor people must manage their money (Rutherford, n.d.; Hartfree and 
Collard, 2015; Rutherford, 2000). Most poor individuals cannot afford expensive banking 
services (Matin et al., 1999; Nice and Irvine, 2010; Davies et al., 2016). MM accounts are 
usually affordable and can be easily managed when compared to bank accounts (David-West 
et al., 2019; Aron, 2018; Aron and Muellbauer, 2019; Ouma et al., 2017). MM, therefore, helps 
to prevent poor people falling into poverty by smoothening the impact of immediate expenses 
(Suri and Jack, 2016; Riley, 2018; Abiona and Koppensteiner, 2020). Microinsurance services 
through MM channels help financially-excluded people when they get sick (Heymann, 2014; 
USAID and HFG, 2014; TIGO, 2017) by allowing them to receive health services and pay for 
associated expenses (Raithatha and Naghavi, 2018; BIMA, n.d.). Many financially-excluded 
individuals in Tanzania and Africa get accounts through mobile phones (The Global Findex 
Database, 2015; FinScope, 2018). As a result, MM account ownership has almost doubled since 
2014 (The Global Findex, 2017). Eradicating poverty is a challenge. However, mobile phones 
have proven to be an effective solution that facilitates FI by providing access to formal financial 
services (The Economist, 2008; Mhella, 2020; Evans, 2018; Lenka and Barik, 2018). 
As a lot of people use MM and own a mobile phone in Tanzania, they are likely to access 
formal financial services in the future, when banks and other FIs start to validate payments 
using mobile phones. Some banks have considered the enhancement of ‘customer 
authentication’ by using any of the following: (i) password or pin; (ii) a card reader or registered 
mobile device; (iii) a digital fingerprint or voice pattern. Those who do not have any of these 
things risk the rejection of their payments (Cavaglieri, 2019; Fang and Zhan, 2010; Sung et al., 
2015). Tanzania having MM success has resolved the authentication issue as more people are 
using registered mobile phones for their transactions and payments. 
According to GSMA (2020b), mobile technology services accounted for 4.7% of the world 
GDP, contributing to $ 4.1 trillion of economic value, and 30 million jobs were created through 
the mobile ecosystem. In Tanzania, MM agent jobs increased, as illustrated in Section 7.7.2. 




taxation (GSMA, 2020b). Moreover, MM helped bridge the FE gap in low- and middle-income 
countries, where 1 billion accounts were registered at the end of 2019 (GSMA, 2020b). In 
Tanzania, 55% of the population use MM services, while only 17% use banking services 
(InterMedia, 2016). 
There is literature detailing the benefits of mobile phones and why people own them (de Silva 
and Zainudeen, 2007; Sridhar and Sridhar, 2007; Mpogole et al., 2008; Souter et al., 2005; 
Samuel et al., 2005; Donner, 2007; Chakrabarty, 2005). Mobile phones have more than 5 
billion subscribers worldwide. Moreover, mobile phone networks cover more than 7 billion 
people providing access to a variety of life-enhancing services that facilitate the attainment of 
the UN SDGs. The mobile phone networks also have a crucial impact on FI (GSMA, 2020b). 
A study conducted in Tanzania by Sife et al. (2010) revealed that mobile phones created 
arrangements to help low-income people remit money via social networks. Mwaikali (2013) 
reminds us that before the advent of MM, Tanzanians sent money through buses and that the 
arrival of MM reduced the risks associated with this. Traditional means used to deliver money 
such as the use of buses are not risk-free and could be interrupted by thieves and conmen as 
well as by delays (Mwaikali, 2013; McNamara, 2008). A study of African countries conducted 
by Andrianaivo and Kpodar (2011) revealed that MM provides access to formal financial 
services to financially-excluded people in low-income and middle-income countries (also see 
Mwaikali (2013)). Solin and Zarzan (2010) also provide evidence to reaffirm the role of MM 
in providing access to formal financial services. FI bridges the gap between financially-
excluded people on the one hand, and financial infrastructure and channels on the other. By 
doing so, FI through MM enhances access to microloans and savings. It also supports money 
transfers and in some cases provides working capital to financially-included people, which in 
turn stimulates investments and economic growth (Samuel et al., 2005; Mwaikali, 2013). 
Moreover, MM helps reduce the costs of formal financial services which empowers the MNOs 
to provide these services as well as the financially excluded to access the same services (Hassan 
and Semkwiji, 2011; Mwaikali, 2013). According to Ahmad et al. (2020), there is empirical 
evidence that MM contributes to the economy via its positive effects on financial and food 
security, employment, and on financial, human, and social capital accumulation (also see: Yang 
and Choi, 2007; Andrianaivo and Kpodar, 2012; Aker and Wilson, 2013; Beck et al., 2015; 
Carlson et al., 2015; and Ky et al., 2018). For small and low-income businessmen, first, MM 
has improved payment and collection mechanism as it helps them receive payments from 




expenses and avoiding the risks of using cash. Second, MM enhances transparency and reduces 
the risk of financial misbehaviour. MM also allows small businessmen and low-income 
individuals to pay their utilities, reducing the costs of queuing at the bank for hours which could 
impact negatively on their businesses (Parikh et al. 2013). 
6.6.3 Costs of Running a Mobile Phone 
Further research is required to determine the number of people who remain financially 
excluded because they cannot afford the costs of running a mobile phone. According to 
Kleinman (2013), the cost of running a phone varies from a simple phone call to a wide range 
of phone services including time spent on social networks, checking emails, uploading photos 
and files etc. The costs vary much depending on how much data you use or the time you use to 
engage with mobile phone services. There are pay-as-you-use mobile phone services and there 
are also fixed mobile phone contracts which may include a package of free minutes and data 
use for a specific period. Mobile phone costs can become unbearable or expensive when a user 
of mobile phone services exceeds his allowance (Kleinman, 2013). 
According to Minihane (2020), data allowance can challenge mobile phone users. As costs of 
data continue to drop, new apps and services can challenge customers as they cannot know 
how much data use will suffice their needs. Firstly, there are ‘low-data’ users who use their 
mobile phones to keep up with their family and friends or read the news. They usually use a 
data allowance of about 5 GB per month. Secondly, there are ‘medium-data’ users who use 
their mobile phones for emails, social media and entertainment. They usually use a data 
allowance of at least 10 GB per month. Thirdly, there are ‘heavy-data’ users who use 
their mobile phone for entertainment and work and could need a data allowance of around 20 
GB per month (Minihane, 2020). According to Mpogole et al. (2008), the cost of running a 
mobile phone in Tanzania for low-income people ranged from 15,000 TSh (6.5 USD) to 45,000 
TSh (19.4 USD) per month. 
According to Luxton (2016), eight in ten people living in developing countries own a mobile 
phone. However, the operating costs remain disproportionately high in some countries. 
Tanzania has one of the cheapest costs of running mobile phone operations in Africa. 
According to RAMP (2017), Tanzania is ranked fourth among 49 countries in Africa when 
comparing the affordability of 1 GB of prepaid mobile data. InterMedia conducted surveys in 
2014 and 2015 and interviewed 3,000 and 3001 respondents, respectively. These samples were 




mobile phones as compared to 96% in 2015 (InterMedia, 2016). In 2015, 54% of the adult 
population owned basic mobile phones, 44% owned feature phones, and 12% owned 
smartphones (InterMedia, 2016). In 2015, 77% of the adult population owned a mobile phone, 
20% of adults could borrow a mobile phone, and 4% of adults had no access to a phone in 
Tanzania (see Appendix 6.5).  61% of the adult population used MM services in Tanzania in 
2015. 66% of males used MM services as compared to only 57% of females. 79% of adults 
living in urban centres used MM in 2015 as compared to 54% of people living in rural areas. 
79% of those living above the poverty line used MM services in Tanzania as compared to 58% 
living below the poverty line (see Appendix 6.6). 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter answers the research question: 'How did MM moderate some factors of FE that 
other financial institutions failed to moderate in Tanzania?’ My findings demonstrate that 
neoliberal roll-back policies relaxed financial repression and facilitated the boom of innovative 
financial services (Ouma et al., 2017), which included MM. This revolutionised and improved 
the provision of formal financial services, creating new delivery channels that have moderated 
some of the factors of FE. For instance, my findings demonstrate that MM has come to resolve 
three challenges. Firstly, the lack of access to formal financial services, which also includes 
the moderation of distance and scale. Secondly, moderation of high costs of financial services 
for the poor or affordability. Thirdly, managing risks and allowing access to more financially 
excluded people. These are the technical solutions to removing some factors of FE. In this 
regard, MM is a means to an end. It is used to correct some market failures causing FE. The 
end result of MM is more FI and reduction of the banking exclusion for financially-excluded 
people. The following scholars also have written in favour of these arguments (Camner and 
Sjöblom, 2009; Di Castri, 2013b; Merritt, 2011; Hayer and Mas, 2009). Bina and Giaglis (2007) 
see mobile phones as the best solution for FI. Those who support this view argue that this is 
due to: location free access, improved control on bank accounts, and timely information 
(Scornavacca and Hoehle, 2007; Krishna and Walsham, 2005; Varshney and Vetter, 2002). 
Neoliberalism supported ‘poverty finance’ (Rankin, 2013), which extended formal financial 
services to financially-excluded individuals. Through neoliberal roll-back policies, MM was 
left to serve the poor without strict regulations when it started, as has been explained in Chapter 
5. This policy was essential as the neoclassicists would argue that too much government 




market failure, high prices, and underdevelopment. A free market, according to neoclassicists, 
creates a competitive environment and boosts technological advancement (Schoepf, 2000). 
Liberalised markets, the neoclassicists say, determine effective policies of services and 
deregulation removes the barriers to trade and service provisions. MM services emerged in the 
liberalised economy and enjoyed the advantages of being part of the liberalised and deregulated 
economy. The rolling out of state power through the BOT helped the MNOs to create 
interoperable systems, which facilitated the lowering of financial service delivery. As a result, 
both the public and private sectors let technology bring down the costs of financial service 
delivery, facilitate access to formal financial services, and manage the risks of providing 
financial services. With the classical perspective bringing in the re-regulatory aspect of MM, 
technological reduction of costs, and the setting up of legal institutions to facilitate innovations 
and technology as described in Chapter 5, it helped bring down transaction costs which also 
facilitated the efficient outcomes of MM in moderating the factors of FE as discussed in this 
chapter. The classicists would also support MM because of its affordability that would lower 
the costs of accessing and delivering of formal financial services. These facts are aligned with 
the classical ideas of stable price levels and their support to Say’s law, which states that “supply 
creates its own demand” (Baumol, 1999). In this regard, the classicist would assume that the 
supply of MM creates the demand for MM. MM’s ability to moderate the factors of FE would 
increase its demand. This increase in demand would prompt the reaction of the banks. The next 
















Chapter 7: The Changing Banking Sector’s Response to the High Levels of Financial 
Inclusion Caused by Mobile Money in Tanzania3 
7.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter analyses the response of the banking sector to the increasing levels of FI resulting 
from MM innovations or services. It answers research question number 3: “What was the 
response of the banking sector to increasing levels of FI through MM in Tanzania?” By doing 
so it also fulfils research objective number 4, that seeks to investigate the possibility of any 
changes in the banking sector due to the successful penetration of MM services in the sector. 
It, therefore, builds up from the previous chapter, which discussed the role of MM in 
moderating FE. Banks and MNOs in Tanzania have one thing in common, they are all the 
stakeholders in the NPS. While the banks are deposit-taking institutions, the MNOs are non-
deposit taking institutions. The rolling back neoliberalisation and deregulation allowed the 
emergence of non-deposit-taking institutions, while the rolling out neoliberalisation and re-
regulation created a new NPSA and its regulations, which regulated both deposit and non-
deposit-taking institutions. Through the NPS, the MNOs have increased levels of FI. This 
chapter does four things: Firstly, it analyses what the banks have done in terms of innovation 
both at global and local levels. Secondly, it also incorporates the findings of my fieldwork 
research in this analysis. Thirdly, it continues the discussion to show the transformation of 
Tanzania’s banking sector. Fourthly, it fills in the gap that exists in terms of few research works 
being conducted to address the response of the banking sector to increasing levels of FI in 
Tanzania due to MM. In this regard, several studies on banking innovations at the global level 
have been conducted (CPSS, 1996; CPSS, 1999; CPSS, 2000a; CPSS, 2000b; CPSS, 2001a; 
CPSS, 2003; CPSS, 2004; CPSS, 2012; CPSS, 2014; World Bank 2014a; World Bank 2014c). 
These studies did not focus on Tanzania. There is literature on the banking sector reforms and 
FI in Tanzania (Ndanshau, 1996; Mbowe, 2010; Ndalichako, 2014), however much of this 
literature does not explicitly cover the banking sector’s response to FI resulting from MM, and 
other digital financial services. There is this gap, and this chapter tries to address it.  
With the increasing rate of mobile services penetration, the banking sector witnessed 
significant changes in the way transactions are performed. It is not surprising that the banks 
 
3 I presented this chapter at the 7th International Congress on Technology, Science and Society in Madrid, Spain 
on the 3rd of October 2019. Thus, some sections of the chapter appear online. I will send out this chapter for 





have adopted these changes and at times sought to meet the consumer’s requirements using 
new innovative services. According to Moga (2010:255):  
“the core of the bank’s new strategic orientation currently consists of developing new alternative 
distribution channels”.  
There are two main methods banks use to operate their services, namely: ‘intermediation’ and 
‘money creation’ models (Kumhof and Jakab, 2016). In modern neoclassical intermediation of 
loanable funds theories, banks intermediate real savings. New bank loans create new funds. In 
this regard, the banks need to attract customers from outside of the banking system to ensure 
continued profitability. Hence, their collaboration with the MNOs is justified. MM trust funds 
in bank accounts, as discussed in Chapter 5, is one of the examples of the bank’s intermediation 
role. The second model that the banks use is the ‘money creation’ model. This is financing 
through money creation. The bank can immediately reduce the quantity of their lending if they 
think doing so will boost profitability. This may increase interest rates and make financial 
services more expensive. Due to MM lower interest rates and affordability of financial services, 
the banks tend to innovate and take on the intermediation role to attract more customers by 
working with the MNOs, or by using other innovations. Moreover, neoclassicists are pro-
markets. They support innovations that make markets more efficient (Sredojević et al., 2016; 
Solow, 1956; Acemoglu, 2009). Hence, banking innovations and changes that are beneficial 
and profitable will be supported by the neo-classicists (also see: Mehra et al., 2011). Likewise, 
the classicists believe in the economics of value in exchange (Robinson, 1962). It would 
therefore be correct to say that the classicists would support MM services because of their 
affordability.  
“According to classical and neoclassical economics payment instruments, methods and habits 
compete with each other for the attention of parties that participate into an exchange transaction. 
This means payments with a mobile device (= a payment habit) must increase productivity and/or 
decrease costs for both parties and other stakeholders of the ecosystem” (Dahlberg, 2016). 
The services also present greater value than that of the banking services, and this would be the 
explanation why many people would choose MM over banking services. In this regard, 
classicists would see the logic behind the banks putting more value in their services to respond 
to increasing MM services.  These views shaped how I designed this chapter to show how the 




In this chapter, I argue that the banking sector is transforming, and this is illustrated by how 
the sector innovates itself by undergoing several changes (MM, also being the cause of some 
of these changes). The chapter consists of seven sections as follows: Section 7.1 provides the 
overview of the chapter. Section 7.2 briefly introduces the main findings of the chapter. Section 
7.3 briefly mentions the surprise of the findings. Section 7.4 introduces the four main issues 
that trigger a response from the banking sector. Section 7.5 analyses the global standard-setting 
bodies and their role in setting standards for national payment systems. Section 7.6 analyses 
Tanzania’s national retail payment system to establish an understanding of the changes in the 
banking sector. Section 7.7 provides a review of the different responses of the banking sector 
to higher levels of FI caused by MM. It analyses the various steps the banks took to reach the 
poor and financially-excluded populations. Section 7.8 summarises the other significant 
findings. Section 7.9 briefly suggests the expected future responses. Section 7.10 concludes the 
chapter. 
7.2 What are the Main Findings of this Chapter? 
The rolling back of the government let innovation determine the regulations. Innovations such 
as MM could kick off without strict regulations, and the regulations came later after the 
innovations flourished. According to Major (2012:537), neoliberalism is seen as a process of 
market deregulation relaxing the controls over the banking sector. Supporting innovations was 
the agenda of the BOT to facilitate the growth of MM, and it created some tensions between 
the banks and the MNOs. The government had to roll-out its power and influence to thwart 
those tensions through the BOT. According to Major (2012), “neoliberalism manifests itself in 
the changing forms of financial market regulation”. This is a phase of depoliticisation and re-
regulation where governments indirectly use finance ministries and central banks. Moreover, 
the rolling out of neoliberalisation processes facilitated the inclusion of non-deposit-taking 
institutions in NPS activities, which allowed the MNOs to participate in the NPS. The banks, 
on the other hand, participate in the NPS as the deposit-taking institutions. The global standard-
setting bodies facilitated the neoliberal rolling out by setting NPS standards that became 
accepted worldwide to harmonise the functions of NPS networks across the world. It was the 
inclusion of the MNOs in the NPS and the increased levels of FI it created that triggered 






7.3 Was There Anything Surprising that Came Out of the Findings? 
One would think that banks and other financial institutions are the only well-equipped 
institutions with relevant knowledge and skills to provide financial services, and that they 
should be left alone to do just that. It is usual to see banks providing financial services on their 
own. However, technology and MM have changed this. Due to pressure from the MNOs, the 
banks form strategic alliances and partnerships to help them offer affordable financial services, 
including their collaboration with the MNOs. Thus, they respond to MM by innovating some 
aspects of their services, products, and processes, and by enhancing strategic alliances and 
partnerships. They cannot do everything alone. They also depend on those who have 
competitive advantages in providing certain services, including the use of technology to deliver 
financial services. Developing new technologies is expensive, and banks must collaborate with 
MNOs and other innovative institutions to resolve this issue. These findings are somehow 
surprising, given the structural and financial powers that banks have. On the structural power 
of banks, see: Culpepper and Reinke, 2014; Culpepper, 2011; Bell and Hindmoor, 2015; Bell 
and Hindmoor, 2017; Dafe, 2014. 
7.4 The Three Main Factors That Trigger a Response from the Banking Sector to the 
Increasing Levels of FI Caused by MM 
In the previous chapter, I argued that MM moderated some factors of FE such as: (i) lack of 
access to financial services which included: distance, scale and scope; (ii) high costs of formal 
financial services; (iii) the risk of providing formal financial services to financially-excluded 
people, therefore, the issue of risk management. The moderation of these factors was possible 
through the: (i) economies of scale; (ii) economies of scope; and (iii) the networks created by 
interoperable networks. These three main factors have forced the banks to come forth and react. 
As I mentioned earlier, both the MNOs and the banks are stakeholders in the NPS. However, 
the MNOs with innovative solutions benefit from the economies of scale and scope. According 
to CPSS (2012:18): 
“Significant supply-side economies of scale and scope apply to the payment infrastructure used to 
process payment information. Such economies are achieved when the average cost of producing a 
payment service decreases with the quantity produced (scale), or if the joint production of two or 
more products in the same infrastructure reduces the cost or improves the quality compared with 
producing them independently (scope)”.  




“Economies of scale and scope are important in evaluating the costs and benefits of payment 
innovations. On occasion, the benefits of multiple systems can outweigh the cost of savings from 
maintaining just a single platform. For example, competition between payment systems can keep 
prices lower than if a monopoly existed. Further, different types of payment instruments may not 
be perfect substitutes, allowing them to satisfy different needs. Also, while a low-cost payment 
service is desirable, it may delay the entry of innovative payment methods until the new method 
can become cost-effective enough to compete with existing methods” (CPSS, 2012:18). 
This means that the banks have to innovate to keep up with the MNOs that heavily use the 
economies of scale and scope. Moreover, the MNOs have created social systems of agents and 
interoperable systems. On the demand side of the financial infrastructure, MM, including other 
digital financial technologies, increase the value of the existing shared networks:  
“the basic payment network effect derives from the fact that each additional user increases the value 
of the network for each of the existing users, i.e., adding one more node in the network creates a 
positive externality or ‘spillover’ for all other nodes. A classic example of network externality takes 
place in the telephone network, where the value of holding a telephone for each user increases with 
the number of users’ access via the network. Because of high fixed costs, payment networks often 
need to sign up a minimum number of users, often referred to as the ‘critical mass’, in order for the 
total value of the network to exceed the operating costs” (CPSS, 2012:13).  
There is also the risk management issue that MM has been able to manage (Gilman and Joyce, 
2012: 1-2; Muralidharau et al., 2014; Solin and Zerzan, 2010). All this prompts the banking 
sector to innovate and respond to the challenges brought by MM services. Before I analyse the 
banking sector’s innovations and responses, there are rules of the game that govern the banking 
sector. These are standard-setting bodies, both at global and national levels, that facilitate the 
governance of the banking sector and other digital financial services. The standard-setting 
bodies are a result of the roll-out neoliberalisation policies that I discussed in Chapter 3, Section 
3.6.1. They are there to ensure that different banking and financial systems can work together. 
7.5 Standard-Setting Bodies at the Global Level and Their Roles in Setting the Rules of 
Payment Systems  
According to Peck and Tickell (2002:384):  
“the neoliberal project … constituting an ongoing ‘neoliberalisation’ … focus on 
the purposeful construction and consolidation of neoliberalised state forms, modes 




The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) acts as a bank for central banks. It serves central 
banks and facilitates their efforts to maintain monetary and financial stability. It also facilitates 
discussions between the banks and other authorities working on promoting financial stability. 
Within the BIS, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) is a standard-
setting body dealing with payments including clearing and settlement systems as well as other 
related issues (CPSS, 2001b; BIS, 2004; Blommstein, and Summers, 1994). The CPSS reports 
to the Governors of the Global Economy Meeting. There are global policies and principles 
originating from the CPSS such as: the ‘2003 Role of the Central Bank in Payment Systems’, 
the ‘2005 Central Bank Oversight of Payment and Settlement Systems’, the ‘2008 
Interdependencies of Payment and Settlement Systems’, the ‘2012 Innovations in Retail 
Payments’ and the ‘2012 Principles for Market Infrastructures’. The CPSS also acts as a forum 
for central banks to monitor and analyse financial schemes, instruments, settlements, associated 
arrangements, and payment systems both within and across countries. There is also a ‘Joint 
CPSS-World Bank Taskforce on Payment Aspects of FI’ that facilitates FI within and across 
the jurisdictions (Löber, 2014). The ‘Basel Process’ promotes the global governance of 
payment systems and banking sectors. The process is simplified in Diagram 7.1 below:  
Diagram 7.1: The Basel Process 
 




In summary, Diagram 7.1 illustrates how the BIS interacts with national and global actors. The 
BIS in this process is used as a platform for discussion and cooperation among global financial 
authorities, including the national central banks. I will provide the names of the institutions 
mentioned in this process: the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Committee on the Global Financial 
System (CGFS), the CPSS and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO). There are meetings at a high-level for senior financial officials, as well as the 
facilitation of the activities of the different groups supporting financial stability. All of these 
bodies, as mentioned above, facilitate the ‘Basel Process’. Brenner and Theodore (2002:362-
363) discuss further these institutional changes generated through the deployment of neoliberal 
political and economic programmes. They are vital in setting up internationally agreed 
standards. The process is crucial because it sets rules that affect the banks and the MNOs, who 
are the key stakeholders of the payment systems (CPSS, 2012; GPFI, 2016). 
The CPSS, for instance, categorises banking and MM innovations. There are, therefore, 
‘process-oriented categorisation’ or ‘product-related categorisation’ of banking and MM 
innovations. If it is a ‘process-oriented categorisation’, then it deals with payment process 
innovations; this includes: (i) how to initiate payments; (ii) overall payment process, including 
clearing and settlement; (iii) how the payments are received; and (iv) new schemes to offer 
solutions. If it is the ‘product-related categorisation’, then it deals with products and how they 
are innovated; this includes: (i) innovation in the use of card payments; (ii) internet payments; 
(iii) mobile payments; (iv) Electronic Bill Presentment and Payment (EBPP), and 
improvements in infrastructure and security (CPSS, 2012: 9-13; OECD, 2005). Also, there are 
other innovations or instruments for reaching out to financially-excluded people such as: the 
cooperatives, microfinance institutions, agent banking outlets, and community banks, that will 
be discussed later in this chapter. 
7.6 Tanzania’s Situation 
Before neoliberal policies, the government controlled both fiscal and monetary policies. After 
the neoliberalisation, the government rolled back and left the monetary policy aspect and 
banking supervision under the central bank. Hence, the removal of political controls from the 
central bank (Patnaik, 1999). The BOT is an authority regulating and supervising the NPS. The 
MNOs, on the financial side, are regulated by the BOT because they use the payment system. 




system, the BOT uses the following regulatory tools: (i) the 2015 NPSA; (ii)the 2015 Payment 
Systems Licensing and Approving Regulations; (iii) the 2015 Electronic Money Regulations 
(BOT, 2017). Diagram 7.2 below summarises the Payment Systems and Digital Financial 
Services (DFS) in Tanzania. 
Diagram 7.2: Payment Systems and DFS Landscape in Tanzania 
 
From Diagram 7.2: the Retail Payment Systems (RPS) are of particular attention to this 
research. They have systems, instruments, and channels. The systems are in terms of: (i) cheque 
clearing system; (ii) ATM networks; (iii) card switches; (iv) Point-of-Sale (POS); (v) interbank 
services; (vi) remittance services; and (vii) e-commerce. Furthermore, the instruments are in 
terms of: (i) credit instruments which include: payer-initiated payments and credit push 
payments such as cash, credit transfers, MM transfers, and e-money transfers; (ii) debit 
instruments which include: cheques, direct debit, card payments including debit and credit 
payments. Moreover, the channels include: ATM, POS, internet banking, mobile banking, 
mobile payment, and agent payments. Hence, mobile banking, mobile payments, and agent 
banking are emerging channels. This is what the Tanzania retail NPS looks like. 






Diagram 7.3: The Most Popular and Fast-Growing MFS Models in Tanzania 
 
 
As demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, MM is the fastest-growing model. Mobile banking 
(which is the use of MM for banking transactions), mobile payments (which use mobile phone 
to effect payments), mobile commerce (which is the purchase of goods and services using 
mobile phones) and e-banking (which uses electronic channels for banking including ATMs, 
POS, and Internet) are also other fast-growing models. Hence, the banking sector’s response is 
also how to cope with these new developments as they emerge, as will be discussed later in 
this chapter. However, it will be necessary to also understand the Digital Financial Services 










Diagram 7.4: The Overview of the DFS Ecosystem and its Components 
 
The DFS is a complex system, as shown in Diagram 7.4. The system includes both traditional 
and non-traditional providers of financial services. As far as the banks and financial institutions 
are concerned, as of March 2017, there were forty-two commercial banks, three financial 
institutions, twelve community banks, four deposit-taking microfinance, two private credit 
reference bureaux. Likewise, there were two-hundred-eighty-six Bureaux de Change. The 
pension sector had six public pension funds. The insurance sector had twenty-eight private 
insurance companies and two re-insurance companies. As far as the MM side was concerned, 
there were twenty-two internet banking providers; thirty mobile banking providers; five mobile 
payment providers and as of December 2018, that number had reached eight providers. 
Diagram 7.4, therefore, provides a simple picture of the banking sector and the digital financial 
service providers. Strand 7.1 and Strand 7.2 illustrate the products share for each sector in this 
ecosystem. Because of its affordability, MM has created a discrepancy between market share 
in terms of products for MNOs and banks, whereby 60% of Tanzanians utilise MM. However, 
the MNOs contribute to only a 1% share of products in the market. The banks, with a 64% 





Table 7.1 illustrates the structure of the banking sector between 2012 and 2016 to facilitate an 
understanding of the above analysis.  
Table 7.1: Distribution of Banking Institutions’ Branch Network 
 
Source: BOT (2016c:1). 
7.7 The Advent of MM and the Initial Reaction from the Banking Sector 
This section presents my research findings. The advent of MM was not unopposed. The 
banking sector objected: 
“And we were open, but the banks objected of course in the very beginning. Eh, they objected. 
They said that the MNOs were entering the money business. They were also in the payment system. 
But they had no supervision, and strict regulatory requirements like the banks did. In which case, 
they believed that that created unfair competition. And from their point of view and as they had 
heard it from elsewhere, they thought a bank-led model would allow the MNOs to work under the 
banks” (Former BOT Governor). 
The regulation and requirements for the MNOs were stricter than they were for the banks 
because there were no regulations when MM started. Neoliberalism relaxed the regulations for 




“as a process of financial market deregulation, marked by the relaxation of controls over the banking 
sector” (Major, 2012:537).  
 However, the ‘test, monitor, and regulate’ approach was used by the BOT to design good 
regulatory policies (see Chapter 5). The idea was to let innovation determine the regulations, 
which is a neoliberal roll-back policy: 
“I had that clear. Clear commitment on that one. Secondly, we had meetings every two years to 
discuss the financial sector issues, if you want, eh; it was like a ‘symposium’. The banks in that 
symposium, of course, they were very clear also about the same. Hence, I understood clearly that, 
look, firstly the MNOs were purely doing transfer system. They are a platform. They didn’t issue 
money because, for every unit bought with mobile money, there was a unit which was sitting in a 
transfer account in a bank. So, there was no creation of money. Eh, mm, eh, mm, then it is true that 
they are not taking deposits. This is clear. They are not doing credit. It is clear. What distinguishes 
a bank from other institutions is the fact that they are deposit-taking, and per regulations and 
essentially in terms of supervision is to manage the risk in relation to the protection of deposit 
interests. That was the main principle. So those are not taking deposits. There is no risk of exposure 
to the depositors. They are involved in the payment system, and that’s purely a platform. Yeah, 
purely a platform. And, we told them it was also true that actually every shilling of the electronic 
money balance sitting in the e-wallet of somebody, they (the banks) are the custodians in the trust 
account, of the equivalent that gives it. Yeah, so we told them that there is no competition. There is 
no competition in relation to the core business of the banks” (Former BOT Governor).  
The BOT reassured the banks that MM was not competing with them. Since the banks also 
make transfer payments, maybe one can argue that there is competition. However, banks have 
limited technology and cannot reach customers in remote areas. Hence, the banks also 
understood that the MNOs were trying to solve the problem that they never themselves solved, 
which was to reach financially-excluded people. The bricks-and-mortar branches would not 
resolve the issue. The ATMs were very few, and they needed to reach everyone in a cost-
effective way:   
“And we told them, look, if you use this platform well, you could actually grow your business in a 
very cost-effective way. Fortunately, they started talking about agent banking. And they started 
seeing that actually now they can widen their net and network without having to go through the 
branches. Yeah. So, they started having agents, big banks like CRDB and NMB were the first to 
embrace that, and they could see that that was what was there. Second, I think they also saw that it 
made banking much more efficient and convenient, eh, for their customers because now they do it 





7.7.1 The Mobile Banking Platform 
One of the first responses was for the banks to start using mobile banking platforms. The m-
banking services have grown over time, as is illustrated in Graph 7.1.  
Graph 7.1: Mobile Banking Growth, 2008-2015 
 
Source: BOT (2017). 
Rotchana and Speece (2003) studied m-banking from the customer’s point of view and found 
that it is convenient, and it facilitates transactions as it is accessible 24/7. However, Cruz et al. 
(2010) argue that the use of m-banking services is still lower or underused. Moreover, the m-
banking transaction volumes are also smaller compared to other banking transaction volumes 
(Huili and Chunfang, 2011). However, Graph 7.1 illustrates that despite all these issues, m-
banking is still growing. M-banking, therefore, offers the possibility of increasing efficiency 
of the payment system and of expanding access to formal financial services (Porteous, 
2006:12). An excellent example of a collaboration between an MNO and a bank is that between 
Vodacom Tanzania and Commercial Bank of Africa (CBA) that launched a banking service 
known as M-Pawa. M-Pawa allows customers to save and borrow money on their mobile 
phones (Masamila, 2014:55). Neoliberalism enhances these collaborations as it acts as a 
process of marketisation to help the various actors to reach a wide range of customers (Birch 
and Siemiatycki, 2016). Also, other payment services facilitated by the aggregators go through 
m-banking: 
“Further, once you have these integrators, operators like MaxMalipo and others that were platforms 
for them, could help them connect with their customers through mobile devices. Eh, they are 




for one, which wanted to create its own platform which became very expensive … NMB wanted to 
do so. Even those who did so, eh, Standard Chartered, eh, CRDB, as they had to manage the 
adaptation of their platforms despite working with an aggregator, which made it very expensive. 
So, actually the cost and I told them … that look your mobile money, eh, operations without thinking 
about a switch, would be extremely expensive because of your investment costs and costs of 
overhead that you are spreading across very few customers of yours. Whereas if you have a switch, 
everybody goes through that system. And the costs go down. So, yeah, we have come to the level 
of understanding that this could be in their favour. So, now they are thinking about actually a switch, 
yeah, a collective switch for the same purpose. Even more, these steps were taken to clarify the 
issues. This was how, you know, ultimately peace was brought through all these steps” (Former 
BOT Governor). 
Hence, during the time of my field research, I realised that the banks were thinking about 
creating their collective switch for the same reasons explained by the ‘Former BOT Governor’. 
Hence: (i) the collaboration with the MNOs through MM and mobile banking services; (ii) 
other opportunities the banks have to create their switches; as well as (iii) the possibility the 
banks had to work with the aggregators; reduced the opposition from the banks directed 
towards MM services. Section 7.8.2 discusses the switch issue. I will have to go through other 
innovations first before discussing the switches. Hence, I discuss agency banking in the next 
section. 
7.7.2 Agency Banking 
The ‘intensification of neoliberalism requires institutions’ and agents ‘that are not only 
complementary but also interactively reinforcing’ (Wrenn, 2015). Hence, agents within the 
specific contexts of neoliberalism and industries are also the drivers of changes and innovation. 
The classicists would support a free financial system and other systems to support it (also see: 
Pennington, 2011; Le Maux, 2019). Applying the open systems theory, banks are in constant 
interaction with their environment in which they operate. In the era of MM technology and 
other digital financial innovations, new innovations change the global economy with the banks 
striving to achieve a competitive advantage as the changes present both opportunities and 
challenges. Contingencies come with these opportunities and challenges (Dahlberg et al., 2008) 
as the banks innovate to reflect the changes in both internal and external environment (Alrawi 
and Thomas, 2007). The contingency theory is well placed to explain how the banks can hardly 
shy away from innovations that sustain their operations and businesses. Agency banking is one 
of the new innovations that the banks have adopted (Ivatury and Lyman, 2006; Ignacio, 2008; 




(Lambert, 2006). Agency theory allows the ‘Principal’ to delegate work to the ‘Agent’ who 
performs the work. The theory explains the dynamics of the contracts between the ‘Principals’ 
who are the owners of the economic resources and the ‘agents’ who are the managers 
responsible for using and controlling those resources (Lambert, 2006; Boučková, 2015; 
Kambua, 2015:17). For this research, the banks and MNOs are regarded as the ‘Principals’. 
 A banking agent is a retail or post outlet contracted by an MNO or financial institution to 
process a client’s transactions (Chiteli, 2013:207). Hence, agency banking is not available 
through a bank branch teller, but it is done through the owner or an employee of a retail outlet 
that conducts transactions by letting customers deposit or withdraw funds, transfer funds, 
inquire about an account balance, pay bills, get direct deposits from their employers, and open 
up bank accounts. Hence, the banking agent is an important distribution channel for FIs 
(Ignacio, 2008).  
There are two reasons for the banks to develop a network of banking agents namely: (i) the 
cost to the provider of originating and processing the transaction; and (ii) the cost to the user 
of accessing the service (traveling and lining up for services) (Ignacio, 2008). According to 
Ignacio (2008), the economies of scale reduce the provider’s costs. The banks would 
concentrate transactions at specific locations where they believe a larger volume of transactions 
would absorb the cost of running bricks-and-mortar branches. This strategy produces results 
where customers are densely populated and where there are enough resources to cover fixed 
costs. The story is different for the poor customer who lives a few kilometres away from the 
bricks-and-mortar branches. He incurs extra costs. In this case, the costs shift from the provider 
to the poor user, who must travel long distances and spend time lining up for the bank services 
(Ignacio, 2008). Most poor customers cannot afford these extra costs and are therefore excluded 
from accessing formal financial services. Hence, agent banking shifts the emphasis at the retail 
level from the concentration of bank branches in highly populated areas to retail outlets in less 








Access Strand 7.3: Access Channels for Financial Solutions in Tanzania – Base: All 
Products 
 
Source: FSDT (2017:22) – Supply-Side Survey 2017. 
From Access Strand 7.3, both MM and m-banking agents still offer a significant share of money 
transfer or payments. They are also crucial in both insurance and credit services. The agents 
provide only 3% of access to the deposit. Credit is more likely to be offered through branches. 
Moreover, Graph 7.2 shows the growing number of MNO agents. The banks have increased 
not only the number of bank agents, as shown in Graph 7.4, but also the number POS and 
ATMs, as shown in Graphs 7.3 and 7.5, respectively. 
Graph 7.2: Number of MNO Agents   Graph 7.3: Number of POS 
 
Source: Bank of Tanzania and TNCFI (2017a:26-27) 





From the Graphs 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5 the number of MNO agents in Tanzania grew by 147% 
to 379,254 as at the end of May 2017, from December 2013 when the NFIF launched. At the 
same time, the number of bank agents increased to 7,717 from 591; the points-of-sale increased 
to 8,474 from 2,552, and the number of ATMs increased to 2,017 from 1,481 (TNCFI, 
2017a:26). Table 7.2 shows the increase in the number of contracted agents between 2013 and 
2016. During that period, there has been an average of a 72% increase in contracted agents per 
year (BOT, 2016c). As the number of agents has increased, the number of community banks 
has remained constant, as shown in Table 7.5 in Section 7.7.4. According to Wrenn (2015), in 
the neoliberal context, agents are used to sustain systems. This section has therefore illustrated 
the importance of agents in the provision of formal financial services.  
Table 7.2: Agents Contracted by Banks and Financial Institutions 
 
Source: BOT (2016c:49).  
7.7.3 Community Banking 
Community Banks were another innovation that was encouraged by the BOT. Olawepo and 
Ariyo (2011) recognise the importance of community banks in financing poor communities 
with the focus on improving their development through financial and social intermediation 
services they provide, such as: (i) provision of micro-savings, microcredit and micro-
investment services in rural areas; (ii) employment to community members, which increases 
their financial capabilities; (iii) involvement in local development projects; (iv) the largest part 




banking activities to promote low levels of development within and outside local communities. 
One of my respondents also echoed these views: 
“The idea of community banks was actually to bring if you want banking services closer to the 
community. Eh, by letting them own those services as part of the community. Eh, with a clear 
understanding that most of the commercial banks did not want to go that far. Thus, community 
banks began back in 1998, I think.  Around there. Eh, they were banks. They were around to do 
deposit-taking. But restricted to do their business only within the locality. And they were allowed 
to start with a much smaller capital. Eh, with the understanding that they will keep their overheads 
fairly low and be able to serve the community and over time grow. So, I think they grew up to about 
twelve where the community now start being also defined not only along geographic lines but along 
categories of people” (Former BOT Governor). 
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 confirm the assertions made by the Former BOT Governor. While the 
number of community banks remained constant from 2012 to 2016 as illustrated in Table 7.3, 
Table 7.4 reaffirms their services in certain locations along with categories of people they 
served, as well as the number of the employees they had, demonstrating the capacity they had 
to offer services. According to Mataba and Aikaeli (2016:78), Tanzania has Cooperative 
Community Banks (CCBs) and Non-Cooperative Community Banks (NCCBs) as also shown 
in Table 7.4. 
Table 7.3: Distribution of Banking Institutions’ Branch Network 
 









Table 7.4: Community Banks and their Main Features, 2015-2016 
 
The categorisation of community banks, as illustrated in Table 7.4, include: women, farmers, 
cooperatives, etc.:  
“All these are community banks. Their capital requirements are different, but prudential rules are 
the same as those of the banks.  There are issues of capital and liquidity because ultimately, it is the 
safety of the depositor. Notwithstanding who owns the banks, we are not much interested in who 
owns the community banks. We are interested in what would it take to keep the deposit essentials. 
However, a good number of these couldn’t keep the costs down. They had full-fledged boards even 
when their business base was tiny. They had full systems rather than shared systems with others 
even when their business base was small. So, typically, the cost of operating began eating into the 
capital. So over time, they eroded the capital, bringing it down to negative. Under those 
circumstances, a number of them cannot continue, partly because they have already endangered the 
depositor’s money. Hence, these banks were part and parcel of the broader effort at financial 
inclusion” (Former BOT Governor).  
Community banks emerged to provide inclusive financial services in the areas they served. The 
relaxation of some banking requirements and regulations, which were less strict than the 
commercial banks but stricter than the MNOs, made them survive. However, the 
implementation of the Basel III standards caused several issues to community banks (Mnuchin 
and Phillips, 2017). Unfortunately, in 2018, the BOT had to revoke five licenses of these 
community banks due to their undercapitalised status to protect financial stability in the 
country. These banks included: Covenant Bank for Women Ltd, Efatha Bank Limited, Njombe 
Community Bank Limited, Kagera Farmers’ Cooperative Bank Limited, and Meru Community 




cooperating with technology (Baily and Montalbano, 2015) such as ATMs and MM, the area 
in which my findings suggest they have to improve. They also have to improve in the number 
of branches as well as in cutting down the number of employees, which increases overhead 
costs. Table 7.4 shows this in detail. Closer to community banks are the microfinance 
institutions. 
7.7.4 Microfinance Institutions 
Microfinance is another innovation in the banking sector that is used to reach poor customer. 
In some cases, microfinance banks have partnered with the MNOs to efficiently reach 
financially-excluded people. Microfinance in Tanzania began in 1995 with NGOs and Savings 
and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOs). For SACCOs, see Section 7.7.5. Neoliberal 
financial market failures caused the emergence of microfinance services to provide microloans 
to needy individuals. The dire need for microloans to the poor was a result of the rolling back 
of the state in the early 1990s. The cutting of subsidies and social welfare:  
“had neoliberalism proposing a solution of simply making the affected population pay themselves. 
This required the expansion of finance” (Muhammad, 2015). 
It sought to link the gap between formal financial institutions and the poor by offering 
intermediary solutions of transaction aggregation and rationalising transaction costs to bring 
about efficiency. In developing countries, these costs are high because of poorly designed 
financial and legal systems as well as informational networks. Poor customers are mostly 
affected by lacking collateral and information asymmetries such as moral hazards and adverse 
selection. Hence, it becomes more difficult for banks to work with poor customers, as poor 
customers are considered to be unbankable. What microfinance institutions brought to the 
financial sector was the provision of small loans to poor customers who do not have access to 
commercial banks without asking for collateral. Hence, microfinance institutions lend to 
individuals and groups. Group-lending brings in the notion of joint-liability and helps to 
mitigate issues caused by adverse selection and moral hazard. According to Kipesha (2015), 
microfinance institutions intended to assist the poor and to provide financing of poor 
communities to help them improve some aspects of their lives, such as acquiring basic 
education, fighting against poverty etc. 
In Tanzania, the NGO-supported institutions or any formal bank can provide microfinance 
services (Brown et al., 2015). By 2015 four NGOs dominated the NGO-supported microfinance 




FINCA Tanzania (78,000 borrowers), and Vision Fund (34,000 borrowers) (Brown et al., 
2015:10 quoting MIX, 2015 and MF Transparency, 2015). In 2016 FINCA, became a 
microfinance bank. In 2016, the microfinance banks were:  EFC Tanzania Microfinance Bank 
Limited, FINCA Microfinance Bank, Vision Fund Tanzania Microfinance Bank Limited, and 
Hakika Microfinance Bank Limited. Altogether, the four banks had 38 branches and 41 
operational centres (BOT, 2016c:24). Table 7.5 illustrates the recent entries of banks into the 
microfinance market. Other banks regulated by the BOT that provide microfinance services 
include: Equity Tanzania, Access Bank, NMB, Akiba Commercial Bank PLC, Mbinga 
Community Bank Limited, Mwanga Community Bank, and CRDB.  
Table 7.5: Distribution of Banking Institutions’ Branch Network 
 
Source: BOT (2016c:1). 
There have been several challenges existing in Tanzania’s banking and microfinance sector. 
These challenges have restricted access to financial services due to the use of traditional 
banking approaches. Traditional banking approaches have made it difficult for banks to deliver 
financial services to the poor at the bottom of the pyramid, especially those living in rural areas. 
Understanding this challenge, banks and MFIs have reorganised their approach. In this effort, 
there is no doubt that a wave of digitalisation has started in every bank, and some of the MFIs. 
For instance, FINCA Microfinance Bank and Halotel (a mobile company providing MM) work 
together to provide access to low-income people and financially-excluded people: 
“And last year (2017), FINCA was able to launch a mobile savings product, which is of its kind. It 
is the second mobile financial product in this country, and this product goes by ‘Halo Yako’ with 
the partnership of Halotel, it enables the account holder to transfer in as small amount as 100 
shillings to the account at no cost. Indeed, this digitalisation has helped those in rural areas to be 
included in formal financial services. And it has enabled these people to create and build savings, 




Hence, microfinance banks have started to digitalise their services or partner with MNOs to 
provide digitalisation or technological solutions that increase access to financially-excluded 
people. However, the microfinance sector in Tanzania still lags behind, as shown in Strand 7.4.  
Strand 7.4: Demand for and Supply of Financial Services 
 
FinScope (2018).  
The uptake of microfinance services in Tanzania is still low at 2% and 7% between 2013 and 
2017 respectively. However, the MFIs have 7% of financial products share. While MM has 
only 1% of products share and about 60% of uptake of formal financial services. Hence, there 
is a big difference between the MFIs and the MNOs. Meanwhile, the banks have 64% of the 
financial products to share in the market, and only 17% of the uptake of formal financial 
services. Thus, the response of the banking sector to digitalise financial services and to work 
with the MNOs provides a promising solution towards reaching financially-excluded people. 
Furthermore, and according to FinScope (2018), and as shown in Strand 7.5, 97% of 
microfinance clients own a mobile phone. Only 22% utilise it to access microfinance services. 
“The spreading of and innovation within the microfinance sector demonstrates a successful 
neoliberal initiative that is both socially conscious and economically beneficial. By connecting 
groups of poor individuals to lending institutions or affluent individuals in developed countries, 
microloans have been able to foster the strengthening of local economies, necessary for consuming 





 Given the success of MM, the efforts of digitalising and partnering with MNOs, just as FINCA 
and Halotel did, could increase FI through digitalisation. Another example is that of TigoPesa 
(an MNO) partnering with NMB to digitise cashew nut sales in Mtwara with ‘TigoKorosho’ 
services reaching a wide range of small farmers. 
Strand 7.5: Channels Used to Access Microfinance Services in Tanzania 
 
Source: FinScope (2018). 
Furthermore, the microfinance and commercial banks have also tried to reach the financially 
excluded people through the SACCOs (Kaleshu and Temu, 2012; Ndiege et al., 2014; Ndiege 
et al., 2013; Ndiege and Pastory, 2012; Temu and Ishengoma, 2010). 
7.7.5 SACCOs  
SACCOs are member-driven cooperatives and make decisions democratically. They have an 
identity, values, and principles. They are formed by members who have common interests or 
belong to specific groups such as labour unions, churches, clubs, or communities. Their main 
purpose is to alleviate poverty by building their members’ capacities to utilise limited 
resources. In Tanzania, SACCOs proliferated in the 1980s and 1990s when most crop 
marketing cooperatives collapsed (Maghimbi, 2006). Since then, they have grown in numbers. 
According to the Ministry of Agriculture Food Security and Cooperatives (2011), SACCOs 
have increased in numbers from a membership of 291,000 to 1,552,000 between 2006 and 




Table 7.6: SACCOS Statistics – May 2007 to 2011 
 
By March 2013, the number of SACCOs reached 5,559 with 45% in urban areas, which is an 
increase from 5,344 in 2011 (Brown et al., 2015:9).  
Strand 7.4 (in Section 7.7.4) shows the share of SACCOs uptake of formal financial services 
at 3% and 2% between 2013 and 2017 respectively. As far as the number of financial products 
in the market is concerned, SACCOs have a 12% share. Only the banks had more product 
shares in the market. The neoliberalised economy gives incentives for profit-maximisation as 
SACCOs seek to partner with banks to enhance their competitive strategies (Macharia and 
Tirimba, 2018).  
According to Kaleshu and Temu (2012:149), only three banks have branch networks that cover 
at least each regional headquarters, namely: CRDB, NMB, and NBC. Out of these three banks, 
only the NMB has branches in almost all district headquarters in mainland Tanzania. Moreover, 
Kalesha and Temu (2012:150) also acknowledged that joint action between banks and 
SACCOs would expand financial services in rural areas. The practice of linking SACCOs to 
banks is known as ‘linkage banking’. It started way back before MM and even increased more 
after the advent of MM. For instance, the Kilimanjaro Cooperative Bank began to extend credit 




established a department to work with the MFIs and SACCOs in 2007. The MM era has seen 
other banks extending linkage banking to SACCOs including: Tanzania Investment Bank, 
Akiba Commercial bank, Uchumi Commercial Bank, Kagera Farmers’ Cooperative Banks, 
Mufindi Community Bank, Dar es Salaam Community Bank, Mwanga Community Bank, 
Njombe Community Bank, Mbinga Community Bank. According to Kaleshu and Temu 
(2012:152), banks confirm that their partnerships with SACCOs help in building capacity for 
the SACCOs board of directors, management, staff, and members of SACCOs. All this is done 
to direct formal financial services to the SACCOs. For benefits to both sides, there has been an 
expanding of financial linkage between SACCOS and banks (Kaleshu and Temu, 2012; Ndiege 
et al., 2014; Ndiege et al., 2013; Ndiege and Pastory, 2012; Temu and Ishengoma, 2010). 
7.8 Further Findings 
The sections above have shown how banks have responded to increasing FI through alternative 
channels and instruments. As mentioned earlier, at the very beginning the banks opposed MM. 
After long discussions with the BOT, they started collaborating with the MNOs. They used 
MM as a platform to help increase access to financial services for financially-unreached 
populations. Microfinance institutions have also begun to use the same platform to reach their 
customers and clientele. Hence, the banks have responded by forming partnerships with the 
MNOs, or with other formal and non-formal financial institutions as well as by developing or 
using other digital financial services as the previous sections have shown. Therefore, I argue 
that banks and other FIs use MM as a platform. Various types of financial service delivery 
systems can use MM to effect payments. The same system of agents that MM has been using 
over time, has recently been used by the banks through ‘agency banking’. Ultimately, the banks 
have come to understand that they need to respond and adjust to the MM revolution, and by 
doing so, they are transforming the banking system. 
7.8.1 Bank-MNO Collaboration or Partnership 
In the neoliberal era, the state rolling back its powers allows the formation of partnerships. The 
partnership between the CBA and Vodacom M-Pesa, for instance, is an example of how a bank 
can use an MM platform to deliver saving and credit services. ‘Tigo Nivushe’ partnership with 
Jumo, as well as ‘Airtel Timiza’ partnership with Jumo. The banks have an advantage because 
while the MNOs can offer credit services, they are not deposit-taking institutions. This 




that CBA performs the banking functions even when it uses the platform known as M-Pesa for 
transactions: 
“So, whoever that’s involved in M-Pawa is a client, a customer of the bank. So, over time, their 
coverage, in terms of the customer base growth expanded with agent banking, with eh, services 
such as M-Pawa. Everybody saw that, and then I think they agreed very clearly that this (mobile 
money platform) acts complementary to banking. Not a competition. And fortunately, during my 
time, every two months after MPC (Monetary Policy Committee) meeting, we met with the CEOs 
of the banks to let them know about the new decisions we made, etc. But that also gave us an 
opportunity to always talk about these things. And we also had what we called ‘quarterly’ meetings 
with banks, where we dedicated about two to three hours once a quarter whenever we did it, to 
discuss issues with them that would require joint solutions. And we used those opportunities to deal 
with these issues. Yeah, and we made it very clear that, look, if there were questions about this, put 
them on the table. We will work together on them, and we will find solutions. It is also true that we 
had a national financial inclusion council where banks were represented, so are the other 
stakeholders where we talked about various innovations and various actions for promoting financial 
inclusion … there, that was a platform as well of resolving any potential conflicts across various 
stakeholders” (Former BOT Governor). 
The banks had different platforms they could use to discuss the developing changes in the 
banking sector, including those brought by MM. Importantly the BOT was and still is chairing 
the National Financial Inclusion Committee (NFIC), which is another platform that provides 
opportunities to talk about any issues transforming the banking sector and how to respond to 
the transformation (see Chapter 5, Section 5). At the NFIC, not only do the BOT and the banks 
negotiate, as they usually do in their bi-monthly or quarterly meetings, they also consult with 
other FI stakeholders. This gives everybody who uses the payment system or who works to 
raise FI levels, an opportunity to discuss the essential developments and how to face challenges. 
These meetings have been beneficial to the banks: 
“The good thing, we work together, that is all I can say. In the action plan, there is always who is 
the key implementer. So, a chance of being against each other or whatever is minimal. Whatever 
needs to be handled by the MNOs will be clearly stated. But banks will do their assignments to 
complement what the MNOs do. Who is a leader in implementing a certain task, will always be 
known. It is either a bank or an MNO … if you look at some actions to be taken by the MNOs, the 
majority of those actions are not to extend usability because usage is already there.  However, they 
need to deepen and improve the functionality of their platforms. From there, the banks can easily 





When MM started, its regulations were less strict than those of the banks. This was due to 
deregulation of financial sector, and the ‘RCA’ as explained in Chapter 3, provided the 
rationale for these arrangements. Following complaints from the banks, the BOT ordered that 
MNOs should form separate legal entities for MM services that would be regulated by the 
BOT. This was in line with the 2015 NPS Act, the 2015 Payment Systems Licensing and 
Approval Regulations, and the 2015 Electronic Money Regulations. The requirements for 
issuing an electronic money license demand for a non-banking institution to establish a separate 
legal entity for the BOT regulations: 
“They had to get permission from us. We told the mobile money companies that they should be 
separated from the telecommunications side. So, we did have simple initial rules. But in terms of 
setting the regulations, we introduced the NPS Act after we had learned what was, eh, risky. What 
was not risky. How risks could be mitigated” (Former BOT Governor).  
These steps also helped to facilitate collaborations and partnerships between the banks and the 
MNOs.  The process of establishing the NPS Act and the related regulations was quite smooth. 
The TCRA who regulated the telecommunications sector, as well as the BOT who controlled 
the banking sector, were all present. They came together to align the interests of the two sectors. 
The Attorney General’s (AG’s) Office was also interested in those negotiations. The AG’s 
Office had toured some of the institutions in an attempt to create an ‘electronic evidence act’. 
It sought to understand the issues associated with presenting evidence in an electronic format, 
and whether that evidence could be considered admissible in the same way as something signed 
physically would be.  
“There was a related eh act on resolving disputes also originating from electronic transactions. Eh, 
and I think eh, those two as precursors, plus … the dialogue that we had, eh, banks were allowed to 
react. Mobile phone companies, mobile money subsidiaries were given a chance to react …  as part 
of the process of the preparation of the act. And then the usual steps which involved a possible 
hearing. Yeah. So, I don’t think, it (the process of bringing together the banks and the MNOs to 
discuss the creation of the NPS Act) was contentious … You know it is only contentious if you do 
not have a process of engagement and dialogue continuously… Hence, all these mentioned channels 
were part and parcel of the process of, yeah, ultimately coming to consensus and understanding” 
(Former BOT Governor).  
7.8.2 Bank Switches and Consortium 
From the findings, I also learned that banks had to react because their traditional approach of 




maximise the advantage of the economies of scale, scope, and external networks using bricks-
and-mortar branches, as explained in Section 7.4. Coping with technology, partnering with the 
MNOs and other FIs, as well as copying the agent model from the MNOs were the alternatives 
that Section 7.7 detailed. 
Neoliberal regulatory capitalist principles enable rapid widespread partnerships for FI 
(Soederberg, 2013). Also see Section 3.6. With the MNOs using their interoperable network, 
the banks have also sought to create a national payment switch that connects with any ATMs, 
POS systems, mobile payment systems, and internet-oriented commercial portals (Uddin and 
Akhi, 2014:216). The national payment switch, therefore, connects all electronic transactions 
and channels them to one or more payment processors for authorisation and payments. Just as 
it is with the interoperable mobile system, and according to Uddin and Akhi, (2014:216), the 
national payments switch lowers the costs of payments and transactions.  
I provide the following example to help understand the benefits of the financial switch. When 
small banks started in Tanzania, they needed channels to help them deliver financial services. 
Most of those delivery channels are electronic channels such as ATMs, POS, etc. In the past, 
the new small banks did not have those channels. Their customers had to go to the banks to get 
financial services:  
“It reached a time when they decided to start a platform that they would share instead of each bank 
running its platform or instead of each bank running its switch to drive its one or two ATMs. At 
that time, even mobile money had not become so popular. What was in their minds was the ATMs. 
They wanted a collective switch, and that was how the ‘Umoja Switch’ started. It was just a club of 
banks where several banks were members. Six banks launched the consortium” (Senior Switch 
Officer). 
During my field research, there was an attempt by the banks and the TBA to connect banking 
and other financial providers to a national payment switch to reduce the costs of making 
transactions between different financial institutions. The banks seemed to have learned from 
the MNOs and their interoperable system: 
“A customer with an NBC account, if he wants to send money to a customer of a different bank, 
such as the Azania Bank, he cannot do it in a cost-effectively manner. He needs to use the EFT or 
TIS. The interoperability with mobile money providers hasn’t been possible yet. Even though the 
NBC has a mobile banking product and the Azania Bank has the same product, these two products 
cannot talk account to account. But we believe now with the existence of an interoperable mobile 




interlink all the banks, all the payment providers, and so forth. It will lower down the costs of 
connectivity that the banks have to incur in the absence of the central switch, which helps the 
exchange of the accounts’ details … Yes, we are now pushing for the establishment of the national 
payment switch” (Executive Banking Sector Official).  
There were two famous switches in Tanzania at the time of my research, namely: the Umoja 
Switch and the BCX. The BCX started in 2006 with six banks namely: Dar es Salaam 
Community Bank (DCB), Azania Bank, Akiba Bank, Bank of Africa (BOA), Twiga Bancorp 
Limited and Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB). Given the changing realities of the banking 
sector, including MM and other digital financial services, in 2011 the members of the Umoja 
switch reached 18:  
“In 2012, the banks realised that there was a need for a separate company to manage the switch on 
behalf of the banks. Before that arrangement, the banks had to take the members of staff to establish 
a committee to help manage the switch. This is the management of the network. A new company 
was created. From the beginning of the consortium, the banks met and worked together, but they 
did not invest big in owning the structure. They, therefore, agreed to outsource management services 
from a different company. That was why the BCX emerged from the Umoja Switch. BCX came 
with a switch. The banks outsourced its services” (Senior Switch Officer). 
By 2016, 27 banks had joined the club and used the BCX switch. With the TBA and other 
banks pushing for a national payment switch, the TAMNOA and the MNOs have been reluctant 
to participate in this project. This has, at times, created tensions: 
“We thought when we would be together, it would be easier and cheaper for the customers to 
transact anything. But they (the MNOs) were reluctant because they had their infrastructure ready. 
They wanted the banks to connect to them. That they have the infrastructure, so, the banks should 
connect to them, switching to them. And then we said no, we also have our switches, so let us come 
together and establish one new infrastructure, and we will all connect whether you have a switch or 
not, but you connect to the main switch” (Executive Banking Sector Official). 
As far as the national payment switch is concerned, my view is that the use of the switch can 
be analysed from different perspectives. It indeed lowers the costs, but it is also true that it 
needs members to be part of it. Otherwise, you do not have a switch. There is also an issue that 
foreign banks are part of other international switches. And this explains why the national 
payment switch project has taken so long to realise, despite all the benefits it will bring to the 





7.8.3 The Know-Your-Customer (KYC) Requirements 
Neoliberalism has been behind the financial regulatory reforms (Campbell, 2010:8). 
International standard-setting bodies orchestrated risk-assessment and management policies 
implemented globally (BCBS, 2001; BCBS et al., 2003; FATF, 2003; FATF, 2007). BCBS, 
FATF, and IAIS have contributed to the diffusion of risk-management policies. This includes 
the diffusion of the KYC requirements. The diffusion of the KYCs is one of the examples of 
‘neoliberal bureaucratisation’ of some aspects of financial governance policies and regulations 
(Amicelle, 2011). The FATF ‘40 recommendations’ were published in 2003 to provide due 
diligence measures on risk-sensitive issues, including customer-identification issues (FATF, 
2003).  According to Rajput (2013), KYC is what enables the banks or financial institutions to 
know their customers and their financial activities to be able to serve them better. There are 
three key elements to the KYCs, which include: how customers are accepted to be members of 
a financial institution, how to identify customers, and how to monitor higher risk accounts. 
Usually, a financial institution will require a photograph, proof of identity, and proof of address 
to allow anyone to use its services. All this is what I mean by the KYC requirements (also see: 
Rajput, 2013). Rajput (2013) argues that banks that ignore the KYC requirements put 
themselves at legal and reputational risks. They may also put other banks at risk as well. They 
may also become vehicles of money laundering, terrorist financing, and other unlawful 
activities. The banks with good KYC policies may not only put themselves in the right position 
to avoid risks, but may also contribute to the safety and soundness of the entire banking system. 
In Tanzania, the banks were not happy with the KYC requirements for MM services. They 
thought that MM KYCs were less strict than their KYCs were. They raised the issue with the 
central bank, stating that it created an unfair competition or rules for the different players in 
the payment system: 
“We told the BOT about our position with our concern on the advent of mobile money … we 
thought that more of our customers would use mobile money rather than using banking products. 
As it was, we did not get a quick response as we expected from the government or the Ministry of 
Finance. Our major concern was that mobile money providers had been allowed to do business in 
the same space while having very relaxed KYCs” (Executive Banking Sector Official). 
The BOT and the NFIC supported the National Risk Assessment as a way to know how the 
KYC issues would be addressed. The results would go to the global standards-setting bodies I 
introduced in Section 7.5. To have the different tiers of KYCs in place, the global standard-




“For different levels of transactions, in essence, that was what we had used as far as mobile money 
was concerned. Eh, we limited the transactions to reduce the exposure to risk. So, as a condition, of 
moving to tiers, they (the Global Standards-Setting Bodies) want you to do a national risk 
assessment, which will give comfort for the first time. The tiered KYCs we used so far for mobile 
money as opposed to banks were different … that consent is there, is known, solutions are being 
sought with tiered KYC, but there is a requirement that you need to fulfil to get a green light from 
the global standard-setting bodies” (Former BOT Governor). 
The global standards-setting bodies established the KYC risk management requirements as a 
supplement to the Basel Committee’s customer due diligence for banks. The requirements were 
issued in October 2001 (Rajuput, 2013). According to Rajput (2013), the requirements examine 
the critical elements of the KYC requirements with bank branches and subsidiaries. The global 
standard-setting bodies see the adoption of the KYC requirements as an essential part of the 
bank’s risk management practices. During my field research, the government issued national 
ID cards, which would facilitate the KYC procedures. The biometric cards were also issued to 
curb crime. The BOT had also set strict procedures for MM KYCs in response to the banks’ 
complaints.  
7.8.4 Banks and Other Digital Platforms Such as Selcom and Maxicom (Malipo) 
Papadimitropoulus (2019:584) argues that neoliberalism supports digitisation to create more 
choices and opportunities. He also asserts that digitisation also helps businesses to cut down 
“costs by downsizing, outsourcing, and crowdsourcing”, “thus, individuals break with the 
bureaucratic structures of corporations” as they make payments and receive services easily. 
There are digital platforms that have been allowed to operate using the payment system. They 
include Selcom and Maxicom (MaxiMalipo). They play an aggregation role. According to 
Winiecki (2017, aggregation is a: 
 “development strategy focused on maximising transaction volumes by providing services on a non-
exclusive basis”.  
According to Papadimitropoulus (2019:567): 
“In neoclassical economics which form economic bedrock of neoliberalism, technology is 
considered a means of production the development of which spurs innovation and productivity, thus 
offering more negative freedom, that is more opportunities and choices for the individual to 




It is, therefore, a neoclassical approach. Hence, aggregators work with banks, MNOs, and other 
financial service providers in the back end, and they also seek to have as many access points 
and customers as possible on the front end. These are aggregators, and at times they are 
regarded as switches because they also work with banks. They provide an integrating 
infrastructure to expand both financial and non-financial services. They have developed quality 
platforms for electronic billing, MM distribution, payments to bank accounts, etc., and by doing 
so, they are advancing financial services to the different segments of society. 
Banks, having seen the benefits of using these aggregators, have joined their platforms in an 
attempt to reach those people they failed to reach before. For instance, at the time of my field 
research, Selcom had connected more than 20 banks to mobile banking for core services. 
Selcom had also connected 30 banks for value-added services such as bill payments, merchant 
payments, and interoperability with other financial institutions: 
“We have integrated about 35 banks in our services. We provide them with banking services on 
their phones. We have 18,000 agents all over Tanzania. We are TCRA licensed, and we are also 
BOT licensed. In that regard, we are regulated by the TCRA and the BOT … We are also a switch 
in the sense that we also serve the banks … We also serve the MNOs. If you want to transfer money 
through us, let’s say using M-Pesa, from a M-Pesa wallet to a bank account, we will facilitate that 
transfer. If you want to withdraw money from the banks and send it to M-Pesa, you pass through 
us. If you want to purchase Luku (electricity services), you do that through us. It does not matter 
where your payment comes from, our job is to deliver it to its final destination” (CEO 
Aggregator). 
Diagram 7.5 illustrates the development of Selcom as an aggregator. It also incorporates the 
above-provided evidence more systematically. The banks have used the aggregators to reach 
the services they would hardly reach without an aggregator. The MNOs had used these 










Diagram 7.5: The Selcom Journey: From Airtime Distribution to Aggregation, Agent 
Network Management, VAS 
 
Source: Winiecki (2017). 
7.9 The Future of the Banks’ Responses 
Digitisation supports neoliberalism as it allows financial institutions and businesses to reduce 
costs, outsource, and crowdsource (Papamitropoulus, 2019; Howe, 2008). Neoliberalism 
produces ideas that facilitate the creation of platforms to support service delivery through 
marketplaces (McKee, 2017). Banks, MM, and digital financial transactions are essential 
building blocks of payment systems (Panagariya, 2019). For instance, Ho (2018) captures well 
the development of MM in Graph 7.6. The details for the graph are in Chapter 5. He calls this 









Graph 7.6: The Journey to Fully Digital Financial Services 
 
Source: Ho (2018). 
There are three phases in the journey described by Ho (2018), namely: Phase 1: the services 
and money transfer, Phase 2: the commerce and payments, and Phase 3: the mobile finance. 
Each phase represents a few services that the customers enjoy. It is tough to move from Phase 
1 to Phase 2. But once in Phase 2, the MNOs connect the unbanked customer to more advanced 
financial services. Once in Phase 3, most customers are more than ready to use banking 
services. Graph 7.6 demonstrates the characteristics of the innovation diffusion theory. The 
classical theories investigate: 
 “the acceptance of innovative elements in the conduct of traditional services based on the 
innovation diffusion theory” (Moga, 2010:256).  
The theory determines the adoption of innovations at different stages as follows: ‘relative 
advantage’, ‘compatibility’, ‘complexity’, ‘trialability’, and ‘observability’ (Moga, 2010: 256; 
Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1995). According to Moga (2010): 
“researchers such as Tan and Teo (2000), Gerrard and Cunningham (2003), and Nor and Pearson 
(2007) had tested the theory on the e-banking adoption. The nominalised factors are complexity, 




For all these reasons, the future of the banking sector will depend heavily on the success of 
MM and how the banking sector responds to digital financial services. MM has been a game 
changer. Technology, therefore, will always be a game-changer.  
Several banking institutions have also failed to use the mobile platform to expand their 
financial services. This has been the case with the community banks and some microfinance 
institutions. More has to be done in that area to tap the benefits of mobile financial payments 
into building inclusive financial systems in Tanzania. Inclusive financial systems will help 
boost the country’s economic growth as well as the development of individual Tanzanians.  
7.10 Conclusion 
From this chapter, the rolling back of the government not only allowed MM to grow but also 
provided other financial service alternatives to emerge. The emergence of these new solutions 
triggered a response from the banking sector, which was not only to innovate but also to work 
or partner with financial and non-financial institutions. The chapter also details the rolling out 
of the state through the central bank and that the global standard-setting bodies also informed 
BOT policies and regulations. 
The chapter has answered the research question number 3: “What was the response of the 
banking sector to increasing levels of FI through MM in Tanzania?” It provides the response 
of the banking sector to the increasing levels of FI caused by MM services. This has fulfilled 
research objective number 4: to investigate the possibility of any changes in the banking sector 
due to the successful penetration of MM services in the sector. I have shown how the banks 
opposed the advent of MM. Given the efforts of the BOT to ensure that the roles of the banks 
and the MNOs are established, only then did the banks started to collaborate with the MNOs. 
To increase levels of FI, the banks also started mobile banking and recruited bank agents all 
over the country. They also collaborated with aggregators and SACCOs to reach the customers 
they would otherwise not be able to reach. Moreover, some banks started providing 
microfinance services. Alongside these banks, microfinance banks and community banks, were 
also established. All these innovations sought to promote FI. Hence, the banking sector has 
transformed over time. The transformation is illustrated by how the banking sector innovates 
itself by undergoing several changes (MM, also being the cause of some of these changes). 
In terms of political economy, tensions between the banks and the MNOs were thwarted by the 
BOT taking a leadership role convincing them to work together. This is another example of 




each other as partners and not as competitors. As a result, various working collaborations and 
partnerships were formed to increase efficiency in the financial sector due to cost-sharing 
between the MNOs and banks in terms of service delivery. This was an example of the 
‘regulatory capitalist governance approach’, where the government allowed partnerships to 
increase efficiency in the sector. Neoliberal policies encourage such types of PPPIs. MM 
interoperability also encourages the idea of starting a switch that would be used by both the 
MNOs and banks as well as the other FSPs. The banks increased their reach to potential 
customers using agent banking to imitate agents used by the MNOs. The reduction of costs was 
one of the main issues that eased the collaborations between the FSPs. Both classicists and 
neoclassicists also support cost reduction in financial markets to favour efficiency. There were 
also different platforms the banks and MNOs could use to settle their differences, including the 
NFIF (another example of RCA as explained in Chapter 5), as well as their regular meetings 






















Chapter 8: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
8.1 Overall Recapitulation of Purpose and Findings 
This research seeks to: (i) explore MM growth; (ii) study how neoliberal roll-back and roll-out 
policies enhanced MM growth; (iii) investigate how MM moderated the factors of FE; (iv) 
examine how MM increased FI in Tanzania and the response of the banking sector to MM 
growth.  
The findings suggest that inclusive neoliberalism facilitates technological advancement. 
Whether neoliberalism is inclusive or not has been argued depending on the country of analysis. 
Some theorists claim that neoliberalism has extractive and exclusive outcomes (Christiaens, 
2019a; Duménil and Lévy, 2011). In Tanzania, neoliberalism created a conducive environment 
that helped the provision of access to formal financial services for financially-excluded people 
through MM, as illustrated throughout this dissertation. This was one way of reducing FE. 
Moreover, the inclusive neoliberal agenda, which meant giving neoliberal policies a "human 
face" (Pastor and Wise, 1999), also facilitated the invention and implementation of inclusive 
financial ideas, and ways of using technologies to moderate some factors of FE. There are times 
when neoliberalism has turned inclusive (Craig and Porter, 2007). The use of technology such 
as MM proves this fact, as it has been detailed in this dissertation. This chapter seeks to provide 
some explanations and concluding remarks on these arguments. 
This chapter seeks to discuss why and in what ways my theoretical framework, main theories, 
and the methods of research, I have used in this dissertation should now be used to facilitate 
research in the political-economic sense to further understand the issues of MM and the 
response of the banking sector, be it for efficient resource allocation or further regulatory 
development issues. Before this research, the following theories were used to study MM: 
diffusion of innovations, financial intermediary theories, supply-side and demand-side theories, 
market for the poor theory etc. (also see examples from: Kim et al, 2018; Munyoki et al., 2015 
Aduda and Kalunda, 2012; Kumar, 2014; Fischer, n.d.; Joy et al., 2011; Nielsen, 2014; 
Burjorjee and Scola, 2015; DFID, 2005; DFID/SDC, 2009b; DFID/SDC, 2009c; Diamond, 
1984; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2008). But with my study, classical and neoclassical theories 
connect MM studies to the political-economic world. The two theories are complementary and 
capable of explaining market failures, technological efficiencies, technological advancement, 
and use of technology and innovations such as MM as well as how to regulate them for their 




implement neoliberal policies that affect the included as well as the excluded people. In this 
context, I refer to all forms of exclusion, including any forms of FE.  
With my findings derived by using the classical and neoclassical perspectives as the analytical 
tools of analysis, the advent and growth of MM can now be understood through neoliberal roll-
back and roll-out policies. The findings presented evidence that the two policies contributed to 
the advent and growth of MM. Moreover, both classical and neoclassical views facilitated the 
role of MM in moderating some of the factors of FE. By doing so, MM helped to increase FI 
in Tanzania. Hence, political economists and development theorists will now have to take 
account of my work to explain further the rolling back and rolling out policies, inclusive 
neoliberal policies, and MM growth for FI. 
8.2 Relationship with Previous Research and Summary on How I Answered the 
Research Questions 
In terms of the first research question which looked at how neoliberalism facilitated the growth 
and development of MM, the findings of this study seem to build on the key neoliberal policies 
as well as on some other researchers as delineated in Chapter 5. The key neoliberal policies 
included the liberalisation of both the telecommunications and banking sectors, the creation 
and implementation of the CLF, the deregulation and re-regulation of the telecommunications 
and banking sectors as well as the practicality of the MNOs in delivering formal financial 
services to everybody, even financially-excluded people. For instance, Maurer (2011) claims 
that MM stands in opposition to banking exclusion, which facilitates innovations in the 
changing banking sector. Many of the researchers I cited in Chapter 5 claimed that MM linked 
people to financial services; the official documents I cited also demonstrated the different 
stages of MM development in Tanzania.  
To respond to the second question: “How did MM moderate some factors of FE in Tanzania?” 
The findings in Chapter 6 explored ways through which MM moderates the factors of FE. By 
doing so, it provided the rationale for MM survival. Its usefulness and practicability, in terms 
of transforming financial services, were key to its survival. These facts not only echo the views 
of the respondents, but also of the researchers such as Jack and Suri (2011); Morawczynski and 
Pickens (2009); Mbiti and Weil (2016) who provide evidence to show how MM offers a 
solution to resolve the issue of lack of proximity to banking infrastructure. Regarding the role 
of MM in reducing the high prices of financial services, some researchers have argued in favour 




Mbiti and Weil, 2016). As it regards the moderation of risk, Gilman and Joyce (2012) claim 
that risk management is key to the success of MM development, while Solin and Zarzan (2010) 
argue that MM payments reduce risks as they are traceable and safer when compared to the 
cash payments. 
The findings of Chapter 7 reveal that the advent of MM did not occur unopposed. The findings 
answered research question number 3: “What was the response of the banking sector to 
increasing levels of FI through MM in Tanzania?” The banks at first perceived the MNOs as 
their competitors and opposed their entry into the sector. With the efforts of the BOT, who 
regulated the NPS, the opposition was thwarted. Banks and MNOs decided to cooperate. 
Masamila (2014) demonstrates how Vodacom Tanzania and the Commercial Bank of Africa 
(CBA) work together. Chapter 7 also described other innovations that occurred in the banking 
sector, partly as a response to the advent of MM. Those innovations included: agency banking, 
mobile banking, community banking, microfinance services, bank-MNO collaboration, new 
bank switches and consortium, review of the KYCs, and a collaboration between banks and 
other digital platforms such as Selcom. The response of the banking sector to MM has also 
been studied by the World Bank (2014b). 
The systematic reviews on MM, development, and FI on the one hand (Kim et al., 2018; 
Dahlberg et al., 2008; Duncombe and Boateng, 2009; Diniz et al., 2011), and the systematic 
reviews on the ICTD on the other hand (Lwoga and Sangeda, 2019; Zaremohzzabieh et al., 
2014; Thapa and Saebo, 2014; Mbuyisa and Leonard, 2015; Duncombe, 2016), facilitated the 
process of finding the theoretical and methodological gaps for my research topic. Their findings 
reveal that no study has used classical and neoclassical theories to study neoliberalism and how 
it facilitated the growth of MM and its role in moderating FE and increasing FI. This makes 
the current research unique. Also, their findings called for in-depth qualitative research to 
facilitate the attainment of critical understanding of MM. Hence, their claims justify the use of 
in-depth unstructured interviews, which make this research unique.    
The contributions of the researchers mentioned above, and their publications demonstrate how 
my research is related to previous research. They also proved to be useful in informing or 
supporting my key research arguments and findings. In terms of the policy, Chapter 2 revealed 
that Tanzania does not have an NFIP. Instead, it has had two NFIFs with NFISs. Researchers 
who analyse the NFISs and the key roles of the different stakeholders include: Aro-Gordon 




MM directly. Through interviews, it was clear that the NFIFs facilitated MM growth to catalyse 
an increase in inclusive financial services (also see TNCFI, 2017b). This again demonstrates 
how my research relates to previous research.  
8.2.1 A Synthesis of Findings from the Three Empirical Chapters 
The objectives of this Ph.D. research were: (i) to explore the advent and successful growth of 
MM in Tanzania with a view to determine how it happened; (ii) to study the levels of FE and 
FI in Tanzania to understand the seriousness of these issues, and how they relate to MM, and 
neoliberalism; (iii) to assess the role of MM in moderating FE; and (iv) to investigate how the 
banking sector responds to increasing levels of FI caused by MM. A key finding suggests that 
neoliberalism facilitated the advent of MM in Tanzania, which in turn aided in reducing FE 
levels and increasing the FI rate in Tanzania. This finding answered the first research question: 
how did neoliberalism facilitate the growth of MM in Tanzania? (see Section 1.3). 
Furthermore, another finding suggests that MM moderated some of the factors of FE, which 
answered the second research question: how did MM moderate the factors of FE in Tanzania? 
Moreover, the third finding suggests that there was a response from the banking sector to 
increasing levels of FI in Tanzania caused by MM, which responded to the third research 
question: what was the response of the banking sector to rising levels of FI through MM in 
Tanzania? Also, see chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
Neoliberalism and MM in Tanzania, and how this has facilitated the transformation from FE 
to FI, has not been systematically documented anywhere to my knowledge. Moreover, 
theorising about roll-back and roll-out and their link to FE and FI using classical and 
neoclassical perspectives helped to demonstrate the advent and growth of MM, as well as how 
MM moderates some factors of FE to increase FI, as well as how the banking sector responded 
to the increasing levels of FI through MM in Tanzania. To achieve all this, there was a need to 
collect data through in-depth unstructured interviews. In-depth unstructured studies help us 
understand neoliberal political-economic issues and issues of FE, FI and MM. In Section 3.1, 
I briefly introduced the issue of the lack of in-depth qualitative case studies that provide a basis 
for theorising MM research. Duncombe and Boateng (2009:1250) claim:   
“Overall, there is noticeable lack of in-depth qualitative case studies that 
could provide a basis for theorising”. 
In Section 4.3, the in-depth unstructured interviews were part of my efforts to try to address 




unstructured interviews I used, provided in-depth data that enabled me to arrive at the findings 
and the theorising I discussed and analysed in this dissertation (see Sections 1.4 and 3.4 for the 
theoretical framework, also, see Sections 5.2.1, 5.7, 6.2.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.8 for the findings). 
I had to use secondary official sources also to check consistency or divergence of the collected 
views from the respondents, as well as to track down new emerging data (see Section 4.8.3). 
The in-depth unstructured interviews were also used as argued in Section 4.8.1 because of their 
flexibility in allowing interviews to talk about a wide range of important issues. 
Apart from the in-depth unstructured interviews that brought in the CLF and NPS issues and 
how they related to MM, FI and FE, the literature review helped me to identify critical research 
gaps (see Section 1.2) that needed to be addressed in terms of MM and the transition from high 
levels of FE to increasing levels of FI, as well as the theorising between neoliberal roll-back 
and roll-out issues (also see Sections: 1.5.1, 1.5.2, and 1.5.3, 2.6, 2.9, 3.2, 3.6.1, 6.3). From the 
literature we found that the research gaps included: (i) the inclusion through neoliberal policies 
using MM has not been well researched, and that (ii) when it comes to MM, its growth, and its 
role in moderating FE, as well as, its role in increasing FI, these issues have not been given 
much attention, and that there is no evidence of researchers theorising MM issues using a 
theoretical framework that combines classical and neoclassical perspectives to help explain the 
role of neoliberal roll-back and roll-out policies in facilitating FI through MM (for extensive 
systematic literature reviews on these issues see: Duncombe and Boateng, 2009; Lwoga and 
Sangeda, 2019; Dahlberg et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2018; Sharma and Kansal, 2012; Diniz et al., 
2011; Zaremohzzabien et al., 2014; Duncombe, 2016; Thapa and Saebo, 2014; Mbuyisa and 
Leonard, 2015; Fernández-Olit et al., 2020). It also helped to link these issues to the GPE (see 
Sections 1.4.1, 1.4.2), where I explained the three essential perspectives to inform research in 
GPE, namely, the ‘economic-nationalist’, ‘liberal’, and ‘critical’ (O’Brien and Williams, 
2016). I linked this research with liberal perspectives, specifically the neoliberal perspectives 
and by using classical and neoclassical views which are the main variants in the liberal 
thoughts. The literature further informed the selection of appropriate: issues/factors to be 
investigated (see the research gaps above and literature that supported empirical Chapters 5, 6, 
and 7), and methodologies to be used and in this case in-depth unstructured interviews (also 
see: Duncombe and Boateng, 2009; Lwoga and Sangeda, 2019; Kim et al., 2018). Literature 
also served as the basis for supporting, comparing and contrasting the findings or arguments of 




8.2.1.1 Finding 1: Neoliberalism Facilitated the Advent and Growth of MM in Tanzania, 
Reducing FE Levels and Increasing FI in Tanzania 
During the initial stages of designing this Ph.D. research, the first question I posed to myself 
was ‘what political economy facilitated the advent of MM?’ During the interviews, I realised 
that it was the neoliberal political economy as the liberalisation of the telecommunications and 
financial sectors played a key role in allowing the entry of private institutions into these sectors, 
and also allowed innovations to evolve and survive. These findings helped formulate the first 
research question for this research: ‘how did neoliberalism facilitate the growth of MM in 
Tanzania?’ In responding to this question using the responses from the interviews and 
literature, it became clear that both the CLF and the NPSA facilitated the growth of MM and 
that deregulation (neoliberal roll-back policies) and re-regulation (neoliberal roll-out policies) 
supported the creation of the CLF and the NPSA (as demonstrated in Sections 3.7.2; 5.4.2; 
2.4.1.1; 2.6.1; 4.8.3; 5.4.4; 7.6). For the NPSA also see: URT, 2015a; URT, 2015b; URT, 
2015c; URT, 2015d, URT, 2015e. 
8.2.1.2 The CLF and the NPSA 
The first key finding that helped structure this dissertation was that neoliberal roll-back and 
roll-out policies could be used to explain deregulation, liberalisation, and re-regulatory policies 
(Peck and Tickell, 2002; Benner et al., 2010:13), which could also explain the creation of the 
CLF and how it paved the way to MM services, and how these services were allowed to enter 
the NPS. I started explaining this process right from Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, Section 3.7.2, I 
explained how the CLF began and how it was used as a key strategy to implement the full 
liberalisation policy of the telecommunication sector (also see Appendix 8.1). I also discussed 
how it enhanced the concept of technology and service neutrality (also see: (Nkoma, 2010; 
Mwalongo and Hussein, n.d.; Mfungahema, 2014; Materu-Behitsa and Diyamett, 2010; Gunze, 
2014; Mfungahema, 2006). I also outlined the essence of the CLF and how it influences the 
regulatory environment (also see: Materu-Behitsa and Diyamett, 2010; Mfungahema, 2006; 
van Gorp and Maitland, 2009; Boshe, 2013; and Moshiro, n.d.). In Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2, I 
explained that not much on the CLF and MM had been investigated by researchers in Tanzania, 
even though the CLF facilitated the advent of MM.  I also mentioned how the CLF helped 
additional financial services to be added to the providers in the telecommunications sector. 
These assertions were also supported by one of the respondents as it appears in Chapter 5, 




“The best thing that the TCRA did a while ago was creating what was referred to as the ‘Converged 
Licensing Framework’ … That Framework I am talking about 2006 or 2007. The issuance of the 
license to every service, as technology has changed over time. We issued converged licenses since 
2006. They said they provided a license that was technologically and service neutral. What did all 
this mean? … They are free to do any innovation based on the licensing framework. As I said earlier, 
it is converged and that we do not regulate the technology. We do not regulate the service …. Hence, 
mobile money was like an addition to the services offered by the operators” (Senior Telecom 
Sector Official). 
Moreover, as value-added services were added to telecommunications services, the CLF 
brought flexibility into the legal and regulatory framework in the telecommunications sector. 
This framework was also in line with the technological and service neutrality discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 5 as well as by the Senior Telecom Sector Official. The TanzaniaInvest (2020) 
also echoed these views:  
“the CLF ensures regulatory flexibility, addressing market and technology developments, as well 
as efficient utilisation of network resources and encouraged the market entry of small-scale 
operators. The CLF of Tanzania establishes four categories of licenses as follows: Network 
Facilities Providers (NF), Network Service Providers (NS), Application Service Providers (AS), 
and Content Service Providers (CS) … The licensing regime provides separate licenses for 
infrastructure and services. Previous regime services, including internet provision, were licensed 
individually.”   
Hence, the relaxation of licensing regulations to ensure flexibility as guided by the CLF was a 
game-changer. What was regulated was not the technology itself but the services. This style of 
regulating helped create innovative opportunities (Mfungahema, 2006; Mfungahema, 2014). 
Through the CLF, it is clear that the regulations of the markets took into consideration the 
neoliberal realities, as the CLF could be considered as a neoliberal roll-back initiative, as it 
allowed private telecommunications providers to enter Tanzania’s market to create innovative 
opportunities that cut across the different sectors of the economy. With the CLF, the MNOs 
required the use of the NPS to provide formal financial services. The MNOs enter the NPS not 
as deposit-taking institutions but as non-deposit-taking institutions that offer formal financial 
services.  
“Any payment mechanism that is in the country is grounded. It falls under the BOT mandate. 
Whether you pay through the bank, whether through the Western Union, through TigoPesa, M-
Pesa, whether through the EMS, whether it is through the bus, anything involving the payments is 




The agreements between the BOT and TCRA facilitated the operations of MM in Tanzania. As 
demonstrated in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, the introduction of the NPSA was key to the smooth 
functioning of MM in Tanzania. The NPSA was an example of the neoliberal rolling-out policy 
to accommodate new challenges created by DFSs such as MM (also see Appendix 8.2). With 
the 2015 NPSA, laws, and regulations for the issuance of e-money were enacted including: the 
2015 PSLARs (dealing with payment systems licensing and approval regulations) and the 2015 
PSEMRs (dealing with payment system electronic money regulations) (URT, 2015a; 
URT,2015b; URT, 2015c; URT, 2015d; URT, 2015e). The NPSA allowed the MNOs to use 
the NPS as well as to register as financial institutions and become directly regulated by the 
BOT for their financial tasks. In contrast, TCRA regulated the communications aspects of MM. 
Since then, MM has been key to increasing FI. From Chapters 5, 6 and 7 (Sections 5.2.1; 5.4.4; 
5.5; 6.3.3; 6.4.2.1.2; 7.1; 7.2; 7.6; 7.8.1). The rolling out (re-regulation) neoliberal policies 
enhanced the growth of MM through the NPS regulations that defined and accepted e-money 
as part of the NPS. The NPSA and its regulations resolved the compliance issues and legally 
recognised e-signatures. The regulations dictated who got involved in the NPS. Likewise, 
deregulation and liberalisation allowed MM to operate, during its initial stages, without stricter 
regulations. As it appears in Section 7.8.1: 
“They had to get permission from us. We told the mobile money companies that they should be 
separated from the telecommunications side. So, we did have simple initial rules. But in terms of 
setting the regulations, we introduced the NPS Act after we had learned what was, eh, risky. What 
was not risky. How risks could be mitigated” (Former BOT Governor).   
In Section 7.2, I briefly demonstrated how the global standard-setting bodies aided the 
neoliberal rolling out by setting NPS standards that were accepted worldwide to harmonise the 
functions of NPS networks across the world. In accepting the NPS standards, the NPSA was 
created as demonstrated in Section 7.8.1:  
“There was a related eh act on resolving disputes also originating from electronic transactions. Eh, 
and I think, eh, those two as precursors, plus … the dialogue that we had, eh, banks were allowed 
to react. Mobile phone companies, mobile money subsidiaries were given a chance to react … as 
part of the process of the preparation of the act. And then the usual steps which involved a possible 
hearing. Yeah. So, I don’t think, it (the process of bringing together the banks and the MNOs to 
discuss the creation of the NPS Act) was contentious … You know it is only contentious if you do 
not have a process of engagement and dialogue continuously… Hence, all these mentioned channels 
were part and parcel of the process of, yeah, ultimately coming to consensus and understanding” 




8.2.1.3 Issues of FE, FI, and MM through Classical and Neoclassical Perspectives 
There is a transformation from high FE levels to increasing FI levels in Tanzania facilitated by 
MM services (see Sections: 2.6.1; Access Strand 2.2; Strand 5.2; Strand 5.4; Access Strand 
6.2; Graph 6.16). 
My findings reveal that there was no theoretical perspectives or frameworks that explained the 
earlier mentioned transformation. Linking MM, neoliberal policies and the transformation from 
FE to FE have not been easy. I demonstrated how to link them through literature I presented in 
Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4. Creating theoretical frameworks to study MM has been an issue (see 
Chapters 1 and 3). Moreover, MM studies often involve interdisciplinary theories and methods 
(see Chapters 3 and 4). The interdisciplinarity nature of MM studies and the absence of enough 
frameworks of analysis are issues that researchers cannot ignore (also see: Duncombe and 
Boateng, 2009; Kim et al., 2018; and Chapter 3). From these issues and the existing literature 
and theoretical perspectives on MM and FI, I was able to fill in the gap that existed in terms of 
linking MM, neoliberal policies and the transformation from FE to FI as demonstrated 
throughout this dissertation. I presented this through the theoretical framework, as explained 
in Chapters 1 and 3, and by applying the concepts it generated in the subsequent chapters. I 
used the theoretical framework, and the concepts it has produced as the basis for my arguments 
in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation.    
Thus, it turned out that classical and neoclassical perspectives informed the neoliberal policies 
and were able not only to explain roll-back and roll-out policies but also issues of FE and FI 
(also see Sections: 1.1; 1.4; 2.5; 2.5.1; 2.5.2; 3.4; 3.5; 3.6.3). I argued that neoliberal roll-back 
and roll-out processes facilitated the arrival and development of MM, and that neoliberalism 
also facilitated the inclusive digital agenda that catalysed FI by providing access to financial 
services to financially-excluded people through MM technology. 
For discussion and analysis, I introduced the issues of FE and FI in Tanzania in Chapter 2. I 
also used statistics from FinScope surveys to demonstrate the transformation from high FE 
levels to increasing FI levels. Concrete evidence to demonstrate FE in Tanzania came from the 
2006 FinScope survey, where the FE rate was 54% (FinScope, 2006). That rate increased by 
2% in 2009 to 56% (FinScope, 2009). In 2013, the FE rate went down to 27% (FinScope, 
2013a). In 2017, the rate remained at 28% (FinScope, 2018). This trend demonstrates a 
significant shift from 54% in 2006 to 27% in 2017 of financially-excluded individuals. Access 




the uptake of MM services jumped from 0% in 2006 to 60% in 2017 (see Strand 5.1 in Section 
5.3.4; FinScope, 2006; and FinScope, 2018). Moreover, Strand 5.4 in Section 5.5 also 
demonstrates the uptake of MM services. Strands 5.1 and 5.2 demonstrates the importance of 
MM in Tanzania. From Strand 5.1, the bank has only 17% of the uptake of formal financial 
services while MM has 60%. Importantly, Strand 5.2 demonstrates the share of financial 
products in the market. While MM accounted for 1% of the market share of products, with 60% 
of financial service uptake, the banks accounted for 64% with 17% of financial service uptake. 
Access Strand 6.2 in Section 6.4.1 shows that the uptake of financial services stood at 45% in 
2009, reached 73% in 2013, and remained at 72% in 2017 (also see: FinScope, 2018). This 
trend demonstrates the increase in FI over time. Moreover, Graph 6.16 in Section 6.4.3 shows 
an increase in account penetration between 2008 and 2015. MM accounts have increased 
significantly when compared to bank accounts. This increase is another evidence to 
demonstrate how MM plays an essential part in increasing FI. 
As it regards classical and neoclassical perspectives, I started by introducing essential classical 
and neoclassical concepts and literature in Section 1.1 to link the two views with the issues 
related to the research objectives. In Section 1.4, I briefly introduced the theoretical framework 
and how it facilitated the analysis of this research. Moreover, Sections 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6.3 further 
elaborate the theoretical perspectives. In these sections, I explained how classical and 
neoclassical perspectives explained the rolling-back and rolling-out of neoliberal policies 
concerning deregulation/liberalisation and re-regulation. Ontologically, neoliberalism supports 
the view that markets are socially constructed. Epistemologically, neoliberalism promotes the 
construction of markets (Cahill et al., 2012; Birch, 2016; Swarts, 2013). The construction of 
markets also alternates between classical and neoclassical principles, where the classicists 
would want to correct the market failures by allowing limited government intervention. At the 
same time, the neoclassicists would emphasise deregulation and liberalisation of markets to 
correct emerging market failures. Through these views, I argued that the CLF was a result of 
deregulation and liberalisation of the telecommunications sector, and the NPSA was a result of 
re-regulation aimed at supporting MM and other DFSs without inconveniencing other FSPs to 
enhance FI. These above-explained views underline the importance of classical and 
neoclassical views in this research. Section 2.5 briefly explained how one could link classical 
and neoclassical perspectives to exclusion debates, FE and neoliberalism. Neoclassical 
perspectives provide explanations for poverty and exclusion that are beyond a person’s control, 




to claim that individuals and laissez-faire policies may cause poverty and exclusion (also see 
Section 2.5.1). As explained in Chapter 1 and with the theoretical framework, inclusive 
neoliberalism can easily be explained by also using classical and neoclassical perspectives 
which are crucial to describe rolling-back and rolling-out neoliberal policies. 
8.2.2 Findings in Chapter 5 (Inclusive Neoliberal Agenda). 
In Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3, I discussed the theoretical assumption that backed the ‘test, 
monitor, and regulate’ approach, which facilitated the advent of MM (also see: Haider, 2013; 
Castri and Gidvani, 2014). Also, see Diagram 5.2. I asserted that the ‘test, monitor, and 
regulate’ approach was a classical perspective as it views markets with success and failures. It 
encourages the regulator to observe how new services develop before placing rigid regulations 
on them to achieve the best market efficiency. Lack of strict regulations for MM services during 
the arrival of MM facilitated the survival and growth of MM services, and this can be viewed 
from the neoclassical sense where deregulation and lack of government intervention are said 
to have facilitated the development of new services and markets to help achieved profit-
maximisation. From Diagram 5.2 in Chapter 5, there was the creation of proper legal and 
regulatory frameworks to facilitate MM development (also see: UNCTAD, 2012; Di Castri and 
Gidvani, 2014; Ondiege, 2015). This move could mark the roll-out or the re-regulation phase 
where rules and laws are established to support the growth of MM to provide a legal and 
regulatory framework that facilitates the functioning of MM services. The third assumption 
depicted in Diagram 5.2 in Chapter 5 was the conducive environment and the politics of FI 
involved that helped MM to thrive. The creation of the conducive environment and the rolling 
out of FI politics were achieved through the creation of partnerships among different MM 
stakeholders which demonstrated how the RCA supported the creation of conducive 
environments. The NFIF is an example of this partnership, as shown in Section 5.5 in Chapter 
5. 
From Chapter 5, Section 5.7, the findings suggest that MM helps reduce the digital divide issue 
in the delivery of formal financial services in Tanzania. Usually, literature covering technology 
discusses the digital divide issue in a neoliberal and globalised information economy. Literature 
also suggests that technology creates a ‘national digital divide’ and an ‘international digital 
divide (also see: van Dijk and Hacker, 2003; Warschauer, 2004; Stevenson, 2009; Al-Jaghoub 
and Westrup, 2009; Ragnedda and Muschert, 2013). It also suggests that poor communities 




us to rethink this literature. Thanks to inclusive neoliberal agenda, mobile phones can be used 
to provide financial services and therefore to provide a solution to moderate some factors of 
FE (Geach, 2007; Hinson, 2011). MM and other Fintech technologies have been used as tools 
to unite the poor and the rich through financial services (Riley and Kulathunga, 2017). This 
finding is one big surprise from this research, that somehow MM bridges the digital divide gap 
(also see: Kizza, 2013; Southwood, 2013). MM succeeded because a lot of low-income people 
own or can get access to mobile phones (also see: GSMA, 2020b; InterMedia, 2013). 
Chakrabarty (2005) argues that the use of mobile phones can help increase growth, alleviate 
poverty, and overcome a perceived digital divide. De Silva and Zainudeen (2007) also claim 
that mobile phones contribute to addressing specific social and economic development goals 
as well as playing a key role in broader national development strategies. Mobile phone divide 
has reduced significantly in Tanzania and the world (see: Mpogole et al., 2008; InterMedia, 
2013; GSMA, 2020b; Curry and Koczberski, 2013; Pimenidis et al., 2009). When people have 
access to mobile phones, it makes it easy for them to receive digital financial services through 
their mobile phones. Mobile phone use has increased thanks to neoliberal roll-back policies of 
deregulation (liberalisation) which allowed easy entry of technology to the financial sector 
(also see: Howard and Mazaheri, 2009; Duso and Seldeslachts, 2010; Materu-Behitsu and 
Diyamett, 2010; Mwakatumbula, 2017). McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) claimed that 
direct controls on financial markets hindered financial development. Neoliberal rolling back 
policies facilitated the creation of the CLF as discussed in Sections 3.7.3, and 5.4.2. The CLF 
was the primary tool that was used to facilitate the liberalisation of the telecommunications 
sector and allowed value-added services such as MM. Hence, liberalisation was essential to the 
emergence of MM. We also found in Chapter 5 that neoliberal roll-out (re-regulation) policies 
facilitated the creation of the NPSA which formalised the entry of MM and resolved the 
regulatory and legal issues related to MM and other digital service providers. We also found in 
Section 5.4.5 that the interoperability agreements were also part of neoliberal roll-out policies 
where the government facilitated the negotiations through the BOT and brought together the 
MNOs and therefore improved efficiency of MM services. As Section 5.7 briefly emphasises 
neoliberal literature that covers technology and discusses the digital divide issue (Van Dijk and 
Hacker, 2003; Warschauer, 2004; Stevenson, 2009; Al-Jaghoub and Westrup, 2009; Ragnedda 
and Muschert, 2013), this digital divide can create a ‘national digital divide’ and an 
‘international digital divide’ (also see: Rao, 2005; Cullen, 2003; Skaletsky, 2013; Guillén and 
Suárez, 2005). Communities that lack technology could be excluded from socio-economic and 




as has been demonstrated throughout this dissertation, mobile phones are essential links 
between financially-excluded individuals and formal financial services. MM has been a tool 
used to unite the poor and the rich through financial services. It has, therefore, bridged the 
digital divide gap between financially-excluded people and access to formal financial services. 
As explained in Section 5.7, this has been one surprise from this research, that somehow MM 
helps to bridge the digital financial gap in Tanzania and elsewhere (also see: Kizza, 2013; 
Southwood, 2013). Also, see Section 5.2 and 5.2.1 to view other explanations of the findings. 
8.2.3 Findings in Chapter 6 
In Section 6.4, I explained the theoretical assumptions and qualitative findings that helped the 
moderation of the factors of FE. From the neoclassical perspective, FE bars low-income 
entrepreneurs from accessing financial means which challenges neoclassical profit-maximising 
efforts (Christiaens, 2019b). Classicists are more likely to support the removal of any forms of 
exclusion as they can use the angle of value and distribution to explain FE (see Section 2.5.1). 
The neoclassicists would also support FI through MM if it moderated the factors of FE by 
maximising profit as human beings make rational decisions to maximise profit and utility (see 
Section 6.4). Hence, lack of access to formal financial services to financially-excluded people 
(as discussed in Section 6.4.1) as well as high costs of formal financial services (as mentioned 
in Section 6.4.2), and the risks associated with a cash economy (as discussed in Section 6.4.3) 
are all potential barriers to profit-maximisation for the MNOs and businesses in a neoclassical 
sense. 
From Chapter 6, we find that MM moderates some factors of FE. This means it removes or 
weakens some barriers to FI (Ahmad et al., 2020; Mhella, 2020). Sachs (2008) acknowledges 
the transformative ability of mobile phones, while Davidson and McCarty (2012), and Aron 
and Muellbauer (2019) discuss transformative MM services and how they drive customer usage 
of MM for the unbanked. The statistics and evidence provided in Chapter 6 demonstrate the 
MM transformation in Tanzania and how MM moderates the factors of FE. Issues of distance, 
scale and scope, including risk management, have been resolved by using MM technology in 
Tanzania. We also see the problems of interoperability and how they support the issues 
mentioned above in Chapter 5 (Section 5.4.4) and Chapter 6 (Section 6.4.2.1). We also learned 
that MM has successfully reduced the proximity issue. Proximity means being near to formal 
financial services (also see: TNCFI, 2014). Proximity issues have also been mentioned in 




(ACP, 2014). People walk around with their mobile phones and their e-wallet accounts in their 
pocket. They use mobile phones to access formal financial services anytime they want to do 
so. (ACP, 2014). As MM services are available 24/7 and anywhere, they also reduce the costs 
of accessing financial services. As we saw in Chapter 6, the cost of accessing FI could be 
travelling for hours to reach a bank or a financial point, or allowing technology to reduce the 
costs (see Section 6.4.2) and as the banks have a reserve requirement and some people may not 
be able to afford to open an account in those banks, FI becomes an issue. Hence, MM is cheaper 
and therefore, likely to be used by financially-excluded people, as demonstrated in Chapter 6. 
Interoperability, as discussed in Section 6.4.2.1, is also one of the ways used by the MNOs to 
reduce the costs of providing formal financial services (also see: Di Castri, 2013a). 
Interoperability is also part of neoliberal rolling-out efforts, where the state through the BOT 
brought together all the MNOs to facilitate their agreements to work together. From Chapter 2, 
we outlined how the state-led financial sector provided only a few individuals with access to 
formal financial services (also see: Hanson and Ramachandran, n.d.). From this dissertation, 
we learn that financial deregulation and liberalisation, as part of neoliberal roll-back policies, 
facilitated the advent of innovative solutions such MM, which increases access provision to 
formal financial services. Thus, today we can analyse the moderation of the factors of FE as 
we did in Chapter 6. 
8.2.4 Findings in Chapter 7 
In Chapter 7, Section 7.1, I introduced the notion that neoclassicists support innovations that 
make markets more efficient (Sredojević et al., 2016; Solow, 1956; Acemoglu, 2009). Thus, 
the neoclassicists support banking innovations and changes that make financial services more 
profitable (also see: Mehra et al., 2011). Classicists are more likely to support MM services 
because of their affordability as they support the economics of value in exchange (also see: 
Robinson, 1962). Hence, innovations that increase the efficiency of banking services would be 
supported, and the reaction of the banking sector to the growth of MM has been to support 
innovations that improve the efficiency of the banking sector, as it has been demonstrated in 
Chapter 7. Hence, the neoclassical perspective, which forms the economic bedrock of 
neoliberalism, supports technology such as MM that maximises profit and productivity (also 
see Section 3.7). It also supports other innovations, as demonstrated in Chapter 7. 
One of the findings to emerge in Chapter 7 was that the banking sector has responded to the 




determine the regulations. The BOT used the ‘test, learn, regulate’ strategy. These findings are 
broadly in line with researchers such as Di Castri and Gidvani (2014), Haider (2013), 
UNCTAD (2012), Oyebode (2014), and Llewellyn-Jones (2016). Furthermore, several studies 
on banking innovations at the global level have been conducted (CPSS, 1996; CPSS, 1999; 
CPSS, 2000a; CPSS, 2000b; CPSS, 2001a; CPSS, 2003; CPSS, 2004; CPSS, 2012; CPSS, 
2014; World Bank 2014a; World Bank 2014c). These studies did not focus on Tanzania. There 
is literature on the banking sector reforms and FI in Tanzania (Ndanshau, 1996; Mbowe, 2010; 
Ndalichako, 2014), however much of this literature does not explicitly cover the banking 
sector’s response to FI resulting from MM, and other digital financial services. Chapter 7 tries 
to address this gap. Addressing this gap is also in line with Chapter 5, Section 5.5, where I 
briefly demonstrate the importance of the RCA through the different coalitions that facilitate 
FI and its politics. The neoliberal roll-out strategies through the global standard-setting bodies 
and the government and how international standards were implemented nationally were the 
other examples of the RCA, as briefly explained in Chapter 7, Section 7.5. The surprise is that 
banks and other financial institutions under normal circumstances are the ones who provide 
formal financial services. Non-deposit-taking institutions are now providing formal financial 
services and even collaborating with deposit-taking institutions. This finding is somehow 
surprising. The PPPIs have been created (also see Sections 2.6.1, 3.3.1.2, 3.6.2, 5.5, and 7.5). 
Initially, there was opposition from the banks, as demonstrated in Section 7.7: 
“And we were open, but the banks objected of course in the very beginning. Eh, they objected. 
They said that the MNOs were entering the money business. They were also in the payment system. 
But they had no supervision, and strict regulatory requirements like the banks did. In which case, 
they believed that that created unfair competition. And from their point of view and as they had 
heard it from elsewhere, they thought a bank-led model would allow the MNOs to work under the 
banks” (Former BOT Governor). 
The findings in Chapter 7 demonstrate that the banks reacted to the expansion of MM services 
in Tanzania. The neoliberal rolling-back of the government let innovation determine the 
regulations, as shown in Section 5.4.3: 
“You know, the central bank is an authority. It has authority over the National Payments System. 
The MNOs and the other non-financial institutions get involved in the payment system side. They 
are not on the banking side. We were open to this. The banks objected in the very beginning. They 
said the MNOs were entering the money business. And that they were in the National Payments 
System. And that they did not have strict supervision and the requirements. They thought the 




thought this created the conditions for the unfair competition. And as they heard it from elsewhere 
that they could use the bank-led model to run mobile money, the big difference was whether one 
proceeded with innovation or not, and the willingness to take the risk to let innovation lead while 
you monitor and then appropriately manage the risks. The system was called ‘test, monitor, and 
regulate.’ This was the concept” (Former BOT Governor). 
Hence, MM in Tanzania started at a time when the rolling-back policies allowed MM services 
to kick off without stricter regulations. In Tanzania, regulations came later after the innovations 
had flourished. Di Castri and Gidvani (2014), and Parkes (2014) also share the same findings. 
These re-regulations were part of neoliberal rolling-out policies. From Chapter 7, the 
moderation of some factors of FE by MM was made possible through: (i) economies of scale; 
(ii) economies of scope; (iii) the networks created by interoperable systems (This has been 
well-discussed in Sections 6.4.2.1, 6.4.2.1.1, and 6.4.2.1.2). Ignacio (2008), CPSS (2012), Mas 
and Radcliffe (2011), and Logan (2017) would also agree with these findings. These three 
factors could not be ignored and forced the banks to react. In Section 7.4, I discussed how the 
MNOs used innovative solutions to capitalise on the economies of scale and scope. It means 
as MM services expand and more customers use these services, the costs of providing formal 
financial services through MM decrease with the increase in the number of people using them 
(scale). I discussed this view briefly in Chapter 6, Section 6.4.2.1, where Metcalfe’s and 
Moore’s theories were used to explain how digitisation could reduce costs and scale up MM 
services. It also means the production of two or more financial products in the same 
infrastructure brings down the costs or improves the qualities of those services by producing 
them independently (CPSS, 2012). These are some of the fundamental reasons why MM 
services have survived, expanded, and succeeded to the point of making the banking sector 
respond by working together with the MNOs or by resorting to other innovations to remain 
profitable. This means that the banks have to innovate to keep up with the MNOs that heavily 
use the economies of scale and scope. Neoliberalism policies encourage profit-maximisation 
and utilisation of technology to support financial services’ efficiency, and profitability of the 
FSPs. Papadimitropoulus (2019), Howe (2008) and Mohan (2019) support these views. As 
mentioned earlier, through the RCA neoliberal policies facilitate the creation of the PPPIs, 
which allow banks to work with MNOs and other FSPs to provide formal financial services. 
These collaborations enhance FI in Tanzania, as I demonstrated in Chapter 7. The reaction of 
the banking sector was also made possible because both the classicists and neoclassicists 




and collaborations discussed in Chapter 7 helped the banking sector respond to increasing FI 
levels caused by MM. 
8.3 Limitations of the Research and the Anticipation of Criticisms 
I should stress that my study has been primarily concerned with neoliberal policies, MM, FE, 
and FI. FI, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, has been defined as the provision of access to formal 
financial services for everyone at a reasonable price. This meant that the study limited FI to 
this definition. Moderation of some factors of FE by MM also reflected this definition as well 
as the definition of FE as delineated in Chapter 2, as the inability, the difficulty or reluctance 
to access appropriate ‘mainstream’, also referred to as ‘formal’ financial services (Mitton, 
2008:1; McKillop and Wilson, 2007:9). This means that the study limited FE and FI to these 
definitions. The moderation of FE also reflected the realities of the two definitions. The study 
did not delve into other ways of enhancing FI, such as job creation, welfare service provision, 
etc. Hence, the findings of my research are limited/restricted to FI as perceived in Chapter 2. I 
should also make it clear that I deliberately did so to narrow the focus of my study as well as 
to help my research concentrate on inclusive financial issues as perceived by existing literature 
on FI, FE, neoliberalism, and MM. For this research, FI and inequality are two different 
concepts. 
The findings of my study do not imply that other researchers should not investigate FI issues 
from the unemployment angle, or any other poverty-related issues. FI encompasses many 
interdisciplinary issues, and access to formal financial services is just one of the many issues 
out there to be studied. Unfortunately, the nature of the Ph.D. programme and its design, as 
well as the data I collected allowed me to concentrate only on the issues regarding access to 
formal financial services. My research has analysed FI issues and MM issues from these points 
of view. Many theories can help explain MM, FE, and FI, as depicted throughout the thesis. 
However, classical and neoclassical theories were more appropriate for the design of this 
research, given the involvement of neoliberal policies. 
8.4 Problems Arising During the Research 
Several issues arose during the data collection and write-up stages. The most serious was the 
rejection I got from the National Assembly to conduct my research on their premises. As I used 
snowballing techniques, some respondents recommended that I got the Hansard notes from the 
University of Dar-es-Salaam where they were stored. The good news was that I got the Hansard 




A second problem was the observance of the conditions stipulated by the research ethics 
committee. The ethics forms required that all interviews should be free, and people should 
consent to how they wanted to be interviewed. In three cases, the respondents preferred focus 
group interviews instead of in-depth unstructured interviews. To not miss opportunities with 
key respondents, I had to accept focus group sessions in these three cases. This made the 
respondents feel comfortable as they consented to be interviewed. The changes limited the 
gathering of as much information as I wanted to obtain. However, the focus groups were also 
the right way of confirming the respondents’ assertions by asking other respondents if they 
agreed with what the other respondents had said.  
The third issue concerned the research assistant who accompanied me to different institutions, 
and who called the relevant institutions for appointments. He initially transcribed the recorded 
interviews. Issues arose when some institutions did not authorise his requests for interviews, 
which delayed the availability of a few interviews. I had to go to those offices to follow up 
their refusals. In most cases, upon my showing up, we were granted interviews. Likewise, the 
interview transcriptions were not written properly. I had to start transcribing all over again, 
which delayed my data analysis and follow-up sessions with key respondents. 
8.5 Implications of the Findings 
My study offers suggestive evidence for the role of neoliberal policies in facilitating the advent 
and growth of MM, and how MM moderated the factors of FE to enhance FI in Tanzania. The 
‘test, learn and regulate’ approach adopted by the BOT (Di Castri and Gidvani, 2014), was also 
supported by the classical and neoclassical perspectives as illustrated in Chapter 3 and 
throughout this dissertation. MM offers an alternative for moderating the factors of FE and for 
increasing FI in Tanzania, and probably elsewhere. Some literature and evidence support 
neoliberal policies and exclusion (Arce and Pantazis, 2019; Christiaens, 2018). Other literature 
and evidence support neoliberal policies and inclusive arguments (also see: Porter and Craig, 
2004; Craig and Porter, 2003). This dissertation also tries to tell the other neoliberal inclusive 
story (also see Chapter 1). Rolling-back and rolling-out policies through classical and 
neoclassical perspectives are both practical solutions with a result that teaches us how we can 
make neoliberal policies exclusive or inclusive depending on the choice we want to support. 
The two solutions also show us how to regulate and support innovations such as MM for the 
benefit of the entire adult populations, as it has been demonstrated by using the Tanzanian case 




In this sense, the classical and neoclassical solutions are the relevant approaches that have a 
wide range of use from correcting market failure to facilitating technological advancement to 
transforming societies; as well as from managing exclusive neoliberal policies to creating 
inclusive neoliberal policies. In most cases, the choice depends on the policymakers and 
political scientists and how they want to shape the markets and economies. 
Although this study was specific for MM development and its role in transforming the highest 
levels of FE to increasing levels of FI in a neoliberal era, it is nevertheless possible that the 
findings of the study may contain pointers to the ways in which other inclusive developmental 
solutions could be generally developed in other areas of political economy and development in 
the future. 
8.5.1 Theoretical and Policy Implications 
This dissertation has been written to fulfil the requirements for a Ph.D. in GPE: 
Transformations and Policy Analysis. The transformation is in terms of the transition from high 
levels of FE to increased levels of FI in Tanzania. I argue that neoliberalism facilitated this 
transition through the growth of MM. The neoliberal policies analysed here are the roll-back 
(deregulation and liberalisation) and roll-out (re-regulation/state intervention) policies which 
aided the advent and growth of MM which in turn facilitated the transition from high levels of 
FE to increasing levels of FI in Tanzania.  
I have argued that the growth of MM was facilitated by its roles in moderating the factors of 
FE and in facilitating FI (see Chapters 2, 5 and 6). Meanwhile, neoliberalism caused and 
facilitated the growth of MM because of deregulatory, liberalisation and reregulatory policies 
that resulted in the creation of the CLF, which facilitated the adoption of financial technologies 
by the MNOs as well as their entrance in the financial sector which allowed them to use the 
NPS. This is one way of demonstrating inclusive neoliberalism through MM, as MM facilitates 
FI. In this regard, neoliberalism is informed by classical and neoclassical perspectives. Thus, I 
deploy and develop a conceptual framework that includes both classical and neoclassical 
perspectives to explain the roll-out and roll-back neoliberal policies and how they facilitated 
FI through MM. Therefore, the significance of this study is that it informs our empirical and 
theoretical understanding of inclusive neoliberalism and MM by introducing a focus on the 
transition from FE to FI through classical and neoclassical lenses hitherto lacking. 
Thus, this study moves the research on MM and FI to embrace further evaluations of existing 




(re)regulations. According to Levi-Faur (2005), neoliberalism creates a new global order 
referred to as ‘regulatory capitalism’ (see Section 3.6). The classical and neoclassical 
perspectives determine which regulations and policies are required to resolve government 
intervention issues or market failure issues (see explanations on Sections 1.4, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6). 
Attention is paid to what has already been done and the results that have already been produced 
to help us think about possible outcomes of present and future policies and research. 
Moreover, the use of neoclassical and classical perspectives to explain the ‘RCA’ (see Section 
3.6) showed that it was possible to generate a conceptual framework to tell how the two 
perspectives support MM development as shown in Chapters 1 and 3. The research findings 
have shown that the two perspectives are complementary, and explain policymaking and help 
policy analysis for MM and other regulatory issues. One of the significant implications of these 
theoretical perspectives is that they can serve as a productive framework from which further 
MM and their policy issues, and their effects on FE and FI, can be studied in more detail. For 
instance, deregulatory and re-regulatory policy analysis through the lenses of roll-back and 
roll-out neoliberalisation processes, and as informed by the classical and neoclassical 
perspectives in previous chapters, indicates that in Tanzania, apart from promoting MM, the 
Tanzanian Government also has a vision to enhance FI. Here I advise the government to 
consider both neoclassical and classical perspectives in their policymaking processes. Tanzania 
does not have an NFIP. It opted for an NFIF. The reason for adopting an NFIF was that it was 
easier to use different policies cutting across sectors to achieve FI goals. The NFIP is usually 
‘distributive’, ‘constituent’, ‘regulative’, or ‘redistributive’ in nature; or a combination of these. 
According to Lowi (1972:300), Lowi (1964:713), Greenberg (1977:534), and Hult (2015), 
policymaking is about choosing these options. Based on the Tanzanian situation, the NFIP 
would be hard to implement across the different sectors of the economy and I agree that the 
NFIF remains the best strategy for FI policies in Tanzania. Hence, the use of classical and 
neoclassical perspectives for policymaking supports better NFIF. This will also support the 
PPPIs and the ‘consultative policymaking processes’ that Tanzania has created for its NFIF, as 








8.5.2 Methodological Implications 
Although the research methods used in this study were not entirely new, they were combined 
in ways that were rarely used previously. In particular, the use of in-depth unstructured 
interviews, focus groups and selected secondary sources for statistics was unique. It gave me 
the possibility to unveil previously hidden details, as the in-depth unstructured interviews 
allowed the respondents to respond to the questions, as well as to add to the details further 
information they deemed relevant. 
Moreover, the method of analysis as detailed in Chapter 4, started with interview transcriptions, 
and the identification of possible themes using the ‘thematic analytical method’. This method 
facilitated the process of extracting themes from the interviews to help answer the main 
research questions, and then creating a useful thematic map for further data analysis. The 
thematic analysis proved to be useful when putting together arguments to strengthen the 
research findings. The interview transcripts, and the data from various selected secondary 
sources provided both primary and secondary logic that was needed to explain the research 
findings. The methods provided transparent ways to ensure the acceptability, reliability, and 
validity of the research findings and their explanations. Hence, the methods used for this 
research have shown to be quite effective at providing data and at facilitating the analysis of 
data and the findings. 
8.6 Research Recommendations 
Research into MM growth and development and its role in moderating FE and increasing FI is 
still in its initial stages. This study is distinctive because it contributes to the overall body of 
knowledge related to MM growth through inclusive neoliberal policies to moderate factors of 
FE to increase FI. However, further research related to these areas needs to be done. 
More research with more case studies is needed to facilitate the generalisability of my research 
findings. As reported earlier, my findings apply to Tanzania due to the qualitative methods 
used, and in order to claim that the findings are applicable elsewhere, further research is needed. 
Studies in neoliberalism and MM growth will help assist in determining more ways of making 
financial services more inclusive, and in reaching remote and financially-excluded people. 
Furthermore, studies that distinguish between the non-deposit and deposit-taking institutions 
will help create strategies or policies to further enhance FI through the NFIF. As MM matures, 




and neoclassical perspectives to justify the relevance of new policies, strategies, and 
regulations. 
Additional research is needed to expand on the new emerging factors of FE and FI. There is an 
ongoing transformation of the banking and financial sectors. As MM matures, and as the world 
shifts from a neoliberal political economy to other forms of political economies, we need to 
understand what new alternatives will be employed in pursuit of inclusive development, a new 
political economy, and how access to formal financial services for financially-excluded people 
changes over time.  
Likewise, more research is needed to perceive the patterns of changes in the banking sector 
and its continuous response to the increasing levels of FI brought about by new technologies 
and innovations such as fintech technologies. At the same time, as NPSs change, new 
regulations will arise, and new ways of delivering financial services will also emerge. How to 
allocate and distribute these services is also what needs to be researched to ensure that the 
political economy of FI and development benefits each segment of the adult population. 
Finally, the different roles of various FI stakeholders, both at national and international levels, 
need to be investigated. An expanded study would expose any tensions or new emerging 
interests, ideas, and institutions. The three analytical tools are also vital in determining 
emerging any changes in the political economy of MM, banking, FE, and FI. 
8.7 Contribution to Knowledge 
Contribution to knowledge comes in two forms, namely: contribution to literature and 
theoretical contribution. See Sections 8.7.1 and 8.7.2. I will start this section by detailing what 
I mean by contribution to knowledge before detailing theoretical and literature contributions to 
research from this Ph.D. In addition to the recommendations for future research as detailed in 
Section 8.6, my research has made three key contributions to the literature on neoliberalism, 
MM growth, FE, and FI. The research combines and integrates these areas, which is relatively 
new. The related literature usually takes aim at one research area. My research, therefore, is 
one of the very few research works that simultaneously investigate these issues. This type of 
literature is new and is still developing, for instance, literature on neoliberalism that explains 
MM is hard to find. My research provides this literature. 
Furthermore, MM is just over a decade old; its development and the reaction of banking 




especially at a time when fintech and digital platforms have become the key channels for 
financial service delivery. My study should contribute doubly to the understanding of the 
process that helped MM development and growth in Tanzania, and perhaps elsewhere.  
The theoretical framework I used depended much on classical and neoclassical perspectives 
and their relationship to neoliberal roll-back and roll-out policies which created a conducive 
environment for the advent and growth of MM services. Of importance is also the notion of 
inclusive neoliberalism, which is always overlooked. The dissertation contributes to the 
literature that demonstrates the inclusive role of neoliberalism through MM to help it moderate 
the factors of FE, and therefore, increase rates of FI. Although there were studies that 
researched inclusive neoliberalism (Porter and Craig, 2004; Craig and Porter, 2003), these 
studies did not elaborate on the role of inclusive neoliberalism and how it energised the efforts 
to eradicate FE and make FI a global agenda as depicted in Chapter 2. Some literature tends to 
focus on inclusive finance and economic growth (Corrado and Corrado, 2017; Abor et al., 2018; 
Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2017). It is hard to find research works linking neoliberalism with MM. 
Likewise, my research contributes to the literature as follows. Firstly, it deviates from 
mainstream African mobile literature, which mostly employs qualitative and microeconomic 
assessments (Jonathan and Camilo, 2008; Merritt, 2010; Demombynes and Thegeya, 2012). 
This research adds more value to the above literature by including the empirical 
macroeconomic assessment of what contributes to the growth of MM. Secondly, the research 
uses MM data used in various official documents such as the FinScope Surveys, InterMedia 
Surveys, GSMA statistics, World Bank data, the supply-side report, the first and second NFIF 
documents as well as the evaluation document of the NFIFs. By doing so, the data has been 
rigorously studied, checked, and verified to make the analysis of MM more credible. Thirdly, 
the increasing collaboration trend between the MNOs and banks to serve low-income and 
financially-excluded people through mobile innovations increases the importance of this study 
and follow-up studies in the future in the political-economic, and development sense. 
Finally, my investigation of the NFIF and the role of the different stakeholders in supporting 
MM and FI increased the originality of my study. Although its application started in 2014 
(TNCFI, 2014), the NFIF and its impact on FI and MM remains a topic for research, mainly 
because Tanzania does not have an NFIP. It depends much on the NFIF to implement various 




development. Therefore, I hope that the findings of my study could attract other researchers' 
attention to the issues discussed in this dissertation.  
8.7.1 Contribution to Literature  
Gaps in the existing empirical literature drive part of my research. I have used systematic 
literature reviews to identify these gaps. The following are the systematic and standard 
literature reviews I have used: Kim et al. (2018), Duncombe and Boateng (2009), Dahlberg et 
al. (2008), Lwoga and Sangeda (2019), Diniz et al. (2011), Zaremohzzabien et al. (2014), 
Thapa and Saebo (2014), Duncombe (2016), Alampay and Moshi (2018), Dahlberg et al. 
(2015); De Albuquerque at al. (2014), Dennehey and Sammon (2015), Dobbie and Gillepsie 
(2010), Duvendack (2020), Fernández-Olit et al. (2020), Koku (2015), Leite et al. (2019), 
Mbuyisa and Leonard (2017), Nan et al. (2020), Shaikh and Karjaluoto (2015), Slade et al. 
(2013), Zewge et al. (2017), Johnson et al. (2015), Donner and Escobar (2020), Avgerou 
(2010), and Karsen et al. (2019). This body of literature and systematic reviews demonstrates 
that there was a gap in knowledge in terms of linking together FE, FI, neoliberalism, and MM. 
At its early stage, researchers find it challenging to theorise MM, which makes it hard to fill in 
some existing knowledge gaps (Duncombe and Boateng, 2009; Kim et al., 2018). Moreover, 
current literature tends to shy away from political-economic issues and solutions, which can 
help advance MM research and its links to FE and FI in Tanzania and elsewhere. The literature 
to support FE in Tanzania is rare, let alone how to link it with neoliberal realities and political-
economic theoretical perspectives. These issues cannot be ignored, and I hope that the 
knowledge I have generated while putting together the empirical evidence of my interviews 
and other secondary sources has contributed to knowledge and literature in this field. Using 
literature and systematic reviews to identify the gaps has helped me to ensure that the literature 
gap I have identified exists beyond any doubts. 
It is worth noting that the empirical data, knowledge and literature generated from this research 
will direct researchers to find unexplored areas of analysis. The literature and knowledge 
gathered in this dissertation will also prove useful to researchers and policymakers desiring to 
have a better understanding of MM, neoliberalism, FI and FE. As a result, it is possible to use 
the knowledge and literature included in this research to improve MM debates and issues of 
theorising its problems. Researchers can also benefit from using the knowledge and a body of 
literature used to advance the arguments of this dissertation to detect scarcely analysed areas 
and to engage in political-economic debate on neoliberalism, MM, FE and FI. It is also worth 




and literature, its usefulness, contribution, and academic value should be noted as it is intended 
to advance knowledge and literature in this field of study. Most of the literature that build 
concepts and arguments for this research have been provided in Chapter 2. 
To show the gaps in literature and how this researched has responded to address them, I will 
start by briefly outlining how the literature informed this research and helped it to identify the 
gaps that this research addressed. The literature as discussed in Chapter 2 and this chapter, 
supported the research to identify critical areas of investigation of literature gaps that needed 
to be addressed in terms of MM and the transition from high levels of FE to increasing levels 
of FI, as well as the theorising between neoliberal roll-back and roll-out issues. It also helped 
the research to link these issues to GPE as described in Chapters 1 and 2 (also see Sections 
1.4.1; 1.4.2; 3.3.1.2; 8.9). It also helped to identify the critical issues of investigation (see 
Appendix 4.7) and it also played a vital role in the formulation of the three main research 
questions. In some cases, also helped check the relevance of the empirical data. 
From the literature review, past research had a lot of written literature on mobile/digital 
devices, financial services and development (Kim et al., 2018; World Bank 2012a; Kpodar and 
Andrianaivo, 2011; Waverman et al., 2005; Saker and Wells, 2003; Leistert, 2013; Qiang et 
al., 2011; Aker, 2010; Duncombe and Boateng, 2009; Dahlberg et al., 2008). Also, the literature 
includes studies on MM, financial services, and FI (Peruta, 2015; Duncombe and Boateng, 
2009; Maurer, 2011; Morawczynski and Pickens, 2009; Mbiti and Weil, 2016; Donavan, 2012; 
Jack and Suri, 2011; McKay and Pickens, 2010). Also, the literature has focused more on FI 
and development (DFID, 2004; Klapper et al., 2004; Morduch and Haley, 2002; Sarma and 
Pais, 2011; Beck et al., 2007a; Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012a). The literature has also 
focused on MM and development (Mendoza and Thelen, 2008; Spence and Smith, 2010; 
USAID, 2013; GSMA, 2015a; Beck et al., 2015; Aker et al., 2016; Sekabira and Qaim, 2017; 
Chale and Mbamba, 2015; Nan, 2019). 
There is literature that focuses on mobile phones, MM, and neoliberalism (Leistert, 2013; Tyce, 
2019; Miller and Rose, 2008). There is also literature that backs the role of neoliberal, classical 
and neoclassical views on technological advancement (Comin and Hobijn, 2004; Butter and 
Hofkes, 2006; Leistert, 2013; Hurwitz and Manne, 2018; Ricardo and Jimenez, 2019; 
Sredojević, 2016). There is also literature to help understand classical and neoclassical theories 
(Fogelberg and Kulkarni, 2006; Hurwitz and Manne 2018; Pennington, 2011; Thweatt, 1988; 




Moreover, other literature unveils how neoliberal policies of deregulation and re-regulation 
emerged and survived (Edwards et al., 2012; Lockie and Higgins, 2007; Graefe, 2006; Self, 
2000; Majone, 1992; Majone, 1997). Likewise, some other literature supports inclusive 
neoliberal developments (Klak et al., 2011; Craig and Porter, 2007; Porter and Craig, 
2004; Bergh, 2012; Kushnir, 2020; Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2010; Stiglitz, 2008; 
Konings, 2016). Madise (2019) provides excellent literature to discuss regulation and MM in 
sub-Saharan Africa by using a Malawian case study. Mooslechner et al. (2006) illustrate the 
dynamics of inclusion and exclusion as they link them to finance. As far as the theories and 
methodologies of neoliberalism are concerned, Cahil et al. (2012), Peck et al. (2012), and 
Edwads et al. (2012) provide relevant literature for this Ph.D. study. For the political economy 
of capitalism and regulations, I considered the views of the following researchers: Scott (2006), 
Booth (1997), Majone (1992), and Majone (1997). For neoliberalism and forms of exclusion 
including financialisation: Christiaens (2019a), Fama and Jensen (1983), Sassen (2010), Sassen 
(2014), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Davis and Walsh (2017), and Vogl (2017) also provided 
relevant literature. 
By considering the above literature and the literature I have used throughout this dissertation, 
I was able to map and identify my contribution to knowledge which fills in gaps in the existing 
literature. My empirical data and the literature I have used provide new evidence on inclusive 
neoliberalism and MM and how they facilitate the transformation from FE to FI that has not 
previously been published. Theoretical advances from the theoretical framework as illustrated 
in Chapters 1 and 3 help researchers to perceive inclusive neoliberalism and MM and how they 
facilitate the transition from FE to FI. This is detailed in Chapters 1, 3, and 8. Firstly, linking 
MM and FI is a political-economic concern for researchers seeking to understand the 
transformations caused by MM in Tanzania and elsewhere. Researchers should not accept these 
transformations at face value but should examine them using classical and neoclassical theories 
as well. Secondly, the issues of neoliberal roll-back and roll-out policies on the one hand, and 
classical and neoclassical perspectives on the other, are deeply interrelated. Thirdly, MM 
moderates some factors of FE, and therefore facilitates FI.   
Most of the literature I presented earlier takes aim at one research area. This research is one of 
the few studies that simultaneously investigates the issues of neoliberalism, FE, FI, and MM. 
The research combines and integrates these areas/issues and therefore contributes knowledge 
to the existing literature. The combination of neoliberalism, FE, FI, and MM is relatively new, 




decade old. Its development and the reaction from the banking institutions it created, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 7, are new pieces of knowledge that need further research and 
dissemination at a time when fintech and digital platforms have become the essential channels 
for financial service delivery. This study contributes doubly to the literature that analyses the 
undertaking of the process that helped MM development and growth in Tanzania and, perhaps 
elsewhere. 
Furthermore, the theoretical framework this study uses as presented in Chapters 1 and 3, 
depended much on classical and neoclassical perspectives and their relationship to neoliberal 
roll-back and roll-out policies and how they created a conducive environment for the growth 
and advent of MM. This new knowledge helps researchers to explain the inclusive role of 
neoliberalism and how it facilitated the advent of MM. This body of knowledge and literature 
is hard to find. Thus, this research provides this knowledge and adds it to the existing body of 
literature. 
This research also deviates from mainstream MM literature, which employs qualitative and 
microeconomic assessments. Thus, the study adds more value to the above literature by 
including the empirical macroeconomic assessment of what contributes to the growth of MM. 
The increased collaboration between MNOs and banks to serve low-income and financially-
excluded people through mobile innovations increases the importance of this study and other 
follow-up studies in the political-economic and development sense. The inclusion of NFIF and 
the different stakeholders, as well as the classical and neoclassical perspectives supporting FI, 
increases the originality of this study. The NFIFs are rarely mentioned in academic literature, 
and the knowledge produced by this research is one of the first attempts to include them in 
academic literature. Few researchers have tried to do so (Aro-Gordon, 2017; Mihak and Singh, 
2013; Newnham, 2014; AFI, 2016b; World Bank, 2012c). Their contributions did not have 
MM and neoliberal views, and how the theories link these two together. 
The knowledge that this study has generated doubly adds value to the existing body of literature 
to support MM investigations and how they moderate some factors of FI and how they facilitate 
increasing levels of FI. To debate or engage in academic discussions about the issues mentioned 
above, the knowledge that this dissertation adds to the literature is also the role of inclusive 
neoliberal perspectives as they have been well discussed in this dissertation. Literature has 
biased other areas of investigations and forgot the above-mentioned areas of studies. The role 




of lack of access to formal financial services to financially excluded people, high costs of 
formal financial services, moderation of risk by MM services, and how MM moderated them, 
adds knowledge to the existing literature (see Chapter 6). The discussion about the CLF and 
NPSA in Tanzania also adds knowledge to the current literature on MM. The inclusion of the 
politics of FI in Tanzania and the growth of MM in Tanzania also adds value to the existing 
research (see Chapter 5). The analysis regarding the response of the banking sector to increased 
levels of FI caused by MM in Tanzania also adds value to the existing literature (see Chapter 
7).  
In this study, I reviewed the literature on FE, FI, MM, and neoliberalism, see Chapters 2 and 
4, and throughout this dissertation. I presented a discussion that deregulation (liberalisation) 
aided the advent of MM through the CLF and that re-regulation through NPSA strengthened 
MM, and that both deregulation/liberalisation and re-regulation were part of neoliberal roll-
back and roll-out respectively. I linked this experience to Tanzania. Furthermore, in Chapter 2, 
I presented details of FE and FI in Tanzania. I also offered details on classical and neoclassical 
perspectives and their supportive literature and how the different concepts link to this study. 
The local and global contexts of FE and FI are also outlined. Details on local and global 
contexts of MM are provided in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 provides details on the global standard-
setting bodies and how they facilitated MM and FI. 
8.7.2 Contribution to Theoretical Perspectives for Studying MM 
My contribution has been in terms of combining classical and neoclassical perspectives as 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 3 and throughout the dissertation to demonstrate how MM 
succeeded in moderating FE and increasing FI levels in Tanzania (also see Sections 1.4 and 
3.4; Appendix 8.3). The explanations provided to support these theoretical perspectives reveal 
that the two theoretical perspectives can be used to support inclusive neoliberal efforts to 
increase FI through MM. This evidence advances current and future academic thinking. This 
way of thinking and theorising is not only unique but also useful in providing a basis for further 
theorisation in this area. The use of literature and the application of the above theoretical 
perspectives to my study and arguments, as demonstrated throughout the dissertation, not only 
concretised the contribution mentioned above, but also made the dissertation arguments and 
the issue of inclusive neoliberalism tangible. The literature provided in Chapter 2 and in the 
subsequent paragraphs of this section demonstrates the gaps and how the above theoretical 




see in this section. Still, they failed to demonstrate the role of neoliberalism in helping MM 
thrive and how MM moderated some factors of FE to increase FI levels. Classical and 
neoclassical theoretical perspectives as employed in this study have helped fill in the above 
gaps by demonstrating the role of neoliberal roll-back and roll-out in facilitating the growth of 
MM and FI. This new way of explaining the advent and growth of MM is an essential 
contribution because MM research is in the nascent stage, and different theoretical perspectives 
to support MM studies are needed. Researchers shied away from political-economic solutions 
to help explain MM issues and the transition from FE to FI in Tanzania. I have addressed this 
issue by using classical and neoclassical perspectives. 
My research indicates that current research on the themes of MM, FI, FE, and neoliberalism or 
development are still in the nascent stage. Kim et al. (2015) concur with these views. 
Duncombe and Boateng (2009:1250) claim: 
“… overall, there is a noticeable lack-of-depth qualitative case studies that 
could provide a basis for theorising.” 
My research uses in-depth unstructured interviews and secondary sources to resolve this 
research gap and to provide a basis for theorising. They also claim that studies on mobile 
payment need more than one theory: 
“m-finance research related to the design and adoption has been fairly well 
conceptualised, drawing more strongly on approaches borrowed from 
innovation research. Conversely, needs and impact research is more 
conceptual, and consequently appears not to be following a well-defined and 
thought out research trajectory … one reason for this may be that the 
complexity of influencing factors makes it challenging for practitioners and 
researchers to conceptualise needs and assess financial impact within a single 
model-based approach” (Duncombe and Boateng, 2009:1252). (also 
see Section 3.1). 
I came across these difficulties and decided to conceptualise my research using classical and 
neoclassical perspectives around the ‘RCA’ as explained in Chapter 3. Moreover, few 
systematic research articles examine the theoretical and conceptual frameworks used to study 
MM and other related ICTs for FI and development (Kim et al., 2018; Dahlberg et al., 2008; 
Duncombe and Boateng, 2009; Diniz et al., 2011; Lwoga and Sangeda, 2019; Zaremohzzabien 
et al., 2014; Thapa and Saebo, 2014; Mbuyisa and Leonard, 2015; Duncombe, 2016). (Section 




study on MM, FE and FI issues (Fernández-Olit et al., 2020; Shaikh and Karjaluoto, 2015; 
Kabakova and Plaksenkov, 2018; Koku, 2015; Dobbie and Gillepsie, 2010; Mbuyisa and 
Leonard, 2017; Zewge et al., 2017; Duvendack, 2020; Karsen et al., 2019; Leite et al., 2019; 
Dahlberg et al., 2015; Slade et al., 2013; Dennehey and Sammon, 2015; De Albuquerque et al., 
2014). None of these essential literature works identifies any other researcher who has tried to 
study MM by using classical and neoclassical perspectives to show the transformation from FE 
to FI through neoliberal roll-back and roll-out policies. This lack of other researchers studying 
these issues jointly signifies the importance of my theoretical framework’s contribution to this 
area of study. 
According to Duncombe and Boateng (2009), no single theory provided a ‘valuable’ initial 
understanding of analysing mobile financial services. Many theories and approaches have also 
been used to study MM and its related issues (Kim et al., 2018; Dahlberg et al., 2008). Research 
approaches including theoretical and conceptual frameworks can be grouped to fit into the 
categorisation of issues addressed through the various models and approaches, including: (i) 
theoretical-based approaches which test and apply a specific theory; (ii) framework-based 
approaches, which use a framework for analysis derived from ‘a body of theoretical work’; (iii) 
model-based approaches which employ models without ‘reference to a deeper body of 
knowledge’; (iv) concept-based approaches, which use defined concepts not theoretically 
grounded; (v) category-based approaches, which prescribe a set of factors to carry out analysis 
(Duncombe and Boateng, 2009).  
Regarding MM and other Mobile Financial Services (MFSs), the conceptual frameworks seem 
to be conceptualised around innovation. Some other frameworks access the financial impact of 
MM and other digital financial services. The contexts for these studies differ from one research 
to the next, and from one country to another. In an attempt to theorise the success of M-Pesa 
innovations in Kenya, Tyce (2019) considers neoliberalism and a developmental state as forces 
working together to boost M-Pesa success. She concludes that both neoliberal and statist 
accounts fail to explain the success of the MM story in Kenya. However, this Ph.D. study has 
demonstrated that by using a classical-neoclassical theoretical framework (see Sections 1.4 and 
3.4) it is possible to show how inclusive neoliberal agenda facilitated the success of MM in 
Tanzania. The use of these theoretical perspectives is a pivotal contribution to theorising the 




According to Duncombe (2011), conceptual approaches are significant in looking at the process 
that links the use of ICTs to measures of outputs, outcomes or impacts (also see: Lwoga and 
Sangeda, 2019). These conceptual and theoretical frameworks use different theories to study 
MM. There are also individual studies that chose the use of theories or models only. Lwoga 
and Sangeda (2019) categorise theories as ‘explanatory’ and ‘predictive’. Explanatory theories 
are those focusing on social capital, socioeconomic issues, network analysis, technology 
adoption, and development. Examples of explanatory theories used to study MM and FI 
include: contingency and systems theory (Dahlberg et al., 2008); diffusion of innovations 
theory (Munyoki et al., 2015); theory of change (Aro-Gordon, 2017; Betete et al., 2018) etc. 
Predictive theories, on the other hand, tend to focus on microeconomic analysis. These may 
include the issues of supply and demand, issues with poor and financially-excluded people, 
financial deepening, connectivity, and economic growth (see: Lwoga and Sangoda, 2019; 
Duncombe and Boateng, 2009). 
The systematic reviews on MM, development, and FI on the one hand (Kim et al., 2018; 
Dahlberg et al., 2008; Duncombe and Boateng, 2009; Diniz et al., 2011), and the systematic 
reviews on the ICTD on the other hand (Lwoga and Sangeda, 2019; Zaremohzzabien et al., 
2014; Thapa and Saebo, 2014; Mbuyisa and Leonard, 2015; Duncombe, 2016), facilitate the 
process of finding the theoretical and methodological gaps for my research topic. Their findings 
reveal that no study has used classical and neoclassical theories together to study neoliberalism 
and how it facilitated the growth of MM and its role in moderating FE and increasing FI. The 
inclusion of classical and neoclassical theoretical perspectives makes this Ph.D. study unique. 
(see Section 8.2).  
Neoliberalism and MM in Tanzania, and how it facilitated the transformation from FE to FI, is 
a new topic. It has not systematically been documented anywhere to my knowledge. Moreover, 
theorising about roll-back and roll-out and their linkage to FE and FI on the one hand, and 
classical and neoclassical perspectives, on the other hand, is new.   
In Chapter 3, I started by identifying existing critical literature on the conceptual and theoretical 
perspectives, and other related ICT for development, FI and FE issues. By doing so, I 
recognised the gaps and proposed the theoretical framework as a bridge. I also discussed the 
different theoretical perspectives on neoliberalism. I selected the RCA as appropriate for this 
research. Classical and neoclassical views guided the approach of this research to investigate 




the theoretical framework and how they applied to my crucial research issues to help answer 
the main research questions. Most conceptual and theoretical frameworks I came across with 
did not bring together the puzzle of neoliberalism and MM growth for FI through classical and 
neoclassical views (also see Appendix 8.3 for selected theoretical approaches used to study FE, 
FI, MM). The theoretical framework used in this research brings these issues together. By doing 
so, it distinguishes itself from previous conceptual and theoretical frameworks used to study 
MM. The used theoretical framework provides an understanding of neoliberalism and its role 
in the growth of MM via rolling-back and rolling-out policies. This body of knowledge is new 
and adds knowledge to the existing literature review. 
I will close this section by summarising the relevance of the contributions as mentioned above. 
Existing theoretical approaches and frameworks tend to shy away from political-economic 
solutions or explanations of MM and the transition from FE to FI in Tanzania, let alone 
literature – in the academic sense on - FE and Tanzania is rare. Not much has been done 
academically despite the presence of increasing peer-reviewed articles on FI as well as the 
reports on FI and FE research conducted through FinScope and InterMedia surveys (also see: 
FinScope, 2006; FinScope, 2009; FinScope, 2013a; and FinScope, 2018; InterMedia, 2014a; 
InterMedia, 2014b; InterMedia, 2016; InterMedia, 2017; InterMedia, 2018). Researchers have 
found it hard in some cases to explain the role of neoliberalism in facilitating FI (also see: Tyce, 
2019). In addressing this gap, this research raises awareness, and it contributes to theoretical 
knowledge that includes classical and neoclassical perspectives and how they inform neoliberal 
roll-back and roll-out policies in facilitating the transformation from high levels of FE to 
increasing levels of FI. The role of MM in catalysing this transformation is hard to ignore in 
GPE and development studies. 
8.8 Autobiographical Reflection 
Doing this Ph.D. research helped me to not only broaden my knowledge of the researched topic, 
but also to gain invaluable research skills that I will use in my future teaching and researching 
career. I gained valuable understanding of what it means to conduct research as well as what it 
means to analyse various policies and research findings. Research, indeed, is a complex and 
tiring experience, with some critics being helpful, while others being unhelpful. Research can 
be frustrating and tedious, but it is also an opportunity to distinguish oneself in the field, which 




Moreover, the research helped me to view the world through multiple lenses, and thus, it 
advanced my expertise in the areas of neoliberalism, MM, and the issues of FE and FI. It also 
helped me to perceive my professional values and beliefs, putting me in a position to be able 
to explore possible changes to the above-mentioned areas in the future. I have begun to believe 
in making neoliberal policies more inclusive and in using the classical and neoclassical 
perspectives to even advocate for more inclusive policies. In summary, the research process 
has prepared me for becoming one of the critical researchers in the future. 
8.9 The Importance of This Research to the GPE? 
In 2008, the World Bank Annual Report, namely, ‘Finance for All’, emphasised the 
significance of FI. That move created inclusive markets. It shifted the global development 
paradigm from the Washington Consensus agenda to the ‘post-Washington Consensus’ agenda 
(Gabor and Brooks, 2017). The global inclusive markets agenda also moved the focus from 
microcredit and microfinance services to a wide range of financial products and services 
(Gabor and Brooks, 2017; Soederberg, 2013). The concept of inclusive finance also emerged. 
It made formal financial services available to broader segments of society at affordable costs 
to reverse FE (Corrado and Corrado, 2017). Global and inclusive financial institutions also 
emerged. The likes of AFI, Better Than Cash Alliance, several G20 initiatives, etc., all worked 
to build national and global inclusive financial systems (AFI, 2014, Goodwin-Groen, 2016). 
With the G20 agenda to foster global finance-led capitalism and with the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation, Omidyar, and other philanthropic initiatives to finance inclusive financial 
initiatives, new digital financial technologies emerged to foster inclusive financial services. 
MM is one of them. As demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 5, access to formal financial services 
increased throughout the world, providing opportunities to low-income and financially 
marginalised people. MM has increased FI significantly in developing countries empowering 
people to exploit better economic and financial possibilities. Thus, FI drives global economies 
on a sustainable growth trajectory. Hence, these issues are of paramount importance to GPE, 
and this research contributes to the GPE scholarship by studying Tanzania’s MM, 
neoliberalism, and the transformation from FE to FI.  
8.10 Behind the Empirical Data 
From the empirical data I collected, 100% of the respondents agreed that MM facilitated FI. 
Nearly 100% of the respondents agreed that the role of the BOT in providing leadership for 




of regulators such as the TCRA, FCC, TIRA, and TRA in facilitating FI in their respective 
industries in collaboration with the BOT. Nearly all sixty elite respondents from the five 
regulatory authorities and some other vital respondents from research institutions, banking, and 
MM sectors recognised the role of neoliberalism. Due to the word limit, I could only directly 
quote eleven of the elite interviewees who had the most relevant data (I have also used some 
extracts from eight low-income respondents in Chapter 6 to substantiate some of their views 
and support the research findings).  
The elite interviews produced original data that I used to inform the arguments of my thesis. 
The elites were policymakers and leaders in their organisations, associations, and institutions. 
They implemented FI or MM strategies. They worked at senior and technical professional 
levels, and their actions affected policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation. The 
majority were in the committees, as depicted in NFIFs. Some of the elite interviewees attended 
those meetings regularly by invitation. The respondents had or were still working with the 
following organisations: BOT, TCRA, FCC, TIRA, TRA, FSDT, MoF, Selcom, Maxicom-
Malipo, AirtelMoney, TigoPesa, Vodacom M-Pesa, HaloPesa, Zantel-EasyPesa, TTCLPesa, 
ACCESS, AKIBA, Amana, BCX, CBA, NBC, NMB, DANIDA, DCB, Exim, FINCA, FIU, 
TBA, TIA, TPB, UDSM, Umoja-Switch, USAID-ASPIRE, WS Technology Consulting Office 
and a SACCO. From the insurance sector, respondents came from Alliance Insurance, GStar, 
Milvik, Mo Insurance, and Resolution. 
Also, I randomly selected twenty low-income individuals on the Dar-es-Salaam streets who 
varied from a woman selling food on the road to a ‘bodaboda’ driver. The purpose was to 
quickly check if the empirical data from the ‘elites’ matched with their experiences. I found 
out that 100% of the low-income respondents agreed that MM empowered them and that 
without MM, life would be tough for them as they depended much on sending and receiving 
money to and from their families. They also depended on microloans to meet their everyday 
demands. Surprisingly most of them used TigoPesa, followed by AirtelMoney. M-Pesa and 
Zantel were mentioned with some of them having more than two MM e-wallets with different 
providers. Zantel and Halotel were hardly mentioned because they invested heavily in other 
regions. 100% of the respondents also agreed that MM services were more convenient and less 
costly as compared to banking services. Of the twenty low-income respondents, only four had 
a bank account. The majority of the respondents did not want government intervention in MM 
business as they seemed to suggest more deregulation than re-regulation for formal financial 




this dissertation, I only used eleven elite interviews because they provided the most relevant 
information I needed (I have also used some extracts from eight low-income respondents in 
Chapter 6 to substantiate some of their views and support the research findings). See 
Appendices 4.9 and 4.10. However, all the responses from every interviewee (of the eighty-
four interviewees) had been taken into consideration. See Appendix 4.1. 
8.11 Concluding Remarks 
From the findings, we conclude that MM growth and development is key to FI, economic 
growth and development, poverty reduction, and to promoting the fight against FE. Therefore, 
neoliberal roll-out and roll-back policies along with classical and neoclassical views facilitate 
MM growth and FI. 
MM development and growth would be difficult to fathom without liberalisation, deregulation, 
privatisation, and re-regulation policies. These neoliberal policies, in the case of MM growth 
and its role in facilitating FI have been inclusive. This has been clearly demonstrated 
throughout the dissertation. The CLF and NPS regulations act as the key policies that 
consolidate MM survival and growth. The CLF supports the neutrality of technology and 
permissionless innovations using neoclassical grounds as detailed in Chapters 3 and 4. The 
concept of permissionless innovation endorses the avoidance of any legal rules or regulations 
that constrain technological advancement. By doing so, the idea of permissionless technology 
protects both individual and firm liberty which also concurs with classical views (also see: 
Hurwitz and Manne, 2018). In this regard, both classical and neoclassical views favour the 
deployment of technology to increase market efficiency. The CLF and how it has been 
implemented in Tanzania to support MM development is an excellent example of this. How 
the NPS has permitted different digital platforms to be used to facilitate MM and other financial 
services, is another example.  
High-volume and low-volume transactions and extensive networks of air time, and other 
services such as microloans through mobile devices, including the issuance of e-money and 
other mobile financial services outside the conventional bank branches, as well as the reliability 
of existing infrastructure and technology to lower costs of financial service delivery, especially 
in remote and sparsely-populated areas, have gained the attention of the policymakers. 
Policymakers are continuously seeking the creation of effective policies, legal, and regulatory 
frameworks for effective MM growth. Allowing MM growth has been a critical policy issue as 




Economic theory supports the development of the financial system to ameliorate allocation of 
resources, which is a political-economic issue, and an essential component of growth 
(Schumpeter, 1911; King and Levine, 1993; Banerjee, 2004). Likewise, there is empirical 
evidence from the development literature that demonstrates that access to formal financial 
services through savings and credit tends to reduce poverty to some degree (Burgess and Pande, 
2005; Dupas et al., 2012). There are also arguments that access to financial services smooths 
consumption and lower the costs of inclusion in economic activities (Fereira and Shady, 2009; 
Bruhn and Love, 2009; Rosenzwig and Wolpin, 1993). Modern development theories have 
identified financial markets as an essential part of the development process (Flores-Roux and 
Mouriscal, 2011). 
There is also evidence that MM has transformed the lives of many poor households through 
'mobile-based money transfer and storage'. There is evidence that the number of mobile phone 
users has surpassed the number of people with bank accounts (Demombynes and Thegeya, 
2012; Medhi and Ratan, 2009). World Bank (2014b) and CGAP (2013b) acknowledge the 
existence of social networks that mobile users use for saving and transactions to reach the poor 
who have no access to formal financial services. These networks, according to Jack and Suri 
(2011) and Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2015), render MM services cheaper and more profitable in 
developing countries. MM has triggered a FI revolution through these networks that serve 
millions of unbanked and poor adult populations. MM resists banking exclusion (Maurer, 2011) 
and moderates the factors of FE by: lowering the high prices of financial services (Donavan, 
2012; Morawczynski and Pickens, 2009); increasing proximity to financial services (Jack and 
Suri, 2011; Morawczynski and Pickens, 2009); reducing financial service risks (Gilman and 
Joyce, 2012). Some studies have demonstrated that a lack of financial services could cause 
poverty and inequality (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Beck et al., 2007b). In light of the 
conglomeration of evidence and my research findings, I confidently argued that previously 
mentioned policies of deregulation, re-regulation, liberalisation, and privatisation, which 
formed part of the neoliberal roll-back and roll-out policies, sustained MM growth. I also 
argued that MM facilitated the transition from high levels of FE to the current raising levels of 
FI. A lack of NFIP in Tanzania, has not stopped the fast pace of FI in Tanzania. The NFIFs 
have kept the key FI stakeholders together through the PPPI arrangements. This involved a 
consultative process attended by both private and public sectors to help facilitate the 
implementations of the agreed FI strategies. Through the neoclassical perspective, the PPPI 




Chapters 2 and 5, has defined the different roles of key stakeholders, including the MNOs. This 
political economy was guided by the following processes: (i) national vision building for FI; 
(ii) implementation of the formulated FI strategies; (iii) management of the results of the 
implemented FI strategies; (iv) engagement of every key stakeholder in the implementation of 
FI strategies and how the key issues were communicated; (v) resource allocation in terms of 
time, space and money. I will conclude by elaborating these key issues. 
The shared vision of the NFIF was formulated to allow the MNOs and other stakeholders to 
engage in the NFIF. This shared vision allowed financial strategies, including MM strategies, 
to receive a national priority. The vision building process was a challenge because different 
stakeholders were mandated or had legal jurisdictions that made them reluctant to get involved 
in certain developments. The question was how they could be brought together to create a 
shared vision for the NFIF. The BOT provided leadership and helped them create an NFIF 
vision without stepping out of their mandates and jurisdictions. Furthermore, the 
implementation of the FI strategies also depended on the specific mandates that the institutions 
had, as well as the flexibility they had to accommodate MM and other digital financial services. 
This is what I refer to as the politics of flexibility. They had to appreciate how their business 
models would change if they adopted these new technologies and that MM could drive or 
accelerate the growth of their businesses or increase FI. The regulators had to ensure ways 
through which financial institutions adapt and work with the fast-growing MM innovation. By 
doing so, the institutions had to manage the results generated by their involvement with MM 
or other innovations while achieving their FI goals. Likewise, monitoring and tracking the 
progress of meeting the NFIF targets were the tasks that both regulators and institutions had to 
manage. This needed the engagement of the policymakers, regulators, and financial institutions. 
With so many parties involved through the PPPI, how to communicate different results and 
decisions without triggering adverse reactions from the financial institutions or the MNOs also 
involved politics. Consequently, their engagement, as well as an effective communication 
strategy, was the essence of the NFIF. Through the NFIF, the MNOs could negotiate the 
importance of MM and different strategies to enhance its development and growth. The current 
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Appendix 4.7: Summary of the Key Documents8 
 
 

















Appendix 4.8: Some Extracts from the Research Diary to Outline the Evolution of Ideas 
While FI is regarded as a policy objective in Tanzania by the BOT (di Castri and Gidvani, 
2014), essential literature and studies on FI and MM tend to concentrate on the micro level 
rather than the macro level. FI policies or strategies at the macro level have been mostly under-
researched by researchers in this field (also see: Jonathan and Camilo, 2008; Merritt, 2010; 
Demombynes and Thegeya, 2012). This situation leads to the first purpose of this study which 
is to determine the type of political economy that led to MM’s advent and the transformation 
from high levels of FE to increasing levels of FI. The objectives of this study, as explained in 
Chapter 1, were also vital in determining how I selected the respondents or institutions I wanted 
to interview (also see Sections 4.6.3 and 4.6.4). Research questions were established (see 
Chapter 1) not to drive the research in a particular direction but to enable conversations with 
the interviewees to help select the central emerging themes (also see Appendix 4.3). It helped 
to draw some tentative conclusions after interviews about the research issues. During the 
interviews, I remained flexible to allow as many ideas and as much evidence as possible to help 
me investigate the emerging issues even further.  The responses from the respondents were 
extremely diverse. I realised later that a structured and standardised questionnaire with little 
flexibility would not be a useful tool for data collection.  
I developed the theoretical framework after I had conducted data analysis, which I did months 
after I had used the in-depth structured interviews to collect the data. Given the complexity of 
the investigated issues and the exploratory nature of this research, it made sense to develop a 
theoretical framework after I had conducted the analysis of the data. Cobbledick (1999:347) 
suggested that in-depth unstructured interviews should be flexible and that the extraction of 
data for the analysis should be carefully done to include the most relevant respondents who 
generated and revealed useful and hidden crucial data. 
As the study was exploratory, I selected 11 key elites whose explanations during the interviews 
reflected the policy issues I was investigating at a macro level (see Sections 4.6.3 and 4.6.4). 
This sample was somehow small but represented some of the diversity in the initially selected 
sample of 64 elite respondents in the area of interest. The 11 elites came from different 
institutions from the financial and telecommunications sectors or were other FI stakeholders, 
including those providing digital platforms for banks and MNOs. They were either members 
of the various committees in the NFIF, or were invited to attend the meetings of those 




perspectives, goals, tasks, and responsibilities. Also, they were all interested in how the banks 
and MNOs worked together to facilitate FI. 
The four research objectives I had shaped how I planned the interviews (see Section 1.3). 
Drawing on several years of personal research on Tanzania’s financial sector reforms, I used a 
systematic structure to guide the line of data collection and questioning in the interviews (see 
Appendix 4.3). The structure had two parts. Part 1 sought to investigate the political economy 
of FE, FI, MM, and banks. Part 2 aimed to examine the transformation from FE to FI, including 
how the regulators, banks, and MNOs responded to this transformation (see Appendix 4.3 for 
the specific questions). 
In in-depth unstructured interviews, the above structure can be referred to as ‘aide memoir’ 
(also known as an ‘agenda’) (Minichiello et al., 1990; McCann and Clark, 2005). The aide 
memoir is a tool that makes researchers remember to cover all the issues they are interested in 
during the interviews (also see: Burgess, 1984; Briggs, 2000). The structure I used during the 
interviews could come close to semi-structured interviews at times in terms of the selection of 
the key issues I wanted to explore in some specific interviews. However, the interviews 
remained unstructured in terms of the format and the range of the questions, and the order in 
which the questions were asked was not predetermined. Likewise, I did not differ from other 
unstructured interviewers because I had to ask questions focusing on the individual context of 
the conversation (on unstructured interviews see: Punch, 1998; Patton, 2002; Minichiello et al., 
1990).  
The aide memoir, as described above, helped me generate hidden, consistent and structured 
data from the different respondents, which is difficult to achieve when researchers conduct 
interviews without any pre-existing structure. The aide memoir made the data analysis easier. 
I used thematic analysis for data analysis. The thematic analysis can efficiently be conducted 
when the researcher has an idea about the possible outcomes of the findings and the structure 
of the interviews. Burgess (1984) supports these views.  
On average, the time I used to interview the respondents varied from nine minutes (for 
financially-excluded people) to two hours and thirty minutes (for the elite respondents). Other 
interviews fell in between these times. Most low-income people I interviewed had a primary 
or secondary level of education and provided short answers. They did not like to talk much. I 




particular interest during the interviews were to keep on asking to know more about specific 
topics, and to follow up with other respondents later, including reading the relevant literature 
to learn more about those issues. As these were in-depth unstructured interviews, the 
environment was more friendly, just like a discussion, where I asked open questions and 
discussed some of the raised issues. This strategy helped me to assist the interviewees in 
unveiling new and sometimes hidden information (on the strategy, also see: Moyle,2002; 
Streubert and Carpenter, 1999; Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, 2016; Kombo and Tromp, 2009). The 
research aimed to report the findings rather than elaborating on methodological concerns. 
Reporting methodological concerns could determine if other studies could be repeated in the 
future by other researchers, as they continued the work or verify the findings. Thus, I handled 
the emergent issues well by asking other respondents about those issues during other interviews 
to see their reactions and to get their responses regarding those issues. 
At the onset, the study tried to investigate MM’s political economy and the changing banking 
sector due to the transformation from FE to FI. The sample consisted of 84 respondents: 64 
elites, who worked for different institutions, and 20 low-income individuals from all walks of 
life. Follow-up interviews to collect additional data were conducted when needed. Due to 
ethical considerations and to ensure confidentiality, most interviewees’ identities were not 
revealed. The research objectives were to provide a rich account of MM growth and its advent 
as well as the transformation from high levels of FE to increasing FI in the financial sector, as 
well as the banking sector’s response to this transformation (see Chapters 5, 6, and 7). I 
intended to probe how MM started in Tanzania, how it grew, what facilitated its advent and 
growth, how it enabled FI, how it moderated the factors of FE, and how the banks reacted to 
the new entrants (MNOs) in the NPS. I did not have a preconceived theoretical framework for 
this study. I had a tentative conceptual framework that ended up changing and was replaced by 
a new theoretical framework as delineated in Chapters 1 and 3. I did not conceive the classical 
and neoclassical perspectives as the two foundations of my theoretical framework at the time I 
started this research. Neither did I think of rolling-back and rolling-out neoliberalisation as the 
two policies that helped bring about the advent of MM and, after that, allowed MM to moderate 
the factors of FE to increase FI in Tanzania. Hence, I did not have pre-defined hypotheses to 
test. I sought to understand MM, FE, FI and the banking sector’s reaction as well as to gain an 
understanding of a political economy that facilitated the growth and advent of MM and FI. I 
depended much on every respondent to help me understand the Tanzanian MM and FI realities. 




to the selection of in-depth unstructured interviews as a data collection method (see Chapter 
4). 
Interviews were conducted at different workplaces or other locations, and each lasted between 
nine minutes and two and a half hours. I did not prepare questions for each interview session. 
At the beginning of each interview, I used one of the questions from a list of questions as they 
appear in Appendix 4.3. After that, I followed up on the answers and asked new questions as 
they emerged, and as the evidence unfolded. I did focus each interview on the research purpose 
and objectives (see Section 1.3). Interviews started by the researcher asking the respondent(s) 
to describe what they do or what their institutions do, which I considered to be very general 
questions. It was a good beginning as it helped the respondent(s) to explain what they do every 
day, and it helped to break the ice, and relevant research questions followed. That question 
helped reveal contextual information about themselves or their institutions. It also presented 
me as a researcher who wanted to learn what their work or responsibilities were and what their 
institutions did.  
Hence, these general questions were used as good starting points to help engage the 
respondent(s) in the conversation (also see Appendix 4.3). I reverted to more relevant and 
challenging research questions as the interviews progressed. This is an in-depth unstructured 
interview technique (also see: Moyle,2002; Streubert and Carpenter, 1999; Sutcliffe-
Braithwaite, 2016; Kombo and Tromp, 2009). This led the discussions toward more relevant 
and specific research questions to unveil the issues of MM, FE, FI, and the response of the 
banking sector. This technique of questioning and interviewing facilitates not only the 
engagement of the respondent(s), but also led to more focused conversations. There were many 
different questions used for each interview, depending on the issues discussed in those 
interviews. I captured the interviews by recording through a Dictaphone and on very few 
occasions by writing down the answers when the respondent(s) refused to be recorded. This 
situation was repeated three times. I also transcribed the interviews for the analysis. It took 
about three months and it was a time-intensive and consuming task. From the transcripts, it 
was clear that unstructured interviews produced varying data from one session to another, 
which helped construct the Ph.D. story about MM, FE, FI, and the response of the banking 
sector. I used a thematic analysis technique for data analysis, which enabled me to select the 
key themes and content emerging from the interviews (especially from well-informed 




and link the different emerging themes and concepts. Then, those codes turned into themes. 
Those themes helped me build my Ph.D. story and created the relevant research objectives for 
this Ph.D. study. From these research objectives, literature review, and interviews in Phase 1 
and other emerging themes in phases 2 and 3 of the interviews, the three research questions 
emerged (see Section 1.3). I had to answer these research questions by reading the interview 
transcripts, literature reviews and other follow-up interviews. 
When I chose unstructured interviews, I intended to use them to study complex policy and 
political-economic issues leading to the transition from FE and FI, including the advent of MM 
and the banking sector response. The in-depth unstructured interviews provided detailed 
descriptions of the researched issues. I used these details to design and to write this Ph.D. 
dissertation.  
Phases Involved in In-Depth Unstructured Interview Sessions 
Phase 1: 
I used three phases in conducting in-depth unstructured interviews: first, I interviewed eight 
low-income people near the Tandika Daladala Station to have an idea of MM, FI, FE, and 
banking issues. The interviewees included four small MM agents: a ‘mama ntilie’ (a woman 
selling food on the streets), a car mechanic, a ‘muuza kashata’ (candy seller), and a ‘daladala’ 
driver (commuter bus driver). Second, after interviewing in Tandika, I interviewed other 
respondents near the Makumbusho area. I interviewed two elites: an MM platform expert and 
a senior employee of a big aggregator company. I also interviewed an MM super-agent at the 
Mnazi Mmoja area. As listed above, in Phase 1, I interviewed 11 respondents ranging from 
low-income and financially-excluded people to an MM platform expert. These were 
unstructured interviews. This first phase of interviews helped me build an understanding of 
Tanzania’s MM, FI, FE, and banking sector issues. It also helped me develop a sampling 
strategy based on what I heard from the first 11 respondents. This first phase strengthened the 
sampling strategy that I prepared before arriving in Tanzania (see Section 4.6). 
Phase 2:  
Before arriving in Tanzania, I wrote down a list of who I had to interview (see Section 4.6). I 
also prepared tentative interview questions to help me investigate further the issues of my 




were there to consider asking them if I had to. Having in mind what I prepared before arriving 
in Tanzania, and what I got from the first phase of interviews, I furthered the investigations in 
Phase 2 where I interviewed 62 elite professionals from different institutions to understand the 
various policy issues affecting MM, FE, FI, and aspects of the banking sector. The results from 
this stage of interviewing brought the focus down to policy and political-economic issues that 
facilitated MM, FI, moderation of FE, and the banking sector’s response to the increasing levels 
of FI caused by MM. 
After the first 14 interviews, which included TTCL as an MNO, and FINCA and AMANA 
Banks, I reached out to the senior policymakers. They included the MoF, BOT and TCRA 
officials.  I reached out first to the BOT senior officials; the first interview was with the policy 
people, and the second interview was with NPS experts and the senior TCRA official. Before 
meeting with the senior TCRA official, I met with TigoPesa officials. In this order, I had met 
with the two MNOs (TTCL and TigoPesa) before I met with TCRA. These two meetings 
helped me to understand some of the MM challenges before I met TCRA as the regulator. 
Furthermore, I met with the remaining four MNOs (HalotelPesa, Vodacom M-Pesa, 
AirtelMoney, and Zantel - EasyPesa) after I had met with the TCRA. I also met with ten banks 
(FINCA, AMANA, AKIBA, TPB, NBC, DCB, EXIM, CBA, ACCESS, and NMB) before I 
met with a respondent from TBA and the former BOT governor. By the time I met a respondent 
from TBA and the former BOT governor, I had interviewed the respondents from all six MNOs 
and respondents from at least eight banks. I had also met with the BOT, MoF, FIU, TCRA, 
FSDT, and the World Bank. These interviews helped me to follow up with the issues I learned 
from all of the above respondents by asking the former governor, who was the chief 
policymaker, and the NFIC chairperson, on the one hand, and with the TBA respondent on the 
other. The governor was key in bringing into perspective everything I had learned before 
meeting him. Meeting the governor was a turning point, as I started to understand the critical 
policy issues and how I would need to analyse them to write a meaningful dissertation. He also 
advised me to meet with a few people as well. Thus, I ended up meeting with donors such as 
DANIDA, USAID, FCC, and the insurance institutions, including TIRA, TIA, Resolution, MO 







Phase 3:  
I implemented Phase 3 in two different stages. The first stage was interviewing 13 low-income 
people, and the USAID-ASPIRES and -ENGINE teams as one of the development donors. 
During these interviews, I wanted to know what the low-income people knew about MM, FI, 
and banking issues. I also wanted to check what I had learned from the elites was what low-
income people acknowledged. I also wanted to know from one of the donors about FI and MM 
in Tanzania, and what they think about MM, FE, FI, and the banking sector response. The 
second stage of this phase was to conduct follow up interviews on the critical policy issues 
with the former BOT governor and the former chairperson of the NFIC, two respondents from 
FSDT, and one of the financial sector’s prominent authors who also worked with the BOT. 
These interviews helped me to clarify some of the critical policy issues I did not understand 
when I conducted other interviews earlier. It was during this stage that I was also introduced to 
the essential and official documents on FI in Tanzania, such as FSDT (2017), TNCFI (2017a), 
TNCFI (2017b), and TNCFI (2018). 
Other Qualitative Data from Other Respondents (other than the 11 Elites) and How It 
Has Informed the Research’s Perspectives and Findings 
The three phases explained above, 1 demonstrated who I met and how my thinking kept on 
developing from one interview to another. See the earlier sections above to know the sequence 
of how the interviews occurred. I used Phase 1 as a pilot. I was trying to understand the issues 
that low-income and financially-excluded individuals had, so I could seek policy and 
theoretical perspectives and clarifications when I met with policymakers, MNOs, banks, and 
other FI stakeholders (see Section B.2). 
From the interviews in Phase 1, the following issues were raised: first, taxation was not an issue 
when mobile money started as the government did not impose taxes. In 2017, the government 
began imposing taxes, and MM users felt this taxation. It turned out that taxation was low and 
fair. However, for a financially-excluded individual, even a dime was too much. I explained 
these issues in Section 5.5. Second, the agent factor emerged. Agents are of two kinds: small 
agents and super agents. They both help the MNOs reach the financially-excluded people easily 
(also see Sections 6.4.2.1.1, 7.4, 7.7.2, and 7.8 to understand the role of agents and their 
contributions to these academic debates). Third, of the 11 respondents I interviewed in Phase 




respondents demonstrated that not only was FE a problem, but it also illustrated that MM 
moderated some factors of FE and increased FI, as discussed in Chapter 6. Fourth, I also 
discovered during the Phase 1 interviews that MM users not only deposited, withdrew and 
transferred money, but also saved, got microloans, and paid bills and utilities using mobile 
financial services. The microloans were also becoming a working capital for some financially-
excluded individuals. I discussed these issues in Section 6.4.3. Fifth, the issues of KYCs also 
emerged. Some of them contributed to FE the financially-excluded people lacked IDs or the 
documentation they needed to open an account with a bank. It appeared that MM services had 
less strict KYCs that attracted many financially-excluded individuals to start using MM 
services. The TTCL interview brought in the factors and challenges of operating MM services 
in Tanzania. I used some of the knowledge I got in the interview also to write Chapters 5 and 
6 to explain MM’s advent and growth in Tanzania. 
Phase 2 
During Phase 2, I learned that the critical issues for the research I was conducting were situated 
around the CLF and the NPS. The CLF has been detailed in Chapters 3 and 5 (see Sections 
3.7.3 and 5.4.2). I also detailed the NPS in Chapters 3 and 5 (also see Sections 3.7.4 and 5.4.4). 
It emerged that the CLF facilitated MM advent during the deregulation and liberalisation of the 
telecommunications sector, also referred to as the roll-back era. In this dissertation. The CLF 
was used as a tool to advance the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector and added 
value to the mobile phone services, which gave rise to MM services: 
“The best thing that the TCRA did a while ago was creating what was referred to as the ‘Converged 
Licensing Framework’ … That Framework I am talking about 2006 or 2007. The issuance of the 
license to every service, as technology has changed over time. We issued converged licenses since 
2006. They said they provided a license that was technologically and service neutral. What did all 
this mean? … They are free to do any innovation based on the licensing framework. As I said earlier, 
it is converged and that we do not regulate the technology. We do not regulate the service …. Hence, 
mobile money was like an addition to the services offered by the operators” (Senior Telecom 
Sector Official). 
At the same time, the NPS was flexible to allow services outside the banking sectors to offer 
formal financial services to financially-excluded people. There was a need to regulate the 
financial sector to enable fair competition between the banks and the MNOs. This phenomenon 




Eh, you know, the central bank is an authority. It has authority over banking and payment 
systems. Eh, the MNOs which provide mobile money services use the payment system and 
become part of the payment system. They are not doing banking business. And we made it clear 
from the very beginning about these two different roles as the banks objected of course. They 
objected from the very beginning, arguing that the MNOs were entering the money business. 
They argued that MNOs use the payment system. They complained that the MNOs did not have 
appropriate supervision and requirements while using the payment system. The banks had strict 
supervision and requirements. In which case, they saw it clearly, that lack of strict supervision 
and requirements created conditions for unfair competition. And as they learned from 
elsewhere, mobile money services could be under the banks … Therefore, this National 
Payment System Act, eh, came after we have gone through all these experiences and the NPSA 
provided the legal space for mobile money activities (Former BOT Governor). 
It became clear from the interviews in Phase 2 that the CLF and NPS were the two main 
bedrock foundations for this research. This is reflected in every chapter of this dissertation. 
Whether it is the ‘test, monitor and regulate’ approach, interoperability issues, barriers to FI, 
or the banking sector’s response to increasing levels of FI through MM, the CLF and NPS 
perspectives could explain these issues. The interviews in this phase helped me to come up 
with the theorising of these issues and facilitated locating of the literature gaps. Of course, as 
you will see in the dissertation, I also had to depend on the literature to explain the theorising 
of these issues (see Chapters 1 and 3). However, the interviews led me to conclude that roll-
back and roll-out neoliberalisation processes catalysed the advent of MM and its growth as 
well as facilitating how MM moderated some factors of FE to increase FI in Tanzania. Through 
literature, I could explain this thinking through classical and neoclassical perspectives, as 
demonstrated throughout this dissertation. Some respondents could also help this research 
explain the advent of MM and its growth in Tanzania (in Chapter 5), the moderation of factors 
of FE (in Chapter 6), and the banking sector’s response (in Chapter 7). Some of the ideas and 
knowledge from the interviews were incorporated and included in these chapters, even though 
the quotations were not provided. They claimed that the impact of MM was massive and has 
helped to change their lives. 
Phase 3 
During Phase 3, I sought to understand if what I heard from Phase 2 was correct and 
convincing. I had to go back to low-income and financially-excluded individuals and to one of 
the donors (USAID) to understand how they perceived MM and FI in Tanzania. I asked the 




services. Most of the respondents did not have bank accounts, but the selection was random. 
and I did not know whether they had a bank account. I also did not know if they had an MM 
account either. Of the 10 low-income respondents I had interviewed in this phase, eight 
respondents used MM services, and only two had bank accounts. 
The respondents agreed that MM services were empowering them financially: 
“For me, Tigo services, especially 'Tigo Timiza'. Therefore, 'Timiza' has helped me and have 
facilitated in smoothing my financial shocks and issues. I remember I had problems with paying 
rents. I had no money. I got a loan from them. I was able to pay my rents. Now I live better with 
my kids. Airtel is the MNO that has helped me to meet my financial needs” (Fisher - Low 
Income Respondent).  
 
“Although there are challenges here and there, mobile money services have provided us with 
affordable financial services. We can now save and deposit small amounts. It does help because 
you save in a small amount to make it a significant amount. Your savings stay there, and you 
will use that in the future” (Mbwana – Low-Income Commuter Daladala Bus 
Driver). 
 
“Mobile money technology has helped to change people’s lives. The impact is massive. Without 
mobile money, making ends meet would be very challenging for some people. At times, you 
are at work, and someone at home needs money. If it were not mobile money, you would leave 
the workplace to go home. With mobile money, you still stay at work and continue working 
while you send money home through your mobile phone device” (Emanuel - Low-Income 
Respondent): 
“As I have mentioned earlier, mobile money has become part and parcel of our lives. Thus, 
people have made these transactions part of their lives. Whether it is a boss in the office or a 
passerby, everyone walks with his mobile phone and has a float on the phone. He wants to buy 
things when he gets to the shop. It is an alternative of you holding cash in your hand or an 
alternative to a bank card. Now, they use mobile money … He comes to an agent to withdraw 
200,000 TShs and goes to buy what he wants. It has become part of our lives” (Noorah - MM 
Agent). 
 Most of them did not consider banking services an option as they thought their incomes were 




and other utilities. They also used MM to send money to their families and loved ones. They 
also received money from their families and friends: 
Researcher: Who is helping you the most? The MNO or the banks? 
 
Mbwana (Bus Driver): Airtel money. Airtel money. 
 
Researcher: It seems like you don’t often use bank services. 
 
Mbwana (Bus Driver): I have never used the bank services. 
 
Researcher: That is fine. It seems like mobile money, and this Airtel money serves better low-
income people.  
 
Mbwana (Bus Driver): Yes. If you follow their conditions and take loans and pay on time, you 
get money and you can finance your small business, then yes, they serve us better.   
 
Researcher: What I get from you is that the MNOs serve the low-income people and that the 
low-income people like to use them. This is real. It is not a fabrication of publicity from them. 
Isn’t it?  
 
Mbwana (Bus Driver): That is true.  
Some of them used MM to accept transactions when cash was not available. They felt the 
burden of taxation and other charges and could recommend their removal:  
“I use the Tigo service. TigoPesa helps me. When I want to send money to my village, I do so 
easily. It has simplified these financial services. The government has increased taxation, so they 
have increased service charges. At times, I have to use AirtelMoney services. It helps. 
AirtelMoney charges seem to be lower” (Fisher – Low-Income Respondent). 
Another respondent a bus driver also echoed these views: 
Mbwana (Bus Driver): I think the agent services could be improved. For instance, when I send 
10,000 shillings the commission and taxes are also charged. So, I have to send 11,500 for the 
receiver to received 10,000. These expenses can be a challenge to those living in villages.  
 





Mbwana (Bus Driver): Here in Dar es Salaam the charges are not an issue. I am not sure about 
those living in the villages. Based on the low-incomes, I assume that any increase in charge 
affects them somehow.  
 
Researcher: Do you think there are different rates for urban and rural areas? 
 
Mbwana (Bus Driver): I don't think so. It is just me thinking about the economic activities in 
these two areas and the residents' income levels in these two areas with different development 
levels. 
Most low-income respondents thought that the government should not interfere with blocking 
MM, but figured it could use its powers to improve how MM served financially-excluded and 
low-income people. They confirmed that MM helped to bring formal financial services close 
to low-income and financially-marginalised individuals. They also reaffirmed the importance 
of agents as a link between MNOs and financially-excluded people. Seven out of 10 low-
income respondents in this phase also claimed to have used MM for saving purposes:  
“I am self-employed selling ‘kashata’ (candy) and other small items. I get some little money. Yes, I get 
something. I walk and stroll-out selling candies. In this way, I get money to eat and survive. I use 
AirtelMoney a lot. I just like Airtel. I started using it since I owned my first mobile phone. I have stayed 
with Airtel, and I have not changed to getting another line with Tigo or Zantel. It helps me to send money. 
To save, I put money on my phone. In short, it helps me as I do not have a bank account. Mobile money 
helps small traders like me to get a wide range of financial services” (Gaston - Low-Income 
Respondent). 
Low-income respondents thought that MM was good for the country’s development and 
credited globalisation/neoliberalisation for MM technology development. They reaffirmed the 
availability of microloans and how they would get microloans. In short, they preferred MM 
services over banking services. 
“I credit globalisation/neoliberalism for mobile money success. Second, any developing 
country must change to develop. How? Nobody succeeds right from the beginning. We started 
slowly by buying vouchers for airtime. Then, we call. In the past, for instance, we used TRITEL. 
During that time, there were no mobile money services. However, people added money through 
vouchers, and you needed to buy a significant amount of airtime using a voucher. These days 
they have lowered the costs, and we have mobile money. We can put 3,000 or 5,000 TSh on 





“If I meet someone walking with money, I will tell them to put that money in a bank, but more 
likely, I will encourage them to use mobile money. You have it there, and you can use it at any 
time and faster. You own the phone even when you are in bed sleeping, and you can still make 
transactions while at home. If you have TigoPesa, you directly and quickly go to buy some rice 
to cook. It is convenient and easy to use these services” (Said – Low-Income 
Respondent). 
“A lot of banks in Tanzania still have minimum balance requirements for account owners. That 
minimum balance is 10,000 TSh. For a person who earns an average of 40,000 TSh a month, 
10,000 TSh is a lot of money. It is a fourth of what they are supposed to spend. So having that 
10,000 TSh in a bank account is a lot of money. So, we don’t have 10,000 balance requirements 
for mobile money. You don’t need 10,000 TSh to stay active with mobile money (Financial 
Sector Official). 
Also, I interviewed the USAID (ENGINE and ASPIRES Programmes) to follow up with what 
I had learned about development donors in Phase 2. From Phase 2, I realised that donors did 
not support MM innovation with the same interest they had in other development projects. Of 
course, it got the DFID support to materialise operationally. The experts who initially created 
those systems were Tanzanians and not Kenyans. They were called the e-Fulusi. Their first role 
was to back up innovation with risk, and risk that the private sector itself could not take.  
“Traditional donors usually do not do innovation. They want proven systems that they can use 
to support delivery. However, with FSDT, a nucleus around which several 
supporters/development partners actually congregated, eh, as if you want a coordinator, a 
coordination of that kind of support. I think that was quite important. Eh, from the data and 
surveys, and the interoperable activities, almost along the work step. The fundamental principle 
is that their money can bear that type of risk and play a significant role in terms of innovation, 
but the traditional aid money does not. When you see some results, they can, and they came 
very late into this. Yeah” (Former BOT Governor).  
Subsequently, since many development partners were interested in poverty alleviation and 
fighting exclusion, MM innovation was picked up quickly by many foundations and not so 
much by the traditional development partners to start with. Foundations were typically money 
that could bear the risk of innovation and its proceedings. Traditional donors usually do not 
support innovations in the same way they help other development projects. They wanted 
proven systems to be used to support delivery. But with FSDT as a nucleus around which 
several stakeholders and development partners congregated to provide coordinated support, 




traditional development partners came later to support MM innovations in Tanzania. The 
foundations were the first, except for the DFID, according to one respondent. This delay by 
traditional donors to support MM would be verified by other interviews with DANIDA, 
UNDCF, and USAID (ENGINE and ASPIRES Programmes). 
From the three phases of interviews, it became clear that NPS, CLF and neoliberalism were 
vital in answering my research questions. This was how my research thinking started to 
develop. The research questions were formulated based on in-depth research and using 
documentary or secondary data. My data analysis established the research gaps in FI, FE and 
MM. Based on my research objectives and interests on the one hand, and on the literature and 
research gaps I identified along with the Ph.D. upgrade examiners’ advice, I developed an 
interest in learning more about the political economy that facilitated the development and 
growth of MM in Tanzania. Therefore, the following research question was created: what was 
the political economy that facilitated the growth of MM in Tanzania? I went to Tanzania to 
understand this political economy.  Among many other research questions and issues, I wanted 
to answer that question or understand that political economy. Based on the respondents' 
responses to the many questions I was asking, and after the consultation with my supervisors, 
it became clear that it was a neoliberal political economy. After considering the previous 
literature, research gaps, objectives, theoretical perspectives, and the Ph.D. upgrade examiners’ 
advice, the question was ‘how did neoliberalism facilitate the growth of MM in Tanzania?’ The 
fieldwork responses I got from the interviewees and the themes evolved from the interview 
data analysis, including the literature provided answered this question. 
As I mentioned earlier, the literature review, including theoretical and research gaps I provided 
during my upgrade examination coupled with my interests in studying MM and FI, identified 
the need to research MM and FI and MM and FE. Researchers have often investigated MM 
and FI but have rarely investigated MM and FE. Therefore, it made sense for me to examine 
the moderation of FE factors through MM in Tanzania. The upgrade examiners and I arrived 
at this conclusion based on the literature I had read and presented, which showed a research 
gap in this area. The line of thinking that supported this idea was also based on the research 
objectives I had presented to the Ph.D. upgrade examiners and on the fact that if MM survived 
and succeeded in Tanzania, then there should be something of value that made MM survive. 
Hence, I formulated the following question: how did MM moderate the factors of FE in 
Tanzania? After considering the research objectives, literature review, the research and 




this research question.  We all agreed that looking at how MM moderated FE's factors to 
increase FI could be one of those values. The responses I had received while doing fieldwork 
in Tanzania and the themes evolved from the interviews during data analysis provided answers 
to this second research question.  
Moreover, based on the previous research I conducted before the fieldwork in Tanzania, the 
research objectives, and the Ph.D. upgrade examiners’ advice, it became clear that the banks 
have a significant contribution in the financial sector. One would think that the banks should 
be at the forefront of FI. Having discovered that some FI comes from the MNOs and not the 
banks, and a body of literature also supports these views, it became clear that there is inclusion 
through the MNOs. The question was: “what are the banks doing and what are their responses?” 
Hence, the third research question was formulated as “what was the banking sector's response 
to increasing levels of FI through MM in Tanzania?” The different themes and evidence 
emerged from the data analysis provided answers to this third question as well.   
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Appendix 4.10: A Full List of the Respondents 
Interview 
Number 
Name/Job Title Organisation Place Date 
1 Zalona/“Mama Ntilie” 




Tandika, Dar-es-Salaam February 2018 




Tandika, Dar-es-Salaam February 2018 




Tandika, Dar-es-Salaam February, 2018 
4 Said - Mechanic/Driver Low-Income 
Business 
Tandika, Dar-es-Salaam February, 2018 




Tandika, Dar-es-Salaam February, 2018 
6 Gaston - “Kashata” (Candy 
Seller on the Streets) 
Low-Income 
Business 
Tandika, Dar-es-Salaam February, 2018 




Tandika, Dar-es-Salaam February, 2018 
8 Emmanuel - Super Mobile 














Makumbusho, Dar es 
Salaam 
February, 2018 
11 TTCL MM Official  TTCL TTCL, Headquarters, 
Dar es Salaam 
February, 2018 
TTCLPesa Marketing Official 




Salaam during a FINCA 
Conference 
February, 2018 
13 Senior MoF Official Ministry of 
Finance 
Serena Hotel, Dar-es-
Salaam during a FINCA 
Conference 
February, 2018 
14 Amana Bank Senior Official Amana Bank Amana Headquarters, 
Dar-es-Salaam 
February, 2018 






16 BOT Official  BOT BOT Headquarters, 
Dar-es-Salaam 
March, 2018 
BOT Senior Financial 
Inclusion Policy Official 
BOT Senior Financial 
Inclusion Expert 
BOT Senior Staff Member – 
Microfinance 
BOT Senior Staff Member – 
Financial Inclusion 
17 Senior BOT Official BOT BOT Headquarters, 
Dar-es-Salaam 
March, 2018 
NPS Financial Analyst 
Senior Financial Analyst 
18 MM Expert  TIGO TIGO Headquarters, 
Dar-es-Salaam 
March, 2018 
19 Senior Telecom Sector Official TCRA TCRA Headquarters, 
Dar-es-Salaam 
March, 2018 
20 Senior Financial Intelligence 
Official 
FIU – Ministry of 
Finance and 
Planning  
FIU Office at Ministry 







21 AKIBA Bank Senior Official AKIBA AKIBA Bank Ilala 
Branch 
March, 2018 




23 Mobile Money and Mobile 
Banking Expert 
TPB TPB Headquarterts, 
Dar-es-Salaam 
March, 2018 
24 Financial Sector Official FSDT FSDT Headquarters, 
Dar-es-Salaam 
March, 2018 
25 Mobile Money Compliance 
Expert 
Airtel Airtel Headquarters, 
Dar-es-Salaam 
March, 2018 
Mobile Money Services 
Official 
26 Mobile Money Services Expert Zantel Zantel Headquarters, 
Dar-es-Salaam 
March, 2018 




28 Digital Alternative 
Channels/Retail Banking 
Expert 
NBC NBC Headquarters, 
Dar-es-Salaam 
March, 2018 
29 Mobile Banking and Customer 
Official 
DCB DCB Headquarters, 
Dar-es-Salaam 
March, 2018 
30 SACCOS and VICOBA Expert Hazina SACCOs Ministry of Finance and 
Planning, Dar es Salaam 
March, 2018 
31 Author, Economist and 
Financial Specialist 
BOT BOT Headquarters, 
Dar-es-Salaam 
March, 2018 
32 Umoja Switch Financial 
Inclusion Expert  




33 Halotel Mobile Money Expert Halotel Halotel Headquarters, 
Dar-es-Salaam 
March, 2018 
34 Exim Bank Senior Mobile 
Banking Expert 
Exim Bank Exim Headquarters, 
Dar-es-Salaam 
March, 2018 
35 M-Pesa Float Expert Vodacom Vodacom Headquarters, 
Dar-es-Salaam 
March, 2018 
Senior M-Pesa Official 
Vodacom M-Pesa Marketing 
Official 
36 Senior Taxation Expert TRA TRA Headquarters, 
Dar-es-Salaam 
March, 2018 
Taxation Systems Officer 




















39 Senior Manager in Cash 
Management and 
Transactional Banking 
CBA CBA Headquarter, Dar-
es-Salaam 
April, 2018 
40 Senior Switch Expert BCX BCX Headquarters, 
Dar-es-Salaam 
April, 2018 




Kunduchi Beach Hotel, 
Dar-es-Salaam 
April, 2018 







43 Senior Financial Specialist World Bank World Bank Offices, 
Dar-es-Salaam 
April, 2018 
44 The Executive Banking Sector 
Official 
TBA TBA Offices, Sukari 
House, Dar-es-Salaam 
April, 2018 
45 The Former BOT Governor Former employee 
of BOT 
Kunduchi Beach Hotel, 
Dar-es-Salaam 
April, 2018 
46 Insurance and Microinsurance 
Expert 
TIRA TIRA Headquarters, 
Dar-es-Salaam 
April, 2018 
47 Alternative Channels 
Specialist 




Mobile Banking Expert 
48 Insurance Expert G-Star G-Star Office, Dar es 
Salaam 
April, 2018 
49 Insurance and Microinsurance 
Expert 
Resolution Resolution 









51 Senior Insurance Policy 
Official 1 
MO Insurance MO Insurance Office, 
Dar es Salaam 
April, 2018 
52 Senior Insurance Policy 
Official 2 
Alliance Insurance Communicated 
Through Emails 
April, 2018 
53 The Executive Banking Sector 
Official 












55 Senior Microloans and Mobile 
Money Expert  
Milvik  Milvik Office, Dar-es-
Salaam 
April, 2018 
56 Senior TIA Official 1 Tanzania Insurers’ 
Association 
Kitega Uchumi 
Building, Dar es Salaam 
April, 2018 
Senior TIA Official 2 
57 Emmanuel - Boda Boda Driver Self-Employed Kinondoni B, Dar-es-
Salaam 
April, 2018 
58 Fisher - Low-Income Boda 
Boda Driver 
Self-Employed Kinondoni B, Dar-es-
Salaam 
April, 2018 
59 Seki - Low-Income Boda Boda 
Driver 
Self-Employed Kinondoni B, Dar-es-
Salaam 
April, 2018 
60 Said - Low-Income Boda Boda 
Driver 
Self-Employed Kinondoni B, Dar-es-
Salaam 
April, 2018 
61 Gratius - Low-Income Tailor  Self-Employed  Moroko, Dar-es-Salaam April, 2018 
62 ASPIRES and Financial 
Inclusion Expert 
USAID USAID Offices, Dar-es-
Salaam 
April, 2018 
ENGINE and Financial 
Inclusion Expert 
63 John - Low-Income Shop 
Seller 
Employed in a 
Shop 
Moroko, Dar-es-Salaam April, 2018 
64 Thomas - Low-Income 
Barber/Hairdresser 
Self-Employed Moroko, Dar-es-Salaam April, 2018 
65 Paolo - Low-Income Charcoal 
Seller 
Self-Employed Moroko, Dar-es-Salaam April, 2018 
66 Karin - ‘Mama’ (Street Food 
Cook and Seller) 
Self-Employed Moroko, Dar-es-Salaam April, 2018 
67 Robert - Small 
Trader/Machinga 
Self-Employed Moroko, Dar-es-Salaam April, 2018 




69 Executive Financial Sector 
Official 
FSDT Over-the-Phone April, 2018 
70 Former BOT Governor Former employee 
of BOT 
Over-the-Phone April, 2018 
71 Author, Economist and 
Financial Specialist 
BOT Over-the-Phone April, 2018 





























Appendix 4.11: At Macro Level: Extracts from Interview Transcript 1 
Researcher: I am trying to understand the process that initiated mobile money, as banks 
objected to its arrival in other countries. They thought the MNOs would be their competitors. 
In Tanzania, the government allowed the advent of mobile money. It took off. Was there 
opposition from the banking sector? I want to understand why banks allowed mobile service 
providers to start mobile money services. Was it like a government intervention to push 
innovation and financial inclusion, or banks saw the benefits of mobile money services and 
allowed it to take off? 
Former BOT Governor: Eh, you know, the central bank is an authority. It has authority over 
banking and payment systems. Eh, the MNOs which provide mobile money services use the 
payment system and become part of the payment system. They are not doing banking business. 
And we made it clear from the very beginning about these two different roles, as the banks 
objected, of course. They objected from the very beginning, arguing that the MNOs were 
entering the money business. They argued that MNOs use the payment system. They 
complained that the MNOs did not have appropriate supervision and requirements while using 
the payment system. The banks had strict supervision and requirements. In which case, they 
saw it clearly, that lack of strict supervision and requirements created conditions for unfair 
competition. And as they learned from elsewhere, mobile money services could be under the 
banks. Likewise, of course, eh, whether one proceeds with innovation or otherwise, is a 
willingness to take risks to let innovation lead. At the same time, you monitor, and then 
appropriately, you manage the risks. We call this system ‘test, monitor and regulate’. And, this 
was the concept. I had that clear, clear commitment on this one. Second, we had meetings. 
Every two years in this financial sector, if you want, eh, it was like a symposium. In that 
symposium, of course, the banks were also clear about the same issue. I understood it clearly 
that, look, firstly, mobile money providers were purely creating a transfer system. It is a 
platform. They don’t issue money because a unit is sitting in a bank transfer account for every 
unit that a customer buys through mobile money. So, there is no creation of money. Eh, then it 
is true that they are not taking deposits. This is clear. They are not doing credit business. This 
was clear. What distinguishes a bank from other institutions is deposit-taking. Per regulations, 
regulations are essential in terms of supervision to manage the risk in relation to the protection 
of deposit interests. That was the main principle. So, those are not taking deposits. There is no 
risk of exposure to the depositors. They are involved in the payment system, and that is purely 




shilling of the electronic money balance sitting in the e-wallet of anybody, they were the 
custodians in the trust account of the equivalent given to it. Yeah, so we told them that there 
was no competition. There is no competition in relation to the core business of the banks. Eh, 
of course, since banks also make transfer payments, maybe with regard to transfer payments, 
but, they know that since they have limited reach, that was the problem we were trying to solve. 
Brick-and-mortar branches wouldn’t be cut, ATMs were very few, and we needed to reach 
everyone in a cost-effective way. And we told them, look, if you used this platform well, you 
could grow your business in a very cost-effective way. Fortunately, they started talking about 
agent banking. And they started seeing that actually, they could widen their net and network 
without going through branches. Yeah, so they started having agents. Big banks like CRDB 
and NMB were the first to embrace that, and they could see that that was what was there. 
Secondly, I think they also noticed that it made banking much more efficient and convenient, 
eh, for their customers, because now they do it through the mobile banking platform. Eh. Once 
you had these integrators, operators such as MaxMalipo and others, which were platforms for 
them, allowed them to connect with their customers through mobile devices. These platforms 
act as the aggregators, and essentially you are going through them when you are doing mobile 
banking. Except for one, which wanted to create its platform which became very expensive, 
because eh … 
Researcher: Which one was that? 
Former BOT Governor: NMB wanted to do so, but, eh, even those who did so, eh, Standard 
Chartered and CRDB, they had to adapt their platforms to connect and sync with other 
platforms run by the integrators, which made it very expensive. So, it was the cost, and I told 
them that anyone, eh, including me as a customer with several banks, that they had to look at 
their mobile money operations, and that without thinking about a switch, their operations would 
be costly because of their investment costs and the costs of overheads they are spreading across 
very few customers of theirs. Whereas if they have a switch, everybody goes through that 
system. And the costs will go down. Yeah. So, we have come to the level of understanding that 
this could be in their favour. So, now they are thinking about creating a switch, yeah, a 
collective switch for the same purpose. This clarified the issue they had initially, which was 
how you know peace was ultimately brought about through all these steps. Finally, eh, indeed, 
a few, at least one bank to start with, and other banks may start using the platforms for saving 
and credit. That was CBA. By looking at the example of M-Pawa, other non-bank financial 




to take deposits except for banks. That also made a distinction. It became obvious who the bank 
was. It was CBA. Even if they used a platform called M-Pesa for transactions. So, whoever 
was offering the M-Pawa services was actually a client or a customer of the bank. Over time, 
their own coverage, meaning the growth of their customer base, was enhanced with agent 
banking lending a helping hand and services like M-Pawa. Everybody saw that. They agreed 
very clearly that mobile money services acted complementary to banking. They were not a 
competition. And fortunately, during my time, we had meetings every two months. The MPS 
meetings with the banks' CEOs let them know about the new decisions we had made etc. They 
also gave us an opportunity to always talk about these things. We also had what we called the 
'quarterly' meetings with banks, where we dedicated about two to three hours once a quarter 
whenever we did it, to discuss issues with them that would require joint solutions. And we used 
those opportunities to deal with these issues. Yeah, and we made it very clear that if there were 
questions about these issues, put them on the table. We would work together on them, and we 
would find solutions. It was also confirmed that we had a national financial inclusion council 
where banks were represented, so were other stakeholders, where we talked about various 
innovations and various actions for promoting financial inclusion. That was another platform 
to resolve any potential conflict across multiple stakeholders. The central bank was in the 
council's chair, so that was another opportunity to talk about these issues. Not only talks 
between the central bank and banks in a bilateral fashion as we did bi-monthly or quarterly that 
I spoke of earlier, but also the national financial inclusion council meeting involved all essential 
stakeholders. Everybody could get a chance to discuss the issues. We were able to ultimately, 
I think everybody now knows, and I am pleased that this has been extremely useful to banks. 
Yeah. 
Researcher: When it comes to the regulations, mobile money started without a robust 
regulatory system. 
Former BOT Governor: Yeah. 
Researcher: Mobile money started through the 'test and learn'. 
Former BOT Governor: This was exactly what I was telling you.  
Researcher: Yeah. 
Former BOT Governor: At the onset, we decided we gave the guidelines. It was not that they 





Former BOT Governor: We had to permit them to operate. We told them that mobile money 
companies should separate from the telecommunications side. So, we did have simple initial 
rules, but in terms of setting regulations, we introduced the National Payment System Act after 
we had learned the risks, in terms of what was risky, and what was not risky, and how risks 
could be mitigated.  
Researcher: Right. 
Former BOT Governor: We did that after making this important decision that informed 
mobile money companies that the customer money in trust accounts was not the MNO money. 
It belonged to their customers. It is like they have deposits with the banks in one basket, but 
one can actually tell based on the average deposit or average balances in each wallet, the 
customer’s balance.  So, when the MNOs earn an income from a trust account, they have to 
redistribute it and give the profit share to the customers. It is the shared profit on a pro-rata 
basis of the average balances in the e-wallet that each one has. 
Researcher: Right. 
Former BOT Governor: Eh, and this we did before we established that Act, therefore the Act 
itself was part of what we did. And now, this has actually helped to create an evident sense, eh, 
of who their customers are, and those customers understand that, look, you can save money in 
your phone and actually get remunerated from it.  
Researcher: Right. 
Former BOT Governor: Maybe, one could argue that this comes close to the competition if 
you want, but it is not competition because that money is being remunerated from trust accounts 
in banks. The bank is just a conduit, and I was interested in visiting the villages, having a couple 
of sessions with people just to know why they opt to put their money in a bank account instead 
of keeping it in their phone. Do you know what their answer was? One of the villagers said that 
if you save through the banks at every end of the month when you check your balance, even 
when you have not used your account for that month, your balance has reduced, because you 
know ledger costs, etc. Eh, if you saved through mobile money, that was what they said, even 
before they started paying the dividends/profit, your money was still intact, nothing had 




days I am told, I am sure if you asked him again, and on top of that he will say “I also still earn 
some profits on this side”. 
Researcher: Right. 
Former BOT Governor: So that was a clear expression of why, eh, you know, the clientele 
were happy with the system as it was. Therefore, this National Payment System Act, eh, came 
after we have gone through all these experiences and the NPSA provided the legal space for 
mobile money activities.   
Researcher: From your experience, how could my research issues be analysed? 
Former BOT Governor: First, the financial system, eh, is what you have to look at. Prior, 
during, and in the most recent time. So, the financial system serves the basic, eh, functionality 
of the system with the government at any point in time and is never separate from it. So it is 
true that before 1966 the whole commercial system was external oriented, and it meant in 
essence one paid a lot more attention to working with the major marketing agencies, and 
companies that collected primary commodities for export. You also had a few major supplying 
entities of imports, eh, for use, eh, in the rural areas. But, even if that system had mobile money 
from there, it would have worked better than without it. Because what mobile money has come 
to solve, as I said, is really those three or four, eh, if you want, challenges. One of distance, one 
of scale, we talked about affordability, and one of managing risks. This is the technical solution 
part of these issues. So, you have to look at mobile money, eh, as a means to an end. It is not 
by itself as an end. It is always serving the system. It is also true that even when these changes 
took place, in 1966, it was a lot more about who owned the system. And it wasn’t so much 
focused on how we got services and where they are supposed to get. Otherwise, you would 
have seen a whole range of, maybe, microfinance institutions. And you know that the 
instrument that was used was cooperatives, Yeah. Eh, to try and reach wherever that one could. 
Eh, of course, cooperatives also build their own ranks in there, and whoever that was in charge 
of those ranks virtually bankrupted the cooperatives as a system. So, cooperatives were one set 
of chances to get finances down to the people as they tried to replace the old system. The banks, 
eh, the big changing banks, but it was the state that took over ownership to align with this new 
operational framework, which in essence, as I’ve said, was built around cooperatives and 
villages. Eh, but the fundamental constraints of space, of affordability, eh, and of risk remained. 
Their solutions were not sought, even though those solutions intended to bring about a major 




were open to private ownership of banks. Government partly retained some participation, but 
certainly, the doors were open. A whole range of these banks came back. Still, as I said, until 
2006, 9% of the adult population could be included. So, neither the shift to state ownership nor 
the cooperative system nor the liberalisation stage succeeded in breaking these constraints. 
That’s why it is essential to go into the fundamentals of what helped break the constraints to 
do this. So, I think your story can be told, but alongside it, keep in mind the constraints, and 
that is more on the technical constraints that needed solutions. Indeed, without these solutions, 
it would be challenging to increase financial inclusion. We had the intentions to include people, 
and we stated clearly how we wanted to use microfinance solutions, eh, building these so that 
we could. You remember, even before we embarked on liberalisation, during the time of 
Nsekela, read his era, he introduced frontline banking which in essence was an effort to try to 
reach precisely the frontline. Eh, but until liberalisation started several branches, ministries and 
others created systems such as the cooperatives were included and all these had issues. And 
one of the theses you may want to take a look at, I don’t know if you have read it, is 
Ndalinshau’s thesis. Michael Ndalinshau.  
Researcher: What is it called? 
Former BOT Governor: The essay is on the informal financial system in Tanzania. He went 
through the history, eh, whether it is rotating savings or neo-credit issues. 
Researcher: Is it a book? 
Former BOT Governor: This was a Ph.D. dissertation that I supervised.  
Researcher: Ok, from the University of Dar es Salaam? 
Former BOT Governor: Eh, the University of Dar es Salaam. He might have written a few 
papers on that from his dissertation. Still, it is fairly rigorous; I mean a careful record of the 
evolution of these systems, including the role of different kinds of players in the financial 
system. Eh, be it cooperatives, be it ROSCAs, Rotating Savings Associations, be it … all these 
and the state's role trying to get there, eh, is described. As I said after 2006, you will see how 
far we had got, from independence from 1961 to 2006. How many years? 45 years. Eh, that 
was how far we got. I think after independence we were somewhere around 2% or 3% of 
inclusion. After that, it climbed to 9% in 45 years and then there is this huge jump from 9% to 




That as a concept was embraced a long time ago. And we have seen cooperatives and the other 
instruments; the government tried all these instruments. Yeah, it was their approach. 
Researcher: This time, technology is the critical factor. 
Former BOT Governor: Yeah, technology has helped.  
Researcher: I see that, that is fine. I see you have helped learn many things, including the 
things I was looking for in those processes. When writing my Ph.D. I should also consider 
some recommendations in the future as an integral part of my Ph.D. For instance, things that 
have been done and those other things that need to be corrected. Maybe they should have been 
done better than they have been done. For instance, what I get from other bankers, they 
mentioned that one thing they would like to see changed was the KYCs, in terms of the different 
tiers of verification. They feel like sometimes they have been fined simply because they have 
miswritten the records. When the regulator comes to inspect and identifies some mistakes, the 
FSPs are fined heavily. So, they felt like there should be different verification systems from 
tier 1 of verification, it then goes to tier 2, then tier 3 to ensure that everything is in order. And 
then, there are so many other issues … for instance, the banks would like to work using one 
switch because the existing switches, including the BCX or Umoja, do not include every bank. 
They would like the use of one switch, and we heard that the government is encouraging the 
creation of that switch, and they are in the process of launching it.  I think that will be taken 
care of within a short period. Yeah. 
Former BOT Governor: Who is launching this main switch? 
Researcher: I think it is e-government … there is one switch that the government is 
considering launching, and it will replace some of these other switches. 
Former BOT Governor: I am not sure. You see, a switch can be taken from very different 
perspectives. I know for sure the Bankers’ Association itself discussed in a tautology that it 
would like to set up a national switch. Eh, it does not need just to be a government switch 
because a switch must have members, eh, as a part of it. Otherwise, you don’t have a switch. 
Yeah, you can’t just say that everybody will use the same highway because there is a highway. 
Not necessarily! You could have many other highways. So, that commitment, I am not sure 
where they are with that project. Talk to Kimei. He is still the chairman of the TBA. His deputy 
is the Standard Chartered CEO. They will tell you where they are with the switch project. This 




perspective through which the tax base is captured well. It is different from the other switches 
in the sense that this switch must have an international component as well. Just ask them, and 
they will have the answers because a number of these banks are already part of the global 
switches anyway. So it is not like they were waiting for this other one. No. They are used to it. 
Then, there is an initiative to connect national switches across East Africa as a cross -border 
initiative. There is even more, eh, there is the East African if you want, ‘EPS’ payment system, 
which is operational. And it is a multi-currency switch; we use our currencies to settle 
transaction across borders. There are many initiatives, including in the SADC area, where we 
have another switch, which uses Rand. However, they want to use all the currencies in the 
future. So, all these initiatives are there. Where do we place the government switch and what 
will it replace is a different issue. However, the KYC issue is something that we have been 
working on, and we were required to conduct a national risk assessment to connect to the global 
standard-setting bodies. They also need to agree. And one of the major constraints to financial 
inclusion, which requires a global initiative, Africa attended the conference; I remember we 
represented Africa during the Global Standard Basel Conference. We discussed the global 
standard-setting issues, and we agreed on cleared KYCs, which were based on the assessment 
of risk for the different levels of transactions. In essence, that was what we had used as far as 
mobile money is concerned. Eh, it is because you have a limit on the transactions side. You 
want those transactions not to exceed a specific limit to reduce the risk exposure.  So, as a 
condition of moving to tiers, they want you to do a national risk assessment, which will give 
comfort for the first time. The use of tiered, if you want, KYCs which we have used so far to 
run mobile money as opposed to banks, is different. Mobile money KYCs are different from 
the banks’ KYCs. Whether that system has not been problematic, that is another issue. That 
people have not misused the use of that tiered KYC to transact that is another issue. The misuse 
of the tiered KYCs is also illegal. Eh, so that consent is there, is known, solutions are being 
sought with tiered KYCs, but there is a requirement that you do this so that you get a green 
light from the standard-setting bodies which oversee the KYCs globally. We cannot set our 
own KYCs standards. If you do this all banks and correspondence banks, they will refuse to 
okay the transactions. For example, the US will be concerned with terrorism, as the new KYCs 
can be regarded as a conduit of terrorism. This will mean the death of banking as far as the 
cross-border banking is concerned. And we are a country that depends on export and imports 
to do our business. Hence, we have to adhere to those standards. At least we have put enough 
pressure for them  to actually open this door. Before we did this, the US asked for another 




Customer, which is the KYC. So, there was the requirement of the KYCC. We also sought the 
support of FATF who are the responsible standard-setting body. They supported us. They 
dropped off the KYCC. So now, the challenge is to move from KYC as a single monolithic 
system to tiered KYC, and I think we would succeed in that. So, it’s true that that is one of the 
constraints. I think it is not enough just to have access; there are three steps.  First, you improve 
access. Access doesn’t mean utilisation, you can have access, but you are not utilising it. Access 
levels based on the 2017 FinScope survey for our country were close to 88%, but utilisation is 
at 65%. So, some have access but are not using it adequately. The next big drive is to increase 
utilisation, eh, which means you have to have the right products responsive to the previously 
unbanked group's needs, and particularly microcredit is fundamental. Yeah, the savings side is 
also moving pretty well, and you must invest in capabilities, and the central part of that is 
financial literacy. This country has already set up, if you want, a foundation that will deal with 
this. The central bank has resourced its initiation. However, FSDT and other stakeholders will 
follow. Those who are ready to provide financial literacy can be funded to help people use 
financial services. One thing is to know that you have access and the other thing is to understand 
what the products are and what products are available, what’s the cost, how do you use them? 
Also, to improve utilisation, you need customer protection, so that people continue to have 
confidence in that system. Be it from fear that technology can be an issue, or worry that you 
cannot resolve the dispute you may have with the service provider. This is very important, 
which is the third leg in terms of getting utilisation. Once you have increased utilisation, then 
we have to look at the impact, ultimately financial inclusion is not an end in itself but a means 
to an end. You want to help the previously unbanked, the poor, to get microcredit to SMEs and 
poor households, but how that makes a difference in their livelihood is another issue. The latter 
is about the outcome, eh, and it has an impact on financial inclusion. The other things are the 
means only, but an outcome and that outcome should cause an impact. So, when we speak of 
utilisation, what we want is utilising previously unbanked, utilisation by the poor people. For 
instance, the TASAF programme has become part of that system. They are getting paid through 
that system. It allows people to manage their savings and investments better. They are people 
who are making an impact assessment. What difference is it making to their livelihood and the 
way they manage this? Suppose the government decides that all teachers and all health workers 
in the villages can be paid through this system. In that case, they will reduce teachers’ 
absenteeism because they will no longer be required to go to the districts at the end of the 




same I also think for health workers, so these ultimate impacts are things that we hope will 
actually materialise. 
Researcher: What was the role of development donors in this financial inclusion era? Were 
they supportive and did they get involved?  
Former BOT Governor: Of course, if you look at history, in Kenya, for instance, the whole 
mobile money concept started here, and the youth were actively involved. It got the DFID 
support to materialise operationally. Those youngsters who created that system were 
Tanzanians and were not Kenyans. They were called the E-Fulusi and so their first role was to 
back up innovation with risk and risk that the private sector itself couldn’t take. Subsequently, 
since many development partners were interested in, if you want, poverty and fighting 
exclusion anyway, from whatever services, this innovation was picked up quite quickly by 
many foundations. And not so much by the traditional development partners to start with. 
Foundations are typically money that can bear the risk of innovation and proceed. Traditional 
donors usually do not do innovation. They want proven systems that they can use to support 
delivery. However, with FSDT, a nucleus around which several supporters/development 
partners actually congregated, eh, as, if you want, a coordinator, a coordination of that kind of 
support. I think that was quite important. Eh, from the data and surveys, and the interoperable 
activities, almost along the work step. The fundamental principle is that their money can bear 
that type of risk and play a significant role in terms of innovation, but the traditional aid money 













Appendix 4.12: At Meso Level: Extracts from Interview Transcript 2 
Researcher: We can start with the infrastructural issues. Are you dealing with the issues of 
infrastructure? And what does the infrastructure mean when dealing with mobile money?  
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: It is an underlying technology that creates these 
systems, the way these systems run, platforms, whether they are interconnecting between, as 
you know there is interoperability, so how does it connect between mobile money service 
providers and the banks, on the one hand, and other solutions-providers on the other. 
Researcher: How do you define a platform? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: So, basically, a platform is an engine that runs either 
the wallet or parts of the mobile wallets system. This could be something like a ledger that does 
the debiting and crediting, reconciliation of revenue assurance, or reporting. So many are 
depending on whoever the provider is, for that particular mobile money ecosystem.  
Researcher: Is it a language? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: No, no, no. It is basically a system, so it could be a 
system or an entire ecosystem. 
Researcher: By language, I mean things like html and whatever else. 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: So, in one system, they could be multiple; for example, 
the underlying technology could be DINAS. It could be a hostel or tomcat webserver that 
connects the Oracle or Myschio database that operates on the reporting with web platforms. 
So, it is multiple systems all in one.  
Researcher: Are there any security issues with these systems?  
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: So, it depends. I mean every system has a way of 
controlling IT, so, multiple admins. For instance, there is a segregation of duties; it can be a 
database administrator, where you only deal with the database. If you are dealing with malware 
issues, you only deal with malware, so that if it needs to collude, you need to talk to three or 
five people, unless you steal the password(s) together. Systems are segregated, and they operate 
individually. So you could be an admin, but you don’t have every password. You may have 
one password, but you may not have the super password. You may not have it. So, what tends 
to happen is you have the first part of the password the other person has the second part. For 




Researcher: When it comes to mobile money, how does it work?  
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: So, it depends. Mobile money is a vast term. So the 
basic essence of operating a mobile wallet in a feature phone, you have a feature phone that 
connects to a mobile network, so these are the MNOs (Mobile Network Operators). And then 
plus the connection they have configured something known as the USSD. With USSD, it allows 
you to request multiple services and exchange responses and interact with systems using 
shortcodes in terms of numbers. For example, in Tanzania, it has been standardised. All the 
financial services are under *105*xx#. Right? 
Researcher: Right. 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: So, when you do that, your mobile phone would tell the 
network, I am trying to reach this mobile money service. The other mobile money service 
would respond either with the menu or with indications. Right? The majority of banks take you 
to one of the indications before they take you to the menu. However, MNOs would like to give 
you the menus and only validate you at the end of the transactions. You select the choices on 
the menu once your account has been selected. If I want to take you back to the old days, the 
first thing you do is walk to the shop. You buy a sim card. They ask you for an ID. There you 
do the KYCs. You register. The registration helps the providers to know their customers. Once 
they know who you are, your account is activated. You are by default owning a mobile money 
account on your phone, but you need to activate it. How do you activate it? By dialling the 
menu, and then entering what is called as a ‘default code’, that might be provided or by default 
there is nothing there. You enter your pin to confirm that the account is yours, and that account 
is activated. The next step is to reload, to put money in your mobile wallet. Right? You go to 
either a ‘wakala’ (agent) to put the money on your phone, or you can use your bank account, if 
you gave one, to send money to your mobile wallet. You can also ask someone to send it to 
you so that you receive it. Once you receive it, you have a virtual token wallet on your phone. 
Researcher: The value now.  
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: The value, so, with the value, there are multiple things 
you can do. Either withdraw it, pay for goods, pay for services, or transfer it to another mobile 
number, or to a bank account. So now it gets even easier to transfer it abroad. All these features 
plus additional information services in your account like balance request, mini statement 
request, change of pin, and all that, they are all under one menu. Right. You dial that menu, 




money. I am here to withdraw money. I am here to pay for these goods. This is the invoice. I 
am here to transfer money to someone. It is the same thing, but you have it on the mobile phone 
- USSD. 
Researcher: So, that is the USSD which is commonly used in Tanzania? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: Yes, that’s the basic access. 
Researcher: What is the other one? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: I thought we had seen mobile apps ageing; these are 
smartphones applications. 
Researcher: So mobile apps, do they use the USSD or not? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: No, so there are two parts. There are those of third 
parties that indirectly resemble the USSD, like the app called MULA. Secondly, there are those 
used by either mobile money operators or aggregators. These use something called API, 
Application Programmable Interfaces. This is a machine talking to another machine. So, the 
API is an app in your phone talking to a server directly without using USSD.  
Researcher: Ok. That is another model. Completely different. 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: That’s entirely another model. It is relatively new. 
Maybe the first app has been in Tanzania for the past two and a half years. And yes, they 
evolved faster ever since, yeah, Tigo Pesa started, AirtelMoney followed, and then, Vodacom 
launched. They started with 100, and now they are also available on Apple products’ IOS. The 
technology has attracted many businesses in terms of its suitability for payments for goods and 
services. You can imagine that paying for goods and services was not comfortable using the 
USSD. The USSD is limited in terms of the characters, and it is also limited in terms of the 
sessions and time, but an app is easy because you can even scan what you are trying to pay for. 
Researcher: Ah, ok. I assume that the tendency in Tanzania is that they still use the USSD a 
lot? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: The majority still uses the USSD. However, the 
emerging trend is such that the middle-class people and the businessmen tend to use apps for 
shopping. 




Platform and Infrastructure Expert: No. Mobile banking is still the same. It comes with 
both options. One is USSD, and the other is an App. So, it is almost the same thing. They are 
using the two methodologies to get the services. 
Researcher: Oh. Ok. Yeah. As an infrastructure provider, then how do you connect with 
mobile businesses? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: Yeah! Do you mean mobile operators? 
Researcher: Yes, the MNOs. 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: So, we have to differentiate between MNOs and 
MMOs. You can be a mobile money operator without mobile money services.  
Researcher: So, there are mobile money providers? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: There are mobile money operators and mobile money 
network operators. So, how do you connect mobile money operators is first by establishing that 
business relationship. That I am Mhella and I want to either send or receive funds through your 
network. Right, so with those business arrangements, say if you receive 1,000, how much 
should we charge either you or whoever is paying you? Or when you send 1,000, how much 
should we charge you whenever you are sending to anybody? That is out of the way. The 
business arrangements are out of the way. What is left is the technical part. And that is where 
we come in. So previously we used to rely a lot on what we call ‘flat files’, or ‘web calling’ 
meaning the system goes on a web and then tries to get transactions, but lately there have been 
a lot of APIs. There is an organisation called ‘GSMA”, Global Association for, is called GSMA 
Association so basically is an association. 
Researcher: I know it. 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: So GSMA tries very hard to work with the operators 
first to get APIs, but they realised it is too cumbersome for every operator to have their own 
APIs. What they have done, they have worked on a project to harmonise the APIs. 
Researcher: Through interoperability? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: No, these are different things. So, this is, you can 
operate with an API without interoperability. Interoperability doesn’t necessarily require an 





Platform and Infrastructure Expert: But the APIs as they are, they are just one of the ways 
interoperability can be done. With the harmonised API, it means as long as you have agreed 
on a business case, the way you connect to one mobile money operator is the same way you 
connect to the other operator. If you agree with Vodacom, then the technology you use, the 
codes you use will be the same: connecting Tigo Pesa, or Airtel Money. So, your question was, 
how do you engage? To answer in short is a business arrangement, that is, you agree on the 
structure of fees, limits, transfers, how your actual money be handled after it has been received 
or sent, which account they deduct, you also need to deposit some money before you start 
sending money out, and then secondly is the technical part. That means you are connected to 
the API.  
Researcher: So, that’s it. Who is controlling you? Who is giving you the license, I mean that 
process of being operational, who is regulating you? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: Previously, it used to be TCRA. The Tanzania 
Communications Regulatory Authority. Slowly, we are entering the financial sector, and we 
are increasingly seeing the Bank of Tanzania's involvement. 
Researcher: So, who is who now?  
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: Both regulate them because for you to operate a 
shortcode you need TCRA’s license, at the same time to hold somebody’s funds depending on 
what you are trying to do if you are paying, BOT wants to know who you are. However, if you 
are going to hold somebody’s deposit at any time, even if it sits at the bank, you need a license 
from the BOT.  
Researcher: How do you go through that process? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: So that question I am reserving for the banks and the 
MNOs. 
Researcher: Because the thing is, one of the questions is, I am trying to understand that process 
that allows the emergence of mobile money services. 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: So, at a very high level, there are so many licenses 
depending on where you fit that question. However, at the basics of it, if you are not a bank, 




Directorate at the Central Bank. They have different licenses and schemes. If you are a mobile 
wallet, you have a different license. If you are a bank, you fall under banking supervision for 
which later you still have to go to the NPS. You need to be regulated as a bank. The majority 
of the system aggregators and integrators, and wallet providers go for a license at NPS.  
Researcher: NPS! Is that through the BOT? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: Yes, that’s through the BOT. 
Researcher: Your platform, what is its name? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: So, we don’t have a platform. We are providing. We 
are working with companies on infrastructures. 
Researcher: On infrastructures. 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: Yes, that means they can buy a platform from anyone 
they want. It could be ‘Conviva’. It could be ‘Teno’. It could be … you name it. That system 
needs to be hosted on an infrastructure. Our competence is to understand how companies meet 
the requirements provided by software providers. Also, to help them utilise the full potential 
of the infrastructure to scale in the market. Because software providers can give you whatever 
they think may work, but it may not work in the market as well.  
Researcher: So, working with these people, what are the challenges that you face? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: Technology evolves very fast. Super fast. And the 
adaption rate depends on how you attract potential customers. You can’t use somebody’s past 
data to plan for your future because by the time it gets into the market, that data may no longer 
be relevant. So, I think the ever-changing business environment impacts a lot on how 
technology is supporting innovations. 
Researcher: Innovations? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: Yeah. So that is a challenge.  
Researcher: So, do you have anything or some of the platform's things to facilitate how the 
users engage with mobile money? Maybe it is hard for them to understand how the transactions 
are made because they are not technology savvy. Do you get any complaints about the 
complications of the system? 




Researcher: Do you make them user-friendly in other words? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: The guys who work there, they are already in the 
business, and they understand. The customers are mostly at the enterprise level; those do not; 
there is not much of the education needed to be offered. Also from the front, a lot has been 
done to educate people what mobile money is; today you go in the market, the mama will tell 
you how mobile money works, and she can cross-sell that to the next mama, so the customers 
understand. Of course, there are small issues here and there due to wrong transmissions, or 
fraud cases here and there. Still, collectively mobile money operators and banks are doing a 
fantastic job taking initiatives to educate how to use mobile money services. That is not our 
biggest concern. I think adoption is very high, people may not understand anything about 
banking, but they know mobile money. Yeah. 
Researcher: Are there any legal issues that limit your businesses? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: Like? 
Researcher: Any legal issues? The conditions? Issues? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: For us specifically, less adoption when it comes to 
businesses connecting to mobile money, cause the barrier to entry, so are the requirements one 
has to fulfil to connect with mobile money operators. They are not easy to achieve for a start-
up company that is trying to facilitate payments for small scale merchants, right, so that being 
said, I think the regulators can assist in terms of understanding what ways can they use to lower 
that entry point, for let's say, start-up companies that want to facilitate either payments or other 
value-added services. 
Researcher: So, you are saying that it is not a very competitive environment? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: No, it is a super-competitive environment. 
Researcher: What about the entry? It sounds like it is a monopoly. 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: There are those who cannot afford to enter the markets 
due to their financial positions, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that they are the most 
innovative or have the best customer care.  




Platform and Infrastructure Expert: It is. However, the business is not levelled. And we 
don’t expect for it to be levelled, but the entry level should be at the reach of the majority, not 
in the way that now anybody can be a service provider, for example, no. It should be in a way 
that if you were proven, then it should be easy. 
Researcher: So how many platforms do you have in Tanzania? Do you have big platforms? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: How many? The well-known are the MNOs.  
Researcher: MN? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: MNOs. Mobile Money Operators 
Researcher: Yeah, ok. 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: We have Vodacom MPesa, TigoPesa, Airtel Money, 
EzyPESA, HaloPesa, TTCLPesa and ehee. Yeah, those are the six which are the ones that you 
may see. They have ‘Wakalas’ (agents) all over. Second, to that, you have the system 
aggregators and integrators. Maxicom and Selcom are the biggest. And now and then you see: 
mobile wallets popping up, maybe either to facilitate payments or I don’t know what else, they 
keep on coming and going, coming and going.  
Researcher: So, what do you think is the role of the government here? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: It’s tricky. So far, I feel like a good job has been done 
in the way that they haven’t been very relaxed and haven’t been over-regulating. Sometimes 
regulations kill innovations. So, the mere fact that the regulation is playing a catch-up game 
with mobile money services allowing innovation to occur is a good thing. Right. So, so far, so 
good. But the way things are now, I feel like they are going to put a lot of regulations that may 
slow down innovation. So far, to be honest, I have no complaints. The previous governor 
professor was key to the success of mobile money. 
Researcher: That is one of the people I would like to interview. If I get him, it will be nice. He 
developed the two financial inclusion frameworks, which is why he is one of the people I need 
to interview. When it comes to the operators, for instance, I want to talk to some of them. How 
do I get them, and who are they? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: The big six are well known. Right? If you write to 
Vodacom, TigoPesa, AirtelMoney, EzyPesa – Zantel, and Halopesa and TTCLPesa, yap, it is 




Mobile money has taken on a life of its own. It is no longer sitting under operations, no, no, 
no. Either you will have to call the mobile commerce directors or mobile money department 
heads and directors. These are the guys that are at the forefront to tell you what’s happening 
and if you find them on a good day, they may even give you some critical data, and all that. 
When it comes to the aggregators, the best people to meet are the CEOs. Most of them are very 
much approachable. See how that works.  
Researcher: For platform experts like you, how do you get involved in this financial inclusion 
policy and framework? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: Our exposure to the policy is minimal, because, by the 
time the policy gets to us, it is mainly about implementing what has been designed, planned, 
tested and now is ready to be deployed. Right? So, there isn't much, to be honest. We don't deal 
with policy paper work.   
Researcher: You are just implementing. 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: We are just implementing what other guys have agreed 
on, but I can tell you for sure that sometimes these polices lead to overkill in terms of what it 
takes to run such kinds of services. The tasks are enormous. If somebody was able to achieve, 
let's say, 100 worth of infrastructure to run, but the policies demand for 300 worth, it becomes 
a little bit tricky, in terms of, at what cost should I invest? Initially, jump in and throw your 
money. You play it like in a casino, and hopefully, you get something. Or gradually you get 
there. If you ask anyone who is building the infrastructure: should I do it in one go or do it 
slowly as I progress? The best-case scenario is to do it in one shot. Then you plan better—the 
sustainability at foresight. Let me test the water, and then I will increase my investments, it 
leads to a topology that looks like you are building a road from here to Mbezi. First, you say, 
let us build a road to Mwenge to see how the traffic jam disturbs me and then I will continue 
afterwards. Before you are even done with Mbezi, you realise, oh, the traffic isn't that much, 
but the contract was only from here and Mwenge. So, that again, you either get somebody else, 
and you have to go through negotiations again. If there is any area that policy could help, it is 
where regulations are more assuring to keep on investing. 





Platform and Infrastructure Expert: Well, we have been invited by the previous 
government. The Ministry of Science and Technology through its deputy minister used to invite 
a lot of stakeholders. The majority of those meetings were just informal talks to provide the 
basis for creating the regulatory frameworks. They were involved in committees. The steering 
committee looked after mobile money and other issues. Again, we spent most of the time to 
validate what others have written in technical terms. We contributed to the draft in that way.  
Researcher: In that sense, the platforms themselves are developing and the sector, let me call 
it this way, the industry of platforms isn't big, so it is still developing … 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: It is vast. Let's not make mistakes about it. It is huge. 
However, it is like a giant baby. It is taking on a life of its own. It is at a different stage, but it 
is significant. So, it takes its path, like, who might have thought that you would be able to get 
a loan without even stepping into a building? I don't know who you are, but now you can get 
loans, right? So, by the time you are done with regulating mobile money, send and transfer, 
saving and withdrawing, another baby comes out, and you are like, oh! Now, I am doing the 
lending. You know. When I am giving loans, do you have a regulatory framework to regulate 
mobile money operators' loans? So, it is moving very fast like it may not look like normally. 
We proliferate with time, and in this case, time doesn't matter. The adaption could be within 
seconds, and a new product evolves, and it is equally liked in the market. 
Researcher: So, if I get it right, during this phase, the mobile money provider or operator 
thinks he needs a specific product, and then you can help him develop this product? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: So, what they do, we have the standards for the 
provision of the wallet. However, the big companies bid for it, and they come forth for 
consultations because you can't go and ask a small provider for such a significant investment. 
If you get a deal, you need to ask your friends or someone you trust, is this good enough for 
me? Or are they asking for too much? So, once they have the quotations, we look at the size of 
that infrastructure. If it fits with the original scope and what's in the market, then it is a good 
deal. That is what we do, and then once there is an agreement, we create the infrastructure, 
deploy it, or look at what has been deployed.  
Researcher: In terms of the location, I assume that most of you are in Dar es Salaam?  
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: Yeah. The beauty of the infrastructure is that anybody 




Germany. The government ordered it to be relocated to Dar. They brought it here. If you are to 
transact through M-Pesa, the transactions first went to Germany. 
Researcher: Comparing the mobile money operators and the banks as they all now offer 
financial services, do you see the banking sector transformed or what do you think is the banks' 
future?  
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: Banks will be banks. Definitely, there have been 
disruptions. Some severe disruptions and people used to fear because it was unknown territory. 
Banks thought mobile operators wanted to be banks. Mobile operators thought the banks 
wanted to be mobile operators. Some banks have mobile money licenses. You have operators 
that were looking for banking licenses. But from what I see at the moment, they are still 
complementing each other. So, banks can now reach the deposit desks run by agents in the 
remote areas of Tanzania, where they do not have a branch. At the same time, mobile money 
cannot keep money in their pockets. They need to have trust accounts with the banks. So, it is 
a win-win situation with the banks too. Right? So, we are complementing each other. We are 
yet to come to a point where they are competitors. Slowly, it is coming, in terms of payments, 
you know, with the banks you can go somewhere and swipe your card and pay. Gradually, it 
is getting there. We are not there yet. They are not competing, they are complementing each 
other.  
Researcher: What I think is that over time mobile money will influence the transformation of 
the banking sector. 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: That is done. Banks used to close at 5 pm. You did not 
get banking services after 5pm. Right? Right now, you can bank through your phone. So, the 
transformation of services has already been done. And the banking sector continues to be 
transformed. Right now, people enjoy banking services the same way they want mobile money. 
Hence, people have 24-hour access to their banking services. And that is a challenge because 
banks were set to run for a day and close their books. They do that at the end of the day, and 
they open them at the beginning of the next day. But transacting 24/7, what does that mean? 
Do I ever close my books or not? So, banks now are forced to never sleep. They are open online 
all the time without the operators. They still offer services through mobile banking. 
Researcher: It was part of your definition when you said a platform was like a ledger book.  




Researcher: I never thought of it that way. 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: It is a ledger. You have your number, and it says your 
balance is zero. If you add money to your number, you get this much credit. You deduct it 
when you withdraw it or when you send it to another number. And whatever is debited is stored, 
debit Deo’s number, credit the agent’s wallet. Or send money to Johnny debit Deo, credit 
Johnny’s number. It’s a simple entry like a ledger. There is no, as the foundations of it, they 
are all into the banking just that the accessibility has changed.  
Researcher: Talking about politics, is there any politics affecting anything around here? 
Platform and Infrastructure Expert: To be honest, I am not a huge fan of politics, and 




















Appendix 4.13: At Micro Level: Extracts from Interview Transcript 3 
Researcher: I am researching mobile money and how the banks facilitate financial inclusion, 
enabling middle- and low-income people to access formal financial services. We want to know 
what your experience has been with the MNOs and banks. You could also tell us if the services 
have empowered you in financial terms. You can tell us what good things you remember from 
these services. For instance, some other people said to me that they have been health insurance 
beneficiaries through mobile money services and have received 40,000 shillings per day for 
the days they were hospitalised. This insurance helped them cover medical costs and prevented 
income loss due to not working while being hospitalised. Therefore, they did not worry much 
about their jobs and income. They reduced the stress they would otherwise have because of the 
financial losses incurred during their hospitalisation time. Others said they were able to take 
care of their mothers and families. When they work and send them money through mobile 
money, and they receive the money instantly. Before mobile money services, I had to wait until 
someone goes to the village. At times, I had to wait longer. You see things like that. Do you 
have something or any stories you could tell about mobile money and how it facilitates your 
daily life? 
Fisher: For me, Tigo services, especially 'Tigo Timiza'. Therefore, 'Timiza' has helped me and 
has facilitated in smoothing my financial shocks and issues. I remember I had problems with 
paying rent. I had no money. I got a loan from them. I was able to pay my rents. Now I live 
better with my kids. Airtel is the MNO that has helped me to meet my financial needs.  
Researcher: So, they help you pay your bills and smoothen your consumption? 
Fisher: Yes, they do. They help meet my financial needs. 
Researcher: Paying your rent? 
Fisher: Rent and other expenses such as tuition fees and school uniforms for my children and 
school shoes. When I have financial needs, I use my mobile money services. They give me 
small loans. I go to the agents to cash out. I use the money and life goes on.  
Researcher: So you get the small loans from them? 
Fisher: Yes, the small loans - 'Timiza'. 
Researcher: ‘Timiza'. It seems like you have good experience with it.  




Researcher: Excellent. If I want to understand this better, what would you say to remember 
your experience with TigoPesa?  
Fisher: In a few words, I would say "Timiza is the saviour and the future".  
Researcher: "Timiza is the saviour and the future". I can understand this. Timiza has helped 
you improve your life through its small scheme loans. You have been able to meet some of 
your expenses through them. 
Fisher: Yes. House rent and children's school uniforms, yeah.  
Researcher: Who is helping you the most? The MNO or the banks? 
Fisher: Airtel Money. Airtel Money. 
Researcher: It seems like you don’t often use bank services. 
Fisher: I have never used the bank services. 
Researcher: That is fine. It seems like mobile money, and this Airtel M,oney serves low-
income people better.  
Fisher: Yes. If you follow their conditions and take loans and pay on time, you get money and 
finance your small business, then yes, they serve us better.   
Researcher: What I get from you is that the MNOs serve the low-income people and low-
income people like to use them. This is real. It is not a fabrication of publicity from them. Isn’t 
it?  
Fisher: That is very true. 
Researcher: You confirm this.  
Fisher: Yes, and for me, Airtel have been so helpful. 
Researcher: Do you think that some issues or factors create barriers to accessing financial 
services? For instance, some people suggest things like the banks ask you for many documents 
before opening an account with them. You must have a certain amount of money to access their 
services, and a lot of people may not have the amount requested.  




Researcher: On top of that, what do you think makes low-income people unsure of opening 
an account with a bank or an MNO? What are the deterrents/barriers?  
Fisher: I can revert to the same issue that bank services for us are not timely services. You can 
go to a bank branch and ask for a loan. It will take days before you get a loan. They also place 
a lot of conditions with those loans. We either cannot meet those conditions, or we are 
discouraged by those conditions. However, for Airtel, I congratulate them. They serve us on 
time and without many conditions. For low-income people like me, they save our lives. Mobile 
money and the improvement of its services are essential to the low-income people. The MNOs 
provides me with financial services. I do not have a bank account, so I don’t depend on the 
banks to get financial services.  
Researcher: Why does mobile money succeed?  
Fisher: It succeeds because the MNOs have improved access to financial services. People like 
me can access formal financial services; without the MNOs, we would be excluded or have 
difficulty accessing formal financial services. 
Researcher: If I may ask, you are given two choices. One, you are asked to support the 
government efforts to improve bank services. Two, you are asked to support the government 
efforts to improve mobile money services. Of the two choices, which one would you choose?  
Fisher: I will ask the government to favour the MNOs because I benefit from their services. I 
have been using mobile money for ten years now. I like the services, and I will stay with mobile 
money.  
Researcher: Why did you choose mobile money services if there are also other financial 
services available?  
Fisher: It is straightforward. You store value and use it whenever you want. You ask for a 
small loan; you get it immediately. You pay back the loan, and you build a credit history with 
small amounts of money. That makes sense to me. Mobile money services have succeeded in 
changing people’s lives. They also provide a little working capital for some of us. These small 
loans change lives.   
Researcher: Thanks very much for your time. I appreciate that you have given important 
mobile money details.  




Appendix 4.14: At Micro Level: Extracts from Interview Transcript 4 
Assistant Researcher: My name is xx. I live at North Azimio. I know this neighbourhood. My 
colleague here is ZZ. What is your name?  
Bus Driver: Mr. Mbwana ... 
Assistant Researcher: You must be from Tanga. 
Bus Driver: Ah, I am not. I am from Kilwa. Ngido to be specific.  
Assistant Researcher: Many who are called Mbwana are from Tanga, isn’t it?  
Bus Driver: Those coming from Tanga are called Kibwana. 
Assistant Researcher: Kibwana! That it is good to know. Those Mbwanas are all over the 
coast regions! 
Bus Driver: Yes, that’s true.  
Assistant Researcher: There is no Mbwana in the northern part of the country. You find them 
in the coastal regions and maybe Morogoro. 
Bus Driver: Mobile money helps sometimes. They will ask if you have any forms of 
identification before serving you. If you have lost your identity card, it could have some 
challenges. 
Assistant Researcher: That is a good starting point where you outline the challenges. It seems 
like this is one of the difficulties that bothers you a lot. You have remembered it. 
Bus Driver: That is one of the critical challenges. 
Assistance Researcher:  What is your occupation? 
Bus Driver: I am a daladala commuter bus driver. 
Assistant Researcher: Which route? 
Bus Driver: I drive the Tandika-Makumbusho route. It is also known as Temeke. The line is 
also known as Temeke-Makumbusho.  
Assistant Researcher: How is work? 




Researcher: Do you use mobile money services? 
Bus Driver: I use TigoPesa and Airtel Money. I have two lines and use both.  
Assistant Researcher: When did you start using mobile money? 
Bus Driver: I started using TigoPesa a while ago. I also started to use Airtel Money. I lost the 
Airtel phone, and I got it back. 
Assistant Researcher: That happens when you move a lot.  
Bus Driver: Eh! Yes, That’s why I had to get the line back. But I had two different lines. 
Assistant Researcher: How do you use mobile money? Do you send money to your mother 
or children while they are at school? 
Bus Driver: I use it for my expenses. When I need money, I use mobile money services. 
Assistant Researcher: Do you use an agent to get those services?  
Bus Driver: Yes, I do. They charge a small service charge for their services. Although the 
charges are small and fair, they could be expensive for low-income people.  
Assistant Researcher: Do you have a bank account? 
Bus Driver: I do not have one. I have never opened a bank account in my life.  
Assistant Researcher: Why? 
Bus Driver: I am a low-income person, and I do not have much money to keep it in a bank 
account. 
Assistant Researcher: Is it an inconvenience or your low income is an issue? 
Bus Driver: It is not about being inconvenienced due to strict regulations or reserve 
requirements. I get one thousand shillings from my gigs, then, I go home, and my wife is 
waiting for me to provide for the family. She wants our children to have a meal. You save two 
thousand, and from nowhere, a family member is sick. I have to pay for hospital bills and 
medicines. From what I earn, where will I get enough money to save in a bank account? 
Assistant Researcher: So, the reserve requirements are also high. You can’t afford them. 




Assistant Researcher: I see that the costs of running and maintaining that account can be an 
issue here. 
Researcher: Do you want to say that mobile money services have helped bring financial 
services to low-income and financially-excluded people?  
Bus Driver: For low-income people like me, it has helped. The ‘have-nots’ like me, we send 
and receive small amounts of money. If I want two thousand shillings, I can quickly get it from 
my friends via mobile money services. 
Assistant Researcher: I can see in this case, mobile money services have an advantage over 
bank services. When you go to the bank, you cannot open an account with two thousand or five 
thousand shillings. Maybe community banks. 
Bus Driver: With mobile money services, they have managed to reach out to financially-
excluded and low-income people and small businessmen and women. They (the MNOs) have 
started to cater to low-income people to meet their financial needs.  
Assistant Researcher: Yes, they want to reach to as many financially-excluded and low-
income people as soon as they can, and the government should help them. The majority of the 
population in this country are either low-income or financially-excluded people. The average 
and ordinary citizens. Have you met any challenges as a mobile money customer? Any 
challenges with e-wallets? In the past, every wallet was in the pocket of your trousers; now you 
have these electronic wallets.  
Bus Driver: Yes. 
Assistant Driver: What are the challenges? 
Bus Driver: There are not significant challenges there. The e-wallets are fine. I remember 
before them, I was selling plastic bags since a was a kid. I got involved in Rambo plastic bags 
business. One day, I struggled to get on to a commuter daladala bus; they stole my wallet. 
Nobody has stolen my e-wallets.  
Assistant Researcher: A lot of us got robbed like that at one point. You board on a commuter 
daladala bus, then you realise your wallet is not there. Someone has stolen it. You start patting 
yourself everywhere. The wallet is not there. It's gone. Stolen! The bus conductor lets you go 
without paying for the bus ticket as he understands that this happens so often. The good thing 




Researcher: What if a government policy official walks in here and asks you what should the 
government change in terms of mobile money that you think does not work?  
Assistant Researcher: Or whatever needs to improve. 
Bus Driver: I think the agent services could be improved. For instance, when I send 10,000 
shillings the commission and taxes are also charged. So I have to send 11,500 for the receiver 
to receive 10,000. These expenses can be a challenge to those living in villages.  
Researcher: Do you think that the taxes have increased?  
Bus Driver: Here in Dar es Salaam the charges are not an issue. I am not sure about those 
living in the villages. Based on the low-incomes, I assume that any increase in charges affects 
them somehow.  
Researcher: Do you think there are different rates for urban and rural areas? 
Bus Driver: I don't think so. It is just me thinking about the economic activities in these two 
areas and the residents' income levels in these two areas with different development levels. 
Researcher: I think the rates are the same, but the living conditions may not be the same. This 
might make it seem like the agents are an issue while the agents only do their jobs by doing 
precisely what they are required to do.  
Bus Driver: Most of the low-income customers might think that the agents are an issue. Like 
you said, the agents were provided with those rates and they have to charge those rates. Those 
who do not know these politics may blame them while the government could be the one to 
blame. Regardless, these are affordable rates and low-income and financially-excluded people 
afford them even though they would like to pay no taxes. 
Researcher: The taxes and charges are legal. Remember that the agents have to be paid as 
well. So, the little charges from the eyes of the government cover those costs.  
Bus Driver: Those affordable charges have facilitated financial inclusion anyway. 
Researcher: So you can afford the financial services. 
Bus Driver: Yes. I can afford it. I am no longer challenged to access formal financial services 
through mobile money. We are no longer excluded. We send and receive money in a timely 
fashion. This has helped us to meet our financial needs. 




Bus Driver: Terrible! With traffic jams in every corner of this city, that would have been 
terrible! The agents have helped us receive timely financial services. It is a good thing that they 
are everywhere.  
Researcher: This could be like going to a bank, right? 
Bus Driver: Yes. First, you have to deal with the traffic jam before you get to a bank. Second, 
you do not have banks everywhere. Third, you have a long queue waiting there for you before 
you are attended. It is an inconvenience to some of us.  
Researcher: Would you like to see more big loans instead of small loans offered by mobile 
money? 
Bus Driver: Yes. However, you also have to know that not every low-income person is the 
right person. We still have conmen round. They need to find ways to stop these conmen from 
accessing those loans. However, I am aware that a lot of good people get those small loans and 
repay them. So, it is working so far. However, I always think about what if conmen find a way 
to disrupt these arrangements. So far, I have not heard a lot of these cases. Everything seems 
to be okay. 
Researcher: Well, the conmen will always be there. From the MNOs themselves, conmen are 
not a big issue, and these services are safer, which is why over 60% of the population uses 
mobile money. The small loan default issue is a big problem, according to the MNOs 
themselves. The loanee has a registered account, and his/her particulars are known. Tracing 
him and where he/she is isn’t a problem.  
Bus Driver: If you want a small loan, for instance, 500 shillings, you get that quickly. I have 
had 10,000 and 15,000. The more you repay, the more you can get as a loan. It is a sound 
system. We create a credit history by using mobile money services.  
Researcher: What else do you want to be improved? 
Bus Driver: We want them to increase the talking time. The vouchers we think are economical, 
and we want to talk more. Increasing the voucher value will help us have enough time to 
process data and things like that. That is one thing I would like to be improved.   
Researcher: Yes, I have heard that you used to talk a little more with 500 shillings, which has 




Bus Driver: The use of a phone itself needs money. There are service charges and other charges 
we incur when we use financial services. These charges have remained stable for quite 
sometimes. This is good. However, we do not know when will the government change them. 
This new government charges taxes on everything. So, we do not know when they will start 
charging high taxes on mobile money services. They have not done so. However, what if they 
do? 
Researcher: That is a good point. With over 60% of the population using mobile money 
services, charging these people taxes will create revenue to the government. We do not know 
if they will do this as they want to help low-income and financially-excluded people receive 
formal financial services which boost economic activities.  
Bus Driver: Although there are challenges here and there, mobile money services have 
provided us with affordable financial services. We can now save and deposit small amounts. It 
does help because you save a small amount to make it a significant amount. Your savings stay 
there, and you will use that in the future.  
Researcher: Thanks very much for talking to me today. 


















Appendix 6.1 Who are Most Likely to be Financially-Excluded People in Tanzania? 
Some literature suggests that DFSs and other services struggle to reach individuals who do not 
own mobile phones or digital devices (Ozili, 2018; Klapper and Hess, 2016; Lotto, 2018; 
Firchow and Ginty, 2020). People without phones or reliable signals can be excluded from 
using formal financial services as they may not have access to other FSPs, and MM services 
facilitate FI (Hoernig and Bourreau, 2016; Aron, 2015; Gibney et al., 2015; UNCTAD, 2015). 
Another literature asserts that DFSs depends on internet connectivity which may exclude 
individuals who do not have connectivity (Ozili, 2018; Sarma and Pais, 2011). Other scholars 
argue that how MM and DFSs are introduced in a country, whether forced or voluntarily, may 
lead to self- or voluntary exclusion if the financially-excluded people are not ready to use DFSs 
or MM (Ozili, 2018). Other views bring up the issue of digital data security. Through digital 
security, security issues are minimised and any breaches of customer rights are reduced, which  
reduce lack of trust in digital financial services (Ozili, 2018; Kear, 2017). Some have 
experienced unfavourable MM incidents or what may be referred to as “systemic black-swan 
risks” which may have fatal consequences when they occur (Ozili, 2018). Other scholars 
consider unfavourable policies and regulatory environments that discourage the expansion of 
MM and other DFSs (Ozili, 2018; Greenacre, 2018; Ondiege, 2015; Singh and Gutierrez, 2013; 
Tetteh et al., 2020).  
The BOT recognises the role of technology in the use of financial services to help unbanked 
populations receive formal financial services (BOT, 2016). The BOT collects aggregate 
monthly data from the seven MNOs (Vodacom M-Pesa, AirtelMoney, TigoPesa, Zantel 
EzyPesa, HaloPesa, TTCLPesa, and Smart). The data include: the number of transactions, the 
value of transactions (TSh), the number of registered customers, the value of outstanding 
remittances (TSh), the money balance on customer e-wallets (TSh); and several agents. The 
number of registered customers in Tanzania was over 55% in 2017 (see Graph 6.11 in Section 
6.4.1, and Table 5.1 in Section 5.3.4). The number of registered customers can be misleading 
as a customer may have more than one account. This multiple counting can be corrected when 
the MNOs use customers’ IDs to identify their MM accounts. The volume and value of 
transactions in Tanzania increased (see Graph 5.5 in Section 5.3.4). The number of agents has 
also increased in Tanzania (see Graph 5.6 in Section 5.3.4, and Table 7.2 in Section 7.7.2).  
Using the BOT’s data, researchers can disaggregate the number of transactions by gender, age, 
location, income groups, or any other variables as long as the details are made available. 




“… if you are a man, financially stable, have a good education and are relatively older, you then stand 
better chances of being financially included. The results show that, as the level of education increases, the 
individual is more likely to be financially included. The possible reason for this observation may be clearly 
linked with the financial ability of educated individuals to afford holding bank accounts and presenting 
personal guarantees when required by the banks during loan application because the level of education 
goes parallel with the income level. In addition, the results confirm a gender gap informal financial 
inclusion, and this may be due to the factors such as inability of women to show collateral, their poor 
financial education awareness and lower business experience. Second … the factors which affect traditional 
banking services are the same as those affecting mobile banking services (gender, age, income and 
education), and that there is a negative trend and a clear departure of customers’ usage from banking retail 
services to mobile financial services. Although this gap has been narrowed recently, the best option with 
the banking sector is to create more new delivery channels while using mobile financial services as an 
infrastructure to deepen financial access reaching more un-banked population.” 
The FSDT works closely with the BOT to facilitate the availability of these data (FinScope, 
2006; FinScope, 2009; FinScope, 2013a; FinScope, 2013b; FinScope, 2018; Ephraim and 
Mhina, 2019). InterMedia’s and FinScope’s surveys also provide some of these data 
(InterMedia, 2014; InterMedia, 2016; InterMedia, 2018). The number of active users can be 
distinguished from the number of inactive MM users (see Table 5.1 in Section 5.3.4). Likewise, 
the active MM agents can be distinguished from their inactive counterparts (see Graphs 7.2 and 
7.4 in Section 7.7.2). The value of transactions can also be disaggregated to provide the 
different types of transactions such as payments for utility bills, micro-insurance payments, 
MM transfer payments, retail payments to businesses, etc. (also see Graphs 5.3 and 5.7 in 
Section 5.3.4). 
Researchers tend to acknowledge the limited nature of macro-level data for MM when they 
study MM and whether it may cause inflation through the increased velocity of circulation 
caused by MM (Aron, 2017). The monetarist view suggests that the spread of MM increases 
the velocity of circulation, which increases ‘effective money’ and therefore, inflation (Aron, 
2017; Simposa and Gurara, 2012). However, the literature suggests that a link between MM 
innovation and inflation through the velocity of circulations is doubtful to exist (Aron et al., 
2015; Aron, 2017; Kipkemboi and Bahia, 2019; Mawejje and Lakuma, 2019). This finding is 
important because it encourages customers to save and spend to meet their daily needs through 
MM. Hence, there is no evidence that MM in Tanzania triggers inflation that helps to exclude 
low-income or financially-excluded individuals. Moreover, Mawejje and Lakuma (2019) argue 
that MM has moderate positive effects on monetary aggregates, consumer price index, private 




effects for the conduct of monetary policy, and that MM transactional motives have more 
substantial macroeconomic effects than savings motives. 
Mobile phones and MNOs are one of the sources of tax in Tanzania, as explained in Section 
5.5 (also see: GSMA, 2017; and GSMA and Deloitte, 2015). Even though MM users have 
incurred tax expenses, they are still using, although it They would like to see the taxes removed: 
“I use Tigo. TigoPesa helps me. When I want to send money to my village, I do so easily. It has simplified 
these financial services. The government has increased taxation, so they have increased service charges. 
At times, I have to use AirtelMoney services. It helps. AirtelMoney charges seem to be lower” (Fisher – 
Low-Income Respondent). 
The respondent Bus Driver: also echoed these views: 
“I think the agent services could be improved. For instance, when I send 10,000 shillings the 
commission and taxes are also charged. So, I have to send 11,500 for the receiver to received 
10,000. These expenses can be a challenge to those living in villages.”  
There are no statistics available at a macro level to show us how many individuals have been 
excluded from using MM services because of the taxation issues in Tanzania. Lower tax rates 
have had efficient implications. However, charges on the use of MM services (including taxes) 
could make it difficult for some financially-excluded individuals to use MM services. They 
create barriers to affordability (GSMA and Deloitte, 2015:19). According to Ozili (2018), 
digital financial platforms, including MM platforms, could benefit from high and middle-
income individuals at the expense of financially-excluded individuals who cannot absorb any 
related transaction costs. 
Moreover, the trust accounts, also referred to as ‘escrow’ accounts, that are held in banks, as 
explained in Section 6.4.3, have deposits that can be on-lent. Hence, there are possibilities of 
credit creation. MM, in some cases, has brought informal cash into the banking system (Aron, 
2017). According to Aron (2017): 
“The transfer of informal cash will not increase the recorded money supply per se unless the 
source is unrecorded cash, say in another currency. This shift of informal cash into the banking 
sector thus has a zero first-round effect on the money supply; but because banks can lend on in 
a second and further rounds, there is a money multiplier which can expand the money stock. 
The crucial question is, what exactly are the regulations that govern the on-lending of escrow 
accounts? … Initially if the electronic ‘savings’ fluctuate, only a proportion of the escrow 
accounts could be sustainably on-lent; but as the system grows, the escrow balances could 




direct deposit of informal cash in the banking system, since for an escrow account to be 
safeguarded  there must be limits on the degree of extra risk the bank can take on given an 
expansion of its balance sheet of this type.” 
As MNOs continue to keep customer money in trust accounts in commercial banks, some banks 
and MNOs have agreed to provide microloans supported by transaction-based credit ratings 
via MM. Customer credit scores are expected to improve as MM services grow (GSMA, 2014a; 
Aron, 2017; Kipkemboi and Bahia, 2019: 4-6; Aron, 2018; Aron and Muellbauer, 2019). The 
microloans are also expected to evolve in the aggregate to a sizable sum to provide credit to 
small businesses and low-income individuals to ease credit barriers on them which may expand 
the money supply. This will help low-income and financially-excluded individuals who do not 
have collateral to obtain loans in some cases (Aron, 2017). These arrangements started as 
depicted in Sections 7.7.1 and 6.4.3. Yet, there is no creation of money through MM services: 
“mobile money providers were purely creating a transfer system. It is a platform. They don’t issue money because 
a unit is sitting in a bank transfer account for every unit that a customer buys through mobile money. So, there is 
no creation of money. Eh, then it is true that they are not taking deposits. This is clear. They are not doing credit 
business. This was clear. What distinguishes a bank from other institutions is deposit-taking. Per regulations, 
regulations are essential in terms of supervision to manage the risk in relation to the protection of deposit interests. 
That was the main principle. So, those are not taking deposits” (Former BOT Governor). 
As there is no creation of money through MM, some people argue that MM does not include 
the financially excluded in terms of loan provision. However, MNOs and banks have partnered 
in some instances to provide microloans to financially-excluded individuals as demonstrated 
above and in Sections 7.7.1 an 6.4.3. The MNOs offer microloans on behalf of banks. 
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Appendix 6.2: Meso-Level Data and Its Limitations 
Miller and Chatterji (2013) identify the following issues at the meso level: financial 
infrastructure and their supporting services. They argue that several aggregate data at meso 
level explain the difficulty that financially-excluded people have in accessing formal financial 
services. Those who do not have formal jobs and contracts, and do not own properties or land, 
pose difficulties in being accessed or monitored. Sometimes the FSPs do not understand how 
they will manage credit risks. This information asymmetry makes credit assessment difficult 
for financially-excluded individuals. Collateral, any forms of immovable property, expected 
future income and other data, which the poor do not have, are forms of security used by FSPs 
to assess credit risks. These forms of security could pose limitations to ways through which 
DFSs provide credit to financially excluded people. 
Payments as a Platform Model 
GSMA (2019) reports a milestone of over one billion for the number of globally registered 
MM accounts. MM is increasingly integral to the financial ecosystem. As MM grows and starts 
to depend less on service user’s fees, different revenue models have also emerged to facilitate 
MM’s contributions to FI and socioeconomic benefits. They include a shift to the ‘payments 
as a platform’ approach. According to GSMA (2019:21): 
“The ‘payments as a platform’ model represents a five-pillar shift that encompasses both global 
trends and industry needs. It involves lowering barriers for partnerships or creating a more 
accessible environment for third parties and moving away from one-on-one negotiations and 
one-off third-party integrations. It also enables a diversified revenue model supplemented by 
monetization from adjacent services, businesses and governments. All this ultimately unlocks 
more targeted services for individuals, businesses and communities, and creates a more engaged 
user base for providers.” 
As various payment models emerge, regulatory issues also arise. MNOs must have significant 
resources and must take time to not only create strategies to help reach financially-excluded 
individuals but also to create strong agent networks. They must gain customers and should 
educate them to help them use MM services as reaching out to financially-excluded individuals 
is not a guaranteed process. 
Affordable Connectivity, Service Development and ICT Infrastructure 
According to UNCTAD (2019), most financially-excluded individuals live in rural and remote 




financially-excluded people to receive fast, affordable and reliable ICT services, internet and 
MM connection. Some countries have created PPPIs to reinforce national backbone 
infrastructure and increase access to national and international bandwidth. Tanzania has good 
connectivity as MNOs have invested heavily in towers and new technologies. Mobile phones 
can be used anywhere in the country. Most data do not specify areas with connectivity issues. 
We do not know which areas have high rates of FE due to mobile phone connectivity issues. 
What we know is that mobile subscription penetration has increased: 
“The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) estimates that mobile subscription 
penetration was 103 per 100 people in developing economies in 2018 – thought there were 
significant differences by region compared with an average of 128 per 100 people in developed 
countries. In LDCs, penetration surged from 5 mobile subscriptions per 100 in 2005 to 72 in 
2018 … In 2018, the landmark of half (51.2 percent) the global population using internet was 
reached, with 3.9 billion people going online … this represents significant progress towards 
inclusiveness in the digital economy” (UNCTAD, 2019:12-13). 
As far as Tanzania is concerned, and according to GSMA (2016), Tanzania is committed to 
connecting the unconnected, especially those living in rural areas, as it seeks to help them gain 
access to the internet and mobile phone services. Over 17 million individual active mobile 
subscribers were identified in 2016 (BOT, 2017). Tanzania has a population of 50 million 
people, with about 70 percent of the population living in rural areas. Individuals living in rural 
areas are more likely to be financially excluded when compared to their urban counterparts. 
“As population density in rural wards varies significantly, operators have so far been able to 
deploy their 2G networks to up to 85 percent of the population, while 3G network deployment 
is mostly limited to urban areas, resulting in only 35 percent of the population being covered 
and able to access the mobile internet” (GSMA, 2016). 
Data Ownership Policies 
From available data, it is not clear who self-exclude due to risks involving personal data 
management. First, given the strategic importance of personal data, more FSPs buy or share 
their data with other institutions or digital platforms. This problem brings up the issue of who 
controls data and who has access to client data (UNCTAD, 2019; Maina, 2019). Second, 
personal data markets have emerged (Larnier, 2014; UNCTAD, 2019; Arrieta-Ibarra et al., 
2018). Through these markets, institutions can sell or keep the data they have. At times, it is 
ambiguous to predispose who owns or controls personal data. Hence, it raises privacy issues 




may have trust issues over who controls their data and may not use MM services. We do not 
have macro or meso data that specify how many individuals have this issue. The MNOs have 
sought to protect personal data and build customer trust. Some scholars see data as a public 
resource (Turnoff, 2018; UNDP, 2019; Lawrence and Laybourn-Langton, 2018; Singh, 2018; 
and Mazzucato, 2018). There is a need to continue building trust (Hall and Pesenti, 2017, 
UNCTAD, 2019) to clear data trust issues as the expansion of the digital economy is also driven 
by digital data (UNCTAD, 2019). 
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Appendix 6.3: Macro Data Limitations 
To explain the macro data limitations, I will start by distinguishing the macro-level 
perspectives from the micro-level perspectives. The micro-level perspectives deal with 
individual and firm details and their daily interactions. These are views that reckon the elements 
of individual and firm practices which contribute to the investigated issues (also see: Vock et 
al., 2014; Bozzoli and Brück, 2009; Johnson, 2016). When you track an individual’s financial 
difficulties and examine the interaction between that individual and the FIs, you are examining 
micro-level issues. There are empirical studies that explain the determinants of FI through 
micro-economic perspectives to describe the effects of different factors on access to formal 
financial services (Allen et al., 2012; Cámara et al., 2014; Hoyos et al., 2014; Tuesta et al., 
2015). The macro-level perspective, on the other hand, provides a panoramic view of these 
issues (e.g. systems theory of FI, see Ozili (2020:9); Alter et al.,2018; Zachosova et al., 2018; 
Aggarwal and Klapper, 2013; Chakrabarty, 2012; Gabor and Brooks, 2017). It considers 
different smaller micro-level issues. When a researcher realises that FE levels have dwindled 
and that MM facilitates increased levels of FI in Tanzania, and that the government created a 
supportive environment to support the MNOs, the researcher, therefore, takes a macro-level 
perspective. One of the issues with macro-level analyses is that they study issues at the broadest 
level, and therefore tend to be less specific and more philosophical and may also include data 
and statistics (see examples: Jiang et al., 2019; Adil and Jalil, 2020; Arun and Kamath, 2015; 
Abiona and Koppensteiner, 2020). This is one of the macrodata analysis limitations (also see 
Section 6.5). 
Chakrabarty (2012) discusses the measurement challenges at a macro level by reckoning that 
FI concepts, policies, delivery models and implementation processes were new and continue 
to evolve. Hence, FI policies and the macro-level analyses used to evaluate FI’s outcomes will 
continue to change. As policymakers, FSPs and other FI stakeholders continue to adapt to the 
evolving changes; there will always be challenges in terms of how we measure the success of 
FI policies and activities while considering their aggregation across policies, countries, 
activities, and institutions etc.: 
“Statistical analysis performance of financial inclusion initiatives and development of benchmarking 
standards can be quite complex. Second, while existing initiatives in measuring financial inclusion 
initiatives in measuring financial inclusion are commendable, there is a need for greater focus on the micro 
and distributional dimensions. Third, we should explore the need to change the focus of present information 




would call for expanding the scope of the currently used measures of financial inclusion” (Chakrabarty, 
2012). 
Hypothetically, macro-level issues could result from a building up of micro-level problems. 
Moreover, analysing macro-level issues may also require the researcher to use micro-level data 
and statistics, depending on the topics investigated by the researcher. For instance, to 
understand how MM moderated the factors of FE in Tanzania, I also had to take into 
consideration both micro and macro explanations, as demonstrated in this chapter by the 
various respondents. 
To understand the researched issues presented in this dissertation, I understood the limitations 
of macro data, and I sometimes used the micro data to explain the transformation from FE to 
FI in Tanzania. For instance, see data in Section 2.6.1, where FI data by demographics is 
provided. In Section 2.8, I define who is financially-excluded and who is a financially-included 
person. In Section 6.3.3, Graph 6.5a demonstrates a FinScope survey where individuals 
explained how and where they kept their savings in 2006. Most of the financially-excluded 
individuals use MM. Graph 6.5b recorded responses from individuals to demonstrate their 
savings between 2013 and 2017. From these two graphs, it is clear that nobody saved using 
MM in 2006. However, in 2017 about 35% of the population saved using MM. This is one of 
the ways to demonstrate how people on low income are benefiting from MM. Graph 6.6a 
showed the sources people used to borrow money in Tanzania in 2006, and nobody borrowed 
through MM in 2006. However, in 2017 about 4% of the population borrowed through MM. 
This is another way to demonstrate how individuals on low income benefit from MM. When 
individuals were asked when they last used MM services, 64% of the adult population 
responded within the past 30 days, while 82% responded within the past 90 days. This is 
another way to illustrate how individuals on low incomes benefit from MM and how it provides 
them with access to formal financial services. In Section 6.4.3, InterMedia (2016) reported that 
22% of the adult population in 2015 mentioned that MM was their saving channel. In Section 
5.3.4, Strand 5.1 demonstrates that MM had a 60% uptake of formal financial services. All 
these micro data helped build the MM picture at the macro level. The data examined individuals 
and created the macro aggregate behaviour of FIs and individuals or households. These 
aggregate behaviours helped the government and policymakers formulate the NFIFs as 
demonstrated in Section 5.5. The NFIFs were critical at a macro level as they helped 




At times, macro data may not be in a position to tell us who might be excluded. However, the 
researcher uses microdata to build macro data scenarios to explain what might be justified. For 
example, Strand 2.1 in Section 2.6.1 shows that people aged between 16 and 24 years and those 
aged above 65 are likely to be financially excluded. Moreover, females are more likely to be 
excluded financially than their male counterparts. Also, individuals living in rural areas 
experience FE more than those individuals living in urban centres. Those working in informal 
sectors have higher rates of exclusion than those working in formal sectors. There are also other 
datasets from various sources with various microdata that could explain who is likely to be 
excluded (see Sections 4.8.3.1 and 4.8.3.2 of the methodology chapters to find various 
documents that may be used to describe the financially-excluded individuals). 
Also, issues arise when identifying the FI data landscape at macro and meso levels (also see: 
IFC and GPFI, 2011). As FI inclusion research is new, in some cases it lacks the standardisation 
of data collection methodologies and indicators to define research variables. These scenarios 
can make the coordination of data within and across countries very challenging. According to 
IFC and GPFI (2011), data standardisation facilitates compatibility, consistency, and 
transparency of data. It also enhances data quality and availability and therefore minimises 
misinterpretation of data and statistics which helps policymakers to make informed policy 
decisions (also see: Chakrabarty, 2012; Garralda and Tissot, 2016; Loufield et al., 2018). In 
Tanzania, different frameworks for FI data collection and compilation have been created as 
demonstrated by NFIFs and the various documents described in Sections 4.8.3.1 and 4.8.3.2 of 
the methodology chapter (also see: TNCFI, 2014; TNCFI, 2016; TNCFI, 2017a; TNCFI, 
2017b; TNCFI, 2018). Broadly analysed, data collection frameworks are grouped into supply-
side and demand-side data collection tools. The supply-side data consists of data from FSPs 
and regulators through their surveys (also see: TNCFI, 2017b). The demand-side data are 
collected from the users of financial services through households’ and firms’ surveys (also see: 
FinScope, 2006; FinScope, 2009; FinScope, 2013; FinScope, 2018). There are also other 
attempts to compile other data from legislative and other expert surveys (IFC and GPFI, 2011). 
The limitations of gathering these data include high costs of collecting national representative 
data, and less frequency in data collection as FinScope surveys are conducted every three years, 
while InterMedia surveys are conducted every year (FinScope, 2006; FinScope, 2009; 
FinScope, 2013; FinScope, 2018; InterMedia, 2014; InterMedia, 2016; InterMedia, 2017; 
InterMedia, 2018). Data collection frameworks also use the following key data determinants 




of FI including current accounts, customer credit, savings account and insurance), ‘input 
metrics’ (public-sector enablers such as policy and regulations, infrastructure and other 
initiatives), and accepted country macroeconomic descriptors could be used to examine the 
relationship between FI, macroeconomic factors and MM (IFI and GPFI, 2011; Korynski and 
Pytkowska, n.d.).  
There are also data gaps in the FI data landscape at national and international levels (Garralda 
and Tissot, 2016:7-8; Ardic et al., 2012; Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012; Demirguc-Kunt 
et al., 2015; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2018). They involve two categories of data, depending on 
their generic statistical capacity and specific dimensions of FI. The generic statistical capacity 
has limitations and gaps related to how FI statistics get measured, collected and disseminated. 
Some demand-side data may not be available for confidentiality purposes. Moreover, access to 
financial data and measurement are more developed for individuals but less designed for firms. 
Also, data on informal financial providers are not available in some cases, as the informal sector 
data are too hard to collect. Lack of IDs to identify financial service users also slackens the 
reliability of supply-side data on usage. Users, therefore, may sometimes not be identified 
while creating country-level aggregates as lack of financial identity impacts on supply-side 
indicators of use as some users may be counted twice. Tanzania strives to solve these issues by 
offering national identity cards (IFC and GPFI, 2011). 
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Appendix 6.4: Macro-Level Data and its Links to Growth, Inequality and Financial 
Stability 
Macro-Level Data on Growth 
According to Sahay et al. (2015) and Masha (2018), empirical data demonstrates that expanded 
financial services are positively associated with growth and employment. Further empirical 
evidence suggests that affordable transaction costs and sound distribution of risk and capital 
across the economy facilitate the reaching of financially-excluded people, as it allows the 
emergence of new models to enable running of the private sector which enhances a variety of 
development priorities. Moreover, FI enhances government-to-person payments such as 
pension payments, which ameliorate the efficacy of government spending. All this could help 
the inclusion of low-income and financially-excluded people in mainstream financial systems 
(Masha, 2016). Empirical evidence provided by other scholars demonstrates that the positive 
impact on growth is not universal (Rosseau and Wachtel, 2002; Loayza and Ranciere, 2006; 
Ceccheti and Kharroubi, 2012; Masha, 2016). Tanzania has registered positive economic 
growth for more than the past 16 years, and the efforts to increase FI levels have not triggered 
any forms of negative economic growth. 
Macro-Level Data on Inequality 
Credit liberalisation, the term I use for broadened access to financial services, loosens up the 
credit barriers to financially-excluded individuals. They lack collateral, credit history, and 
connections. According to Masha (2016): 
“At the macro level, the impact should, all things being equal, be a reduction in aggregate 
income inequality.”  
Beck et al. (2007) conducted a cross-country study and concluded that about 30% in a variation 
of poverty reduction rates is due to cross-country variation in financial development. Jahan and 
McDonald (2011) also explained inequality using the Gini coefficient. They concluded that 
countries improve at the earliest stages of financial development when bank branch growth and 
private credit are taken into consideration. However, they asserted that inequality reduces 
rapidly when countries reach the intermediate and advanced stages of financial development. 
Clarke et al. (2006) also found evidence associating financial depth with the increasing income 
share of the poorest of the poor across countries between 1960 and 2005. They also found that 




day between the 1980s and 1990s (also see Masha, 2016). In Tanzania, ‘credit liberalisation’ 
has reduced inequality in terms of access to formal financial services whereby most low-
income and poor people can now access MM financial services,   
Macro-Level Data on Financial Stability 
From micro and macro aggregate data, one can analyse the different perspectives of the 
financial system's risks. By analysing the financial institutions’ resolution, profitability, 
supervisory monitoring, macroprudential policy frameworks, instruments and indicators, 
researchers can determine two key dimensions of systemic risks, namely: cross-sectional 
dimension, which includes the distribution of financial risks within the system at a given time; 
and time dimension which provides for how financial fragilities progressively build up over 
time (Jayaram and Tissot, 2015). The NFIF and its micro, meso and macro aggregate data, for 
instance, helps to design, calibrate and implement FI strategies to strengthen the resilience and 
stability of the financial system (also see: TNCFI, 2014; TNCFI, 2018; Jayaram and Tissot, 
2015). 
The advent and spread of MM services, as well as its usage, have several effects on the financial 
system. Sahay et al. (2015) also argue that access to financial services that do not offer credit 
does not generate risks. Most MM services provide non-credit access to financial services and 
do not usually cause systemic financial risks (also see Masha, 2016). According to Kipkemboi 
and Bahia (2019), MM is unlikely to pose any financial instability or risks. It cannot do so 
because most countries require the 100% protection of MM customers. Furthermore, MM is a 
'huge-volume, low-value' payment solution and does not pose any risks to the country's 
financial system (Sahay et al., 2015; Kipkemboi and Bahia, 2019). Moreover, studies from four 
African countries (Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ghana, and Rwanda) demonstrate that the expansion of 
MM played a role in facilitating payments and reducing specific economic and social pressures 
by letting financially-excluded people access formal financial services through MM. The 
studies also suggested that MM does not threaten financial stability because the aggregate MM 
financial services are relatively small compared to the total value of transactions in an 
economy. Hence, it is unlikely that MM disrupts the country's financial systems to trigger 
financial instability (Kipkemboi and Bahia, 2019). For banks, Han and Melecky (2013) 
underline the importance of access to bank deposits to support financial needs during financial 






Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A., and Levine, R. (2007). ‘Finance, Inequality and the Poor’, 
Journal of Economic Growth, 12(1): 27-49. 
Cecchetti, S. and Kharroubi, E. (2012). ‘Reassessing the Impact of Finance on Growth’, 
Working Paper No. 381. Basel: Bank of International Settlements. 
Chakrabarty, K. (2012). Financial Inclusion: Issues in Measurement and Analysis. Also 
Available at: https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Bulletin/PDFs/03SPB101212F.pdf 
Accessed on September 11th, 2020. 
Clarke, G., Xu, L., and Zou, H. (2006). ‘Finance and Inequality: What Do the Data Tell Us?’ 
Southern Economic Journal,72(3): 578-596. 
Han, R. and Melecky, M. (2013). ‘Financial Inclusion for Financial Stability: Access to Bank 
Deposits and the Growth of Deposits in the Global Financial Crisis’, Policy Research 
Working Paper 6577. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
Jahan, S. and McDonald, B. (2011). ‘A Bigger Slice of a Growing Pie’. Finance and 
Development. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Jayaram, K. and Tissot, B. (2015). Combining Micro and Macro Data for Financial Stability 
Analysis: Overview of the IFC Workshop, Warsaw, 14-15 December 2015. Available 
at: Combining micro and macro statistical data for financial stability analysis (bis.org) 
Accessed on December 13th, 2020. 
Kipkemboi, K. and Bahia, K. (2019). The Impact of Mobile Money on Monetary and Financial 
Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. London: GSMA. 
Lawrence, M. and Laybourn-Langton, L. (2018). The Digital Commonwealth: From Private 
Enclosure to Collective Benefit. London: Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Loayza, N. and Ranciere, R. (2006). ‘Financial Development, Financial Fragility, and Growth’, 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 38(4): 1051-1076. 
Masha, I. (2016). Macroeconomic Impact of Mobile Payment Services: A Survey of Research 
Evidence. Available at: https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/2.-
Iyabo-Masha.pdf Accessed on August 25th, 2020. 
Rousseau, P. and Wachtel, P. (2002). ‘Inflation Thresholds and the Finance-Growth Nexus’, 
Journal of International Money and Finance, 21(6): 777-793. 
Sahay, R., Cihak, M., N’Diaye, P., Barajas, A., Mitra, S., Kyobe, A., Mooi, Y., and Yousefi, 
S. (2015). ‘Financial Inclusion: Can It Meet Multiple Macroeconomic Goals?’ IMF 
SN 15/17. Also Available at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2015/sdn1517.pdf Accessed on August 
25th, 2020. 
TNCFI. (2018). National Financial Inclusion Framework – A Public – Private Stakeholder’s 





TNCFI. (2014). National Financial Inclusion Framework – A Public – Private Stakeholder’s 












































































Appendix 8.1 The CLF 
The CLF defines: (i) market structure; (ii) level of competition; (iii) pace of infrastructure and 
expansion; (iv) affordability and range of services available to customers (see: Mfungahema, 
2006; and Section 3.7.3). Quiñones (2015) argues that the CLF seeks to implement clear and 
precise policies and rules that consider innovations, technologies and globalisation issues to 
provide all people with ICTs. The governments designed those rules to apply and develop 
strategies and policies to make economic sectors competitive either through neoliberal rolling-
back or rolling-out initiatives. The rolling-back is when a government refrains from interfering 
and allowing economic sectors to be led by free-market principles. The rolling-out of neoliberal 
policies takes place when independent regulators develop regulations to guide innovation 
across various economic sectors. Gunze (2014) acknowledges the CLF regulatory flexibility in 
addressing market and technological development, while Nkoma (2010) also acknowledges 
the role of the CLF in supporting market entry of various service operators and efficient 
utilisation of network resources. Mfungahema (2006) reckons that all this has been possible 
through service and technological neutrality (also see Section 3.7.2). Thus, the CLF allows 
various service providers to enter and leave the telecommunications market easily (also see: 
van Gorp and Maitland, 2009; Boshe, 2013; Moshiro, n.d.). 
Convergence is the term that has been used to describe digitisation and the capability to alter 
any information, data or content into a dataset that could be stored, processed and disseminated 
digitally (also see: Quandt and Singer, 2009). According to Minehane (2015), there is no 
universally accepted definition of convergence. However, the term describes recent 
technological developments, merger, and acquisition strategies and new service application 
types. Institutions seek to define ‘convergence’ for the legislature and regulatory reform 
(Minehane, 2015). Regulatory convergence was considered necessary for tackling converging 
ICT services across different sectors (Garcia-Murillo, 2005). Technological evolution, as well 
as sectors’ liberalisation, have allowed services to be offered by players outside respective 
sectors or to let them establish inter-sectoral collaborations with other players from the 
different sectors (e.g. MNOs and banks). As convergence continues to evolve, more neoliberal 
rolling-out policies and reforms of the telecommunications sector that cut across other 
economic sectors will be introduced to help regulate innovations and services (Eclles, 2001). 
Digital convergence has benefits to customers and service providers; however, it also has 
created regulatory challenges (Eisenach and Soria, 2016). As the CLF assisted the advent of 




However, policymakers have focused more on reducing regulations to encourage innovations 
which is a neoliberal rolling-back approach. Existing research sees convergence as a means to 
facilitate technological integration or the detachment of regulatory boundaries across sectors 
(Chon et al., 2003). Honskins et al. (1997) also underline the role of convergence in supporting 
various services in different markets.  Agreeing with the reasons we have provided in terms of 
how the CLF fits in with rolling-back neoliberalism, Garcia-Murillo (2005) asserts: 
“… Because of the belief that previous liberalisation efforts were generating intermodal 
competition. Some of these governments believed that they did not need to have such stringent 
regulations. The process that took place to establish a converged regulator also provided an 
opportunity to simplify and eliminate rules. This investigation, thus, shows that the main reason for 
the merger of ICT related regulators was to simplify regulatory procedures, change obsolete laws, 
and provide greater liberties and flexibility to the companies. All of these intended to reduce 
transaction costs, which before the merger were increasing and potentially leading to an uncertain 
and unpredictable environment.”  
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Appendix 8.2: The NPS 
Bossone and Girasino (2001) refer to the payment system as a facility that warrants the 
circulation of money. It involves payment instruments, banking and money transfer procedures 
and inter-bank fund transfers (also see: Masoy, 2017). The NPS is the economy-wide payment 
system or the entire web of payment instruments in an economy (Heinrich, 2003; Sekantsi and 
Lechesa, 2018; Uddin and Akhi, 2014). The NPS, therefore, provides a common platform that 
commercial banks and other financial service providers, including the MNOs and other 
stakeholders, use to facilitate all transaction costs and activities. The NPS provides easy access 
to funds. It also facilitates tax revenue collections as well as eases the flow of money in the 
economy. The NPS also enables FI (Uddin and Akhi, 2014). At the time of my field research 
in Tanzania, negotiations were underway to create a national payment switch that would act as 
a collective electronic payment platform to aid banks, MNOs and their clients to make 
transactions efficiently and cost-effectively. 
MM entered the NPS as a new technology and a platform. The absence of transaction standards 
for MM posed security issues (Hassien et al., 2008; Sekanntsi and Lechesa, 2018; Uddin and 
Akhi, 2014). There was a need for NPS reform and FI to reduce the financial risks posed by 
the new digital and fintech technologies. This required making the NPS more friendly to MM 
as well as enacting transparency and legal requirements in line with global standard-setting 
bodies (as discussed in Chapter 8), such as the CPSS and IOSCO Principles of Financial 
Markets Infrastructures (PFMIs) (also see: Sekantsi and Lechesa, 2018; Linck et al., 2006). 
Firstly, the BOT in 2012 created the MPRs, which acted as guidelines that helped the 
development of MM services. These guidelines include the NPS guidelines for retail payments, 
rules and regulations for retail payments, and the guidelines introducing electronic payments. 
Parkes (2014) argues that the 2012 MPRs established a licensing regime for non-banks, 
including the MNOs as discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.4.4. The MPRs were an example of 
rolling-out neoliberalisation, and it tried to fill the regulatory gaps that emerged as a result of 
the deployment of MM in Tanzania. Secondly, the 2015 NPSA, in conjunction with other 
legislation, empowered the BOT to oversee, inspect, and monitor the payment and settlement 
systems in Tanzania to ensure their safety and efficiency. The BOT introduced additional 
regulations to support the 2015 NPSA. They included the 2015 PSEMRs and the 2015 PSLARs 
(see the following sections where the NPSA issues have been discussed: 2.4.1.1; 2.6.1; 3.6.5; 
3.7.3; 3.8; 5.4.4; 5.4.5; 5.5; 7.6). These new regulations were another example of the neoliberal 




liability for breach of the law. It allowed institutions other than banks and financial institutions, 
such as the MNOs, to operate payment systems in Tanzania. 
Taking an example of the e-wallet that MM uses, it is a digital wallet that allows users to make 
electronic transactions quickly and securely (Uddin and Akhi, 2014). Issues with electronic 
payment systems include authentication which identifies those involved in electronic 
transactions. Authentication mistakes cause issues in payment systems. Hence, digital 
signatures, fingerprints, two-step verification etc. are used to solve authentication issues (Uddin 
and Akhi, 2014; Sekantsi and Lechesa, 2018; Dahlberg et al., 2008). Also, see Sections 5.4.4 
and 7.5. Hence, the NPSA was introduced to resolve these issues. Modern NPSs support 
different payment systems in the country; which enhances payments; fosters financial stability; 
and FI; and provides other economic and financial benefits (Senkatsi and Lechesa, 2018; Uddin 
and Akhi, 2014; Xu, 2000; Zhang, 2006; de Sousa, 2010; Hassien et al., 2008; Delic and 
Vukasinovic, 2006). Providing the solution of integrating banks, application service providers, 
and MNOs also provided end-to-end mobile payment solution to their ordinary users (also see: 
Delic and Vukasinovic, 2006). The NPS works effectively and efficiently when barriers to its 
smooth functioning are removed. 
Literature to discuss the financially-excluded people has broadened, as discussed in Chapters 
2, 5, and 6. It is not surprising that FSPs and payment systems have increasingly been 
dependent on technology. Given that the majority of people in developing countries are 
unbanked and financially-excluded, the use of technology and MM services to reach them is 
justified. This situation has created a blurred line between banking and payment systems (de 
Souza, 2010). MM services that are outside of the conventional banking system, also use the 
NPS to reach financially-excluded individuals. 
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Appendix 8.3: More Details to Help Explain the Theoretical Contributions 
This Appendix briefly mentions a few selected theoretical approaches used to study FI, FE, 
and MM issues Through the understanding of these theoretical approaches, other researchers 
can appreciate the contribution of this Ph.D. research and its classical and neoclassical 
theoretical perspectives. 
Some theorists have considered applying theoretical models to study FI issues (Kabakova and 
Plaksenkov, 2018; Dabla-Noris et al., 2015; Karpowicz, 2014). Salignac et al. (2016) and 
Salignac et al. (2019) provide opportunities for reflection in terms of conceptualising and 
theorising FE and FI. Examining various theoretical positions and conceptualisations, first, 
some researchers take a market position to engage in social exclusion and policy debates 
pointing out issues of FE and FI (Fernández-Olit et al., 2018; Ozili, 2020). Pradeep (2011) 
analyses FE using two theories: ‘the free market model’ and ‘the theory of asymmetric 
information’ (Pradeep, 2011). Pradeep (2011) also acknowledges the following theoretical 
positions to studying FI issues:  ‘the redistributive approach to FI’, ‘the integrationist approach 
to FI’ which ‘hovers around the whole dynamics of the labour markets’, ‘the theory of 
intertwining financial development’, which asserts that ‘economic development and economic 
empowerment of people paves the way for financial development’, and ‘the theory of active 
financial development or supply leading financial development’, which emphasises the role of 
financial institutions in spreading financial development and inclusion. Some researchers 
theorise FI from the beneficiaries angle as they explain the poor, women, economy, and the 
financial systems (also see: Ghosh and Vinod, 2017; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2013b; Swamy, 
2014; Sarma and Pais, 2011; Ozili, 2018; Mehrota and Yetman, 2015). Other researchers use 
policy literature to facilitate the theorisation and conceptualisation of FI (see: Ozili, 2020). 
Likewise, the academic literature may as well focus on the relationship between FI and its 
effects on the economy, including poverty levels and income inequality (Sarma and Pais, 2011; 
Cull et al., 2013; Mehrota and Yetman, 2015. Ozili, 2020; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2013a). This 
literature provides a basis for theorising issues of FI and FE as well.  
Moreover, some researchers study FI and FE issues by using financial geography approaches 
and are known for their efforts to enhance the ‘market exclusion debate’ (Fernández-Olit et al., 
2020). Their theories emerge from geographical perspectives and can investigate financial 
access issues. There are also researchers whose theories are based on financial ecologies and 
who conceptualise FI as a system of interconnected factors. Their frameworks of analysis lay 




al., 2016; Coppock, 2013; Joassart-Marcelli and Stephens, 2010). Some other researchers 
investigate FI issues from the perspectives of social studies of finance looking at social realities 
and how society allocates resources (Fernández-Olit et al., 2020; Kear, 2017; Rogers and Clark, 
2016; Polillo, 2011; Wainwright, 2011). 
Some researchers use financialisation critique theoretical perspectives, and a large number of 
them criticise FI as ‘an imposed requirement to extend financialisation’ (also see: Fernández-
Olit et al., 2020; Sinclair, 2013; Ronald et al., 2017; Figart, 2013; Berry, 2015; Prakhabar, 
2014; Marron, 2013). Some other researchers use economic psychology and financial 
socialisation perspectives to study FI by broadening an understanding of financial knowledge 
and literacy as well as individual behaviours towards FI (Friedline, 2012; Fernández-Olit et al., 
2020). Other researchers use moral perspectives as an approach to studying FI issues, to 
overcome poverty and access issues (Fernández-Olit et al., 2020; Bayulgen, 2013; Gomez-
Barosso and Marban-Flores, 2013; Hudon, 2009). 
In development studies, some theorisations for ICTD research consider the contribution of ICT 
to development where theorising is done by using progressive transformation perspectives 
(Lwoga and Sangeda, 2019; Avgerou, 2010). The capability approach is used in some other 
cases to illustrate the contribution of ICT to development (Lwoga and Sangeda, 2019; Hatakka 
and De, 2011; Kleine, 2010). Schwartz et al. (2010) supports a capability perspective and uses 
it to study poverty alleviation through SMEs in South Africa. His framework provides insights 
on how to alleviate poverty through stakeholders and ICTs in the same SME environment.  
In terms of neoliberalism and the financial system, Major (2012) theorises about the new global 
financial architecture to investigate the second face of neoliberalism which included financial 
markets re-regulation. His research focused on the role of central banks in overseeing the 
functioning of financial markets. Building on neoliberal perspectives, Bernado (2019) analysed 
financial technologies as a means of enabling FI. He interlinked what he called ‘neoliberal 
reason’ discussion with the diffusion of market institutions to explain the re-engineering of 
financial markets to promote the development of financial markets for the poor in developing 
countries. Neoliberals would argue that the government’s interventions prevent development 
and free-market progress (Kotz, 2000; Tambi, 2016; Harvey, 2005; Ives, 2015). Neoliberal 
policies sought to remove obstacles holding back free markets and trade, which blocked 
development in their views. The IMF and World Bank agreed on imposing policies referred to 




between the 1980s and 2000s (Rodrik, 2006; Williamson, 2003; Williamson, 1989). Other 
researchers providing essential neoliberal theoretical perspectives include Cahill et al. (2012), 
Peck et al. (2012), and Edwards et al. (2012). Also see Chapters 1, 2, and 3. Those who 
advocate classical and neoclassical theories include Fogelberg and Kulkarni (2006), Hurwitz 
and Manne (2018), Pennington (2011), Thweatt (1988), Kotz (2000), and O’Brien (2004). Also 
see Chapters 1, 2, and 3. 
Mader (2017) also acknowledges ‘new theories of change’ which outline the benefits that those 
who engage with finance get. Alampay and Moshi (2018) also use theories of change to study 
the impact of MFSs in low- and lower-middle-income countries. Moreover, Nan et al. (2020) 
identified theoretical gaps by examining MM literature reviews and concluded that MM and 
its impact on socio-economic development are under-theorised (also see: Markus and Nan, 
2020). Furthermore, Peruta (2018) uses a macroeconomic approach to the adoption of MM in 
2011 and 2014 based on the alternative strategy of cluster analysis. Neoliberal theorising also 
tends to depend on the implemented reforms and policies. 
At the macro level, FI is a prioritised development policy issue (World Bank, 2014:xi; 
Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2014:3-4; Barclays, 2013:9). Some scholars studied per capita GDP, and 
their empirical analyses suggest that income, as measured by per capita GDP, is one of the 
many vital factors that may explain the level of FI in a country (Norris et al., 2015). Also, at 
the macro level, some other scholars have tried empirical approaches to studying FI and 
growth. Their main goal was to establish a relationship between long-run growth and FI. 
However, this relationship has been hard to prove because of the lack of a sufficiently long-
term series of FI data (also see: Sahay et al., 2015:26). Also, some other scholars have tried to 
study FI by looking at financial stability regressions and economic volatility (Sahay et al., 
2015: 29-30). 
At the micro level, the failures of the financial markets and how they affect the different 
segments of the population have been investigated. At the micro level, factors that affect FI 
can also be classified into demand-side and supply-side factors. These factors determine 
individual decisions when it comes to financial products and services that people have access 
to. As far as the demand-side is concerned, such information as income, education, gender, and 
age can be relevant in determining who has access to formal financial services. Likewise, 
behaviour traits and how people perceive financing could also be important in determining 




micro-level analysis is in line with neoclassical economic views in the sense that such views 
are built upon the assumption that people have rational preferences and make the best decisions 
to support their demands. They also maximise utility while firms maximise profits. Likewise, 
neoclassical economists argue that people make decisions based on what they know or based 
on the relevant information they have (Wentraub, 2007). 
Micro-level theoretical perspectives have sometimes applied the theory of supply leading 
financial development to study FI (Kumar, 2014; Fischer, n.d.; Joy et al., 2011; Nielsen, 2014). 
Other researchers have used the theory of demand following financial development (Kumar, 
2014; Fischer, n.d.; Joy et al., 2014; Nielsen, 2014). 
According to Levitas (2006a), there are two widely recognised sociological approaches to 
studying FI, namely: ‘integrationist’ and ‘redistributive’. The integrationist approach considers 
the labour market’s ability to resolve FE issues as far as it provides people with paid jobs 
helping them to generate their own income. This is the first step towards FI because when 
people have access to adequate income, they tend to demand financial products and services 
that meet their needs (Levitas, 2006b: 136-137 and 147-148; Kumar, 2014:64). Likewise, the 
‘redistributionist’ approach assumes that lack of endowments to facilitate participation in the 
daily life of society is the main cause of exclusion. Therefore, the distribution of resources in 
such a way that the poor and the underprivileged people get their share appears to be the 
solution to wipe out any forms of exclusion (see: Kumar, 2014; Hashem and El-Sháer, 
2015:415-416). 
Other researchers have employed theoretical perspectives based on a market systems approach 
to studying FI. These theoretical perspectives view the market system as key to the delivery 
and use of financial services. At the centre of the market system, the poor and low-income 
people are consumers of financial services and interact with providers to access and use 
financial services. In some places, the lack of institutional capacity to deliver financial services 
creates a significant bottleneck of access to finance for the poor. Hence, multiple market 
functions (backing functions, rules, and norms) are to reinforce the core exchange between 
supply and demand (also see: DFID, 2005; DFID/SDC, 2009a; and DFID/SDC, 2009b). 
Other researchers have used theoretical perspectives based on the financial landscape approach 
as a way of studying FI (Bouman and Hospes, 1994; Helms, 2006; Claessens et al., 2002). The 
landscape metaphor depicts what makes the financial landscape. Whereas the physical 




regions, deserts and muddy swamps”, the financial landscape is made up of a totality of 
institutions and social processes (Benda-Beckmann, 1992; as quoted by Bouman and Hospes, 
1994:1-1). Other scholars employed the assemblage theoretical perspective to studying FI 
(Kuriakose and Iyer, 2014; Schwittay, 2011; Collier and Ong, 2005). 
The assemblage theory is derived from Deleuze’s metaphor theory. The assemblage idea 
asserts that in the social world, a uniform occurrence of events does not occur, and therefore 
there is no fixed ontology of the social events. For instance, scientific objects are made up of 
molecules, and molecules are made up of atoms, and atoms consist of electrons and a nucleus. 
Hence, the process of creating scientific objects follows this fixed process and ontology. The 
social world is made up of social objects. Thus, the assemblage theory suggests a different set 
of metaphors for the second world. In this regard, other metaphors can be used to study FI as 
one of the social world’s issues (see: Delanda, 2006 and Delanda, 2016). FI is, therefore, a 
global assemblage as it involves the decontextualisation and recontextualisation of things that 
help to enhance the discourse of FI. The rationalities of “calculations, the political knowledge, 
and practices of implementation” are what constitutes FI assemblage. Hence, these rationalities 
may be used to enhance FI (Inda, 2005:2; Rankin, 2008; Miller, 2008; and Schwittay, 2011). 
This Ph.D. study draws on the classical and neoclassical perspectives’ framework to assess the 
roll-back and roll-out issues that facilitate the growth of MM which in turn aid the transition 
from high levels of FE to increasing levels of FI in Tanzania. The other theoretical perspectives 
used by other MM, FI, and FE researchers, as described in this section, were not used to link 
the issues as mentioned above, to study them together. The theoretical framework I used, as 
described in Chapters 1 and 3, facilitated a detailed selective examination of issues that link 
neoliberalism, MM and the transition from FE to FI. The use of the theoretical framework 
allowed the study to be set in the political and economic contexts of MM and the transition 
from FE and FI in Tanzania. It also helped to provide a broader perspective on the issue of roll-
back and roll-out neoliberal policies (the framework draws heavily on neoliberal, classical and 
neoclassical literature and can explain issues of MM, FI, and FE as demonstrated throughout 
the dissertation). Classical and neoclassical perspectives have been used to study neoliberalism, 
FE, and FI, and less used to study MM. There was a plethora of theories, theoretical 
perspectives or approaches I could use to explore MM and the issues of FE and FI, as 
demonstrated in this section. They include: open systems theory, contingency theory, the theory 
of change, intermediation theory, demand-side and supply-side theories etc. It turned out that 




theoretical approaches and frameworks tend to shy away from political-economic solutions or 
explanations of MM and the transition from FE to FI in Tanzania. Some researchers such as 
Tyce (2019) acknowledged that researchers find it hard to explain the role of neoliberalism in 
facilitating FI. By using my theoretical framework, I am raising awareness of classical and 
neoclassical perspectives and how they inform neoliberal roll-back and roll-out policies in 
facilitating the transformation from FE to FI. I have provided a framework to help researchers 
theorise the MM successes in a neoliberal era and how FI could be explained using neoliberal 
policies and MM. The transformations caused by MM are hard to ignore in GPE; my theoretical 
framework and perspectives provide an excellent start to engage with these issues. 
Considering all of the theoretical perspectives discussed in this Appendix and in Sections 8.7.1 
and 8.7.2, it is clear that my theoretical perspective as explained in Sections 1.4 and 3.4 and as 
applied to build and support the arguments presented in this dissertation, is unique. It has 
contributed to the understanding of FE and FI through MM as supported by classical and 
neoclassical perspectives to explain the rolling-back and rolling-out of neoliberal policies that 
aided the growth of MM and therefore facilitated the moderation of some factors of FE in 
fostering increasing levels of FI in Tanzania. See some more details in Chapter 3. The classical 
and neoclassical perspectives have revitalised the two essential and often forgotten theories 
that could be used to understand MM services and policies facilitating MM success and 
eradication of FE to increase FI in developing countries like Tanzania. The biased use of 
neoclassical perspectives to drive MM research through market approaches often forgets the 
role of classical views in facilitating MM operations and increasing FI levels. This research not 
only brought back the classical perspectives into the discussions on MM, FI, FE, and neoliberal 
policies, but it also uses both classical and neoclassical theories to enhance the academic 
knowledge around MM issues, FI and FE realities. This study explored how the liberalisation 
(rolling-back/deregulation) of both the financial and telecommunications sectors facilitated the 
advent and survival of MM in Tanzania. It also explored the re-regulation (rolling-out) phase 
that facilitated MM growth and FI through the NPSA and other regulations and policies. This 
study found that neoliberal transformations have influenced the advent and development of 
MM on the one hand, and the moderation of some factors of FE, and increasing levels of FI, 
on the other hand in Tanzania. As a result, those who believe that neoliberalism has done 
nothing to support FI, now have to rethink their positions, especially by considering inclusive 
neoliberal factors. We may differ in how we agree on to what extent the neoliberal policies 




has facilitated the conditions that supported MM and that this support raised FI in Tanzania 
(also see: TNCFI, 2014; TNCFI, 2018; FinScope, 2018). 
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